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David Getches, who succumbed to pancreatic cancer on July 5 at the
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Educated at Occidental College and the University of Southern California School of Law, David practiced law in California and was codirecting attorney for California Indian Legal Services. In 1970, he came
to Boulder to be the founding executive director of the Native American
Rights Fund. There his compassion and commitment led to a remarkable
lifetime impact on the development of American Indian Law. The National Congress of American Indians posthumously awarded David its
Lifetime Achievement Award, noting that "Your piercing intelligence,
diligent work and compassion for the Native cause brought hope and
justice to Indian communities nationwide. We thank you and lift you up
in our hearts."
In 1979 David joined the faculty of the University of Colorado
School of Law. During more than thirty years of teaching and research,
he wrote several widely acclaimed books and numerous articles on Indian
law, water law, and the management of natural resources. His foresight
and perception of the issues were applauded by a generation of scholars
and practicing attorneys, along with the hundreds of law students to

whom he communicated his unfailing enthusiasm for the law. He grasped
the changing environment for land and water in the American West and
was a leader in the establishment of the Natural Resources Law Center,
created to examine these issues in depth.
Forever committed to public service, David served from 1983 to 1987
as Executive Director of the Colorado Department of Natural Resources
under Governor Richard D. Lamm. The challenges of that position - at a
focal point of natural resources administration in the West - sharpened
the common-sense approach to wise resources management for which he
was much respected.
David Getches was appointed Dean of the University of Colorado
School of Law in 2003, a time of unusual challenge. The School's plans
for a much-needed new building had been sidelined because of a sluggish
economy and reduced state revenues. Undeterred by the obstacles, David
welded together the support of the faculty, students and alumni, fashioned an ambitious fundraising campaign, and brought the new Wolf Law
Building through to completion. In addition to its design and environmental merits, the facility is a testimonial to David's tireless efforts and
intense personal commitment.
After eight years of successful leadership, David stepped down as
Dean on June 30 of this year, looking forward, as he said, to returning to
teaching and writing. Sadly, it was not to be.
The milestones of David Getches' distinguished career mark him as
an intellectual visionary in the development of Indian law and water law.
To those of us who had the joy of knowing and working with him, he was
far more. He was a dear friend, mentor, leader, advisor, and delightful
companion. He was a man of many interests who passionately lived a full
life, filled with compassion. As his close friend and colleague, Professor
Charles Wilkinson, noted of David at the time of his passing, "We will
not see his kind again."
James N. Corbridge,Jr.
Professor of Law and
ChancellorEmeritus
University of Colorado Boulder

EDITOR'S NOTE

I

There is a postcard tacked to a bulletin board in the \Vater Law Review's offices at the University of Denver. It depicts two ranchers holding
shovels and engaged in mock battle with one another and into the distance runs an irrigation ditch. The caption under the photo says, "Discussing Water Rights, A Western Pastime". \Vhen I first started working
at the Review I noticed the postcard and thought to myself that this must
be a depiction of a time long since past. Of course, through my time in
law school I've learned that this may not be such an inaccurate depiction
for present clay disputes over water holdings. I've heard several stories
from practitioners of town meetings turned suddenly heated when the
topic of water comes up, and of ranchers and fanners who awake in the
morning to find their headgates mysteriously dislodged from irrigation
ditches and settled directly in their driveway.
As the Water Law Review enters its 15'" year of publication, we hope
to be a conduit of useful information to students, academics, and practitioners who have decided to pursue an interest in the sometimes contentious world of water law. At the Revie,v, we believe that it is the professionals who choose to work in this area that keeps the light-hearted postcard from becoming modern-day reality. It is with that in mind that we
would like to present you with a practitioner-oriented issue of the \Vater
Law Review for your enjoyment and hopefully, use.
First, we have a trio of articles written by Johanna Hamburger, Dean
Waters Price, and Suzanne Lieberman on Colorado Ri,·er water transfers
in three different Colorado River Basin states - Utah, Colorado, and Arizona. As .Jennifer Pitt of the Environmental Defense Fund points out in
her introduction to the articles, each of the articles strives to answer two
questions: who can transfer Colorado River water and who can block a
transfer? This information should prove invaluable to any individual
involved with or interested in the Colorado River as the available supply
of water throughout the Colorado River Basin continues to be stretched
to its maximum possible allocation.
Next, Luke Harris and Christopher Sanchez, Colorado water engineers, provide an in-depth look at groundwater modeling for courtroom
settings from the perspective of the engineer. The article details the process undertaken by water engineers in completing a technical analysis and
then responding to questioning of the analysis during a court proceeding.
Finally, we are proud to publish Pas/judgment "Water Interest": Lilting the Headgate to Let Appropriate Compensation Flow for Unlawful
Diversions, by Jeffrey Matson. The article details the United States District Court for the District of Nevada's decision in United States v. Bell
where the court awarded postjuclgment "water interest" on the outstanding balance of water due to the Pyramid Lake ·Paiute Tribe for the
Truckee-Carson Irrigation District's diversions in excess of federal law.
The article explores historical principles controlling an award of interest,

the water recoupment scheme, and l;nited States Supreme Court precedent in analyzing the District Court's decision.
In addition to these wonderful articles we haYe, as always, an array of
court reports, case notes, book reYie\\·s and conference notes written by
the 1Vater Law Ren·ew Staff. Thank you for your continued patronage of
the ReYiew and happy reading!

Jl1att Brodahl

SYMPOSIUM EDITOR'S NOTE
I am pleased to announce that on April 13, 2012, the \Vater Law Review will host its 5th Annual H~1ter Law Ren"ew Symposium. We've titled this year's topic 2012: The Yearoll¥ate1: The symposium will ofTer
6 CLE credits (1 ethics credit) and will include lunch. The Downtown
De1wer office of Holland & Hart will host the Symposium. All are welcome!
The title for this year's symposium was chosen to help coordinate our
efforts with a program (of the same name) implemented by the Colorado
Water Congress. The purpose behind the CWC's program is to educate
the population of Colorado on the importance of water in our everyday
lives. Similarly, we have invited a number of speakers, primarily attorneys, who will be touching on the importance of water to their individual
areas of practice and how water issues impact the legal realm. Our goal is
to present a variety of presentations, from both water practitioners as well
as non-water specific practitioners, on what water means and will continue to mean in Colorado in the near-term.
Assistant Secretary of Water and Science for the U.S. Department of
Interior Anne Castle will be the keynote speaker. We are honored that
she has agreed to share with us her experience and knowledge of current
water law matters.
vVe have many other top-quality speakers lined up, and they will discuss topics ranging from water rights and energy law to a panel on the
recent Colorado Supreme Court decision in Burlington Ditch Reservoir
& Land Co. v. lvfetro lVastewater Reclamation District. Our website will
have the full speaker list and registration information. Please visit:
http:/hvww .law. d u. ed u/index. ph p/university-of-denver-water-law-review/.

Justine Shepherd
Spnposium Editor
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A DETAILED ANALYSIS OF THE WATER
TRANSFERS FRAMEWORK IN THREE
COLORADO RIVER BASIN STATES
INTRODUCTION: THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR WATER
TRANSFERS IN THE COLORADO RIVER BASIN WILL BE
IMPORTANT
JENNIFER PITT
.........................
I. The Age of Limits
II. Meeting New Demands in the Age of Limits..................

.......... 3
4

One need only look at the dry Colorado River delta, where flows in
the last decade have been intermittent at best, to know that the Colorado
River is fully tapped. While legal rights to additional uses of Colorado
River water may yet be granted, water users seeking new or increased
supply will increasingly look to water transfers, the mechanism by which,
in the context of water markets, voluntary and compensated transactions
allow for the temporary lease or permanent sale of water. Water users
will pursue these transfers either to increase water use or firm the use of
existing supplies that are vulnerable to shortage. To stakeholders and
decision-makers, understanding how transfers will work is critical to
understanding the future of Colorado River management.
The three papers that follow, reviewing the framework for water
transfers in Arizona, Colorado, and Utah, address two questions: who
can transfer Colorado River water and who can block a transfer? The
answers should be of interest to anyone wishing to learn more about the
future of water use in the Colorado River basin, and in particular to:
* existing water users who need to know if they will be able to transfer
their rights or whether their rights will be protected if another water
rights holder wants to transfer;
* entities seeking water who need to know if they will be able to lease
or buy water, the potential obstacles, and the transaction costs;
* state and federal decision-makers who have an interest in whether the
existing legal and policy framework is adequate to protect existing users and third party beneficiaries, and the extent to which the existing
1
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legal and policy framework allows transfers that could meet new demands; and
* state parties, including those whose revenues depend on existing water uses, and those, such as environmental, recreational and community stakeholders, who have an interest in how water transfers will
shape where and how water is used in the basin.

I. THE AGE OF LIMITS
The Colorado River, for eons, has been a lifeline for an arid land, the
major watershed in the driest region of the United States. Over the past
century, aided by federal subsidies, we have built a thriving society in the
American West that depends on the Colorado's water. Our predecessors
faced monumental challenges in taming the Colorado's floods, harnessing
its power, and delivering its waters to the farms and cities they built. The
region's thriving communities and economies are testament to their success. Today we face a different monumental challenge: how do we grow
now that we have so completely developed this river that our use of water
exceeds the supply? Figure 1, developed by the Bureau of Reclamation,
25

20

S15

I2

e4

-10-YEAR RUNNING
AVERAGE
BASINWATERUSE
RUNNING
AVERAGE
BASINWATERSUPPLY
10-YEAR
0

Calendar Year

Figure 1. Colorado River Basin Historical Supply and Use (Source: U.S.
Bureau of Reclamation, Colorado River Basin Water Supply and Demand
Study: A Proposal Submitted for Consideration under the Basin Study Proat
Online
9.
Page
2009.
June
gram,
http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/programs/crbstudv/CRBasinStudy.pdf)
plainly illustrates the predicament, as the line depicting our increasing use
of water over the twentieth century has indisputably crossed the line
which depicts the river's supply of water. This is nowhere more evident
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than the Colorado River Delta, where the United States and Mexico meet
across the Colorado's dry channel, and is increasingly evident in the declining volume of water remaining in storage at Lakes Powell and Mead.'
The age of limits hit the Lower Basin about ten years ago as Arizona
began using its full apportionment and California was cut back to its apportionment with the "4.4 plan." In the Upper Basin parties are beginning to grapple with the idea of limits, as new Colorado River pipelines to
serve growing urban populations are proposed, and regulators assess the
remaining water supply available.! Moreover, the projected impacts of
climate change on the Colorado River are the subject of much study and
understood with increasing specificity. The federal government's first
basin-specific projection foresees a decline of 8.5% in water supply by
mid-century.'

II. MEETING NEW DEMANDS IN THE AGE OF LIMITS
Many water governance organizations in the Basin have weighed in
on the response to the age of limits. The seven states that share the Basin in the U.S. collaborated to study "augmentation" options including
everything from desalination to river basin imports and water imports
using ocean routes, but did not assess water transfers.' A broader study
of responses that includes water transfers is expected in the results of the
Colorado River Basin Water Supply and Demand Study now in progress
by the federal and seven Basin State governments. This Basin Study will
identify and assess a broad range of structural and non-structural options
and strategies.'
The Western Governors have recognized. that "water continues to
move from farms to cities."' A review of water transfers in the Colorado
River Basin found more than 3000 water transactions of more than 23

see
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Lake
at
storage
in
water
view
of
a
1. For
and
http://vww.usbr.gov/uc/water/rsvrs/ops/monthly-sunmaries/index.htil
http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/g4000/lakemead_1ine.pdf.
2. See Study Plans for Lake Powell Pipeline in consideration by FERC - docket P12966-001, also see Colorado Water Conservation Board, 2010. Colorado River Water
Availability Study, Phase 1 Draft Report, available at http://cwcb.state.co.us/technicalresources/colorado-river-wateravailabilitystudy/Documents/CRWAS I TaskI OPhase 1ReportDraft.pdf.
3. Reclamation, 2011.
SECURE Water Act Section 9503(c) - Reclamation Climate Change and Water.
http://www.usbr.gov/climate/SECURE/docs/SECUREWaterReport.pdf.
4. The Seven Colorado River Basin States, 2007. Study of Long-Term Augmentation
Available at
Options for the Water Supply of the Colorado River System.
http://waterplan.state.wy.us/BAG/green/briefbook/FinalAugmentation Study.pdf.
5. Reclamation, 2011. Colorado River Basin Water Supply and Demand Study, Interim
at
Available
1-2.
Appendix
at
Report
1,
Status
No.
Report
http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/programs/crbstudy/Reportl/StatusRpt.pdf.
6. Western Governors' Association, 2006. Water Needs and Strategies for a Sustainable
Future, p. 4. Available at http://www.westgov.org/wga/publicat/Water06.pdf.
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million acre-feet in the past 20 years.' Eleven percent of the volume
transacted was in permanent sales and 85% of the volume was in leases
that for the most part are for fewer than 10 years."
It is this reality, that water transfers do occur and likely will occur
with increased frequency in the age of limits, that points to the importance of understanding the applicable legal and policy framework, and
underscores the importance of the three papers published in this volume
of the Water Law Review. From the perspective of any Colorado River
stakeholder, not least those working to protect and restore healthy river
flows, it is critical to think through where transfers may occur, how such
transfers might affect both instream and off-stream environmental values,
and how those impacts compare to the impacts of alternative water supply
,projects such as new dams and diversions, desalination plants, and basin
imports.
Complex, diverse, and multi-layered laws, as well as regulations and
contract terms all play a role in governing how water transfers may or may
not be transacted. Short of the basic premise that a transfer may not injure another water right, a principal that appears in various forms in state
water law, there do not appear to be uniform criteria against which transfers are assessed. Each state in the Colorado River Basin has law that
governs transfers, and some transfers are controlled by federal contracts
as well. In most cases irrigation and water conservancy districts must
approve water transfers in their jurisdictions or even in related jurisdictions, and their charters and bylaws control who sits on these boards and
thus who is represented in the decisions they make.
By asking "who can transfer water" and "who can block a water transfer and on what premises" it is possible to define the contours of the regulatory framework in which transfers take place.

7. Pritchett, James, 2011. "Quantification Task: A Description of Agriculture Production and Water Transfers in the Colorado River Basin" Special Report No. 21. of the Water
at
Available
University.
State
at
Colorado
Institute
Resources
http://www.cwi.colostate.edu/publications/sr/21.pdf at 17.
8. Id. at 18.
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INTRODUCTION
Transferring water rights from one Arizona irrigation district to another is an inherently complex undertaking. Arizona irrigation districts
seeking to perform out-of-district transfers of water rights from the mainstream Colorado River face multiple barriers. An analysis of these barriers breaks into two questions: (1) who, or what entity, has the authority to
transfer water out of an Arizona irrigation district; and (2) who, or what
entity, can stop a transfer of water out of a district. The abbreviated answers in Arizona are (1) only the irrigation district board has the authority
to transfer a water right for use on lands within its district to outside land'
and (2) any irrigation district, agricultural improvement district, or water
users association ("WUA") in the same drainage may stop such a transfer.' Additionally, any interested person may file an objection with the
Arizona Department of Water Resources ("ADWR"); although the decision to hold a hearing on the matter is solely within the agency's discretion.
In order to more fully grasp the intricacies of mainstream water ownership and determine who can likely make or stop an out-of-district transfer, it is necessary to further analyze the legal structure and socio-political
issues that govern agricultural water in the lower Colorado River Basin.
As a starting point, all mainstream water used in the lower Colorado
River Basin is federal project water; meaning the government has stored
and dammed the water in federal storage projects and allocated it to
states, state entities, and individual users.' The government allocates project water in one of two ways: by decree, which the Supreme Court defined in Arizona v. Californiain 1964;' or by contract with the Bureau of
Reclamation (hereinafter "Bureau").'
Additionally, under state authority' Arizona irrigation districts are
municipal corporations that link the water from federal projects to individual landowners for agricultural use.' Accordingly, they are subject to a
medley of authorities: federal compact, reclamation, state laws, and irrigation district rules.
Questions remain regarding how to separate ownership rights of reclamation water, what use limitations exist, and which laws control in
which situations. To a great extent, the uncertainty about these issues
stems from the unique social and political history surrounding the control

1. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
2.
Id. § 45-172(A)(5).

§ 45-172(A)(4)

(2011).

3. Id. § 45-172(A)(7); §§ 45-102 to -103.
4. Boulder Canyon Project Act, ch. 42, § 5, 45 Stat. 1057, 1060 (1928) (codified at
43 U.S.C. § 617 (2011)); See Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 589 (1963).
5. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. at 589-90.
6. Boulder Canyon Project Act § 5.
7.

ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN.

§

48-2901 (2011).

8. See Boulder Canyon Project Act § 5; See also Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. at
585-86.
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of water within the Colorado River Basin.' As the contemporary sociopolitical landscape of the basin changes rapidly, the law surrounding water use changes at a slower rate." Today's water laws are entrenched in
the history and policy of the past, such that contemporary notions of conservation, higher needs of water use, and better use are not the building
blocks of legal doctrines." Rather, distinct problems and interests of
grand scale are now testing a body of law that centers around notions of
prior appropriation, reclamation, and values of local custom and serving
the family farm."
This article highlights the legal structures that regulate agricultural water from the Colorado River mainstream in Arizona and explores the
historic and social context surrounding these laws. Part one provides an
overview of the individual irrigation districts that rely on mainstream water. Part two begins with a brief discussion of the history of irrigation
districts and the Bureau, and then provides a summary of Arizona statutes regulating the formation of irrigation districts. Part three considers
issues surrounding ownership of federal project water, followed by a discussion on the limitations at the federal, state, and district level of mainstream water transfer from Arizona irrigation districts.

I. DISTRICT SPECIFICS
This section analyzes the seven irrigation districts that hold rights to
mainstream Colorado River Water, and also the Yuma County Water
Users Association. The seven irrigation districts are: (1) Unit B Irrigation
& Drainage District, (2) North Gila Valley Irrigation District, (3) Yuma
Irrigation District, (4) Yuma Mesa Irrigation and Drainage District, (5)
Wellton-Mohawk Irrigation and Drainage District, (6) Mohave Valley
Irrigation and Drainage District, and (7) Cibola Valley Irrigation and
Drainage District." This analysis does not consider irrigation districts
supplied by the Central Arizona Project. No other irrigation districts
holding mainstream water rights exist in Arizona. This section provides a
brief summary of each entity, including its priorities and the volume of its
entitlement and/or decreed right.
9.
See, e.g., NORRIS HUNDLEY, JR., WATER AND THE WEST: THE COLORADO RIVER
COMPACT AND THE POLITICS OF WATER IN THE AMERICAN WEST x - xv (2d ed. 2009)

(providing a brief discussion on the conflicts of federal, state, and local customs in the
development of the basin).
10. See Id. at 307-08, 352.
11. Hamilton Candee, The Broken Promise of Reclamation Reform, 40 HASTINGS
LJ. 657, 657 (1989).
12. Reclamation Act of 1902, ch. 1093, 32 Stat. 388 (1902) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 43 U.S.C. SS 371-498 (2006)); HUNDLEY, supra note 9, at 64; Reed
D. Benson, Whose Water is It? Private Rights and Public Authority over Reclamation
Project Water, 16 VA. ENVTL. LJ. 363, 365-66 (1997).
13. Lower Colorado River Water Delivery Contracts Questions and Answers,
BUREAU

OF

RECLAMATION:

LOWER

http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/g4000/contracts/wateruse.html
[hereinafter Questions and Answers].

COLO.

REGION,

(last updated March 2005)
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In the event of a water shortage, six grades of priority determine reductions to user rights. First priority rights, or present perfected rights
("PPR"), maintain their specific priorities of mainstream water respective
to their date of establishment." Second priority rights, or secretarial reservations, are water rights the Secretary of the Interior (Secretary) creates
under federal law for federal use, such as rights reserved for National
Wildlife Refuges and other public lands." Arizona irrigation districts do
not maintain second priority water." Third priority rights, or contracted
entitlements executed on or before September 30, 1968, have co-equal
status with second priority rights." Rights established after September 30,
1968 have fourth priority." In a time of shortage, holders of fourth priority rights must bear reductions proportionate to their contracted amount."
Entitlements to other unused entitlements or apportionments of water
have fifth priority." Fifth priority holders may not use water until the
Bureau determines it is available and provides written notice." The Bureau has discretion to determine the amount a fifth priority holder may
use either by consultation with the ADWR or by date of contract." Surplus water entitlements have sixth priority." In proportioning sixth priority water, the Bureau follows the same rules that apply to fifth priority, but
need not consult with the ADWR in its discretionary decisions."
The following list also includes individuals who hold rights to mainstream water near five thousand acre feet ("af") or greater. The proceeding volumes do not reflect the amounts that the entities currently use, nor
do they reflect amounts calculated after subsequent out-of-district transfers.
A.

YUMA COUNTY WATER USERS ASSOCIATION

Yuma Country Water User's Association (hereinafter "YCWUA")
became organized in 1603, one year after the Reclamation Act of 1902

14.
State

Arizona v. California, 547 U.S. 150, 154-55 (2006); Water Priorities within the
of

Arizona,

BUREAU

OF

RECLAMATION:

LOWER

COLO.

REGION,

http://www.usbr.gov/1c/region/g4000/contracts/entitlements/AZpriorities.pdf (last updated March 2011) [hereinafter Arizona Priorities].
Questions and Answers, supra note 13.
15.
16. Arizona Colorado River Water Use Present Perfected Right Holders and Contractors Listed Alphabetically, ARIZ. DEP'T OF WATER RES., 1-4 (June 16, 2009),
http://www.azwater.gov/AzDWR/StateWidePlanning/CRM/documents/CopyofAzCRPrio
ritiesListing-Alpha05-2009_web.pdf.
17. Arizona Priorities,supra note 14.
18. Id.
19. Id.

20.

Id.

21.
22.
23.
24.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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passed in the United States Congress.' The Association's purpose was to
deal with the Bureau of Reclamation in the development of the Yuma
Project." The Yuma Project made its first diversion to the area in 1912,
the year Arizona became a state.' YCWUA holds 254,200 af of PPR
agricultural water, fourth priority, decreed 1901, as well as unqualified
water rights certificates, contracted April 1, 1957." YCWUA's voting
system is "weighted," meaning it does not have a one vote per landowner
basis, but rather weighs each vote in value by the amount of acreage held
by each landowner." The association maintains a board of seven members and consists of 53,450 irrigable acres of land.'
B.UNIT B IRRIGATION & DRAINAGE DISTRICT

On July 8, 1905, Arizona statute recognized and decreed Unit B as
an "irrigation and water conservation district."" It holds an entitlement to
6,800 af of PPR agricultural water, fifth priority." Unit B also holds unquantified water certificates, contracted on December 22, 1952." Unit B
maintains a board of three members, contains 3,406 irrigable acres of
land, and counts votes on an individual, one vote per landowner basis."
C. NORTH GILA VALLEY IRRIGATION DISTRICT

Arizona statute recognizes North Gila Valley as an "irrigation and water conservation district." It holds an entitlement to 24,500 af of PPR
agricultural water at sixth priority which the state decreed on July 8, 1905,
and also holds 41, 203 af of Ag water, which the district contracted on
January 1, 1956 as its share of 250,000 af of water for the Yuma Mesa
25.

About

the

Association, YUMA

COUNTY

WATER

USERS'

ASSOCIATION,

http://www.ycwua.org (last visited Oct. 11, 2011).
26. See Id.
27. A Brief History of the Association, YUMA COUNTY WATER USERS'
ASSOCIATION, http://www.ycwua.org/history.php (last visited Oct. 11, 2011).
28. Listing of Individual Water Entitlements in the State of Arizona - Priority 1,
2010),
1 (Jan.
REGION,
LOWER
COLO.
OF
RECLAMATION:
BUREAU
[hereinafter
http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/g4000/contracts/entitlements/AZtable 1.pdf
Priority One]; Listing of Individual Water Entitlements in the State ofArizona - Second
and Third Priorities,BUREAU OF RECLAMATION: LOWER COLO. REGION, 2 (Jan. 2010),
http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/g4000/contracts/entitlements/AZtable2and3.pdf [hereinafter Second and Third Priorities];YCWAU mainstream rights are PPRs - they are not
section 5 contracts.
29. Susanna Eden et. al., Agricultural Water to Municipal Use: The Legal and Institutional Context for Voluntary Transactionsin Arizona, 58 THE WATER REP. 9, 18 (Dec.
15, 2008).
30. Id.
31. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. S 48-2904(A) (2011); See also Questions and Answers, supra note 13, at 1. .
32. PriorityOne, supra note 28, at 1.
33. Second and Third Priorities,supra note 28, at 1.
34. Eden et al., supra note 29, at 18.
35. See ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. S 48-2904(A) (2011); See also Questions and Answers, supra note 13, at 1.
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Division.' The district bases its voting on an individual, one vote per
landowner basis."
D. YUMA IRRIGATION DISTRICT
Arizona statute recognizes Yuma Irrigation District as an "irrigation
and conservation district."" It holds an entitlement to 67,278 af of agricultural water, which the district contracted as its share of 250,000 af of water for the Yuma Mesa Division on January, 1, 1956." Yuma Irrigation
District maintains a three-member board, contains 10,600 irrigable acres
of land, and counts votes on an individual, one vote per landowner basis."
E.YUMA MESA IRRIGATION AND DRAINAGE DISTRICT
Arizona statute recognizes Yuma Mesa Irrigation and Drainage District as an "irrigation and conservation district."" It holds an entitlement
to 141,519 af of agricultural water; the district contracted this share of
250,000 af for the Yuma Mesa Division on January, 1, 1956." Yuma Mesa maintains a three-member board, contains 20,132 acres of irrigable
land, and counts votes using an alternative method other than individual
landowners or registered voters.'
F. WELLTON-MOHAWK IRRIGATION AND DRAINAGE DISTRICT
Arizona statute recognizes Wellton-Mohawk as an "irrigation and water conservation district."" It holds an entitlement to 278,000 af of second priority agricultural water, which the district contracted for on
March 4, 1952." Wellton-Mohawk maintains a nine-member board, it
contains 62,744 irrigable acres, and it counts votes on an individual, one
vote per landowner basis.'
.

36.

Priority One, supra note 28, at 1; Second and Third Priorities,supra note 28, at

2.

37. E-mail from Wade Noble, Counsel for N. Gila Valley Irrigation & Drainage
Dist., to Dean Waters Price (Oct. 14, 2011) (on file with author).
38. See ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 48-2904(A) (2011); See also Questions and Answers, supra note 13, at 1.
39. Second and Third Priorities,supranote 28, at 2.

40.

Eden et al., supra note 29, at 18.

41.
See ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 48-2904(A) (2011); See also Questions and Answers, supra note 13, at 1:
42. Second and Third Priorities,supra note 28, at 2.

43.

Eden et al., supra note 29, at 18.

44.
See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 48-2904(A) (2011); See also Questions and Answers, supra note 13, at 1.
45.
Second and Third Priorities,supra note 28, at 2.

46.

Eden et al., supra note 29, at 18.
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MOHAVE VALLEY IRRIGATION AND DRAINAGE DISTRICT

Arizona statute recognizes Mohave Valley as an "irrigation and water
conservation district."" It holds entitlements to 5,940 af of first priority
water and 35,060 of fourth priority water, which the district contracted
for on November 14, 1968 for both agricultural and municipal and industrial uses." Mohave Valley maintains a board of three members, contains
21,500 acres of irrigable land, and counts votes on an individual, one vote
per landowner basis.'
H.

CIBOLA VALLEY IRRIGATION AND DRAINAGE DISTRICT

Arizona recognizes Cibola Valley as an "irrigation and water conservation district."' It holds entitlements to 9,366 af of agricultural water of
fourth priority water," 1,500 af of fifth priority water," and 2,000 af of
sixth priority water," all of which Cibola Valley contracted for on January
31, 1983." Cibola Valley, which may use 300 af of its entitlements for
municipal and industrial uses, counts its votes on an individual, one vote
per landowner basis.'
I. CONTRACTS WITH PRIVATE LANDOWNERS (NOT ASSOCIATED WITH
IRRIGATION DISTRICT OR WUA)

1. Gila Monster Ranch
Gila Monster is a private Corporation
af of PPR agricultural water with sixteenth
of third priority water," 1,435 af of fourth
fifth priority water." Gila Monster entered

that holds entitlements of 780
priority, dated 1925," 6,285 af
priority water," and 656 af of
into these contracts under the

47. See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 48-2904(A) (2011); See also Questions and Answers, supra note 13, at 1.
48. Listing of Individual Water Entitlements in the State of Arizona - Fourth - Priority;BUREAU OF RECLAMATION: LOWER COLO. REGION, 3 n.1 (Jan. 1, 2010),

49. Eden et al., supra note 29, at 18.
50. See ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 48-2904(A) (2011); See also Questions and Ansvers, supra note 13, at 1.
51. Fourth Priority,supra note 48, at 5.
52. Listing of Individual Water Entitlements in the State of Arizona - Fifth and/or
Sixth-Priority, BUREAU OF RECLAMATION: LOWER COLO. REGION (Jan. 2010),
http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/g4000/contracts/entitlements/AZtable5and6.pdf [hereinafter Fifth and/or Sixth Priority].
53. Id.
54. FourthPriority,supra note 48, at 5.
55. Id. at 5 n.2.
56. Priority One, supra note 28, at 2.
57. Second and Third Priorities,supra note 28, at 3.
58. Fourth Priority; supra note 48, at 6.
59. Fifth and/orSixth Priority,supra note 52.
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Warren Act, and has since merged them into the most recent contract
dated July 28, 1997.'
2. Rayner Ranches

-

Rayner is a private corporation. It contracted for 4,500 af of fourth
priority agricultural water on October 29, 1984."

III. IRRIGATION DISTRICT FORMATION
A.

THE BEGINNINGS

Irrigation districts are distinguished by whether or not they receive
federal project water. Those that do not receive federal water fall entirely
within the purview of the state. This article addresses only irrigation districts receiving federal project water.
At the end of the 19th century, irrigation districts were strictly private
and state controlled entities absent a federal connection." The districts
originated as a functional means of parsing out the control of water
among a collective body of landowners, thus avoiding centralized control
of scarce water among a few large-scale landowners." Necessarily, delivering water across large areas of land in the arid West required infrastructure. Thus to support construction of water delivery systems, irrigation
districts maintained taxing power over all agricultural land within the districts." But irrigation districts often failed to serve their intended purpose
because they lacked a means of generating substantial upfront capital.'
At the turn of the century, the most common form of local water governing bodies were the smaller, mutual ditch companies that avoided the
monetary demands of larger irrigation districts. ' In mutual ditch compa-

60.
61.

Second and Third Priorities,supra note 28, at 3.
Fourth Priority,supra note supra note 48, at 7.

62. See P. ANDREW JONES & Tom CECH, COLORADO WATER LAW FOR NONLAWYERS 210 (2009).

63. Benson, supra note 12, at 365-66. The United States Supreme Court recognized
the agricultural purpose of the federal reclamation programs in Ivanhoe v. McCracken,
357 U.S. 275, 292 (1958) (stating the federal policy of supplying federal reclamation
water to the greatest number of people by "limiting the quantity of land in a single ownership to which project water might be supplied").
64. Although this is generally true today, there is no hard and fast rule across the
board for whether an irrigation district may tax only landowners, residents, or water
users. Rather, the limits to the special taxing power can vary from state to state and from
district to district.
65. Interview with Dr. David Freeman, Professor Emeritus, Colorado State University (Feb. 12, 2010); See also HUNDLEY, supra note 9, at 29 (discussing the creation of
irrigation districts under California's Bridgeford Act and the rise of the Imperial Irrigation District after other irrigation districts failed).
66. Interview with Dr. David Freeman, supra note 65.
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nies, interests in water were based on pro-rata share rather than land
ownership."

When Congress passed the Reclamation Act of 1902, it created a
federal program to reclaim the West's arid lands.' In line with the populist agenda shared by many of the act's proponents, one of Congress'
principle goals through the Act was the settlement and development of
the family farm.' In furtherance of its congressional charge, the Bureau
quickly focused its mission to building large-scale irrigation projects, in
the construction of dams and canal systems, to support agricultural production on a local basis." The Reclamation Act authorized the Bureau to
acquire water, subject to state law, and reallocate it to individual irrigators." In 1922, Congress authorized the Bureau to contract with districts,
rather than individual users." Shortly thereafter, the Omnibus Adjustment Act of 1926 required the Bureau to make all future contracts only
with irrigation districts, or a similar state recognized entity."
The organizational structure and rationale of an irrigation district fit
nicely within the federal plan. States authorized irrigation and conservancy districts with taxing powers capable of generating revenue to pay
back construction costs of irrigation infrastructure, thereby creating a
more feasible and reliable nexus between the Bureau project water and
the end user." Irrigation districts also provided a viable means for the
Bureau to supply reclaimed water to a group, without suffering the costs
of dealing with landowners on an individual basis, while still providing
water to the largest number of farmers as possible."
As a political matter, districts that receive federal project water should
be understood, in some part, as an extension of federal operations and
interests. Of course, federal interests must stand against the reality that
any district worth its salt is likely to recognize that its policies are truly
local, rather than federal, matters.
While the relevance of the federal relationship bears concrete legal
realities, it also serves a host of competing political interests that tend to
provide a backdrop for how to interpret the legal realities surrounding
use of federal water. A reoccurring conflict in the development of the
Colorado Basin has been the desire of local communities and states to
67. Ditches and Diversions, THE
WATER
INFORMATION
PROGRAM,
http://www.waterinfo.org/colorado-water/ditches-diversions (last visited Oct. 17, 2011).
68. Reclamation Act of 1902, ch. 1093, 32 Stat. 388 (1902) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 43 U.S.C. §§ 371-498 (2006)); See also Benson, supra note 12, at
365.
69. Benson, supra note 12, at 366; Interview with Dr. David Freeman, supra note 65.
70. Benson, supra note 12, at 366.
71. Reclamation Act of 1902, 32 Stat. at 389-90.
72. Benson, supra note 12, at 366.
73. Act of May 25, 1926, ch. 383, § 46, 44 Stat. 636, 649 (codified at 43 U.S.C. S
423e (2011)).
74. Interview with Dr. David Freeman, supra note 65.
75. Benson, supra note 12, at 364-66; Interview with Dr. David Freeman, supra note
65.
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"tap federal largesse without incurring federal control."" In the lower
Colorado basin, the irrigation districts drawing from the mainstream are
wholly dependent on the Bureau for their water supply." Consequently,
the federal relationship serves as a backdrop to the political and legal
limitations and conflicts surrounding the future of water use and water
transfers, both inside and outside of an irrigation district.
B. CODIFIED AS SPECIAL TAX DISTRICTS

Arizona statute classifies irrigation districts into two types: irrigation
and water conservation districts, and irrigation water delivery districts."
These laws are the bedrock for addressing who can make or prevent an
out-of-district transfer because they authorize: (1) the formation of irrigation districts as quasi-municipal agencies with powers governing the control of water on lands within an irrigation district, (2) the ability of irrigation districts to contract independently with the Bureau for the delivery of
water, and (3) the powers vested in the irrigation district board."
1. Irrigation and Water Conservation Districts
All seven irrigation districts, excluding the YCWUA, that this article
considers fall within this category of irrigation district. A majority of bona-fide record titleholders of land within the district may form irrigation
and water conservation districts for the purpose of irrigating district
lands." The Board of Supervisors of the County then nominates electors
to be voted in as directors of the district board, which may consist of
three to nine members depending on total acreage within the district."
Statutes treat irrigation districts as municipal corporations," meaning they
may levy taxes," adopt rules and regulations for government of the board
and for the distribution and use of water on lands within the district,"
enjoy the power of eminent domain," enter all lands within the district,'
issue bonds approved by special election," and compel inclusion of unwilling owners' lands that are within district boundaries." These districts

76.
77.
ch. 42,
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

9, at xi.
Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 588 (1963); Boulder Canyon Project Act,
S 5, 45 Stat. 1057, 1060 (1928) (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 617 (2011)).
See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. SS 48-2901 to -3256, §§ 48-3401 to -3477 (2011).
Id. SS 48-2901, -2977, -2978, -3091, -3092.
Id. § 48-2903.
Id. §§ 48-2913 to -2914.
Enloe v. Baker, 383 P.2d 748, 752 (Ariz. 1963).
HUNDLEY, supra note

83.

ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. S 48-2978 (2011).

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id. § 48-2977.
Id. § 48-2978.
Id. § 48-2988.
Id. §§ 48-3182, 48-3219.05.
Taylor v. Roosevelt Irrigation Dist., 232 P.2d 107, 109 (Ariz. 1951).
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may also have the power to drain lands, unlike their counterparts such as
irrigation water delivery district and agricultural improvement districts.'
2. Irrigation Water Delivery Districts
None of the seven irrigation districts considered in this article, nor
the YCWUA, are irrigation water delivery districts." However, this article
includes a description of this type of entity for clarification and to avoid
error.
Irrigation water delivery districts share many similarities with irrigation and conservation districts. Both types of districts have the ability to
use special taxing power, contract with the federal government, levy assessments against landowners within their district, use powers of eminent
domain, and enter upon lands." A three-member board of trustees, who
are elected biennially and must be landowners within the area, governs
these water delivery districts." However, state law does not treat water
delivery districts as municipal corporations." Because they do not maintain municipal status, water delivery districts may not issue bonds or
adopt rules and by-laws governing the lands within district boundaries."
However, state law authorizes these districts to contract and supply irrigation water to lands outside of the district, on the same terms as apply
within the district."
Relevant to conservation interests, Arizona's forfeiture and abandonment laws do not apply to water rights in water delivery districts, so
long as the owner pays all district taxes."

III. TRANSFERS
A. OWNERSHIP OF MAINSTREAM WATER RIGHTS
The Bureau of Reclamation allocates all water from the mainstream
of the Colorado River below Lee's Ferry, by either a decreed right' or a
section 5 contract." Either of these methods of allocation vests a certain
right to use the water. An analysis of how the Bureau allocates these
rights to the irrigation district and subsequently to the individual land89. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. S 48-2905 (2011).
90. Eden et. al., supra note 29, at 14.
91. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 48-3402.
92. Id. §§ 48-3441, 3443, 3444.
93. Id. § 48-3402.
94. Id.
95. Id. S 48-3449 ("A district may contract to provide irrigation service to lands not
included within the district, at charges which shall be not less and on terms not more
favorable than for similar service to district lands, including all overhead expense and
costs provided for by taxation and otherwise.").
96. Id. § 48-3403.
97. See Arizona v. California, 439 U.S. 419 (1979) (supplemental decree).
98. Boulder Canyon Project Act, ch. 42, § 5, 45 Stat. 1057, 1060 (1928) (codified as
amended at 43 U.S.C. § 617 (2011)).
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owners is necessary to understand the nature of ownership of mainstream
water.
A decreed right, or PPR, must have existed prior to June 15, 1929,
the effective date of the Boulder Canyon Project Act (hereinafter
"BCPA")." The 1979 Supplemental Decree of the U.S. Supreme Court
in Arizona v. Cahfornialists and quantifies these PPRs." Rights allocated

after the BCPA took affect are known as "entitlements." 0 ' Section 5 of
the BCPA authorizes the Secretary of Interior "to contract for the storage
of water...and for the delivery thereof at such points on the river...for irrigation and domestic uses."'" Section 5 continues, "[nlo person shall have
or be entitled to have the use for any purpose of the water...except by
0 Taken together with
contract [with the Secretary]"[emphasis suppliedl.o'
the Supreme Court's Supplemental Decree, the federal government allocates all water from the mainstream of the Colorado River below Lee's
Ferry.
B. TYPES OF RIGHTS

1. Present Perfected Rights
All water rights that Arizona irrigation districts and the YCWUA hold
along the mainstream are either allocated by a section 5 contract with the
Bureau or are PPRs, meaning, the right was acquired prior to the effective date of the Boulder Canyon Project Act in 1929,."' Prior to the en-

actment of the BCPA, the Bureau was subject to state law in its control,
appropriation, and distribution of project water." Because PPRs were
acquired under state law, this may implicate that they embody a different
"bundle of sticks," or different set of rights, than water interests acquired
after 1929. To be sure, the Supreme Court, in its 1980 decision Bryant v
Yellen,"' reiterated the Courts consideration of PPRs in Arizona v. California," providing:
We...clearly recognized that § 6 of the Project Act, requiring satisfaction

of present perfected rights, was an unavoidable limitation on the Secretary's power and that in providing for these rights the Secretary must

99. See Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 560-62 (1963).
100. Arizona v. California, 439 U.S. 419 (1979).
101. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 561 (1963).
102. Boulder Canyon Project Act § 5.
103. Id.
104. See Arizona v. California, 292 U.S. 341, 345 (1934); Water Supply Survey: Descrnption of Water Supplies and PotentialAcquisitionIssues, ARIZONA WATER BANKING
AUTHORITY, 15 (May 2010),

http://azwaterbank.gov/documents/WATERSUPPLYSURVEYREPORTrevl2-2010.pdf.
105. Reclamation Act of 1902, ch. 1093, 32 Stat. 388, 390 (1902) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 43 U.S.C. §§ 371-498 (2006)).
106. Bryant v. Yellen, 447 U.S. 352, 370-71 (1980).
107. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 585-88 (1963).
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take account of state law. In this respect, state law was not displaced by
the Project Act and must be consulted in determining the content and
characteristics of the water right that was adjudicated to the District by
our decree.'"
Thus, the established priorities, which are codified in Arizona law,
mandate the Secretary to satisfy these rights accordingly. "
The Reclamation Act of 1902 directed that water rights should "be
appurtenant to the land irrigated."" This notion of appurtenance may
call into question what authority an irrigation district board can assert
over each landowner in a district regarding PPR water. In Brant v.
Yellen, the Supreme Court addressed the nature of the right as it resides
with the individual landowner:
It may be true that no individual farm in the District has a permanent
right to any specific proportion of the water held in trust by the District.
But there is no doubt that prior to 1929 the District, in exercising its
rights as trustee, delivered water to individual farmer beneficiaries without regard to the amount of land under single ownership. It has been
doing so ever since. There is no suggestion . . . that as a matter of state

law and absent the interposition of some federal duty, the District did
not have the right and privilege to exercise and use its water right in this
manner. Nor has it been suggested that the District, absent some duty
or disability imposed by federal law, could have rightfully denied water
to individual farmers owning more than 160 acres. Indeed, as a matter
of state law, not only did the District's water right entitle it to deliver water to the farms in the District regardless of size, but also the right was
equitably owned by the beneficiaries to whom the District was obligated
to deliver water."'
The nature of the landowners' interest in a PPR binds the district to
continue to deliver water to individual landowners on an equitable basis."'
Because the nature of the landowners' interest is equitable and unquantifiable among all landowners within the district, the amount of water to
which the individual landowner is entitled cannot be determined in a specific manner."' Therefore, the right to water is not severable by the individual landowner."'

108. Bryant, 447 U.S. at 370-71.

109. Id.
110. See Reclamation Act of 1902, ch. 1093, § 8, 32 Stat. 388, 390 (1902) (codified at
43 U.S.C. § 485h-4 (2006)).
111. Bryant, 447 U.S. at 371 (citing Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. All Parties & Persons,
306 P.2d 824, 840 (Cal. 1957), rev'd sub non. Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. McCracken,
357 U.S. 275 (1958)).
112. Telephone Interview with Wade Noble, Counsel for North Gila Valley Irrigation
& Drainage Dist., & Jennifer Pitt, Senior Res. Analyst for Envtl. Def. Fund (Apr. 21,
2010).
113. Id.
114. Id.
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A PPR, however, may be severable from the land by the district rather than the landowner,"' according to district rules and subject to state
law."' But this does not take into consideration the federal restraints that
are common to all section 5 contracts, which restrict use to the district
boundaries and require the Secretary's approval for any severance or
changes to use."'

Therefore, the irrigation district board maintains the right to sever
and transfer water from lands within the district to lands outside the district, exclusive to any individual landowner's right, but only subject to the
Secretary's approval."'
2. Section 5 Contracts
All entitlements for use of mainstream water of the Colorado River
receive their deliveries under contract with the Secretary."' The Secretary's authorization to contract specifically with irrigation districts comes
under its master contract with the state and the BCPA.'" In the types of
contracts made with irrigation districts, called "repayment contracts," certain amounts of water are delivered to irrigation districts in exchange for
the repayment of project maintenance and construction costs.'2' After
repayment, the right is supposed to vest in the district lands.'"
The Secretary makes Section 5 contracts for delivery of water to irrigation district lands with the district board, not individual landowners."
The division of ownership interests follows the same analysis as PPRs,
noted above, wherein the entitlement from the Secretary to the district is
tied to the district lands, but the beneficiary interest of each landowner is
equitable and unquantifiable among the landowners within the district. 2 '
Therefore, despite the amount designated in an individual entitlement
115. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-172(A)(1) (2011).

116. Id. § 45-172 (A) (3).
117. See Boulder Canyon Project Act, ch. 42, 45 Stat. 1057, 1060 (1928) (codified as
amended at 43 U.S.C. S 617 (2011)); see also Maricopa-Stanfield Irrigation & Drainage
Dist. v. Robertson, 123 P.3d 1122, 1124-25 (Ariz. 2005) (en banc).
118. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-172 (2011). See, e.g., Bureau of Reclamation, Contract for the Construction of Works, Delivery of Water, and Other Purposes, Yuma
Auxiliary Project, Arizona, 3 (Dec. 22, 1952); Bureau of Reclamation, Amendatory and
Supplemental Consolidated Contract with Wellton-Mohawk Irrigation and Drainage
District for the Delivery of Water Construction of Works, Repayment, and Project Power Supply, 17 (July 17, 1981) (on file with author).
119. Arizona v. California, 376 U.S. 340, 343 (1964) ("[Miainstrearn water shall be released or delivered to water users . . . in Arizona, California, and Nevada pursuant to
valid contracts therefor made with such users by the Secretary of the Interior, pursuant
to Section 5 of the Boulder Canyon Project Act .. . ").
120. Contract of February 9, 1944 (Effective Feb. 24,1944) (between the United States
and the State of Arizona for storage and-delivery of water from Lake Mead), reprinted in
RAY L. WILBUR & NORTHCUTr ELY, THE HOOVER DAM DOCUMENTS A559 (1948).

121.
122.
123.
124.

Benson, supra note 12, at 336.
Id.
Telephone Interview with Wade Noble & Jennifer Pitt, supra note 112.
Id.
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between the district and the landowner, the interest to use such water
cannot be severed from the other landowners in the district, and, as a
result, the individual landowner does not share the right to sever and
transfer the water it receives in its entitlement contract between itself and
the board.
C. FEDERAL LIMITATIONS TO TRANSFERS
1. Entitlements
Initially, entitlements obtained pursuant to section 5 of the BCPA are
subject to the limitations of type and place of use that the delivery contracts specify." With the exception of Cibola Valley Irrigation & Drainage District, the other six districts' contracts tie the total amount of each
entitlement to an amount of water "as may be reasonably required and
beneficially used to irrigate" either a fixed acreage of land or a described
series of parcels of land within the district."
After a review of the BOR's contracts with Mainstream water users, it
is apparent that this provision should be interpreted to require separate
Secretarial approval for changes to the entitlement to any non-irrigation
use.'" Evidently, all irrigation districts that now supply water for domestic
uses in addition to irrigation have sought separate supplemental secretarial authorization for domestic use deliveries.'
The same six districts are also prohibited from using water or permitting water deliveries under the contract "on any lands other than those
irrigable lands which are situated within the district."'" Lastly, the delivery
contracts for all seven districts contain provisions that prohibit any as125. See Bureau of Reclamation, Contract for the Construction of Works, Delivery of
Water, and Other Purposes, Yuma Auxiliary Project, Arizona, 3 (Dec. 22, 1952); Bureau of Reclamation, Amendatory and Supplemental Consolidated Contract with Wellton-Mohawk Irrigation and Drainage District for the Delivery of Water Construction of
Works, Repayment, and Project Power Supply, 17 (July 17, 1981) (on file with author).

126. Id.
127. See Bureau of Reclamation, Third Supplemental and Amendatory Contract Be7 (June 27, 1985);
tween the United States and North Gila Valley Irrigation District,
Bureau of Reclamation, Amendatory Contract with Wellton-Mohawk Irrigation and
Drainage District Permitting the District to Sell Water for Domestic Use 1 6 (August 2,
1965); Bureau of Reclamation, Amendatory and Supplemental Consolidated Contract
with Wellton-Mohawk Irrigation and Drainage District for Delivery of Water, Construction of Works, Repayment, and Project Power Supply, 6(b)(5) (July 17, 1981); Bureau
of Reclamation, Third Supplemental and Amendatory Contract Between the United
States and Yuma Mesa Irrigation and Drainage District, 6(b) (June 27, 1985); Bureau
of Reclamation, Fourth Supplemental and Amendatory Contract Between the United
States and Yuma Irrigation District, I 6(b) (June 27; 1985).
128. Id.
129. See, e.g., Bureau of Reclamation, Contract for the Construction of Works, Delivery of Water, and Other Purposes, Yuma Auxiliary Project, Arizona, 3 (Dec. 22,
1952); Bureau of Reclamation, Amendatory and Supplemental Consolidated Contract
with Wellton-Mohawk Irrigation and Drainage District for the Delivery of Water Construction of Works, Repayment, and Project Power Supply, 17 (July 17, 1981) (on file
with author).
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signment or transfer of interests under the water delivery contract without
the written consent of the Secretary." This final provision implicates that,
subject to Secretarial approval, the severance of water from land and
transfers to lands outside of the district are potentially acceptable.'
The Cibola Valley contract remains an anomaly among the other district contracts to date. Notably, the Cibola contract was devised in 1992
and signifies a unique interest among the agricultural community on the
use of mainstream water."' Cibola's delivery contract expressly contemplates the transfer, exchange, or lease of water out of the irrigation district: "[mlainstream water delivered outside the service area of the district
for purposes of storage, Water Exchange, Water Lease, or Water Transfer pursuant to agreements approved by the Contracting Officer, shall be
deemed to be put to a beneficial Domestic and/or Agricultural Use in
compliance with the provisions of this Article."' If Cibola desires to devise an exchange, lease, or transfer "the Contracting Officer shall take
into consideration existing policy and regulations, significant third party
impacts, environmental concerns, statutes, and court decisions prior to
Consistent with these proviapproving or denying the application."''
sions, Cibola has made at least two transfers of its Colorado River entitlement to the Mohave County Water Authority and the Hopi Tribe.
The contract language appears to reflect a different social and economic interest in the Cibola District; one which is not adverse to out-ofdistrict transfers of water and has also anticipated the market potential of
agricultural water.' This orientation to agricultural water reflects a departure from other Arizona mainstream irrigation districts, with histories
otherwise embedded in the promotion of local agricultural interests.,'
Although other irrigation districts may not have adopted formal policies
against out of district transfers, most irrigation district boards recognize
their political power is fundamentally intertwined with their autonomous
use of and control over their water entitlements.'" This is evidenced in a
2005 University of Arizona Water Resources Research Center study, in

130. Id.
131. Id.
132. See, e.g., Bureau of Reclamation, Amendatory and Supplemental Contract with
Cibola Valley Irrigation and Drainage District, Arizona, for the Delivery of Colorado
River Water (Sept. 2, 1992).
133. Id. 6.
134. Id. 18.
135. Bureau of Reclamation, Contract with Cibola Valley Irrigation & Drainage District for the Delivery of Colorado River Water (Dec. 14, 2004); Bureau of Reclamation,
Partial Assignment of Colorado River Water Under Contract with the Cibola Valley
Irrigation and Drainage District to the Conservation Fund and From the Conservation
Fund to the Mohave Country Water Authority and the Hopi Tribe (Dec.14, 2004).
136. Telephone Interview with Larry Geare, Bd. Member, Cibola Irrigation Dist.
(Apr. 7, 2010).
137. Id.
138. Telephone Interview with Wade Noble & Jennifer Pitt, supra note 112.
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which each irrigation district expressed either outright refusal, or at least
apprehension, toward adopting a policy of out-of-district transfers.'"
As the growth of western cities places greater strain on water resources, irrigation districts will continue to rely on the shelter of a century
old legal system, which was intended to protect a historic model of western society and is identifiably embodied in the water delivery contracts
from the Secretary to the irrigation district. Therefore, the language of
the Cibola contract is a step toward establishing precedence for rethinking the legal limits to agricultural water.
2. Present Perfected Rights
A legal claim that a landowner within a district brings against a district's restriction on an out-of-district transfer of PPR water is inherently
impaired. Conversely, it is theoretically possible for an individual landowner to raise a successful claim to restrict the severance and transfer of
water." Moreover, there may also be the opportunity for an individual
landowner to raise a claim based on the breach of the district board's
fiduciary responsibility to the end user.
To that end, the exploration of the legal rights to PPRs that run with
the land, and are therefore embedded in the landowner's rights to land,
must stand against the backdrop of how conflicts between landowners in
an irrigation district, and between landowners and the district board, have
historically resolved-that is, through negotiation at the local district level."' To a great extent, the conflicting groups have avoided litigation.'"
The organization and governance of irrigation districts is the product of a
century of "doing things a certain way," which is perhaps as strong an
expression of how water rights are defined and used within a district as
any federal or state law.'
D.

STATE LIMITATIONS

1. Arizona Revised Statute § 45-172. Transfer of water rights; application;
limitations; required consent
i.

Severance Procedures

Arizona Revised Statute ("Ariz. Rev. Stat.") § 45-172, governing the
transfer of any waters out of an Arizona irrigation district, explicitly states
that the Director of the ADWR will not authorize such transfers unless

139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Eden et. al., supra note 29, at 17-19.
See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-172(A)(7) (2011).
Telephone Interview with Wade Noble & Jennifer Pitt, supra note 112.

Id.
Interview with Dr. David Freeman, supra note 65.
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the board of an irrigation district, agricultural improvement district, or
water user's association approves."
In Arizona, water rights are appurtenant to the land on which they are
used.'" Consequently, ownership rights generally transfer automatically
when the appurtenant lands transfer between owners. Ariz. Rev. Stat. §
42-172 enables an owner to sever water from the land to which it is appurtenant and transfer it to lands elsewhere, without losing the right's
priority date. "
Arizona law will apply standard procedures to any severance and
transfer of water from lands within an irrigation district, or water users
association, to lands outside of the district."7 To be valid, the ADWR
must approve transfers from district lands to lands held elsewhere." All
such transfers are subject to certain limitations and conditions as set by
the ADWR: (1) the transfer may not affect, infringe upon, or interfere
with other existing rights; (2) the transferred water shall not exceed the
vested rights existing at the time of the severance and transfer; (3) the
Director shall define the amount of water to be diverted and transferred;
(4) the Director shall give notice of the application once a week for three
consecutive weeks, and the notice shall state that any interested person
may file written objections to the proposed severance and transfer with
the Director within thirty days after the publication of the last notice; and
(5) the Director may hold an administrative hearing in appropriate cases.

Arizona procedures do reach to severance and transfers from lands
within the exterior boundaries of irrigation districts; however, special
rules apply." Arizona statute provides that all severance and transfers
from district lands are subject to the approval of the governing body of
This subsection applies regardless of
the district, or similar entity.'
where the transfer is bound; the statute merely states that that any severance and transfer from district lands, or WUA, requires approval."' It
follows that even transfers between lands within the district require the
permission of the irrigation district or WUA board."
Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 42-172(6), by restricting authority over transfers between lands within the district to the district board and affected landowners, provides that such transfers may occur without the approval of the
ADWR." Subsection (6) states that the severance and transfer is subject
only to the district board's approval and the approval of the owners of the
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
.154.

ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. S 45-172(A)(4) (2011).
See id. § 45-172(A).
Id.
See id. § 45-172(A)(4)-(5).
Id. § 45-172(A)(1).
Id. S 45-172(A)(2), (7).
Id. 5 45-172(A)(6).
Id. § 45-172(A)(4).
Id.
Id.
Id. § 45-172(A)(6).

Issue 1I

WATER TRANSFERS IN ARIZONA

23

affected lands.'" However, as the statute provides no direction on how to
evaluate those transfers, such a determination appears to be within the
discretion of the district.
Importantly, the statute mandates that for any severance and transfer
associated with a "watershed or drainage area which supplies or contributes water for the irrigation of lands within an irrigation district," the district must notify the governing bodies of all affected irrigation districts,
agricultural improvement districts, or water users associations, and obtain
written approval prior to filing with the ADWR." Failure of such entity
to reject or approve a proposed severance and transfer within forty-five
days of the notice will constitute an approval."' The statute provides no
direction as to how the affected entities should accord approval. To the
detriment of the proponents of an out-of-district transfer, the statute provides that any aff<cted entity in the watershed or drainage could prevent a
transfer."
The statute also provides that an application for severance and transfer of a water right shall be filed with the ADWR." The ADWR is required to publish notice in a local newspaper, or newspapers, where the
watershed or drainage is located." Any interested person has thirty days
from the last publication to file written objections with the ADWR regarding the proposed transfer." The ADWR has discretion to hold a
hearing prior to its approval or denial of the transfer."
In sum, transfers between lands held within the exterior boundaries
of the district or similar entity are not subject to the approval of the
ADWR. Transfers from district lands to lands held elsewhere are subject
to the approval of the Director of the ADWR and the governing bodies
of all the affected entities in the watershed.'" Therefore, Arizona law
conceivably allows an entity that is not receiving federally allocated water
to block a transfer from an entity that is receiving federally allocated, water.'" Such state law may impermissibly interferie with the exclusive federal control in this area that is vested in the Secretary.'" In other words,
federal law could potentially preempt Arizona's transfer laws.
ii. Federal Preemption

Answering the questions of who has authority to make out-of-district
transfers of mainstream water and who has authority to stop such trans155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Id.
Id. § 45-172(A)(5).
Id.
Id.
Id. S 45-172(A)(7).
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. § 45-172.
Id.
See infra Part III.3.a.1.ii for a discussion of Federal Preemption.
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fers requires understanding whether federal, state, or local law applies.
In the case of mainstream water transfers, the answer is all three.'" An
out-of-district transfer of mainstream water must comply with the laws
and policy of the irrigation district or WUA, the state, and the Bureau. It
is likely that all three governmental bodies must be in agreement, with the
Bureau having the last word.
A preemption analysis is important to determine the limit of Arizona's reach in managing the water of the seven mainstream irrigation districts and the YCWUA. This analysis is especially significant where outof-district transfers are involved. Historically, the state has controlled
water management within its boundaries. However, following the Supreme Court decision in Arizona v. California, the federal government
controls the allocation of mainstream water.' Although the federal government generally has the last word, the Supreme Court affirmed that
states are the principal managers of water within their boundaries." Under the general principles of preemption, state law may not apply in areas
where the federal government determines it has a substantial interest."
However, mainstream water presents an interesting case because the Supreme Court has confirmed the legality of plural control over mainstream
water use."'
Preemption may be either express or implied.'' When determining
issues of federal preemption, courts consider whether Congress intended
to preempt state law on a particular issue in a statute."' Preemption is
express where Congress explicitly states its intent to displace state laws."
Implied preemption is more complicated and comes in two varieties:
conflict preemption and field preemption." Conflict preemption exists
where state law interferes with the execution of, or frustrates the purpose
behind, a federal law." Field preemption exists where Congress has enacted laws designed to "occupy a field" as a complete regulatory scheme,
thereby removing the state's authority to regulate that particular area.1
Occupation of the field may be shown by either the pervasiveness of the
166. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-172; Bryant v. Yellen, 447 U.S. 352 (1980); Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
167. Arizona v. Caliornia,373 U.S. at 588 ("But where the Secretary's contracts, as
here, carry out a congressional plan for the complete distribution of waters to users, state
law has no place").
168. See California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 667 (1978) (stating that state law
governs the control, appropriation, and distribution of Reclamation project water); Bryant, 447 U.S. at 370 n.21 (interpreting that the Court's narrowing of federal authority in
Caiornia v. United States did not reach the Secretary's power under the BCPA over the
allocation of all mainstream water).
169. KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 234-35 (16th ed. 2007).

170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

See Arizona v.Cahfornia, 373 U.S. at 588.
SULLIVAN, supra note 169, at 234.
See id.
Id.
Id. at 237-38.
Id. at 238.
Id. at 237.
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federal regulatory scheme or the significance of the federal interest at
stake.'" Federal law and federal policy may both act to occupy the field
and preempt state law." Considering the Supreme Court's decision in
Arizona v. Cahfornia, recognizing PPRs as federal entitlements, in conjunction with the BCPA and the Colorado River Compact, it is clear that
federal law "occupies the field" for purposes of governing mainstream
waters of the Colorado River.'"
However, an argument against federal preemption might rely on the
history of western water policy as a state issue. In the early part of the
twentieth century, prior to enactment of the BCPA, state law governed
issues of water allocation, even for matters concerning Bureau projects."
The Reclamation Act of 1902 directed the Bureau to comply with state
law when appropriating water for federal projects."' Correspondingly, the
landmark Supreme Court decision of Wyoming v. Coloradoin 1922 held
that, in disputes between states, the law of each state would prevail in
apportioning water to individual appropriators.'" In the years leading up
to the BCPA, downstream states such as Arizona sought the development
of large storage projects in the lower basin in an effort to secure greater
rights to stored water against its sister basin states.'"
However, the BCPA removed the authority of the Bureau to purchase state water and reallocate water under its own scheme by contracting with states, state entities - such as irrigation districts and conservancy
districts - and also private users."' In fact, the BCPA, parallel to the later
Arizona v. California decision, recognized that the Bureau allocates all
mainstream water, including present perfected rights." However, outside
of regulating use in irrigation districts, states have continued to control
water and applying their state law after the Bureau has allocated the water."
With respect to the management of water at the local level, Arizona's
reach is limited in how water is managed within the mainstream irrigation
districts that receive federal project water."' Water use within these districts is generally determined by the Bureau contract and the district's
internal policies, customs, resolutions, and by-laws."
177. Id. at 237-38.
178. See Id.
179. See Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 565, 566, 588 (1963).
180. See Reclamation Act of 1902, ch. 1093, § 8, 32 Stat. 388, 390 (1902) (codified at
43 U.S.C. S 485h-4 (2006)).
18 1. Id.
182. Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419, 470 (1922).
183. See HUNDLEY, supra note 9, at 169-214 (discussing basin state interests and interstate relations leading up to the BCPA).
184. Boulder Canyon Project Act, ch. 42, § 5, 45 Stat. 1057, 1060 (1928) (codified at
43 U.S.C. § 617 (2011)).
185. Id.
186. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. S 45-107(B) (2011).

187. See Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 588 (1963).
188. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 45-107(C). For an example of a Section 5 contract outlining district policies, see Colorado River Water Delivery Agreement: Federal Quantifica-
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With respect to out-of-district transfers, the argument that Arizona
statute regulating the management of irrigation district water law reaches
beyond its purview relies on the expansion of federal authority under the
BCPA, implicitly preempting state law. Arizona v. Cahfornia implicates
implicit preemption by interpreting the BCPA to establish a far greater
level of federal control of Colorado River water than had been previously
recognized in reclamation projects - the Court provides in its interpretation of the BCPA:
Section 18 plainly allows the States to do things not inconsistent with
the Project Act or with federal control of the river, for example, regulation of the use of tributary water and protection of present perfected
rights. What other things the States are free to do can be decided when
the occasion arises. But where the Secretary's contracts, as here, carry
out a congressional plan for the complete distribution of waters to users, state law has no place.""
To be sure, the Supreme Court has provided that federal authority
over distribution of federal project water is broad.'" But, the bottom line
is that the courts have not provided a definitive guide for the extent of
federal versus state control. Certainly, the issue of federal preemption of
project water is as much a political conundrum as it is a legal one.

E. INTERNAL DISTRICT LIMITATIONS TO TRANSFERS
1. Historical Analysis
Traditionally, the Bureau's charge was to ensure development of agriculture in the west and spread ownership interests in water over an array
of land titles to smaller parcels of land.' This is evidenced in the Reclamation Act of 1902, recognizing that reclamation water is appurtenant to
the land to which it is used and stating that its purpose is in part to support the family farm." The 1958 Supreme Court decision in Ivanhoe
Irrgation District v. McCracken supports this view." The court reaffirmed the federal policy of supplying federal reclamation water to irrigation districts as "limiting the quantity of land in a single ownership to
which project water might be supplied."'' The laws which control the use
of reclamation water today are modeled on these populist visions of west-

at
available
Agreement,
Settlement
tion
http://www.usbr.gov/1c/region/g4000/crwda/crwda.pdf (last visited Oct. 18, 2011).
189. Arizona v. California,373 U.S. at 588.
190. See id. at 585.
191. See Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 277-78 (1958).
192. Reclamation Act of 1902, ch. 1093, 32 Stat. 388 (codified at 43 U.S.C § 371-72
(2006)).
193. Ivanhoe, 357 U.S. at 292.
194. Id.
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ern life. The catch, however, today and historically, is that the political
interests that run irrigation districts, and water interests generally, are
often centralized in elite groups of business and political leaders.'"
A survey by the University of Arizona reports that a majority of irrigation district boards express opposition to transfers.'" Accordingly, State
law often protects the authority of irrigation districts to resist external
pressure to sell water.'

Evidently, these insular policies reflect the interest of irrigation
boards. It is uncertain, however, the extent to which these policies embody the range of landowner interest within the districts.
2.

Election of District Board Members

The method a district employs for election of its board is a factor in
determining the power structures that reside within the irrigation district
and, consequently, can influence the district policy regarding out-ofdistrict transfers. Arizona statute provides that the election process for
the board of an irrigation district must generally be based on a "one vote
per landowner" system.' However, landowners of a district may petition
the district board to adopt an acreage system of voting.'" Such a voting
The
scheme weighs gives each elector one vote per acre owned."
YCWUA is the only entity receiving mainstream water discussed in this
article to adopt an acreage system of voting."' The seven irrigation districts discussed in this article mostly maintain a one vote per landowner
system.
The one voter per landowner voting scheme accords with the notion
that an entitlement is appurtenant to the land, implicating that the decision-making authority over water runs with the interest in land. But because the amount of land within a district is fixed, as an individual landowner acquires more land, more power will come to rest in that landowner as the pool of voters is reduced.
For comparison purposes, the Imperial Irrigation District ("IID") in
California maintains an election process that provides one vote to each

195. For instance, the League of the Southwest, a predominant influence and lobbying
group in the development of the lower basin in the earlier part of last century, limited its
membership to "mayors of cities, town trustees, county supervisors and commissioners
and members of commercial, civic and social organizations." HUNDLEY, supra note 9, at

59.
196. Eden et. al., supra note 29, at 17-19.
197. See ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. S 48-2977; Eden et. al., supra note 29, at 19.
198. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. SS 48-2917 (requiring electors to have owned land in
the district, to be a resident of the district, and to be at least eighteen years old), -3018
(apportioning one vote to each qualified elector).
199. Id. § 48-3041.
200. Id. § 48-3043.
201. Eden et. al., supra note 29, at 18.
202. Id.
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resident in the district." This is unlike the standard Arizona method,
which provides a one vote per landowner basis."' The IID voting method
is not tied to agricultural land. Interestingly, the IID's recent history of
large scale water transfers exists in stark contrast with the history of Ari-

The unique history of IID's out-of-district
zona Irrigation Districts.'
transfers should be considered in light of the district's governance and
voting system. The democratic character of the IID election system is
notable and evidences the district's unique history among Lower Basin
irrigation districts.

3.

District By-laws/Policy

Arizona law provides irrigation district boards with the authority to
"Imlake, amend, or repeal resolutions, bylaws, and rules necessary for
the government of or for carrying into effect the powers vested in irrigation districts."' However, the irrigation districts have been slow to adopt
by-laws or policy geared toward out-of-district transfers, which may reflect
a desire to handle these issues on an ad-hoc basis."' Nevertheless, as political pressures mount for new uses of agricultural water, many districts
are now beginning to consider and reflect in their official policy or bylaws their position against out-of-district transfers."
CONCLUSION
In sum, state and federal law both protect the authority of irrigation
districts to resist external pressure to sell water, just as the law protects
the ownership interests of PPRs and entitlements to mainstream water in
the district boards. Accordingly, district boards are also the only authority able to make out-of-district transfers. The district boards are also the
strongest authority likely to stop a transfer of water out of a district. To
be sure, many avenues are available for a district board to prevent a transfer, either from their own district or transfers from others. As it stands,
individual landowners generally do not maintain much control or political
capability regarding transfers of irrigation district water not already vested
in the irrigation district board.

203. Choudhry v. Free, 552 P.2d 438, 441-42 (Cal. 1976) (providing that the "pervasive powers exercised by this irrigation district over all residents within its vast area,
whether or not they are landowners, as such that neither the right to vote nor the right to
serve as a director may be confined to freeholders.").
204. Eden et. al., supra note 29, at 15.
205. See, e.g., Agreement for Transfer of Conserved Water by and Between Imperial
Irrigation District and the San Diego County Water Authority (Apr. 29, 1998), available
at http://www.iid.com/Modules/ShowDocument.aspx?documentid-887; Colorado River
Water Transfer Fact Sheet, SAN

DIEGO

CNTY.

WATER AUTH.

(Feb.

http://www.sdcwa.org/sites/default/files/files/publications/watertransfer-fs.pdf.
206. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. S 48-2978(17) (2011).'
207. Telephone Interview with Wade Noble & Jennifer Pitt, supra note 112.
208. Id.; Telephone Interview with Larry Geare, supra note 136.

2011),
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The state can prevent an out-of district transfer, as statute vests such
authority in the Director of the AWDR. The Bureau, on the other hand,
is unique. If it wishes, the Bureau maintains the authority to prevent an
out-of-district transfer, if not as matter of its largess in federal preemption
then as provided universally in section 5 contracts. On the other hand,
the Bureau is also likely to exert influence at the district level to compel
out-of district transfers, as evidenced in the IID transfer to coastal municipal interests."
Ultimately and invariably, the complexity of a plural legal system is a
reality in the Colorado River basin; no out-of-district transfer is likely to
be made without bringing each governing authority-Federal agency, state
agency, and district-to the table.

209. See e.g. Colorado River Water Transfer Fact Sheet, SAN DIEGO CNTY. WATER
2011),
(Feb.
http://www.sdcwa.org/sites/default/files/files/publications/watertransfer-fs.pdf; U.S. DEP'T

AUTH.

OF THE INTERIOR, COLORADO RIVER WATER DELIVERY AGREEMENT: FEDERAL
QUANTIFICATION SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 2-3 (Oct. 10, 2003), available at

http://www.law.arizona.edu/Iibrary/research/guides/portals/Original%20Appendices/20
CORiverWaterDeliveryAgree2003.pdf; U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, ALLOCATION
AGREEMENT AMONG THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE METROPOLITAN WATER
DISTRICT OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, COACHELLA VALLEY WATER DISTRICT, IMPERIAL
IRRIGATION DISTRICT, SAN DIEGO COUNTY WATER AUTHORITY, THE LA JOLLA, PALA,
PAUMA, RINCON, AND SAN PASQUAL BANDS OF MISSION INDIANS, THE SAN LUIS REY
RIVER INDIAN WATER AUTHORITY, THE CITY OF ESCONDIDO AND VISTA IRRIGATION
available
at
(Oct.
10,
2003),
DISTRICT
4,
15-17

http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/prograns/AAC/refdocs/Secretary2003a.pdf.
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SUMMARY
A complex and robust system for protecting water rights for agricultural uses has evolved in Colorado since the state's earliest days. Water
management organizations ("water organizations"), such as irrigation and
water conservancy districts, have played not only an integral but equally
complex role in protecting irrigation rights throughout Colorado's history.
Estimated at eighty-five to eighty-nine percent of the total water diverted
6and consumed in the state, agricultural water use is still dominant in Colorado.' With agricultural water rights generally the most "senior" in Colorado, municipal and industrial entities will increasingly look to agriculture for water.! This article identifies the legal and political sources and
issues to consult concerning the role that water entities play in controlling
and transferring "agricultural water" in Colorado. This article's goal is to
assist the analysis of the implications of constraints on water rights transfers in Colorado for the establishment of a water banking scheme among
Colorado River basin states in the event of longer-term shortages
throughout the basin. As political subdivisions of the state, and with laws
conferring seemingly uncompromising in-basin retention provisions, water organizations are powerful in Colorado. However, Colorado's role as
the major headwaters state and its "trans-mountain" dynamics have combined to preclude a total prohibition on transfers within or from the state.
Nonetheless, water entities in Colorado - particularly water conservancy
districts - likely play a larger counterbalancing role than realized in keeping agricultural water in-basin, and therefore warrant closer investigation.

I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
Some of Colorado's earliest non-indigenous settlers moved to Colorado to take advantage of the 1862 Homestead Act, which allotted land to
settlers for five-year periods for agriculture.' Despite extremely arid conditions, settlers used water not only for agricultural crops but also livestock grazing in pastureland and woodland.' The 1860s marked the beginning of the "ditch-building" era, which saw the formation of the state's
first water organizations by farmers and ranchers. They were joint ditch-

1. COLORADO WATER CONSERVATION BOARD, ALTERNATIVE AGRICULTURAL WATER
TRANSFER METHODS TO TRADITIONAL PURCHASE AND TRANSFER, STATEWIDE WATER
SUPPLY INITIATIVE: FINAL DRAFT PHASE 2 REPORT 3-1 - 3-3 (2007) [hereinafter SWSI

Repord.
2. Id. at 3-1.
3.
PATRICK CREEDEN, HISTORY: A LOOK BACK AT THE HISTORICAL ROLE OF
AGRICULTURE
IN
THE
ROCKIES
17
(2010),
available
at

http://www.coloradocollege.edu/stateoftherockies/010%20Report%2OCard/historyB.pdf.
4. Katherine Sherwood, Overview Section: Common Ground for Competing Uses,
The 2010 Colorado College State of the Rockies Report Card 37 (2010) ("Sherwood"),
available
at
http://www.coloradocollege.edu/stateoftherockies/010%20Report%2OCard/land_waterB.
pdf.
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es and ditch companies, which were small and generally upstream to take
advantage of first flows.' Groups of users formed mutual ditch companies
("MDCs") to share labor and costs of acquiring and conveying water."
Agricultural development in the face of water scarcity and uncertainty
helped propel prior appropriation as the legal system for regulating water
in Colorado.' The Constitution also gave water for domestic purpose
higher preference than any other purpose; however, agricultural purposes
were specifically preferred over manufacturing purposes." The Constitution also gave "agricultural purposes" priority for water over manufacturing purposes in Colorado, second only to domestic purposes."
Government entities with taxing power took over water development
9
from some of the MDCs when water development became too costly.
Nevertheless, MDCs grew in number after the Colorado Constitution
exempted the ditches, canals, and associated works that they owned from
state property taxation." MDCs also provided a cheap, flexible, cooperative solution to irrigation development when many capitalistic water enterprises failed." John Wesley Powell, a former director of the U.S. Geological Survey, conservationist, and explorer of the Colorado River," supported enlisting the national government on behalf of farmers to prevent
corporate monopolies from forming in the late 19th century.'" Powell's
policies led to the formation of the first irrigation districts." Irrigation
Interview with David Freeman, Professor Emeritus, Colorado State University, in
5.
Fort Collins, Colo. (Feb. 12, 2010).
6. Lawrence J. MacDonnell, Commentary, Public Water-Private Water: AntiSpeculation, Water Reallocation,and High Plains A&M, LLC v. Southeastern Colorado
Water Conservancy District, 10 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 1,13 (2006).
7. Justice Gregory J. Hobbs, Jr., Symposium, The Role of Climate in Shaping
Western Water Institutions, 7 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 1, 16-17 (2003). Although
Yunker v. Nichols is the first case to enshrine the prior appropriation doctrine in Colorado as the basis for the Constitution's governing principles for water use, Coffin v. Left
Hand Ditch Co. is cited as the case associated with prior appropriation in terms of dealing riparian rights their final death-knell in Colorado. Id. "We conclude, then, that the
common law doctrine giving the riparian owner a right to the flow of water in its natural
channel upon and over his lands, even though he makes no beneficial use thereof, is
inapplicable to Colorado. Imperative necessity, unknown to the countries which gave it
birth, compels the recognition of another doctrine in conflict therewith." Coffin v. Left
Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443, 447 (1882). Coffin also inextricably links the need for
prior appropriation with the need for agricultural growth through the control of water:
"The climate is dry, and the soil, when moistened only by the usual rainfall, is arid and
unproductive; except in a few favored sections, artificial irrigation for agriculture is an
absolute necessity." Id. at 446.
COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 6.
8.
9.
MacDonnell, supra note 6, at 13.
DAVID H. GETCHES, WATER LAW IN A NUTSHELL 423 (3d ed. 1997).
10.
Donald Snow, The Persistence of Powell: The Idea of Watersheds and Participa11.
tory Democracy, 23 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 31, 36 (2003).
12.
Scott Kirsch, Regions of government science: John Wesley Powell in Washington
and the American West, 23 ENDEAVOUR no. 4, at 155, 157 (1999).
13.
Hobbs, supra note 7 at 20.
14.
Id.; Snow, supra note 11 at 35. Powell advocated the organization of irrigation
and land use districts based on cooperative models of the Mormons in Utah and the
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companies formed to allow landowners to provide for irrigation and
drainage of district lands as necessary to maintain their irrigability." With
the ability to tax and bond irrigable land, landowners also formed irrigation districts and water users' associations to sponsor the first federal projects that the federal government authorized under the 1902 Reclamation
Act."
In 1937, water conservation districts" ("conservation districts") and water conservancy districts'" ("conservancy districts") added the authority to
tax all land within district boundaries; this included non-irrigable as well
as potentially irrigable land and urban as well as agricultural land." Conservation and conservancy districts provided the perfect vehicle for taking
advantage of the 1902 Reclamation Act, which required the Bureau to
contract with local entities for sponsorship and repayment of federal water projects because they had broad power to receive public funds." The
Union Colony in Colorado. Hobbs, supra note 7 at 20. He also advocated the withdrawal of reservoir sites from settlement under the Homestead laws once he realized that
erratic climate conditions would not enable farmers to maintain their farms without
stabilizing their water supplies with larger and stronger conveyance and retention structures than they could afford privately. Hobbs, supra note 7 at 20-21.
15.
See COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-41-101(1) (2011).
16.
Interview with David Freeman, supra note 5.
17. There are four water conservation districts in Colorado, two of which are in the
Colorado River basin: the Colorado River Water Conservation District and the Southwestern Colorado Water Conservation District. The Colorado legislature authorized
their creation under the Water Conservancy Act (the "Act"), COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §
37-45-102 (West 2011) and also authorized them under individual provisions, COLO.
REV. STAT. S 37-46-103 (2011) (authorizing the Colorado River Water Conservation
District); COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-47-103 (2011) (authorizing the Southwestern Water
Conservation District); COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-50-103 (2011) (authorizing the Republican River Water Conservation District); COLO. REV. STAT. S 37-48-102 (2011) (authorizing the Rio Grande Water Conservation District).
18.
For a full list of statutorily recognized conservancy districts in Colorado, see
COLO. REV. STAT. g 37-45-153 (2009). The conservancy districts and other water organizations relevant for this study, i.e. those which service or otherwise control water originally retained from the Colorado River basin for agricultural purposes, are included in
the attached spreadsheet (electronic format only) as Exhibit A. The information for
water organizations listed in Colorado Water Divisions 1, 2 and 5, most relevant for this
study in terms of Colorado River basin coverage, is fairly exhaustive, but not complete.
Water Divisions 4, 6, and 7 contain an incomplete list of water organizations that require
further investigation. Future researchers should cross-reference the data in the spreadsheet with the GIS data sets on the CWCB's "CDSS" ("Colorado Decision Support Systems") website, http://ibcc.state.co.us/ Process/Needs/WaterSupply Availability/ (last
visited Sept. 13, 2011) and the Colorado Division of Water Resources's website,
http://water.state.co.us/pubs/gis.asp (last visited Jul. 5, 2010), which provide agricultural
water holdings totals for individual conveyance structures, water divisions, and districts
for each of the basins. For further explanation of Colorado Water Divisions, see Section
II. A. For further explanation of water organizations in Colorado, see Section III and
Section V.
19. TROUT, WITVER & FREEMAN, P.C., ACQUIRING, USING, AND PROTECTING
WATER IN COLORADO 191-197 (2004). The organic statute authorizing conservation and
conservancy districts, the Water Conservancy Act was also created in 1937. COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. S 37-45-101 (West 2011); Hobbs, supra note 7 at 29.
20. Hobbs, supra note 7 at 29.
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Water Conservancy Act ("the Act") made it state policy to conserve the
water resources of Colorado for the "greatest beneficial use of water within" the state by "directly benefitling] lands to be irrigated from works to
be constructed."" It was also state policy "to obtain from water originating in Colorado the highest duty for domestic uses and irrigation of lands
in Colorado within the terms of interstate compacts."' Notably, the Act
gave districts the ability-at least on paper-to block all sales within their
boundaries.'
The two major water districts formed that year were also created in
response to politics." The Colorado Supreme Court case Coffin v. Left
Hand Ditch Co. affirmed prior appropriation and gave the state unbridled authority to transfer water across water "districts," basins, or even
broader "divisions" outside the basin of origin.' Thus, the Act and formation of the Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District and the
Colorado River District represented the state's first attempts to grapple
with the implications of transfers and circumscribe them; subsequently,
opponents mounted a series of constitutional and other legal challenges
to water conservancy districts after the 1937 Act.' But, very few of the
challenges were successful.' Despite the legal challenges, the legislature
§

21.

CoLo. REV. STAT.

22.

Id. S 37-45-102(2)(b).

37-45-102(1)(e) (2011).

23.
(1) The board has power on behalf of said district . .. () [tlo appropriate and
otherwise acquire water and water rights within or without the state; to develop, store,
and transport water; to subscribe for, purchase, and acquire stock in canal companies,
water companies, and water users' associations; to provide, sell, lease, and deliver water
for municipal and domestic purposes, irrigation, power, milling, manufacturing, mining,
metallurgical, and any and all other beneficial uses and to derive revenue and benefits
therefrom; ... . but the sale, leasing, and delivery of water for irrigation, domestic, and
other beneficial purposes as provided in this section, whether the water is developed by
the principal district or a subdistrict thereof, shall only be made for use within the
boundaries of either the principal district, or the subdistrict, or both. COLO. REV. STAT.
§37-45-118 (2011) (emphasis added); Matthews v. Tri-Cnty Water Conservancy Dist.,
613 P.2d 889, 893 (Colo. 1980) (holding that water conservancy districts are generally
prohibited by statute from selling water for use outside of district boundaries).
24. The Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District ("Northern") was largely
created in response to East Slope pressure for agricultural and municipal water from the
West Slope, and the Colorado River Water Conservation District (the "River District")
was largely created in response to Northern's formation, to protect West Slope agricultural interests. Interview with David Freeman, supra note 5.

25. Geoffrey M. Craig, House Bill 1041 and Transbasin Water Diversions: Equity to
the Western Slope or Undue Power to Local Government? 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 791,
791 (1995).
26. Hobbs, supra note 7 at 29. The power of a water conservancy district to levy and
collect assessments within the district does not violate Section 14 of Article X of the
Colorado Constitution since the section means only that a creditor of municipality may
not levy upon and sell private property of individuals within the corporation to pay the
municipality's debts. Rogers v. Letford, 79 P.2d 274, 288 (Colo. 1938). A water conservancy board has the duty to determine the extent of property necessary to be taken by
virtue of its broad power. Kistler v. Northern Colo. Water Conservancy Dist., 246 P.2d
616, 618 (Colo. 1952). Water conservancy districts are not public utilities subject to the
regulation of the Public Utilities Commission. Matthews, 613 P.2d at 892.

27.

Id.
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has repeatedly given the organizations the authority to actively participate
in water projects in Colorado.' The State also created the Colorado Water Conservation Board ("CWCB") in 1937 ; the first agency to protect
and develop water for Coloradans on a state-wide basis.'
Today, especially since the 2002 drought, the state government plays
a larger role with respect to water planning and delivery." The CWCB is
leading the charge on "water policy," and the conservancy districts' roles
are increasingly tied to conservation and development of water for community uses-much in line with Powell's original vision." Joint ditches
and MDCs collectively comprise a significant share of agricultural water
rights in Colorado." But conservancy districts also comprise a significant
share of agricultural water rights in Colorado and generally enjoy broader
and more cohesive political, legal, and economic power for which water
rights data is more readily available." It is difficult to say what proportion
of Colorado's agricultural water conservancy and conservation districts
control today, but totals for water districts can be tallied for each division
and cross-referenced with CDSS data for rough estimates." Therefore,
this discussion will primarily focus on the role of water conservancy districts in understanding agricultural water transfers in Colorado.

II. PHYSICAL AND LEGAL ORGANIZATION OF IRRIGATION
WATER IN COLORADO IN THE COLORADO RIVER BASIN
A.WATER DIVISIONS
Although Powell failed in his ultimate vision of "watershed commonwealths," i.e. making watersheds the basis for political units in Western
states, Colorado realized his vision of local water districts consisting of
"divisions", as organizational units,.' Under the sweeping Water Rights
Determination and Administration Act of 1969 (the "1969 Act"), Colorado divided the state into seven major divisions according to the seven
major river drainages they represent.'." The state appoints a division
28. Melinda Kassen, Symposium, Statutory Expansion of State Agencies' Authority
to Administer and Develop Water Resources in Response to Colorado's Drought, 7 U.
DENV. WATER L. REV. 47, 73 (2003).
29.

COLORADO WATER CONSERVATION BOARD, STRATEGIC PLAN, 2 (2006).

30. Kassen, supra note 28 at 79.
31. Id. at 80-81; Hobbs, supra note 7 at 30. Indeed, the CWCB is also the agency
leading the charge on Colorado water availability studies through the CDSS. See Exhibit
32. Interview with David Freeman, supra note 5.
33. Id.
34.
tion

See COLO. REV. STAT.
Board,

S

37-45-153 (2011); See also Colorado Water Conserva-

COLORADO

DECISION

SUPPORT

SYSTEMS,

http://cdss.state.co.us/basins/Pages/Colorado.aspx
35. Hobbs, supra note 7, at 29.
36. See COLO. REV. STAT. S 37-92-201 (2011) (listing the seven water divisions and
the river drainages they represent); See D Topical Index, COLORADO DIVISION OF
WATER RESOURCES, http://water.state.co.us/Home/Pages/DTopics.aspx (last visited
July 6, 2010). Divisions are also largely referred to as "basins" in terms of the main-stem
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engineer to each division.' The state and division engineers also regulate
the distribution of water according to the priorities and quantities decreed
by water courts.' "Water judges" are selected from among district court
judges in each division. "Water courts" within each division have jurisdiction over water rights adjudications.'
B. WATER DISTRICTS

Water districts simply represent the smaller tributary basins within
each of the seven water divisions for water rights administration." Water
commissioners are responsible for administering water rights for each of
the districts under the lead of the division engineer."
C.WATER ORGANIZATION BOUNDARIES

Water organizations are typically also divided into "divisions" (not to
be confused with state-administered divisions), which are political subunits.' Because water organizations' boundaries are based on historical
resident land ownership rather than watershed boundaries, they do not
normally correlate with state-designated "divisions." Still, there is strong
language in water organizations' bylaws for maintaining water within the
district's boundaries."
rivers of their respective divisions: e.g. Division 1 is commonly referred to as the "South
Platte River Basin," Division 2 is commonly referred to as the "Arkansas River Basin,"
Division 4 is commonly referred to as the "Gunnison River Basin," Division 5 is commonly referred to as the "Colorado River Basin," etc.
Interview with Sarah Klahn, Partner, White & Jankowski (2009).
37.
See COLO. REV. STAT. S 37-92-301 (2011); TROUT, WITWER & FREEMAN, supra
38.
note 20, at 100.
39. COLO. REV. STAT. S 37-92-301 (2011); TROUT, WITWER & FREEMAN, supra note
20, at 100. The division engineers, under the state engineer, oversee water rights administration through "water commissioners" in the various districts which comprise the divisions, described infra.
Applicants submit applications for water rights to the clerk of the water court.
40.
Getches, supra note 10, at 165. After opportunity for opposition, the state engineer and
subordinate officials provide the clerk with a list of decreed and conditional water rights.
Id. "Conditional" water rights are "unperfected" rights and users must take substantial first
steps towards putting unperfected water rights to beneficial use in order to make them
"absolute." TROUT, WITwER & FREEMAN, supra note 20, at 10. A referee makes a determination on water rights applications and refers difficult matters to the water judge.
Getches, supra note 10, at 165. All parties have the opportunity to protest the ruling to
the water judge and the judge confirms all rulings unless contrary to law. Id. Once confirmed, the water right is assigned a priority date as of the filing of the application. Id. at
166. Appellate review of the water court's judgment and decree moves straight to the
Colorado Supreme Court. Id.
Interview with Scott Hummer, District 36 Water Commissioner, (Apr. 19, 2010).
41.
42.
Id.

43.

See District Board of Directors, UPPER GUNNISON

RIVER WATER

CONSERVANCY DISTRICT, http://www.ugrwcd.org/Pages/board%20and%20staff.htm
(last visited July 7, 2010).
44. The Upper Gunnison Water Conservancy District lists as one of its principal
mandates, "[Tihe Board will work diligently to be well informed about legal, political,
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D.WATER RIGHTS ADJUDICATION IN COLORADO
The Water Conservancy Act, together with a water organization's
rules and policies, largely dictate a water organization's control of agricultural water." An understanding of the legal scope of the water rights,
themselves, is critical to understanding the meaning of "transfers" in Colorado, and therefore to understanding the complete scope of potential
restrictions on transfers in terms of organizations. The most recent data
show that Colorado has easily exceeded the rest of the West in annual
agricultural to municipal transfers since 1990, but the Colorado BigThompson project comprises a vast majority of these transfers."
Unlike all other prior appropriation states, which created separate
administrative agencies with permitting and regulatory authority, Colorado determines its water rights through the court system." Colorado
charges its judicial system with administrative functions to "adjudicate"
water rights.' Water rights in Colorado are also only valid to the extent
that they meet a number of conditions that have evolved under statutory
and case law. Before a water right'can be considered an "agricultural" or
"irrigation" water right, there must be a valid acquisition that, usually, but
not always, entails diversion, beneficial use," and proper initiation of priority for a valid priority date." In particular, agricultural water rights must
also conform to the "duty of water," a limit on the volume or rate of water
use on an acre of land based on a presumption of the maximum quantity
or rate of flow required in the area.' The "duty of water" varies by state,
ranging from one cubic foot per second for every fifty acres in Idaho to
one cubic foot per second for every seventy acres in Wyoming and Nebraska." Colorado's duty of water, one cubic foot per second for every
forty acres," is undemanding but not far from other states' standards for
limiting agricultural water to only the extent needed." Over the last three
engineering and other factors which will or might affect the water resources of the Upper
Gunnison River Water Conservancy District. To this end the District will participate in
activities deemed necessary to enforce its position opposing transfers of water from the
headwaters of the Gunnison River to other basins." UPPER GUNNIsON RIVER WATER
CONSERVANcY DIST., PosITION STATEMENT ON TRANSBASIN DIVERSION (Aug. 28,
2000).
45. TROUT, WITWER & FREEMAN, supra note 19, at 76.
46. Interview with Jennifer Pitt, Environmental Defense Fund (Jan. 2010). A 2007
report indicates that there were 1,494 total transfers for Colorado with 1,270 for municipal uses, but taking the C-BT project out of the picture, Colorado transfers (240 annually) are more comparable with those of California (303 total with 176 for municipal purposes), which is the site of the largest number of annual transfers since 1990.
TROUT, WITWER & FREEMAN, supra note 19, at 5-6.
47.
48. Id.
49. Agriculture is a beneficial use in Colorado. See COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 6.
50. Klahn, supra note 38.
1
51.
TROUT, WITWER & FREEMAN, supra note 19, at 25.
52. Getches, supra note 10, at 131.
53. Klahn, supra note 37.
54. Interview with John Gerstle, Technical Advisor, Trout Unlimited, in Boulder,
Colorado, (Mar. 2009).
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decades, Colorado courts have also added the statutory "anti-speculation"'
and "can and will"' doctrines to appropriation requirements, making it
increasingly difficult for cities to develop water supplies without meeting
certain long-range planning criteria."
As a prior appropriation state, Colorado transfers priority dates with
the water rights." But water transfers are only valid to the extent that they
meet the state's relatively demanding legal standards of transfers."
"Transfers" are one type of "change" under Colorado water law, which can
range from change in point of diversion, place of use, purpose of use,
and timing of use.' Although all changes require rigorous standards,
since transfers entail not only change in the water rights owner but usually
implicate most other change types, extra-basin transfers are difficult in
theory. Water organizations may also include restrictions on transfers in
their by-laws and policies, as will be discussed below. While this study
focuses on transfers external to water organization districts, it also alludes
to intra-district transfers where relevant for an organization.
Users may transfer water rights by sale, lease, or exchange.' Since
water is severable from the land in Colorado, new uses may not exceed
the quantity of rights held by the transferor, thus preventing harm to existing appropriators.'" Most significantly for agricultural water transfers,
the transferee, if successful in all other respects, may only transfer the
amount of water for the new use based on the amount that the old use
historically consumed, rather than the amount actually diverted or even
initially decreed.' Therefore, change applications require calculation of
the change in terms of the amount a crop historically consumes, which in
the case of crops is calculated as an average of fifty percent."
55.

COLO. REV. STAT. S 37-92-103(3)(a) (2011).

56.

Id. § 37-92-305(9)(b).

57. Pagosa Area Water and Sanitation Dist. v. Trout Unlimited, 170 P.3d 307, 315
(Colo. 2007)(holding that municipalities still have the burden of demonstrating that their
conditional appropriations are not speculative and that the appropriations are "consistent
with their reasonably anticipated water requirements based on substantiated projections
of future growth within their service area") (emphasis added) (this refined the "mnunicipali3
37 92
- -10 3 ( )(a)
ty exception" to the anti-speculation doctrine under COLO. REV. STAT. §
(2011)).
58. TROUT, WITWER & FREEMAN, supra note 20, at 10.
59.
Id. at 10, 117-23; Getches, supra note 10, at 167-69.
60. TROUT, WITWER & FREEMAN, supra note 19, at 10, 117-23.
61.
Getches, supra note 10, at 168.
62. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-92-103(5), -305(3) (2011); TROUT, WITWER &
FREEMAN, supra note 20, at 117-122.
63. TROUT, WITWER & FREEMAN, supra note 19, at 119-121; Getches, supra note
10, at 187-89.
Doug Clements, Principal Water Res. Eng'r and Vice President, Spronk Water
64.
Eng'rs, Inc., Guest Lecturer, Water Law, University of Denver Sturin College of Law
(Fall 2009); Sherwood, supra note 4, at 37. A plant "consumes" half by evaporation retention, and transpiration, the "historical consumptive use" ("HCU"). The rest flows or
seeps back into the stream from ditches or fields or groundwater aquifers, etc, partly as
return flow for other appropriators. Agricultural water use in terms of HCU was obtained wherever possible for agricultural water totals in Exhibit A, but difficult to always
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Besides quantity transferred, Colorado courts have factored other
considerations into determining "no harm" to other existing appropriators, including the right to "continuation of stream conditions as they existed at the time of their respective appropriations."' These stream conditions include return flows in terms of the time, amount, and location
that the transferor used the rights." One must also factor in the season of
use as well as the care of formerly irrigated land under the "area-of-origin"
statute." Although Colorado, unlike many other Western states, has no
"public interest" or "public trust" doctrine to contest transfers on the basis
of environmental, economic, or social grounds, Colorado courts are increasingly adding conditions to transfers in the name of public welfare."'
The "anti-speculation" doctrine now applies to change cases.' Moreover,
the most recent Colorado supreme court anti-speculation ruling narrowed
the anti-speculation "exception" for municipalities in developing water
supplies by requiring "reasonable planning periods," etc."
Because so many change issues involve agricultural-to-urban transfers,
and because these types of transfers can potentially impact every downstream user on the stream, transaction costs of going to court over agricultural water transfers can be incredibly high." The most obvious evidence for change case law acting as a barrier to transfers is that users often import "foreign" (i.e. from a different basin) agricultural water for
municipal use rather than changing agricultural water in-basin to municipal use." Because "foreign" or "imported" water is not subject to water
court adjudication and, therefore, not subject to change case standards,
"trans-basin" (and often, "trans-mountain") laws generally permit the diversions." Trans-basin diversions often involve agricultural-to-urban or agricultural-to agricultural changes, and are increasingly subject to state and
federal restrictions," as raised in Section IV, supra.
obtain. It is also important to bear in mind that agricultural land in Western states such
as Colorado includes cropland, comprised of harvested, failed, abandoned, fallowed and
cover crops and pasture and grazing lands; pastureland, comprised of grazing land; and
woodland, comprised of pastured and unpastured land.
65. Farmers Highline Canal & Reservoir, Co. v. City of Golden, 272 P.2d 629, 631
(Colo. 1954).
66.

TROUT, WTIVER & FREEMAN, supra note 19, at 119.

67. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-45-118(1)(b)(II) (2011); Peter D. Nichols & Douglas S.
Kenney, Watering Growth in Colorado: Swept Along by the Current or Choosing a
Better Line? 6 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 411, 423 (2003) (for further discussion of Colorado's "area-of-origin" mitigation statute see Section IV).
68. Craig, supra note 25, at 793-94.
69. MacDonnell, supra note 6, at 1.
70. Pagosa Area Water and Sanitation Dist. v. Trout Unlimited, 70 P.3d 307, 315
(Colo. 2007).
71. Nichols & Kenney, supra note 67, at 423 (additionally, "the larger and/or more
senior the water right and the more significant the change, the more likelihood there is
of injury, with a corresponding incentive for other appropriators to oppose the change,"
compounding potential water court transaction costs).
72. Nichols & Kenny, supra note 67, at 423.
73. Id. at 424; Getches, supra note 10, at 171.
74. See id. at 168-173.
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Such potentially high transfer costs have obvious ramifications for
discouraging large agricultural-to-municipal transfers, as well as discouraging large mineral development, such as oil shale development.' Despite
legal and economic costs associated with water transfers, they are usually
still more cost-effective than water augmentation options." Although
many water basins are already at or near their development capacity or
too remote to be economically attractive, waters from the Upper Colorado, the Gunnison, and the South Platte are targets for additional development." Perhaps ironically, the success of Colorado water law in protecting and responding to the needs of agriculture has played a large role
in not only strengthening the state's economy, but increasing the overall
flexibility of the legal system, including water transfers."

III. WATER ORGANIZATIONS IN COLORADO
A. NOMENCLATURE AND BACKGROUND

As described above, water organizations arose in Colorado as a
means for neighboring landowners to pool resources, in a collective effort
to convey water to locations often distant from the source." There are
five major water organization types in Colorado: conservation districts,
conservancy districts, irrigation districts, ditch companies, and water users' associations. In Colorado, conservation and conservancy districts
largely perform the function that irrigation districts fulfill in other western
states" and are, therefore, the focus of this study. Mutual ditch companies, numbering in the thousands, collectively play a larger role politically
than in most other western states and also fulfill some of the functions of
earlier irrigation districts."' Conservancy districts have also largely supplanted Colorado's earlier "water users' associations," which fulfilled roles

75. See Water on the Rocks: Oil Shale Water Rights in Colorado, Western Reat
(2009),
available
B
Appendix
sources
Advocates
Numerous
http://www.westernresourceadvocates.org/land/wotrreport/wotrreport.pdf.
companies hold significant but conditional or "unperfected" water rights for oil shale
development in Western Colorado.
76. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-103(9)(2011); Nichols & Kenney, supra note 67, at
434; TROUT, WITWER & FREEMAN, supra note 19, at 133. "Augmentation" under Colorado water law is a tool for providing water for new water uses if water is unavailable for
appropriation in the traditional manner and involves a plan to replace out-of-priority
depletions by junior uses in time, place, rate of diversion, and amount, with a substitute
water supply.
77. Nichols & Kenney, supra note 67, at 447-49.
78. See Hobbs, supra note 7, at 19.
79.

TROUT, WITWER & FREEMAN, supra note 19, at 180.

80.
81.

Id. at 190.
Interview with David Freeman, supra note 5.
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similar to irrigation districts but now tend to be more loosely formed advocacy-type groups."

Historically, Colorado has organized totals for agricultural water (i.e.
irrigable area) according to individual conveyance structures, such as
ditches, or use type," and even this type of organization appears to be
fairly recent. Experts have likely found it difficult to organize irrigable
area by water organization, not just because of the challenges of quantifying irrigable area, but because of the organizations' widely-varying powers.
The functions organizations perform, e.g. acting as wholesalers, as deliverer-suppliers, or as policy-makers, can also dictate the extent to which
organizations have the power to transfer water." For example, The
Northern District acts as more of a wholesaler, delivering an average of
220,000 acre feet per year of agricultural water to its constituents," while
other organizations play more of a direct delivery role, such as the TriCounty Water Conservancy District." Others still, such as the Upper
Gunnison Water Conservancy District, play more of a policy-making
role."
There is no set legal "organizational hierarchy" among water organizations, e.g. conservation districts do not control the water rights holdings
of conservancy or irrigation districts within their borders." However, water organizations seem to be endowed with progressively more robust
legal and political powers, from water users' associations "up" through
conservation districts. For example, conservancy districts are empowered
to contract with other water organizations (mutual ditch companies and
water associations, e.g.) and other private corporations for the sale of
water, as authorized by conservancy district boards." Conservation districts have broader eminent domain powers than conservancy districts,
and conservancy districts have broader taxing authority over their constituents than irrigation districts." Irrigation districts can exert some control
82. TROUT, WITWER & FREEMAN, supra note 20 at 187. One notable exception to
this is the Uncompahgre Valley Water Users' Association, which recently paid off its
100-year contract with the Reclamation for its irrigation works.
83. Interview with Kyle Whitaker, Assistant Div. Eng'r, Div. 5, Colo. Div. of Water
Res. (Feb. 24, 2010).
84. Reed D. Benson, Whose Water Is It? Private Rights and Public Authority Over
Reclamation Project Water, 16 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 363, 402-08 (1997).
85. Interview with Brian Werner, Pub. Info. Office, N. Colo. Water Conservancy
Dist. (Apr. 14, 2010).
Operating Policy, (2011),
District,
86. Tri-County Water Conservancy
http://www.tricountywater.org/www/pdf/about/OperatingPolicy/Op policy.pdf (last visited, Jul. 3, 2010).
87. See Upper Gunnison River Water Conservancy District, Activities Planned for
2010 (2010), http://www.ugrwcd.org/Pages/20 10%20Activities.pdf (last visited, Jul. 3,
2010).
88. Interview with Taylor Hawes, Colo. River Program Dir., The Nature Conservancy (Feb. 17, 2010).
89. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-45-131 (2011).
90. Id. §§ 37-46-101; Id. § 37-47-101 (2009); TROUT, WITWER & FREEMAN, supra
note 19, at 197.
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over water users' associations." The extent to which these power distinctions impact water rights transfers from within and between specific water
organizations is unclear but could be the focus of future investigation.
1. Water conservation districts
Colorado created conservation districts under the Water Conservancy
Act, C.R.S. § 37-45-101, with separate articles for each of the districts:
the Colorado River Water Conservation District (the "River District"), the
Southwestern Water Conservation District, the Republican River Water
Conservation District, and the Rio Grande Water Conservation District.
Both conservation and conservancy districts become political and public
corporate subdivisions of the state upon creation, with general and special assessment bond-issuing powers." Conservation districts, like conservancy districts, have historically been, and continue to be, associated
with agricultural interests in particular, although mandated to protect and
develop a number of uses - agriculture, domestic, mining, recreation, fish
and wildlife." Conservation districts are generally established in response
to specific water project needs." They may file for water rights and initiate appropriations for the use and benefit of the ultimate appropriators.'
They may also, as described above, contract with federal agencies for the
construction and repayment of water works.'
There are only four conservation districts in Colorado and only two
in the Colorado River basin, the River District, described infra, and the
Southwestern Water Conservation District. They are both more "regional" in nature than their conservancy district counterparts and exist to protect the interests of their constituent water user." Therefore, they tend to
be involved more in policy than in building their own projects or acting as
water suppliers.' Conservation districts have broad practical powers over
wide geographic areas," with the authority to construct reservoirs, ditches,
COLo. REV. STAT. § 37-42-113 (2011).
TROUT, WITWER & FREEMAN, supra note 19, at 192. Conservation and conservancy districts are often labeled "quasi-governmental" because the courts have had to differentiate them from public utilities, but are in fact, governmental entities, unlike the
other water organization types. Both are subject to all the same taxing and open records
laws as other governmental organs. Id. at 193, 197. A conservation district's landowners
may pursue the creation of "subdistricts," which are also considered separate political
subdivisions of the state, but generally use the same board membership. Id. at 196-197.
Interview with David Freeman, supra note 5. The largely agricultural, and to a
93.
lesser extent, recreational, mandate of conservancy districts is also borne out by the case
law. Conservancy and conservation districts have been party to countless lawsuits, too
numerous to list, but have been fundamental in contributing to the evolution of water
law in Colorado.
94. TROUT, WITWER & FREEMAN, supra note 19, at 195.
95. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-46-107, -47-107, -48-105, -50-107 (2011).
91.

92.

96.
97.

Id.
Interview with Taylor Hawes, supra note 88.

98.
Kassen, supra note 28 at 75.
99. The River District encompasses fifteen counties, the Upper Colorado River and
its tributaries in all of Division 5 and parts of Division 4. About Us, Colorado River
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and other conveyance structures to promote the health and general welfare of their districts and that of the state." The general legislative powers circumscribing the River District and Southwestern do not differ substantially, charging both with the responsibility for protecting and developing Colorado's compact entitlements for Coloradans, in addition to indistrict water conservation, use, and development."'
Conservation districts are governed by a board of directors whose
members are appointed for three-year terms by the boards of county
commissioners from each county through majority voting." Unlike conservancy districts, conservation districts are created by legislative action,
have broader powers of eminent domain, and can contract with public
and private entities in joint ventures.'" Conservation districts also raise
their funds through ad valorem taxes on district property whereas conservancy districts primarily raise revenue through district mill levies.'
B. TRANSFERS UNDER WATER CONSERVATION DISTRICTS: GENERAL
PRINCIPLES

Most conservation and conservancy districts tend to sell or lease water from larger projects to their constituents through allotment contracts,
which circumscribe rules for transfers." Allotment contracts can provide
greater flexibility for the end-user, sometimes obviating the need for water court altogether." But, the flexibility of water allotment contracts and thus their implications for water rights transfer potential - still depend on a number of factors specific to the contract, in addition to legal
and political factors."'
1. Water conservancy districts
There are reports of between 46 and 51 conservancy districts in Colorado, but Colorado's list of recreated conservancy districts in the Water
Conservancy Act contains forty-six conservancy districts, including two
subdistricts." Conservancy districts were also established to finance and
construct waterworks for a number of uses, most predominantly agricul-

Water Conservation District, http://www.crwcd.org/page_1 (last visited Aug. 30,
Southwestern serves six counties and parts of three, the San Juan and Dolores
and their tributaries (which are tributary to the Colorado), all within Division 7.
Us, Southwestern Water Conservation District, http://swwcd.org/about-us (last
Aug. 30, 2011).
100.

TROUT, WITWER & FREEMAN, supra note 19, at 195.

101.

See §§ 37-46-101, -47-101.

102.

TROUT, WITWER & FREEMAN, supra note 19, at 196.

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Id. at 197.
Id. at 192-193, 197.
Interview with Taylor Hawes, supra note 88.
Interview with Brian Werner, supra note 85.
See infra Sections IV and V.
§ 37-45-153(1) .

2011).
Rivers
About
visited
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ture." Conservancy districts also stabilize and increase flows and returns
flows as needed for their constituents."' As described above, there is little
legally distinguishing conservancy districts from conservation districts, but
they are likely often confused because many conservancy districts such as
Northern and the Southeastern Colorado Water Conservancy District
Conservancy districts
("Southeastern") act in such a "regional" capacity.'
also build their own projects, with Northern's Colorado-Big Thompson
project with Reclamation the most notable water project in Colorado."'
Conservancy districts are also generally established on the basic of specific water projects, and then their mandates may expand."'
Conservancy districts are distinguishable from other water organizations in terms of their formation and governance. Unlike conservation
and irrigation districts, the boundaries of conservancy districts are established through citizen-petition and are legally created through judicial
action in district court."' District courts appoint conservancy district
boards unless constituents opt for elections." However, the courts are
only involved in conservancy district activities at district formation and
during disputes; boards are otherwise largely in control of all conservancy
district actions."' Approval of districts by court decree establish conservancy districts as political and corporate state subdivisions with all the
powers of a public or municipal corporation, like conservation districts."'
Boards consist of a maximum of fifteen people, all of whom must reside in the district, own land, and be knowledgeable about water."'
Boards have the power to establish by-laws and rules to carry out the district's objectives."' Conservancy districts can levy four classes of tax assessments." They also generate revenue through sale or leasing of water
by contract and bonding."'
Conservancy districts are endowed with the same broad powers as
conservation districts to appropriate, sell, lease, and use water, water
rights and all personal property of any kind within and outside of the dis-

109.

Interview with David Freeman, supra note 5.

110.

TROUT, WITWER & FREEMAN, supra note 19, at 191.

111. Interview with Brian Werner, supra note 85; Interview with Bob Hamilton, Engineering Supervisor, Southeastern Colorado Water Conservancy District (Apr. 5, 2010).
112. Interview with Bob Hamilton, supra note 111.
113. Id.
114. §§ 37-45-108 to -109 (2009) (outlining the requirements for creation of conservancy districts by petition, including, minimum valuation of irrigated land, $20 million
dollars, and minimum required signatures of landowners with irrigated land within the
district).
115. Id. § 37-45-114.
116. Id. § 37-45-108; Peaker v. Se. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist., 483 P.2d 232, 234
(Colo. 1971).
117.

118.
119.
120.
121.

TROUT, WITWER & FREEMAN, supra note 19, at 192, 195.

Id. at 192
-Id. at 193.
§ 37-45-121.
TROUT, WITWER & FREEMAN, supra note 19, at 193.
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trict.'" They can contract with the federal government for reclamation
They can use eminent domain to
and other development projects."
achieve any district purposes except to control water rights intended for
trans-mountain diversion.'
As with conservation districts, most conservancy districts tend to sell
or lease water from larger projects to their constituents through allotment
contracts, which circumscribe rules for transfers." Conservancy boards
have the power to approve and enforce all allotment contracts, including
the power to withhold water for delinquent payment, and to declare forfeiture of rights upon breach of contract." Conservancy districts also
have the power to allocate and reallocate water within the district.'" The
conservancy district board must usually approve transfer of allotment
contracts.'" While transfers are usually approved, no one has a legal right
to obtain the board's approval of a transfer.'" Unlike any other water organization type, conservancy districts are subject to a unique mitigation
requirement when exporting water from the Colorado River basin from
one of their districts." While the extent to which this provision in combination with other sections of this article limits transfers, recent courts
have ruled that extra-district use is "not per se impermissible."" As with
conservation districts, whether or not conservancy districts manage their
water rights through allotment contracts, there are additional legal and
political factors that can affect transfers, as discussed below.
2.

Irrigation districts

Irrigation districts were first codified under Colorado law in 1905,
and there are currently sixteen of them in the state.'" Older irrigation
122.
123.
124.

§ 37-45-118(1)(b)(I)(A).
Id. § 37-45-118(1)(e).
Id. § 37-45-118(1)(c).

125.

See,

e.g.,

Water Marketing, COLORADO

RIVER

WATER

CONSERVATION

DIsTRICT, http://www.crwcd.org/page-180 (last visited Oct. 1, 2011); Colorado River
Contract 5,
Supply
Water
Yampa
District,
Conservation
Water
http://www.crwcd.org/nedia/uploads/20110419_contractwater_supply yampa.pdf (last
visited Oct. 1, 2011).
126. § 37-45-134.
127. Id.
128.

TROUT, WITWER & FREEMAN, supra note 19, at 76.

129.

Id.

130.

TROUT, WITWER & FREEMAN, supra note 20, at 194; Nichols & Kenney, supra

note 67 at 424-425; COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-45-118(1)(b)(II); See infra Section IV.
131. City of Thornton v. Bijou Irrigation Co., 926 P.2d 1, 57 (Colo. 1996) (holding
"extra-district use is not per se impermissible," despite the fact that C.R.S. § 37-45-118
evinces an intent that a conservancy district use the benefits of any water developed by
the district within the boundaries of the district). The Water Conservancy Act, the repayment contract, and the rules enacted by Northern all "discourage[] and strictly limit[]" use of Colorado Big-Thompson water outside the boundaries of Northern. Id. at
57-58. See also mnfra Section IV (explaining contracts, statutes and board rules in the
aggregate can present barriers to transfer).
132.

TROUT, WITWER & FREEMAN, supra note 19, at 190.
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districts legislatively formed in 1921 and earlier are referred to as Article
41 and Article 42 irrigation districts." All irrigation districts, including
those formed after 1921, are now subject to provisions of Article 43 of
Title 37.'" The purpose of irrigation districts is to maintain the irrigability of land by providing necessary irrigation and drainage."
Irrigation districts are formed through landowner petitions to the
board of county commissioners for the county containing most of the
district, and voted on by qualified electors within the proposed district."
The districts are governed by a three-to-five member board of directors
representing their respective divisions of the district." The state's legislative authority for the rules and management of irrigation districts is much
more exhaustive than that for conservation and conservancy districts, but
the board may still adopt its own rules for determining water distribution
in the district."
In addition to a much narrower mandate than for conservation and
conservancy districts, irrigation districts cannot levy general taxes unlike
the other district types.'" Therefore, irrigation districts are not considered government entities for the purposes of the Colorado constitution."
Special tax levies are only assessed on lands suitable or capable for irrigation." The levies also fund the bonds and repayment for federal irrigation projects."' Boards may also sell bonds to fund the construction or
purchase of waterworks and water rights."
3.

Ditch Companies
i. Joint Ditches

A joint or common ditch is simply a water transport ditch used by two
or more parties, and not a company, per se, and a precursor to the ditch
companies, described below."' Ditch ownership rights are "real property
rights that may be conveyed or reserved separately from the land or water
rights associated with the ditch."" In the absence of any contract, users
own the ditch as tenants in common with all the relevant rights and liabilities of such co-ownership."

133.
134.
135.

Id.
Id.
§ 37-41-101(1).

136.

TROUT, WITWER & FREEMAN, supra note 19, at 190.
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Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

141.

Id.

142.
143.
144.
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Id. at 190-191.
Id. at 191.
Id. at 182.
Id.
Id.
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Joint ditches were the first unofficial water organizations in Colorado
and while real property and ditch maintenance provisions apply, joint
ditches do not have organization-specific legislative authorization."' Once
a ditch owner lawfully diverts water from a natural stream for beneficial
use, the water becomes the ditch owner's real property right but also becomes unprotected by the water statutes governing changes in water
rights." Therefore, unlike stockholders in mutual ditch companies, discussed below, ditch owners have no obligation to avoid injury to other
users claiming reliance on that water."
ii. Mutual ditch companies
Mutual ditch companies ("MDCs") were the first statutorily established water organizations in Colorado, and were authorized as early in
the 1860s in most Western states." MDCs were established in several
ways, including by joint ditch owners who traded their interests for stock
in MDCs, holders of water rights who transferred their rights to the
MDCs in exchange for stock, and by land developers who conveyed their
stock along with each acre sold."' MDCs are one of two types of ditch
companies in Colorado; the other is the carrier ditch company.' MDCs
are non-profit and exist for the benefit of their shareholders, storing and
transporting water to shareholders, who are the sole owners of their diversion works."' Carrier ditch companies convey water for sale to consumers who have contracted with the company and operate at a profit;
their water charges are fixed by the board of county commissioners.
MDCs typically issue shares of stock that represent the shareholder's
right to receive water." MDCs are non-profit entities financed almost
entirely through shareholders' pro rata stock assessments and user fees.'
Although the company holds legal title to water rights and represents its
users against other appropriators, each shareholder is the beneficial owner of the individual water rights as evidenced by shares.'" MDCs are
found in unincorporated form, and also in incorporated form to insulate
shareholders from liability." A state water official indicated that smaller
unincorporated MDCs are much more common in the less-densely popu-

147.

Getches, supra note 10, at 454-455.

148.
149.

TROUT, WITWER & FREEMAN, supra note 19, at 182-183.
Id.

150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Getches, supra note 10, at 455.
Id. at 455-456
Id. at 454-455.
Id. at 454.
COLo. REV. STAT. § 7-42-107.
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TROUT, WITWER & FREEMAN, supra note 19, at 185-186.
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Id.
Id. at 184.

Issue 1I

WATER ORGANIZATIONS IN COLORADO

49

lated, higher upstream areas of the West Slope than on the more highly
populated, lowland East Slope.
Shareholders participate in MDC governance issues to varying extents."Both kinds of MDCs are subject to the Ditch and Reservoir Coinpanies Statute as well as other statutes relevant to all corporations, requirBut an MDC's
ing that MDCs be governed by a board of directors.'
articles of incorporation may vest shareholders with special or conditional
voting rights based on their class of shares and may establish classes of
members or directors with certain voting rights."
C. TRANSFERS UNDER MUTUAL DITCH COMPANIES: GENERAL
PRINCIPLES

Because MDC stockholders are the equitable owners of water rights,
shareholders may change the use of their pro rata share of water rights
outside the ditch without the company's approval, provided other users
are not injured." The companies' bylaws, however, typically contain provisions governing transfers, rights of first refusal, and other restrictions
that commonly require MDC approval.' Although Colorado has permitted transfers if the transferor continues to bear an appropriate share of
maintenance costs, Colorado courts have upheld an MDC by-law limiting
changing the place of use to lands within a single county." Water rights in
the form of ditch company stock readily facilitate transfers but they may
be subject to federal securities laws.";
Water development strategies such as reuse are generally unavailable
for water organizations like ditch companies because they are costprohibitive." Nevertheless, MDCs and joint ditches are extremely flexible water organizations that permit temporary water rights transfers to
allow for efficient water distribution to those with the greatest need."'
The precise number of ditch companies is difficult to ascertain,"' but
159.

Interview with Kyle Whitaker, supranote 83.

160.
TROUT, WITVER & FREEMAN, supra note 19, at 185.
161.
Id. at 185.
162.
Id.
163.
Id. at 186.
164.
Id. at 185-86.
165.
GETCHES, supra note 10, at 458-59.
166.
GETCHES, supra note 10, at 458.
167.
David F. Jankowski et al., Symposium, The 1969 Act's Contributions to Local
Governmental Water Suppliers, 3 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 20, 34 (1999).
168.
Kassen, supra note 28, at 74. If another water rights holder transfers water with
different priorities to an MDC, MDCs have the ability to assign different classes of stock
with different privileges and burdens to its stockholders. GETCHES, supra note 10, at
459.
Data on specific incorporated MDCs is available through the Colorado Depart169.
ment of State in the form of "Entity Extracts" for $50 per submission, but because the
entities are only searchable by title, often do not contain "mutual ditch" language in their
title, and because MDCs can be registered as a number of different entity types, Domestic For Profit, Domestic LLC, etc., a proper search would be extremely tedious and
costly. See Colorado Department of State Order Form for Entity Extract Listing,
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there are likely thousands of ditch companies in Colorado which collectively account for a significant share of agricultural water pertinent for this
study."'
1.

Water users' associations

Like irrigation districts, water users' associations were originally organized as private corporations to take advantage of turn-of-the-century federal Reclamation projects." Although conservancy and conservation districts have generally supplanted private water users' associations, some of
the original organizations still exist, including the Uncompahgre Valley
Water Users Association."' Like MDCs, boards of directors control water users' associations, but the rules may give stockholders limited voting
rights."' Water users' associations are vested with the same authority as
irrigation districts, as well as traditional corporate powers and their own
statutory powers."' The form and purpose of today's water users' associations vary greatly but it is common that the organizations act as advocacy
groups facilitating their constituents' involvement in a wide range of water
issues.'

COLO.
DEP'T.
OF
STATE,
(last
http://www.sos.state.co.us/pubs/business/PDFFillable/ENTITY EXTRACT.pdf
visited Oct. 2, 2011).
170. Interview with David Freeman, supra note 5.
171.
TROUT, WITWER & FREEMAN, supra note 19, at 187.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 188.
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Additional
Ability to initiate Ability to hold Ability of its
water rights users to transfer constraints on
water rights
transfers
water rights
Conservation
Districts

yes

yes

yes, with ap- terms of federal
proval of the allotment contracts
district "Enterprise" (River
District)

Conservancy
districts

yes

yes

yes, with board terms of federal
allotment conapproval
tracts and district by-laws
and CO Water
Conservancy

Irrigation
districts

yes

yes

district rules
yes, upon approval by two- and by-laws and
thirds of district CO Irrigation
District law
electors

Act

Mutual ditch yes, at end-user yes, at end-user
level
level
companies

yes

company articles of incorporation, by-laws
and rights of
first refusal

Table 1. Comparison of Colorado water organizations' powers relative to
transfers."

IV. STATUTORY CONSTRAINTS ON AGRICULTURAL WATER
RIGHTS TRANSFERS IN COLORADO
A. GENERAL STATE STATUTORY CONSTRAINTS AND CONSIDERATIONS
The Water Conservancy Act, as described above, authorizes the legal
creation of conservation and conservancy districts.'" Although the conservancy statutes do not directly address the boards' powers regarding
transfers, the Colorado River District and Southwestern District are mandated internally to protect Western slope interests, predominantly agriculture." Conservancy district boards, as noted above, are charged with
preventing the sale of water outside district boundaries.'"

"Transfers" for this table refer to all transfers, whether within a water organiza176.
tion district or external to a water organization district. The designation depends on the
contract-specific terms.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-45-101 to -153.
177.
178.
Id. §§ 37-46-101, -47-101.
Id. S 37-45-118.
179.
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Conservancy district boards are empowered to "sell, lease, or otherwise dispose of water, waterworks, water rights, and sources of supply of
water for use within the district, " but also to "acquire, construct . . . control, and use any and all works . . . . to the exercise of its power, both

within and without the district for the purpose of providing for the use of
such water within the district," as well as to "take by appropriation . . .
water, waterworks, water rights . . . and any and all real and personal

property of any kind within or without the district necessary or convenient to the full exercise of its powers."" Colorado also has a basis of origin
mitigation statute, which only applies to exports from the Colorado River
basin, requiring that the waterworks from the exporting basin "not be
impaired nor increased in cost at the expense of the water users within
the natural basin.""' This provision added an important "compensatory
storage" requirement for what are typically trans-mountain transfers from
the West Slope to the East Slope, the most notable of which is Northern's
Green Mountain Reservoir.'
Conservancy district boards are also empowered to contract with the
federal government to construct, operate and maintain necessary works
with the requisite water rights and to "list in separate ownership the lands
within the district which are susceptible of irrigation from district sources
and to make an [efficient and beneficial] allotment of water to all such
lands."'" Boards are also charged with levying assessments against the
lands in the district to which water is allotted, and fixing rates for different classes of water users.' Federal allotment and other contracts authorize compliance with the Act." Conservancy districts are compelled to use
the benefits of any water they develop within their own boundaries.'"
However, the Colorado Supreme Court has found transfers by districts
"not per se impermissible," largely on the basis of federal allotment contracts, but also on the basis of Reclamation law and the Water Conservancy Act.'"
B.

"EXTERNAL" CONSTRAINTS

Other state and local statutory constraints relevant for assessing the
ability of districts to transfer water include the "area-of-origin" mitigation
statute, House Bill 1041, Senate Bill 03-73, and the state's anti-export

180. Id. § 37-45-118(1)(b)(I) (emphasis added).
181. Id. § 37-45-118(1)(b)(II).
182. Nichols & Kenney, supra note 67, at 424-25 & n.106.
183. § 37-45-118(1)(f).
184. Id. S 37-45-121.
185. See, e.g., Contract Between the United States and the Northern Colorado Water
Conservancy District Providing for the Construction of the Colorado Big-Thompson
Project, Colorado (Jul. 5, 1938), courtesy of Brian Werner, Northern Colorado Water
Conservancy District (Apr. 14, 2010).
186. City of Thornton, 926 P.2d at 57.
187. Id. at 57-58.
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statute. All of these statutes require further investigation, but will be briefly introduced here.
In response to the inability of Title 37 to completely preclude transfers and the controversy of increasing changes of large tributary irrigation
rights to urban rights, proposals restricting out-of-basin transfers have
been suggested for many years and continue to this day." Scholars partly
blame Colorado's ineffectiveness in restricting transfers on the state's lack
of a "public trust" or "public interest" doctrine as a means to provide basin-of-origin protection from trans-basin diversions.'"
However, Colorado recently adopted legislation requiring area-oforigin mitigation measures for transfers of more than one thousand acrefeet of consumptive use per year from irrigated agricultural in one county
to non-agricultural use in another county.'"
The bill reflects the conservationist thrust of a public trust doctrine,
but also its economic thrust, as it requires compensation payments to
affected governmental entities, including water organizations, for lost real
estate property tax revenue from loss of irrigation."' Three exemptions
work to dilute the measure's effectiveness: (1) mitigation payments do not
apply to water rights held or pending as of August 3, 2003; (2) most water
organizations and municipalities are exempt from payments if the change
is within their service areas; and (3) mitigation payments are not required
if the new place of use is within a 20-mile radius of the historic place of
use, even if the new place of use is in a different county.'" Mitigation
payments are also not an "absolute require [menti," and no water court
decree has yet been entered in a case subject to these provisions."
Some scholars held out hope that House Bill 1041 would help keep
water in-basin because the bill was established to "empower[i local governments to regulate projects that affect the state interest . . . land] increasling] significantly the power of local government to control land use
The thrust of the
activities," including water development projects.'
House Bill 1041 powers is the ability of local government to require a
county permit for any activity designated as a matter of state interest."
The Colorado Supreme Court has rejected challenges by East Slope interests contending that House Bill 1041 is an unconstitutional delegation
of power to local governiment.'" The court has even rejected Denver's
contention that it was exempt from local governmental regulation under
House Bill 1041 as a home rule city.'" Additionally, the Colorado court

188.
189.
190.
191.

Craig, supra note 25, at 794; TROUT, WITWER & FREEMAN, supra note 19, at 123.
Craig, supra note 25, at 793-794 n.11.
TROUT, WITWER & FREEMAN, supra note 19, at 123-24.
Id. at 124.

192.
193.

Id. at124-125.
Id. at 123-125 (citing COLO. REv. STAT. SS 37-92-103, -205, -302 (2009)).

194.

Craig, supra note 25, at 794.

195.
196.

Id. at 794-95.
Id. at 797.

197.

Id. at 805-06.
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of appeals has held that "the existence of previously decreed water rights
does not provide an exemption for the developer from regulation."'
However, "a county may regulate but not prohibit proposed water development projects, although the scope of county regulation is unclear."'
Finally, Colorado has placed statutory restrictions on out-of-state water transfers." Colorado is not unique in this matter, as many western
states have anti-export statutes governing the diversion of water outside
state boundaries."' Colorado's anti-export statute makes it unlawful for
any person, including a corporation, association, or other entity, to divert, carry, or transport by ditches, canals . . . or any other means any of

the water resources found in this state into any other state for use therein
without first complying with" anti-export provisions and paying fees under
C.R.S. sec. 37-81-104.'
Section 37-81-104 authorizes a fee of fifty dollars per acre-foot of water diverted out of the state for beneficial use." The statute sets forth
procedures to assure compliance with interstate water delivery compacts,
but any diversion to an out-of-state use must still go through an official
approval proceeding.' The state engineer, groundwater commission, or
water judge approving the diversion must find that the "proposed use of
water is not inconsistent with the reasonable conservation of water resources of th[e] state," and that it will "not deprive the citizens of thlel
state of the beneficial use of waters apportioned to Colorado by interstate
compact or judicial decree.""
A state's anti-export statute is preempted by federal law, in this case
Article IX of the 1948 Upper Colorado River compact, because the U.S.
Constitution prohibits discrimination against interstate, commerce." Article IX precludes states, signatory or otherwise, from denying the Upper
Basin states the right to acquire rights and supply and construct waterworks for delivery of water to Lower Basin states or to any "downstream"
states, when such use is "within the apportionment to such [lower] state by

198.
199.

TROUT, WITWER & FREEMAN, supra note 19, at 168.
Id.

200. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-81-101; Olen Paul Matthews & Michael Pease, The
Commerce Clause, Interstate Compacts, and Marketing Water Across State Boundaries,
46 NAT. RESOURCEs J. 601, 605 (2006) (citing Edward B. Shultz, Student Article, Water
as an Article of Commerce: State Embargos Spring a Leak under Sporhase v. Nebraska,
12 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 103, 106 (1985)).
201. Matthews & Pease, supra note 200, at 605-06, 648-52.
202. S 37-81-101.
203. Id. at§ 37-81-104.
204. Id. at§ 37-81-101.
205. Id.
206. - See, e.g., Frontier Ditch Co. v. Se. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist., 761 P.2d
1117, 1118 (Colo. 1988) (holding that the federal Arkansas River Compact, giving Kansas exclusive jurisdiction over water rights from Arkansas River tributaries, preempted
conflicting Colorado constitutional provision on rights to unappropriated waters of natural streams.).
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this compact."" For a statute to be unconstitutional, the federal and state
laws in question must contradict each other." Although the federal government has been loath to take regulation of water and other natural resources over from the state, Sporhase v. Nebraska, the groundbreaking
1983 Supreme Court case, made it unlawful to prohibit the export of
groundwater between states."
Although it is difficult to say whether Colorado's anti-export statute
would pass constitutional muster because very few states' anti-export statutes have been tested in federal court, a brief analysis would tend to suggest that it would be unconstitutional under the 1948 Compact for conflicting directly with Article IX. Although conditioning export on certain
measures (i.e. legislative approval) is constitutional, it is not clear that
"fees" would count as "conditions" or discrimination. Scholars also find
the provision that Colorado citizens "cannot be deprived of water by
compact" problematic because they consider Colorado to be attempting
to impermissibly "enlarge" the rights it was given under the 1922 and 1948
compacts."' Nevertheless, the Lower Basin States' entitled apportionment
would also have to be valid under Article IX for Colorado to have to export its water regardless of whether its export statute is constitutional.'
But until this year there has been considerable uncertainty regarding not
only availability, but entitlement, for each state.'
Other adjudicatory considerations for transfers apart from those mentioned in Section III include "calls on the river" and subordination
agreements. The primary calls on the Upper Colorado River during the
irrigation season are the "Cameo Calls," located in the Grand Valley area,
which contains some of the basin's most senior water rights, and the Shoshone Call, which is related to Green Mountain Reservoir, mentioned
infra. River calls and subordination agreements can affect the timing and
quantity of delivery to users in any given year, so it is unclear whether
they would impact transfers. However, experts have indicated that Senate
Bill 03-73, which recently revised the procedures for replacing out-ofpriority depletions, may result in greater overall reductions in irrigated
lands, and could therefore could impact the transfer landscape and war-

207. § 37-62-101. This article is Colorado's ratification of the Upper Colorado River
basin compact.
208. Federal river compacts, like other federal laws, preempt state law when the compact and state law conflict. See, e.g., Frontier Ditch Co. v. Se. Colo. Water Conservancy
Dist., 761 P.2d It 17, 1123 (Colo. 1988).
209. Sporhase v. Nebraska exrel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 953-54, 956, 959-60 (1982)
(holding groundwater subject to Commerce Clause scrutiny despite the Court's affirmation of a state's compelling interest in its own water).
210. Matthews & Pease, supra note 201, at 649-51.
211. Id.at650-51.
212. Benjamin Harding, Principle Eng'r, AMEC Earth & Envtl. and Stratus Consulting, Update on Colorado River Water Availability Study at City of Boulder Water Reat
available
(Mar.
15,
2010),
Meeting,
Advisory
Board
sources
http://www.bouldercolorado.gov/index.phpPoption=com_content&view=article&id- 1288
9&Itemid-2338.
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rants further investigation."' The role of the CWCB, described in Section II, and increasingly involved in water planning statewide, should also
explored with respect to impacts on transfers. Finally, future scholars
should explore the Arkansas River water banking experiment, for which
Colorado created legislature to establish district-level water banking.
C.

FEDERAL CONSTRAINTS AND CONSIDERATIONS

The Water Conservancy Act requires that waterworks planned and
designed for transfer "out of the Colorado river and its tributaries" by any
conservancy district comply with the 1922 Colorado River Compact and
Boulder Canyon Project Act.' The 1922 Compact sets total apportionments, determines dispute mechanisms, protects pre-1922 perfected
rights, and prescribes obligations of the Upper Basin states to the Lower
Basin states, but only in the aggregate.' In 1956 Congress enacted the
Colorado River Storage Project Act (CRSPA), putting into place a network of Colorado River reservoir structures to support the operation of
The projects are mainly for hydro-power but also
the 1922 Compact.'
increasingly for flood control and agriculture, with many conservancy
districts involved as both opponents and proponents. 2 ' The realization
that the seventy-five million, ten-year running average Lower Basin apportionment would leave the Upper Basin states severely shorted in dry
times because of reliance on the longest wet cycle in recorded Colorado
history (1905 to 1929), led to the creation of projects through the CRSPA
to assure local agricultural and domestic supplies."2 The Boulder Canyon
Project Act ("BCPA"), is a comprehensive scheme for apportionment
within the Lower Basin. It does not directly apply to Upper Basin
states,2 but would likely have implications for the Upper Basin states in
the event of curtailment, particularly since the BCPA only applies to
main-stem Colorado River supplies.
On the other hand, the 1948 Upper Colorado River Basin Compact
sets out apportionment among Upper Basin states, and mandates specific
minimum flows and interstate obligations for Colorado tributaries such as
the Yampa and San Juan Rivers."' Most importantly for the purposes of
this study, the Upper Basin Compact precludes states, signatory or otherwise, from denying the Upper Basin states the right to acquire rights to
supply and construct waterworks for delivery of water to Lower Basin
states or to any "downstream" states, when such use is "within the appor1

213. SWSI Report, supra note 1 at 3-5. The impact of SB 03-73 was not fully evaluated during the SWSI availability studies.
214. COLO. REV. STAT. 5 37-45-118(1)(b)(II) (2009).
215. Id. §§ 37-62-101 to -106.
216. Hobbs, supra note 7, at 30.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 28.
219. 43 U.S.C. § 617 (1994).
220. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-62-101 to -06 (2009).
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tionment of such Lower State made by this Compact."" The relevance of
Article IX for this study is clarified in Section A above in the context .of
the constitutionality of Colorado's anti-export statute.
The other major federal law involved in transfer restrictions by conservation and conservancy districts is Bureau of Reclamation law. The
1922 Reclamation Act enabled conservation and conservancy districts to
enter into repayment of large water development projects.'" As noted
above, the Water Conservancy Act authorizes districts to contract with
both the federal government and a wide range of allottees.'" The 1922
Act and subsequent Reclamation laws impact transfers through federal
contracts, which partly dictate the terms of the districts' allotment contracts with end-users." If conservancy districts enter into federal contracts with Reclamation, the government typically owns title to the waterworks, the conservancy district typically assumes the role of "middleman"
with perpetual rights to use the government water, and the end-user has
only beneficial use of the water.' The added federal government nexus
can severely restrict the end-users' rights in terms of transfers,"' and may
also make the rights very ambiguous.'
The water for federal projects has historically been devoted to agriculture but is increasingly municipal, with the Animas-La Plata project
being the most recent project.' Use of water from Reclamation projects
is controlled by both Colorado water law and Reclamation law, obviating
or diminishing the need for water rights or rights changes to be validated
in water court; a contract represents the right to use the water.' However, project water can only be used for certain purposes, which are usually
specified by Congress.'" Still, it is important to bear in mind that since
1987, the Bureau of Reclamation has changed its primary mission from a
developer of large, federally-financed agriculture projects to "resource
manage [r].""' The Bureau's changing role has meant increased voluntary
water transfers and transfer restrictions versus unilateral federal action,
with water organizations at the helm."
Lastly, since Colorado is comprised of one-third federal land, federal
permitting requirements under such laws as the Clean Water Act, Endangered Species Act, and Wilderness Act can impact transfers.' Conserva221.
222.
223.
224.

225.
226.
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227.

Id. S 101.
Hobbs, supra note 7, at 29.
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Id. at 411.
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tion and conservancy districts typically apprise end-users of permits that
are already obtained or will likely need to be obtained, through contracts
with Reclamation.
V.

GOVERNANCE CONSTRAINTS AND CONSIDERATIONS:
BY-LAWS, RULES AND POLICIES OF SPECIFIC WATER
ORGANIZATIONS
A.

CONSERVATION DISTRICTS: CASE STUDY

1. Colorado River Water Conservation District (the "River District")
As noted above, the River District is one of Colorado's four conservation districts, created in 1937 to protect primarily West Slope agricultural
interests in fifteen counties. Indeed, one of its first projects was the negotiation, planning, and construction of Green Mountain Reservoir to provide replacement for water lost to the East Slope through Northern's
Colorado-Big Thompson project, described below, under the Act's statutory basin-of-origin mitigation provision.' The River District covers approximately 29,000 square miles, which is roughly 28% of the land area
of CO.' The River District is involved with numerous projects and policies on behalf of its constituents, largely at the conservancy district level."
The District also protects Colorado's interests with respect to Colorado
River Compact entitlements." This component of the study will focus on
the River District's water marketing scheme, which allows its "Enterprise"
to contract water out to end-users with federally-decreed and nonfederally decreed water rights.
The River District's bylaws are statutorily codified as C.R.S. S 37-46101 and C.R.S. § 37-46-107, and provide broad regional mandates.' The
River District acts as a "wholesaler" in authorizing the Enterprise to provide for the beneficial use of water available from its storage capacity in
two reservoirs: Wolford Mountain and Eagle Park, through a water marketing scheme governed by the District's "Water Marketing Policy" and
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WATER
CONSERVATION
DISTRICT,
http://www.crwcd.org/pagel (last visited Sept. 13, 2011)
236. Colorado River Water Conservation District, http://www.crwcd.org/page_17 (last
visited, Apr. 23, 2010). Agenda items for the April 2010 meeting included "Temporary
water marketing contract with the Upper Yampa River Water Conservancy District for
Elkhead Reservoir," a briefing on the Wild and Scenic Stakeholders process on the Uncompahgre and Lower Colorado Rivers, and input on rule-making for implementation of
House Bill 09-1303 for non-tributary groundwater. Id.
237. COLo. REV. STAT. S 37-46-101 (2009).
238. Id. §§ 37-46-101, -107.
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contract terms." The Board authorizes the General Manager to implemient and administer water supply contracts, and authorizes the President
to execute water supply contracts on behalf of the Enterprise without further board action."
Contractors are eligible to use Colorado River water supply from
Wolford Mountain Reservoir, for which the River District has three water
rights decreed in Division 5, and from Ruedi Reservoir and "other available sources in the water marketing program.""' The Enterprise may enter
into contracts with users within a conservancy district's service area with
an existing program to serve such users only if the conservancy district is
"unable or unwilling" to provide such service."' The Basalt Water Conservancy District, the Middle Park Water Conservancy District, and the
West Divide Water Conservancy District are all part of the program."
The Enterprise provides water supply for agriculture, municipal, and industrial uses pursuant to contracts."'
Contractors may not apply for or secure any change in the water
rights associated with supply, and in particular, are precluded from filing
for Enterprise water without first filing an application with the River District."' Otherwise, users are subject to an extra $400 fee on top of a $400
application fee." Conservancy districts must provide a map of their anticipated service area, and districts and individuals must prove need for the
program water in the quantity requested, with a minimum of 0.1 acre-feet
per year and a maximum of 1000 acre-feet."' Users must also designate
whether they are applying for "full-term" contracts (5 years to 40 years
with the right to renew), or "interim" contracts (5 or less years, which unlike full-term, can include water for out-of-basin uses.' The Enterprise
may enter into contracts with third parties for use of water supplies directly or by exchange or augmentation, within or outside of Division 5, but
only within the state, subject to site-specific determination by the district's
General Manager and General Counsel.' Contractors may not transfer
water supplies without prior written notice, approval of the Enterprise,
and payment of a transfer fee.' Finally, contractors must also comply
239.
Water Marketing Policy of the Colorado River Water Conservation District's
Colorado River Water Projects Enterprise for the Yampa River Basin, COLORADO
RIVER

WATER

CONSERVATION

DISTRICT,

(Apr.

19,

2011),

http://www.crwcd.org/media/uploads/20110419_policy-water_marketing-yampa.pdf.
240,
Id. at 1.
Id. at 2 (providing that the Enterprise's Ruedi Reservoir supply is contracted
241.
through the Bureau of Reclamation, but the federal component of the water marketing
contracts is not analyzed here).
242.
Id.
Id.
243.
244.
Id. at 3.

245.

Id. at 5

246.
247.
248.
249.

Id.
Id. at 3-6.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 2.

250.

Id. at 7
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with delivery contingencies, i.e. water decrees for sources of supply,
terms and conditions of permits for sources and facilities, the River District's organic statute, and other applicable Colorado Law." Thus, Water
District contracts obviate end-users' need to go through water court for
changing water rights, but restrict the extent to which water can be applied and transferred.
B. CONSERVANCY DISTRICTS: CASE STUDIES
1. Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District ("Northern")
Northern, the largest of the conservancy districts in terms of population served, runs a marketing scheme similar to the River District's, but it
operates differently. The first of its kind, the Colorado Big-Thompson
("C-BT") project was created in 1937 primarily to deliver water to farmers
in the South Platte Basin in Water Division 1 following the Dust Bowl."
Northern's contracts with end-users are only for supplemental water
rights, and only apply to return flows. The flexibility of the C-BT system
completely removes the need for water court and allows users to reuse
water to extinction, since the water is the result of trans-mountain diversion.
Northern's twelve-member board is appointed by district court
judges in individual directors' home counties.
Northern has the decreed right to divert 310,000 acre-feet per year
from the C-BT project, but diverts 220,000 acre-feet per year on average
with water increasingly used for municipal over agricultural uses-.' Every
year, Northern informs contract allottees of available quotas under their
contracts." Northern adopted its rules and regulations on water quotas
and delivery in 1956, with amendments in 1975." These rules, together
with the Reclamation contract for the C-BT (and all relevant aforementioned law) govern allotment contracts with users.
Allotment contracts are categorized by "class," with Class C governing
the right of individuals to use water for supplemental irrigation purposes
by irrigation districts, and Class D governing the right of individuals to
Corporate form allotment consupplement their irrigation supplies.'
251.

Id. at 8.

252. The Colorado-Big
DISTRICT,
CONSERVANCY

Thompson Project, NORTHERN COLORADO WATER
(last
http://mvw.ncwcd.org/project_features/cbt-main.asp

visited September 11, 2011).
253. Werner, supra note 85.
254.

Board of Directors, NORTHERN COLORADO WATER CONSERVANCY DISTRICT,

http://www.ncwcd.org/ncwcd-about/board-ofdirector.asp
2011).
255. The Colorado-Big
CONSERVANCY DISTRICT,

visited
256.
257.
258.

(last visited September 11,

Thompson Project, NORTHERN COLORADO WATER
http://www.ncwcd.org/project_features/cbt-main.asp
(last

September 11, 2011).
Id.
Werner, supra note 85.
Id.
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tracts apply to mutual ditch companies, industries, and other corporations or entities. The water quota rules specifically provide for transfers
without any restrictions-apart from beneficial use-within the district:
"use of allotted water is not strictly limited to the lands of each allottee,
[so] transfer of water during irrigation season may be made by rental of
water from one allottee to another."" Annual use of water is not restricted by contract to the lands or areas defined in each allotment contract."
Therefore, an allottee may seasonally rent and transfer water from one
area of the District to another and from one class of service to another."
Changes in type of use require change to a different form of allotment
contract because different classes and rates apply."'
Rules for the C-BT allotment reflect the standard federal contractual
role of the United States as trustee and full owner of the water rights.
The contract gives Northern the right to use the water through full contractual compliance and though its agreement to disclaim any ownership
in the water to end-users." End-users have user rights per contract allotment terms, no greater than those of the district.' But the Secretary of
the Interior, and not merely Northern's board, must consent to the inclusion of lands serviced by the contract within the district."
Water allotted for irrigation must also be "supplemental," meaning the
amount of supplemental water together with existing water supplies available to described lands, necessary to irrigate the land." The board must
make the determination as to supplementation, and the water must be
applied beneficially within the district." Contract rules also lay out the
conditions for withholding water to allottees." Return flows are to be
allocated only to irrigable lands already partially supplied and the District
must collect reports of crop lists of irrigated lands."
The federal contract between Northern and Reclamation for C-BT
construction and operation is also a classic example of federal primacy in
major federal water projects. The federal government retains ownership
in the waterworks; Northern has perpetual rights to use all water, excluding water made available to the Green Mountain Reservoir; the water
should be used primarily for irrigation; the Secretary of the Interior sets
flow rates; and Reclamation can refuse to deliver water if contractual obligations are not met."' The District will also cause "all water filing for the
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id. Class D transfers are slightly more complex since liens are perpetual on the
land but still only require an application to Northern. Id.
263. WUS-NCWCD Contract, supra note 185.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 24
267. Werner, supra note 85.
268. WUS-NCWCD Contract, supra note 185.
269. Id.
270. Id.
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project made in its name or in its behalf to be assigned to the United
States.""
Thus, after the contractors divert C-BT water from Division 5, the
water is very flexible in terms of transfers within the district, but not outside of the district. Northern's allotment contracts completely preclude
end-users' need to go through water court for changing water rights. But
Northern is increasingly restricting the extent to which its contractors can
transfer water within its district through its water marketing schemes due
to recent speculation concerns."
2. Southeastern Colorado Water Conservancy District ("SECWCD")
All of SECWCD's water rights are part of the Fryingpan-Arkansas
("Fry-Ark") federal Reclamation project, serving domestic and agricultural
water constituents in the Arkansas River Valley in Water Division 2."'
Since the district exists to run the Fry-Ark project, its rules are not embodied in one particular set of bylaws, but in a collection of documents
that frame the running of the project: "Operating Principles," Fry-Ark's
federal contract with Reclamation, "Allocation Policies" and the Enterprise's "Policy on Return Flows.""
Like Northern, the SECWCD allocates water on the basis of "allocation principles."' Until 2002, the average allocation was around seventyfive percent of available water, but since the drought agricultural allocations have been curtailed because municipal users have been requesting
their full fifty-one percent, as allowed by the "Principles.""' The estimated
The
irrigable area of the Fry-Ark project is 280,600 acre-feet."'
its
"Enterprise,"
flows
in
return
SECWCD has a separate entity to allocate
and like Northern, the flows can only be supplemental and can only be
used within the district."' Other water organizations within the district
have to comply with the Allocation Principles to receive their water."'
In 1962, Congress authorized construction of the Fry-Ark Project under Public Law 87-590, which included construction of Ruedi Dam and
Reservoir in 1964, on which the River District and its constituents partly

Id.
Steve Porter, Water District Aims to Shut Down Speculators, NORTHERN
COLORADO BUSINEss REPORT (May 9, 2008), http://ncbr.com/article.aspid-93237.
273. Hamilton, supra note 111.
274. Id.
275. Allocation Principles, SOUTHEASTERN COLORADO WATER CONSERVANCY
1979),
29,
(November
DISTRICT
2
http://www.secwcd.org/Allocation/Allocation%20Principles% 01979.pdf.
276. Id.
277. Id.; see also infra Exhibit A.
278. See id. ("1. Supplemental water can only be sold to ditch or canal companies with
decreed rights and 2: Project Water will be sold to municipalities and domestic water
users associations within the District, and will be supplemental only unless otherwise
agreed upon by the Board of Directors.")
279. See id.
27 1.
272.
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rely for West Slope replacement water.' The SECWCD owns all project
rights except Ruedi Dam and Reservoir, which the River District owns."'
The "Fryingpan Arkansas Operating Principles," which also control operation of the project, were negotiated and signed not only by the
SECWCD, but by the River District, Southwestern Water Conservation
District, and the CWCB, because many of the provisions are related to
West Slope compensatory storage needs."' After West Slope replacement
water and Colorado's interstate compact obligations are fully satisfied,
excess water may be sold or leased by the United States via the
SECWCD to water users for any purpose, even outside the natural basin,
with the mutual consent of the signatories."'
As with C-BT water, each spring Reclamation notifies SECWCD as
to the amount available to the district each year."' An "allocation committee" meets to review applications and prepare recommendations for water
allocations, which the SECWCD board must approve.' Project water is
allocated on an acre-foot-per irrigated-acre basis. When demand exceeds
supply," "each ditch only receives a proportional share of available project water," and only after "municipal requests are met up to fifty-one percent of the annual project yield."" The district allocates water but the
Bureau is responsible for accounting for the delivery of project water and
setting water prices.' Prices are set on the irrigator's ability to pay and
the average cost of farming operations under current economic conditions."'

Reclamation owns the supplemental water, but the district retains
dominion and control of return flows through the Enterprise, which
makes return flows available to eligible entities, primarily for augmentation."' Return flows cannot be resold, used, or disposed of outside the
district."'
The SECWCD Allocation Principles also contain anti-speculation
and anti-waste provisions: eighty percent of any allocation of agricultural
280.

History and Descpition of the Fryingpan-Arkansans Prqject, SOUTHEASTERN

COLORADO

WATER

CONSERVANCY

http://wwv.secwcd.org/History%20and%20Description.htmi.
281. Id.
282.

DISTRICT,

(last visited Sept. 9, 2011).

OPERATING PRINCIPLES, FRYINGPAN-ARKANSAS PROJECT, H.R. 91, 87th Cong.

ittp://www.secwcd.org/Allocation/Fryat
available
(1959),
Ark%20Project%200perating%20Principles%20(1961).pdf.
283. Id.
284. History and Descnotion of the Fryingpan-Arkansans Project, SOUTHEASTERN
COLORADO

WATER

CONSERVANCY

DISTRICT,

http://www.secwcd.org/History%20and%20Description.htm. (last visited Sept. 9, 2011).
285. Id.
286. Id. (providing that demand often exceeds supply because the Arkansas River
system is usually over-appropriated).
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Hamilton, supra note 111.
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Project water must be used by November I of the current year and the
remaining twenty percent must be used by May 1 of the following year, or
be subject to forfeiture."
Thus, SECWCD water may be transferred outside district boundaries
via federal contracts under limited circumstances, but is subject to increasing municipal demand within the district.
3. Upper Gunnison Water Conservancy District ("UGWCD")
Upper Gunnison is a smaller conservancy district in terms of population served, located in Water Division 4, more representative of the
smaller conservancy districts on the Western Slope.' The district uses its
powers in ways similar to the larger districts through a combination of
public education, legislative lobbying, and increasingly, litigation."' It is
not the beneficiary of any one project, federal or otherwise. Because it
came into existence in 1959 as the legal entity to handle the construction
and operation of the Upper Gunnison Project, and because that project
failed, it sought other ways to solve its water needs." The UGWCD addressed its water needs largely through recreation, and agriculture and
wildlife, actively opposing several attempts at trans-mountain diversions
by other organizations."
The UGWCD historically heavily relied on the River District for "financial, legal, engineering and political advice and leadership," together
with the Grand Junction Reclamation office."' Then the UGWCD became actively involved in a number of lawsuits in the late 1980s: the Union Park Project, Taylor Reservoir operations, Aspinall Unit operations,
quantification of the of Black Canyon of the Gunnison reserved water
right, and basin-wide augmentation plans." The district, with its small
size lacking the votes or financial resources to accomplish its goals, credits its success in political activities largely to its imperative that the district
to be "both better informed and more influential" than its opponents.' It
has maintained a close working relationship with its "allies" such as the
River District, Uncompahgre Valley Water Users' Association, Bureau of
Reclamation, the CWCB, State Engineer and Attorney General's Office."

292. Allocation
DIsTRICT

Principles, SOUTHEASTERN
(November

COLORADO WATER
29,

CONSERVANCY
1979),

http://www.secwcd.org/Allocation/Allocation%20Principles%201979.pdf.
293.

UGRWCD website, UPPER GUNNISON RIVER WATER CONSERVANCY DISTRICT,

http://www.ulgrwcd.org (last visited Nov. 9, 2011).
294.
UPPER GUNNISON RIVER WATER CONSERVANCY DISTRICT, District Manual,
HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE,
ACCOMPLISHMENTS,
THE
FUTURE
1
(2009),

http://www.ugrwcd.org/Pages/District%20Manual%20Updated.pdf.
295. See id. at 2.
296. Id. at 6.
297. Id. at 3.
298. Id.
299. Id. at 16.
300. Id. at 5.
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It is also "in communication" with "other crucial allies": the Southwestern
Water Conservancy District, Rio Grande Water Conservation District,
the Tri-County Water Conservancy District and Northern."
Gunnison's decree and bylaws are a reflection of these mandates.'
Although there are no provisions specifically alluding to transfer policies,
the laws espouse an "in-basin" theme: "the principal projects and purposes, by accomplishment of which the lands within its boundaries will be
benefited, are as follows: . . . [bly whatever lawful means may be neces-

sary, convenient or required, to defend and to protect the waters having
their source and origin within the boundaries of the proposed District,
from and against diminution or depletion by unlawful or unwarranted
claims or demands thereon by any area or water user or users."'" The
District is also charged with making surveys to determine the best and
most beneficial use of waters within its boundaries, to make appropriations for its constituents, to make "any and all acts and things necessary or
advisable to secure and insure an adequate supply of water, within the
boundaries of the District and within the limits of available water supplies, for present and future use for all beneficial purposes."" Additionally the District is involved in the adjudication "for priority in the name of
the District and on its behalf or in the name of individual water users."
The District shall . . ."participate in actions which may involve rights to
use water for all beneficial purposes, whether such rights by owned by the
District, or by any individual or corporate water user or users within the
District, or in any manner involving or affecting the powers, rights or
functions of the District."' The board consists of eleven members who
serve for four-year terms. The bylaws otherwise largely contain governance language from the Water Conservancy Act. Gunnison's 2010 goals
include: protection of Upper Gunnison Basin water resources for inbasin use, including activities opposing any application for a water service
contract for the Aspinall Unit for uses involving trans-mountain or transbasin diversion; protecting existing and future decreed water uses within
the Upper Gunnison Basin from calls from senior water rights with
downstream diversions, including monitoring 1922 and 1948 Compact
compliance and state actions intra-state shortage allocations; promoting
its recreation in-channel diversion right; and coordinating with the River
District's water activity Enterprise to purchase pre-1922 rights.

301.

Id. at 17.

302.

See In re Decree of the Upper Gunnison Water Conservancy Dist., Civil Action

No.
5618
(Colo
Dist.
7
1959),
available
at
http://www.ugrwcd.org/Pages/District%20Manual%20Updated.pdf.
303. Petition for Forming Water Conservancy District, In re Upper Gunnison Water
Conservancy Dist., Civil Action No. 5618 (Colo Dist. 7 1959), available at
ittp://www.ugrwcd.org/Pages/District%2OManual%20Updated.pdf.
304. Id.
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Thus, small conservancy districts such as the UGWCD, which comprise the vast majority of conservancy districts in Colorado in terms of
scale, play an important, if non-explicit, role in keeping water in-basin.

VI.

CONCLUSIONS AND AREAS IN NEED OF FURTHER
EXPLORATION

Although Colorado does not prohibit the extra-district transfer of water per se, analyzing the extent to which transfers are allowed involves a
complex calculus of possible restrictions at different scales, in which water organizations play a crucial role. "For a trans-basin project to succeed
today, it must feature a degree of Front Range/ Western Slope cooperation lacking in historic diversions because legal tools now exist to block
new projects."' The political and legal rise of state organizations, including water organizations, in planning and development, seem to suggest
that transfers at not only the extra-district but extra-basin level (not to
mention at the trans-mountain level), will be increasingly difficult. Indeed, many water conservancy districts prohibit the extra-district transfer
of water altogether. Allotment contracts may facilitate transfers at a small
or even regional scale, but transfers can still be largely constrained by
federal Reclamation and water district terms. Though history and hydrogeology have made trans-mountain and trans-basin transfers an imperative in the past, and federal compact law will likely trump Colorado's antiexport state law in the event of an inter-state call, it is difficult to know
what impact these dynamics would have on intra-state transfers. But analyzing agricultural water transfers from the water organization-level, particularly with more data on conservancy districts and ditch companies,
which hold the bulk of the water and power, could yield considerable
insight into the matter.
Future efforts should be spent on continuing to learn about the internal governance issues associated with the fifty conservancy districts, including the extent to which organization "type" (e.g. wholesaler, provider,
policy advocate, etc.) influences the amount of water to which the districts
hold rights, and therefore the extent to which those rights can be transferred. Visits to actual water district board meetings to yield further information on conservation and conservancy districts covered in this report, and further case studies into different and more geographically representative district types (i.e. from Divisions 6 and 7) are recommended.
Efforts should also be made to get a better handle on the "wild card" ditch
companies, which likely have a big impact on control of irrigation water
in the aggregate: determining where the ditch companies with the largest
holdings exist, how much water the ditch companies hold, and at what
frequency the companies transfer rights. Talking with water commissioners in the individual water districts would be helpful in this respect. An
306.

Nichols & Kenney, supra note 67 at 448.
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inquiry should be made into how water rights holdings and transfers work
under irrigation companies and water users' associations. More research
should be undertaken on the "external" local and state players and instruments such as the CWCB and other legislative bills, in terms of potential impacts on transfers. Future scholars should also determine
whether "agricultural water" in fact accounts for all of Colorado's possible
uses of agricultural water, including pastureland and woodland, and not
just cropland, and to have it quantified in terms of "historical consumptive use" to the greatest extent possible.
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INTRODUCTION
The current distribution of water in Utah demonstrates the state's
need for a robust water transfer system. Presently, Utah allocates approximately eighty percent of its developed water supply to agriculture.' Yet,
due to a growing population and a changing economic environment, municipalities and industries continue to demand more water.' Nonconsumptive water uses that require adequate instream flows - for example, recreation, aesthetics, and species preservation - are increasing as
well.' In the future, Utah will need to meet these new and competing
demands' largely by reallocating water' from agricultural purposes to municipal, industrial, recreational, and ecological purposes.' "The extent to
which agricultural water will be converted to meet other needs depends
on state agricultural policy, the proximity of growth to irrigated lands,...
the relative value of the land and water to be exchanged, . . . [and] the

amount of water that can actually be converted."'
To satisfy these multiple demands, Utah has in the past focused primarily on developing new water supplies, not on facilitating water transfers. This is likely because Utah has not fully developed the water it is
theoretically entitled to under the 1922 Colorado River Compact. Under
the Compact, 7.5 million acre-feet (maf) is available to the four Upper
Basin states, which include Utah, Wyoming, Colorado, and New Mexico.'
The Upper Colorado River Compact divided the Upper Basin states'
collective allocation into percentages that determined how much water
each upper basin state could withdraw. Utah is entitled to twenty-three
percent of 7.5 maf.' Therefore, Utah's share of Colorado River water is
approximately 1.725 maf. Of this entitlement, Utah used 842,000 acre-

1. UTAH Div. OF WATER RES., UTAH STATE WATER PLAN: UTAH'S WATER
(2001),
35
FUTURE
THE
FOR
PLANNING
RESOURCES:
http://www.water.utah.gov/waterplan/SWPpff.pdf [hereinafter UTAH STATE WATER
PLANI.

2. Marie Leigh Livingstone & Thomas A. Miller, A Framework for Analyzing the
Impact of Western Instrearn Water Rights on Choice Domains: Transferability, Externalities, and Consumptive Use, 62 LAND ECON. 269, 269 (1986).
3. Id.
4. See, e.g., John C. Ruple & Robert Keiter, Water for Commercial Oil Shale Development in Utah: Allocating Scarce Resources and the Search for New Sources of
Supply, 30J. LAND RESOURCES& ENVTL. L. 95, 102 (2010).

5.

Zachary Donohew, PropertyRights and Western United States Water Markets,

53 AUSTL. J. AGRIC. & RESOURCE ECON. 85, 85 (2009).

6. Bonnie G. Colby et al., ProceduralAspects of State Water Law: Transferring
Water Rights in the Western States, 31 ARIz. L. REV. 697, 697 (1989).
7.

UTAH STATE WATER PLAN, supra note 1, at 35.

8. Colorado River Compact, 70 CONG. REC. 324 (1928), available at
Congress approved the
http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/gl000/pdfiles/crcompct.pdf.
Compact by enacting the Boulder Canyon Project Act of 1928, Pub. L. No. 70-642, 45
Stat. 1057 (codified at 43 U.S.C. S 617 (2000)).
9. Upper Colorado River Basin Compact, ch. 48, 63 Stat. 31, 33 (1949), availableat
http://wmy.usbr.gov/lc/region/pao/pdfiles/ucbsnact.pdf.
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feet in 2006, 873,000 acre-feet in 2007, and 818,000 acre-feet in 2008."
Utah therefore has not used all of its allocation, which makes talk of developing new supplies popular.
The average flow of the Colorado River, however, has proven to be
less than the original estimate of 16.5 maf when the Basin states negotiated the Colorado River Compact in 1922." Several studies expect climate
change to further reduce the Colorado River's annual flow." So although
Utah has used a lower percentage of its Colorado River water allocation
than Colorado or New Mexico," which may mean it has less of an obligation than other Upper Basin states to forbear water to satisfy the Compact's terms, it is still very likely that development of new water supplies
will not fully satisfy Utah's water needs. Water transfers will therefore be
necessary to supply part of Utah's future water demand.
Water transfers usually involve shifting water previously appropriated
for one use to another use, often in another physical location." In Utah's
case, entities may acquire agricultural water and transfer it to domestic,
industrial, recreational, or other uses." Utah law has established procedures for water transfers both within the state and outside of it. There
are two primary pathways to transfer water in Utah - one for a water
company shareholder, and another for an individual water rights holder.
A water company shareholder must meet three criteria to transfer a right:
(1) the shareholder must want to transfer the water, (2) the water company must support the transfer, and (3) the State Engineer must approve the
transfer." A water transfer can fail at any of these three levels. Thus,

10.
U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, PROVISIONAL UPPER COLORADO RIVER BASIN
CONSUMPTIVE
USES
AND
LOSSES
REPORT
2006-2010
iv
(2010),

littp://www.usbr.gov/uc/library/envdocs/reports/crs/pdfs/cul2006-201Oprov.pdf
ter PROVISIONAL REPORTI.

[hereinaf-

NORRIS HUNDLEY, JR., WATER AND THE WEST: THE COLORADO
11.
COMPACT AND THE POLITICS OF WATER IN THE AMERICAN WEST 193 (1975);

RIVER

Robert
W. Adler, Revisting the Colorado River Compact: Time for a Change?, 28 J. LAND
RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 19, 30 (2008); see also Niklas S. Christensen et al., The Effects
of Clinate Change on the Hydrology and Water Resources of the ColoradoRiver Basin,
62 CLIMATIC CHANGE 337, 338 (2004) (reporting that tree ring data dating back to 1512

suggests a long term average flow of 13.5 maf).
12. Christensen et al., supra note 11, at 340, 350; see also N.S. Christensen & D.P.
Lettenmaier, A Multimodel Ensemble Approach to Assessment of Climate Change Impacts on the Hydrology and Water Resources of the Colorado River Basin, 11
HYDROLOGY AND EARTH SYS. SCI. 1417, 1419 (2007), Tim P. Barnett & David W.
Pierce, Sustainable Water Deliveries from the Colorado River in a Changing Climate,
106 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SCI. 7334, 7334 (2009).
13.
PROVISIONAL REPORT, supra note 10, at iv; Upper Colorado River Basin Com-

pact, ch. 48, 63 Stat. 31, 33 (1949) (providing that Colorado receives 51.75% of the
Upper Basin's 7.5 maf allocation, New Mexico receives 11.25%, and Utah receives
23.00%). Therefore, based on the BOR PROVISIONAL REPORT 2006-2008 average use

data, Colorado used 55.1% of its allocation, New Mexico used 49.5%, and Utah used
48.9%).
14.
15.

See UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-3-3(2)(a) (West 2008).
See id.

16.

Id. S 73-3-3.5 (West 2008).
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each of these three actors holds veto power over a potential transfer. In
contrast, an individual water rights holder must meet only two criteria: (1)
the water rights holder must want to transfer, and (2) the State Engineer
must approve the transfer." Again, a water transfer can fail at either level.
Utah's multi-layered water transfer approval process is inefficient,
time consuming, and expensive, and thus likely deters water transfers
within the state. Because water transfers will play an increasingly vital
role in water allocation in the state, Utah should streamline its water
transfer process.
Part I of this Article discusses the legal framework that guides transferring water rights and water shares. Part II examines the layers of approval that must be obtained before a water right or water share can be
transferred. Part III discusses the role of and water holdings of water
organizations in Utah, including water conservancy districts, water companies, and water users' associations. This part also identifies additional
limitations on transferring water that the federal government develops for
the benefit of a state. Part IV argues for three reforms that Utah should
undertake to improve the efficiency of its water transfer scheme. First,
water companies should update their by-laws to allow for profit-sharing
among shareholders. Second, Utah should modify its no harm rule.
Third, Utah should adopt legislation that explicitly states the factors the
State Engineer should consider when applying the public interest test to
water transfers.

II. LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF WATER RIGHTS TRANSFERS
AND WATER SHARE TRANSFERS IN UTAH
A.

TRANSFERRING WATER RIGHTS

Any legal entity can acquire water rights in Utah, including individual
citizens, partnerships, trusts, companies, financial institutions, citizen
organizations, and political entities." The Utah state government, as well
as the Federal Government, may also hold water rights." Entities that
acquire water rights may transfer those rights." Transfers often occur by
altering an existing water right." This may involve changing the place of
use, point of diversion, or purpose of use." Changes can be permanent
or temporary." A permanent change "means a change for an indefinite
period of time with an intent to relinquish the original point of diversion,
17.
18.

Id. § 73-3-3(2)(a), (4)(a).
Id. S 73-3-2(1)(a) (West 2001); see also U.S. BUREAU OF LAND MGMT.,

WESTERN

STATES

WATER

LAws:

UTAH

WATER

RIGHTS

FACTSHEET

(2001),

http://www.bIm.gov/nstc/WaterLaws/utah.html [hereinafter UTAH FACTSHEET.
19. UTAH CODE ANN. § 7 3-3-2(1)(a).
20. Id. §§ 73-3-3(2)(a), -3-3.5(2).
21.

UTAH STATE WATER PLAN, supra note 1, at 36.

22.
23.

UTAH CODE ANN.
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 73-3-3(2)(a); see also Colby et al., supra note 6, at 699.
§ 73-3-3(2)(a).
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place of use, or purpose of use."" A temporary change "means a change
for a fixed period of time not exceeding one year."'
Entities can transfer rights through lease or sale." Lease transfers are
often conditioned upon the owner retaining an "interruptible supply,"
which means that the buyer can use the water subject to the lessor being
able to disrupt the buyer's water use under certain conditions." In contrast, the sale of a water right transfers full use rights to the buyer." In the
irrigation context, a sale requires taking at least part of the agricultural
land out of production." Such changes do not affect the water right's priority date."
After deciding whether to lease or sell a water right, a water right
holder can transfer legal title to the right in two ways." First, water rights
can be transferred by deed." Second, water rights can pass by appurtenance." An entity transfers a water right by deed in substantially the same
way as it would transfer real estate by deed." Despite the ability to transfer water rights by deed, they are statutorily presumed to be appurtenant."
This means that the water right is attached to physical land and therefore
transfers with the land when the land changes owners." Appurtenant water rights play a particularly important role in cities and suburbs that border agricultural land. As Utah communities grow, they often buy adjacent
irrigated agricultural land and the water rights associated with that land."
This approach will play an increasingly important role in the future.
Utah's water plan concludes that "much of the increased water supply
requirements brought on by growth in Utah can be satisfied by the conversion []" of agricultural lands to developed lands."
However, purchasing agricultural land and the water attached to it will
likely not fully satisfy future water demand. With this in mind, the Utah
State Legislature passed Utah Annotated Code § 73-1-11(1)," which en-

24. Id. § 73-3-3(1)(a).
25. Id. § 73-3-3(1)(b).
26. UTAH FACTSHEET, supra note 18.
27. UTAH STATE WATER PLAN, supra note 1, at 36.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-3-3(8)(b)(i)..
31. Jeff Gittins, How Are Utah Water Rights Transferred?, UTAH WATER L. &
WATER RTs. (Jan. 4, 2010),
http://utahwaterrights.blogspot.com/2010_01 01_archive.html.
32. UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-1-10 (West 2010).
33. Id. 5 73-1-11 (West 2010).
34. Id. 5 73-1-10(1)(a).
35. See id. § 73-1-11(1)(a)-(c).
36. Gittins, supra note 31.
37. UTAH STATE WATER PLAN, supra note 1, at 35.
38. Id.
39. UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-1-11(1)(a)-(c).
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sures that appurtenance does not significantly burden water transfers."
Section 73-1-11(1) states:
JAI water right appurtenant to land passes to the buyer of the land unless the seller (a) specifically reserves the water right or any part of the
water right in the land conveyance document; (b) conveys a part of the
water right in the land conveyance document; or (c) conveys the water
right in a separate conveyance document prior to or contemporaneously
with the execution of the land conveyance document."
These three exceptions indicate that even if a water right is appurtenant, it can be severed from the land and either reserved or conveyed
separately by the grantor." This statute provides increased flexibility,
which is important to facilitating water transfers. Farmers may be more
willing to sell water if they can retain their land and a portion of their
water rights to continue farming in a more limited capacity. This would
be particularly lucrative to families whose farms have been in their possession for generations. Additionally, under this law farmers might increase profits if they first sever water rights from their land and then sell
the water rights and the land separately. This potential for increased
profit would likely generate incentives for transfers.
Additionally, the process for segregating, or dividing, a water right into two or more separate water rights, and for consolidating two or more
water rights into a single water right, could also have important implications for transfers. In 2009, the Utah State Legislature passed H.B. 18,
entitled "Water Rights Applications and Records," which allowed for the
segregation and consolidation of water rights." Prior to the passage of
this bill, the State Engineer had discretion to approve or deny a request
to segregate a water right." H.B. 18, however, now requires the State Engineer to segregate a water right if the holder of that right requests it."
Therefore, the State Engineer no longer dictates the segregation process.
This law also "permits the State Engineer to consolidate two or more
water rights if the water rights are from the same source, have the same
priority, and are sufficiently consistent in definition."'
H.B. 18 may facilitate water transfers. The water right holder's ability
to decide to split the right without interference from the State Engineer
increases flexibility. Particularly with irrigation water, the holder may not
wish to sell all of a water right. Instead, the holder may wish to sell part
of the water from one water right while still keeping the remainder to
40. See R.L. Knuth, Conveyancing and CollateralizingUtah Water Rights, 12 UTAH
B.J. 12, 14 (1999).
41.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-1-1 1(l)(a)-(c).
42. Knuth, supra note 40, at 15.
43. Codified at UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-3-27 (2009).
44. Jeffry Gittins, Utah Law Developments: Noteworthy Laws Passed During the
2009 Legislative Session, 22 UTAH B.J. 45, 47 (2009).
45. UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-3-27(l)(a) (West 2009).
46. Id. § 73-3-27(3)(a)-(c).
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continue irrigating land. In this situation, segregation is the ideal solution. H.B. 18 places the decision to segregate in the hands of the holder
only, which should facilitate transfers by reduce uncertainty and transaction costs. Similarly, allowing for consolidation should also facilitate
transfers because holders could aggregate many small rights, which individually may not have been conducive to a transfer, into one large right to
create a more enticing transfer. This would also reduce transaction costs
because a potential buyer could avoid negotiating with many small water
rights holders if the right had already been consolidated. Thus, this law
may help incentivize transactions.
B.TRANSFERRING STOCK SHARES IN A MUTUAL IRRIGATION
COMPANY
The previous section focused on transferring water rights held by individuals or entities. This section discusses transferring stock shares in a
mutual irrigation or water company ("company"), which are often referred to as water shares. A share of stock "representis] an ownership
interest in [al mutual irrigation company" which includes "the right to
water service and the delivery of a definite quantity of water" that the
company diverts." Mutual irrigation companies, not shareholders, hold
legal title to the water rights.' Companies can acquire water in two ways.
First, companies may divert water from either inside or outside of the
state" and appropriate it by applying for a water right with the State Engineer.' Alternatively, companies can acquire water by purchasing stock in
another irrigation, canal, or reservoir company,"' provided that the purchasing company's articles of incorporation allow for this."
If a water company has surplus water after delivering water to its
shareholders, the company may lease, rent, or sell surplus water to a municipality, corporation, association, or individual inside or outside the
district for any beneficial use.' Although Utah law allows these actions,
the specific by-laws and articles of incorporation of each irrigation company may prevent or inhibit water transfers outside of company boundaries,' as this Article will later discuss. Individual shareholders within irrigation companies can also decide to transfer their shares.' Shares are
transferred pursuant to the procedures applicable to securities.'
47. Stephen N. Bretsen & Peter J. Hill, IrrigationInstitutions in the American West,
25 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 283, 306 (2006-2007).
48. Id. at 306.
49. UTAH CODE ANN. § 17B-2a-503(1)(g) (West 2007).
50. Id. at § 73-3-2.
51. Id. at § 17B-2a-503(1)(b).
52. Id. at § 73-1-13 (West 1919).
53. Id. at§ 17B-2a-503(1)(h).
54. Stephen N. Bretsen & Peter J. Hill, Water Markets as a Tragedy of the Anticommons, 33 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 723, 732 (2009).
55. UTAH CODE ANN. § 70A-8-409 (West 2011).
56. Id. at § 73-1-10(2).
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III. TRANSFERRING WATER SHARES AND WATER RIGHTS: TIERS OF
APPROVAL
A.

APPROVAL FOR TRANSFERRING WATER SHARES IN A WATER
COMPANY

In Utah, water companies hold massive amounts of water in the form
of water rights. In the Colorado River Basin alone, Utah water companies possess paper title to a little over 13 maf of water that is used for for
irrigation purposes." Part III, subsection B identifies Utah's major irrigation companies and discusses each company's water holdings. Due to the
large amount of water that water companies control, these entities will
play a central role in water transfers.. Therefore, it is important to discuss
how water companies can impact transfers of water held by shareholders.
Although Utah law allows for the transfer of water shares, three entities
must approve the transfer before it can take place: the shareholder, the
water company, and the State Engineer, in that order."' If any one of these three entities vetoes the proposed transfer, the transfer cannot go forward.
1.

Shareholder Approval

The first step in a transfer involving water shares is for the owner of
the share, which is usually an individual, to want to transfer the share to
some other entity. If the shareholder does not want to transfer a share,
then a transfer will not take place."
2.

Water Company Approval

Once a shareholder decides that she would like to transfer the water
represented by her share, she must submit a change request to the water
company that holds title to the water right the share is derived from."
The water company must then decide" to approve the request, deny the
request, or approve the request subject to certain conditions. The com-

57. UTAH Div. WATER RIGHTS, WATER RIGHTS INFORMATION INDEX PROGRAM,
http://www.waterrights.utah.gov/cgi-bin/wrindex.exe ?Startup (last visited Sept. 3, 2011)
[hereinafter WRINDEXI (This amount was calculated by searching the Water Right
Information Index Program (WRINDEX), a water rights database maintained by the
State Engineer. The author examined and added up the water rights held by water companies that divert water from the Colorado River watershed. It is important to note,
however, that WRINDEX is maintained based on information that water rights holders
voluntarily submit to the Division. As such, a discrepancy can exist between true ownership and the Division's database).
58. UTAH CODE ANN. § 72-3-3.5(2)-(3), (7).
59. See id. § 72-3-3.5(2).
60. Id.
61. Id. § 73-3-3.5(3)(a).
62. Id. S 73-3-3.5(3)(b).
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pany makes this decision based on whether it deems the water transfer
necessary or desirable. 3
Although the by-laws of different water companies vary, many companies have provisions that restrict transfers of company water shares.
Some by-laws require that the transfer not injure other shareholders and
not require services beyond the capabilities of the company's irrigation
system. The latter requirement is especially problematic when the buyer
resides outside the water company's jurisdiction because a company's
water delivery apparatus is designed to serve only those within its borders. Since most water companies serve farmers, many buyers, such as
cities and suburbs, are outside water company boundaries. Therefore,
by-laws that limit water transfers to the capabilities of the company's irrigation system will often restrict transfers. Company by-laws can also create an inseverable appurtenance to the land, which means that stock and

its associated water right cannot be transferred without the sale of the
land itself.'
If the company's by-laws do allow transfers, the company's board of
trustees votes on whether a proposed transfer should proceed." These
voting schemes, however, may also impede water transfers. Many water
company by-laws require a majority of the company's board members to
approve water transfers, which could hinder the transfer process because
it may be difficult to garner a majority. Transfers may even face difficulty in companies that allow all shareholders to have an equal vote. Some
company voting rules allocate votes according to the number of acres
irrigated, which could allow a few large landowners to veto a water transfer out of the district." Therefore, a company's voting scheme, regardless
of the method employed, will likely have a dampening effect on water
transfers. If the proposed transfer survives voting and the water company
approves the shareholder's request to transfer, then the water company
itself-not the shareholder-must then submit the change application to
the State Engineer for review."
3.

State Engineer Approval

The State Engineer supervises the measurement, appropriation, apportionment, and distribution of state waters" and approves or rejects
63. Id. § 17B-1-103(2)(1).
64. Bretsen & Hill, supra note 54, at 732.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 732-33.
67. UTAH CODE ANN. § 17B-1-301(2)(m) (West 2011).
68. Bretsen & Hill, supra note 54, at 732.
69. Id. at 737.
70. Id.
71. See E. Jordan Irrigation Co. v. Morgan, 860 P.2d 310, 312-13 (Utah 1993)
(holding that a shareholder in a mutual water company does not have standing before
the state engineer to initiate a change in a water right).
72. UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-2-1(3)(a).
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applications for changes to an existing water right." Therefore, even if a
water company approves a change, the State Engineer still has the power
to deny a change application and block a water transfer. Applications
must also be filed with the State Engineer prior to the "construction, enlargement, extension, or structural alteration of any ditch, canal, well,
tunnel, or other distributing works . .. or enlargement of an existing right
or appropriation."" This is important because many water transfers will
likely require altering existing distribution systems or building new systems to transport the water from the seller's land to the buyer's land.
In deciding whether to approve or .deny a transfer application, the
State Engineer must weigh several factors and follow multiple doctrines.
First, the State Engineer should approve a change of use application if
there is no reason to believe that the proposed change will impair vested
rights." However, if the State Engineer believes that the proposed change
would harm either a junior or senior water right, then the State Engineer
must reject the application." This is known as the "no harm rule," a doctrine that all Western states follow." The water rights holder wishing to
transfer the right has the burden of presenting "at least a prima facie case
that the change will not injure junior appropriators.""
A second doctrine that guides the State Engineer's decision whether
to approve or deny a transfer application is the public interest test. Because Utah law establishes public ownership of the state's waters," the
State Engineer has a duty to manage the state's water to best protect the
public's property interest." Prior to 1989, Utah law remained unclear on
whether the State Engineer was required to take the public interest into
account when considering change applications." Until that point, Utah's
public interest test only definitively applied to applications for new appropriations." In Bonham v. Morgan, the Utah Supreme Court held that
§ 73-3-8, which codified the public interest test, also applied to change
applications." In relevant parts, § 73-3-8 states that:
If the state engineer ... has reason to believe that an application to appropriate water . . . will unreasonably affect public recreation or the

natural stream environment, or will prove detrimental to the public wel73. Id. S 73-3-3(4)(a); see also Jeffrey W. Appel, Ability and Responsibility of State
Engineer Regarding Reallocation of Water Rights, 20 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L.
41, 49 (2000).
74. UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-3-2(1)(a).
75. Salt Lake City v. Boundary Springs Water Users Ass'n, 270 P.2d 453, 455 (Utah
1954).
76. United States v. Caldwell, 231 P. 434, 439-40 (Utah 1924).
77. JOSEPH SAX, BARTON THOMPSON, JOHN LEsHY & ROBERT ABRAMS, LEGAL
CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES: CASES AND MATERIALS 270 (4th ed. 2006).
78. Id. at 274.
79. UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-1-1(1) (West 2010).
80. Appel, supra note 73, at 51.
81. See, e.g., Bonharn v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497, 498-99 (Utah 1989).
82. Id. at 498-500.
83. Id. at 499.
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fare, it is the state engineer's duty to withhold approval or rejection of
the application until the state engineer has investigated the matter. If an
application does not meet the requirements of this section, it shall be
rejected."
The "reason to believe" standard that guides this determination falls
between a preponderance of the evidence standard and the lowest of evidentiary standards.' This low evidentiary standard makes it easier for the
State Engineer to deny a change application, and thereby deny a transfer.
Additionally, the fact that the Utah State Legislature did not define the
public interest test or establish factors to guide its application provides
the State Engineer with great discretion to deny transfers. This discretion
injects uncertainty into Utah's water transfer scheme, and thus may inhibit transfers.
If the State Engineer approves the change application, then the water
transfer may proceed.' If the State Engineer denies the change application, however, the water transfer may not take place." Alternatively, the
State Engineer may approve the change application subject to conditions,
in which case the transfer may proceed only if the applicant meets those
conditions." The State Engineer often designs conditions to mitigate
harm to existing water rights holders and address issues such as minimum
instream flows and permitting by other regulatory agencies."
B.

APPROVAL FOR TRANSFERRING WATER RIGHTS HELD BY
INDIVIDUAL ENTITIES

This section discusses the procedure for approving a change application when an individual person or entity holds the water right. Although
Utah law allows for the transfer of water rights that are held by individual
people or entities, both the individual that holds the water right and the
State Engineer must approve the proposed transfer before the transfer
can take place. If the water rights holder does not wish to transfer, or if
the State Engineer denies the transfer application, then the transfer cannot go forward.
1.

Approval of Water Rights Holder

If a water rights holder uses water that a water company does not control, then any person who is entitled to the use of that water may make
permanent or temporary changes to the point of diversion,,the place of
use, or the purpose of use upon approval by the State Engineer.' Of

87.

UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-3-8(b)(i)-(ii) (West 2007).
Searle v. Milburn Irrigation Co., 133 P.3d 382, 393 (Utah 2006).
UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-3-10(3)(a)-(c) (West 1997).
Id. S 73-3-10(4).

88.
89.

Id. 5 73-3-3.5(9)(a)-(c).
UTAH FACTSHEET, supra note 18.

84.
85.
86.

90. UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-3-3(2)(a)-(4)(a).
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course, if the water rights holder does not wish to transfer the water right,
then the transfer will not occur.
2.

State Engineer Approval

Once the water rights holder submits a change application to the
State Engineer, the State Engineer can approve, conditionally approve, or
deny the change." The process and the factors the State Engineer uses to
make this decision are identical to the process and factors that apply
when assessing a change application that a water company submits, as
discussed above.
IV. WATER ORGANIZATIONS AND TRANSFER OF WATER DEVELOPED
BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
This section discusses water organizations-including Water Conservancy Districts, Water Companies, and Water Users Associations-in
greater detail, provides information on the water holdings of these organizations, and also addresses the issue of ownership of water developed by
federal projects in Utah.
A.

WATER CONSERVANCY DISTRICTS

Water Conservancy Districts ("WCDs") are entities that control part
of Utah's irrigation water. Certain WCDs hold significant amounts of
water in the form of water rights, although this is not true for all WCDs.
In total, WCDs in Utah hold approximately 250,600 acre-feet of irrigation water from the Colorado River." This represents approximately fifteen percent of Utah's total Colorado River water allocation of 1,725,000
acre-feet under the Upper Colorado River Compact. Due to the amount
of water that WCDs control, it is important to understand these entities
and the impact they may have on water transfers.
Utah's legislature intended WCDs to benefit the people." This public purpose distinguishes WCDs from irrigation companies." WCDs
serve the public by furthering three primary state policies regarding water
use." These policies include: (1) controlling and using all unappropriated
waters in the state and applying that water to domestic, manufacturing,
irrigation, and power purposes; (2) obtaining the highest use of water for
domestic uses and land irrigation; and (3) cooperating with the United
States to construct, finance, operate, and maintain water works in the
state.' In addition to these responsibilities, another primary purpose of
91.
92.
Water
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id. §§ 73-3-3.5(9), -3-10(3)-(4).
WRINDEX, supra note 57 (Figure derived from the author's search of Utah's
Right Information Index Program).
UTAH CODE ANN. § 17B-2a-1002(1)(f) (West 2007).
Patterick v. Carbon Water Conservancy Dist., 145 P.2d 503, 510 (Utah 1944).
Utah Code Ann. § 17B-2a-1002(2).
Id. § 17B-2a-1002(1)(c)-(e).
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many WCDs includes supplying water to users within their boundaries
based on water contracts." Such contracts allow the water user to purchase, lease, or otherwise acquire the right to use the WCD's water."
WCDs acquire water in two ways. In addition to acquiring water by
applying for a new appropriation right with the State Engineer, WCDs
can access additional water by acquiring stock in canal companies, water
companies, and water users associations." If a WCD acquires water using
the latter method, it becomes a shareholder, and therefore the water
company must approve a transfer of the share. The authority to transfer
does not vest in the WCD. WCDs can also contract with each other,
with a public entity, or with private individuals for the joint operation of
works" and for the sale, purchase, lease, or exchange of water and water
rights."
To carry out these responsibilities, a WCD's board of trustees has
multiple legal rights and duties.' Two duties are especially relevant to
water transfers. First, the board may make and enforce all reasonable
rules and regulations for the management, control, delivery, use, and distribution of water."' The ability to set rules for use and distribution could
either hinder or facilitate water transfers. For example, the types of water
uses that a WCD allows could negate the water's usefulness in a transfer
if the WCD allowed use for irrigation but limited domestic or industrial
use. Because much of the current demand for water transfers comes
from municipalities and industry, if a WCD established such a regulation
it would frustrate the goal of the vast majority of water transfers. Second,
the WCD board may encumber, sell, lease, transfer an interest in, or
otherwise dispose of water works and water rights.' Coinciding with this
power is the ability to fix the price and terms for the sale, lease, or other
disposal of water." These two powers are important because they give
WCDs the ability to fully control whether a transfer will occur. It is likely
that different WCDs will have varying levels of willingness to transfer.
Therefore, while WCDs may play important roles in transfers in some
areas of Utah, they may be minor players in other areas where the WCD
is unwilling to participate in transfers. Notably, however, the WCD's
board may only allocate water to lands within the district."' Similarly, the
board may only allow the transfer of water to other lands within the district." This within-district limitation curtails the scale at which transfers
involving WCD water could take place. Therefore, while WCDs may be
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id. S
Id. S
Id. S
Id. §
Id. S
Id. §
Id. §
Id. §
Id. S
Id. §
Id. §

17B-2a-1007(1)(e), (fA (h)(i)-(ii) (West 2008).
17B-2a-1007(1)(i).
17B-2a-1004(1)(m).
17B-2a-1004(2)(a)(i).
17B-2a-1004(2)(a)(ii).
17B-2a-1005(8)(a) (West 2010).
17B-2a-1005(8)(a)(i).
17B-2a-1004(1)(d).
17B-2a-1004(1)(e).
17B-2a-1005(8)(a)(iv).
17B-2a-1005(8)(a)(v).
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useful suppliers of water in local trades, they likely will not be powerful
players in water transfers that span large geographic areas.
A discussion of the various WCDs that own and control Colorado
River Basin water in Utah follows. The author collected information on
these WCDs' water rights holdings, such as the quantity of water held, the
purpose for which the water is used, the priority date, the water's source,
and the diversion location. This was done based on searches of Utah's
Water Right Information Index Program (WRINDEX)."'
1. Grand County Water Conservancy District
The purpose of this organization is to provide both domestic and irrigation water to its customers." Grand Water & Sewer Service Agency
("GW&SSA"), established in 1999, manages the WCD's administration,
maintenance, and operation, and also manages revenue and expenses.n'

This WCD's board consists of six individuals that the Governor of
Utah appoints."' Based on the appointment procedure, it seems that
Grand County WCD's boundaries span two or more Utah counties."'
Based on a water rights search using WRINDEX, Grand County
WCD holds only a small amount of water in the form of water rights.
When combined, its water holdings total approximately 2,500 acre-feet of
water dedicated to irrigation purposes."' While this water comes primarily from the Moab Sewage Treatment Plant, the City of Moab acquires
much of its water from streams within the Colorado River Basin." Grand
County WCD acquires the remaining water from underground wells,
held in five separate water rights that have priority dates ranging from
1969 to the early 2000s." Four of the rights have priority dates between
2000 and 2006." The financial value of this WCD's water and stock
rights at the end of fiscal year 2005 was $1,178,533."'

108. WRINDEX, supra note 57.
109. SMUIN, RICH & MARSING, GRAND COUNTY WATER CONSERVANCY DISTRICT
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS FOR THE YEAR ENDING DECEMBER 31, 2005 (2006),
http://sao.state.ut.us/gr/special/2005/05dfgdwc.pdf [hereinafter GRAND COUNTY WCD
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS1.

110. Id.
111. SAN JUAN CNTY. Gov'T, SAN JUAN COUNTY SPECIAL SERVICE DISTRICTS AND
AREAS (2006), http://www.sanjuancounty.org/service_districts.htm (last visited Sept. 7,
2011) [hereinafter SAN JUAN COUNTY SPECIAL SERVICE DISTRICTSI.
112. See Utah Code Ann. S 17B-2a-1005(2)(a)-(c).
113. WRINDEX, supra note 57.
p. 15,
1, at Ch. 11,
supra note
114. UTAH STATE WATER PLAN,
rwv. water.utah.gov/planningsupIeasIcol/swpscl1.pdf

115. WRINDEX, supra note 57.
116. Id.
I17. GRAND COUNTY WCD FINANCIAL STATEMENTS, supra note 109, at 10.
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2. San Juan County Water Conservancy District
This WCD's board consists of eleven individuals who are appointed
by area, as determined by District Court boundaries."' Based on a
WRINDEX search, the San Juan County WCD holds approximately
30,700 acre-feet of Colorado River water, which is used entirely for irrigation purposes."' This WCD's 30,700 acre-feet holding is comprised of
five separate rights. The largest right is 20,500 acre-feet, which comes
from the San Juan River and has a priority date of 1968. The remaining
four holdings are somewhat smaller, ranging from 711 acre-feet to approximately 5,000 acre-feet. Three of these rights have priority dates of
1965, and the last one has a priority date of 1987. The water for these
four rights comes from South Creek and Recapture Creek. This WCD
has applied for additional water rights for irrigation purposes but the
State Engineer has not approved these appropriations.
3. Uintah Water Conservancy District
This WCD operates and maintains the Vernal and Jensen Units of
the Central Utah Project, which were built by the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation.'" This WCD oversees the Steinaker and Red Fleet Reservoirs
and related distribution systems."' This WCD delivers the water contained in the Vernal and Jensen Units to other agencies that then resell
the water to their own users, thus making this WCD one of two of the
largest wholesale water suppliers in the Uintah Basin." The Vernal Unit
provides 17,900 acre-feet of supplemental irrigation water annually to
Ashley Valley canal companies and 1,600 acre-feet of water for municipal
and industrial use." The "Jensen Unit provides 4,600 [acre-feetl of supplemental irrigation water to irrigators and canal companies along Brush
Creek and in the Jensen area annually, as well as up to 18,000 [acre-feet]
of M&I [municipal and industriall water to the Ashley Valley and Jensen
areas."'' This WCD also provides technical, financial, and operational
support to projects that develop local water resources."
A WRINDEX search revealed that the WCD itself holds little water
in the form of water rights. In total, it holds approximately 4,900 acrefeet, spread over sixteen separate rights, that are specifically designated
for agricultural use. The water source is either the Green River or un-
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119. WRINDEX, supa note .57.
120. UINTAH

WATER

CONSERVANCY

DIST.,

to

Welcome

Our

Websie,

http://uintahwater.org/ (last visited Aug. 26, 2011) [hereinafter UINTAH WCDI.
121. Id.
122. UTAH

STATE

WATER

PLAN,

supra note

1,

http://www.water.utah.gov/planning/SWP/unitah/swp-ub06.pdf.
123. UINTAH WCD, supranote 120.
124. Id.
125. Id.

Ch.

6,

p.

2,

available at

84

WATERLAWREVIEW

Volume 15

derground wells. The priority dates of these rights range from 1958 to
2008.
4. Central Utah Water Conservancy District
The Central Utah Water Conservancy District ("CUWCD") serves
Utah County and Salt Lake County and currently manages the Central
Utah Project.'" It is one of two primary water wholesalers in the Uintah
Basin." The CUWCD does not play a large role in distributing water
and it does not hold rights to water from the Colorado River Basin,
though it is a prominent force within Utah due to its role in the Central
Utah Project and its administration of water from basins other than the
Colorado.
5. Duchesne County Water Conservancy District
Based ori a WRINDEX search, this organization holds 48,500 acrefeet of water for irrigation purposes, which is contained in five different
rights." The majority of this water, 41,000 acre-feet, is held in one water
right. The water sources include the Green River, McGuire Draw Creek,
Cottonwood or North Fork Dry Gulch, and the Unita River. The priority dates on these rights range from 1958 to 1964. This WCD also has
additional holdings of 5,800 acre-feet, spread over four rights, that are
used for industrial purposes.
6. Emery County Water Conservancy District
This WCD was organized in 1961 to oversee the development of the
Emery County Project, a unit in the Upper Colorado Reclamation Project
built by the Bureau of Reclamation.'" The project entailed constructing
and managing five major water structures: Joe's Valley Dam and Reservoir, Huntington North Dam and Reservoir, Cottonwood CreekHuntington Canal, Huntington North Service Canal, and North Canal.
The system currently supplies supplemental irrigation water to 18,000
acres of land and full irrigation water to 770 acres." A search of
WRINDEX revealed that this WCD holds only 2,900 acre-feet in water
rights.

126. CENTRAL
UTAH
WATER
CONSERVANCY
DIsT.,
Operations,
http://wNw.cuwcd.com/ (last visited Aug. 26, 2011).
127. UTAH STATE WATER PLAN, supra note 1, Ch. 6, p. 2, available at
http://www.water.utah.gov/planning/SWP/unitah/swp-ub06.pdf.
128. WRINDEX, supra note 57.
.129. Edward A. Geary, A History of Water Development in Emery County, Utah,
www.waterhistory.org (last visited Aug. 26, 2011).
130. Jay Humphrey & Tracy Weber Davidson, Monitoring a Precious Resource
(1998), http://wwiv.campbellsci.com/documents/case-studies/06emeryco.pdf.
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7. Wide Hollow Water Conservancy District
This WCD was "formed in 1990 to provide assistance in developing
and managing water resources in the Escalante area.". It participated in
constructing the Wide Hollow Water Supply Storage Facility ("WSSF")
Project in Escalante, which aimed to "restore the WSSF's original water
storage capacity to help ensure a dependable supply of irrigation water in
this farming area of south-central Utah."' A search of WRINDEX did
not generate any results on this WCD, indicating that it likely does not
hold its own water rights.
B. WATER HOLDINGS OF UTAH WATER COMPANIES
In Utah, water companies hold massive amounts of water and are collectively the most important water entity in the state in terms of water
holdings." In total, water companies in Utah hold a little over 13 million
acre-feet of Colorado River water for irrigation purposes." This represents approximately 750 percent of the water supply allocated to Utah
under the Upper Colorado River Compact.'" This indicates that there is
a significant issue of over-allocation of Colorado River water in Utah."
Regardless, water companies are likely to be vital players in future Utah
water transfers due to their large water holdings. This section aims to
help practitioners identify water companies that have the largest water
131. U.S.
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STORAGE
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PROJECT
5
(2010),
http://www.fransoncivil.com/uploads/Project%2OFiles/1_WideHollow FinalEA.pdf.
132. Id. at 1.
133. This is based on the author's comparison of water rights held by three major
types of water organization in Utah: Water Conservancy Districts (WCDs), water companies, and Water User Associations (WUAs). The author searched WRINDEX to
determine how much Colorado River water each type of organization held. Based on
the WRINDEX search, water companies hold approximately 13 million acre-feet of
Colorado River water that is used for irrigation purposes, WCDs hold approximately
250,600 acre-feet of Colorado River water used for irrigation, and WUAs hold a negligible number of water rights. Therefore, water companies, based on the great quantity of
Colorado River water they hold, will likely be the most important player in future water
transfers.
134. See id.; WRINDEX, supra note 57.
135. The author calculated this percentage by dividing the amount of water held by
water companies (approximately 13 million acre feet) by the amount of water to which

Utah is theoretically entitled under the Upper Colorado River Compact (1,725,000 million acre feet). See Upper Colorado River Basin Compact, ch. 48, 63 Stat. 31 (1949).
136. The issue of over-allocation of water is not unique to Utah. In the West, many
water holdings are represented by shares of stock known as "paper rights." Paper rights
often greatly overstate the amount of water that is both actually used and actually available, known as "wet water." The dichotomy between "wet water" and "paper water" indicates that more water has been appropriated than physically exists. See John D. Leshy,
A Conversation About Takings and Water Rights, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1985, 2005 (2005).
Therefore, Utah water companies do not hold title to 13 million acre feet of Colorado
River water in reality, even though on paper they do. Nonetheless, water companies still
control great quantities of Colorado River water and will be central to water transfers in
Utah.
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holdings in Utah, and therefore may be the most useful entities to examine as potential players in future water transfer deals. Below is a list of
the water companies that have significant water holdings from the Colorado River Basin that are used for irrigation purposes. This information
was obtained by conducting searches in WRINDEX."'
Duchesne Irrigation Company: This irrigation company, located in
Duchesne County, holds 15,203 acre-feet of water that is used for irrigation. The water comes from the Duchesne River. This water is held in
one right, which has a priority date of 1905."
Blanding Irrigation Company: This irrigation company is located in
San Juan County and holds approximately 17,500 acre-feet of water diverted from Recapture Creek. The priority date of each right is 1910.
The use of this water is split among irrigation, stock water, and municipal
supplies.'
Blue Mountain Irrigation Company: This irrigation company is located in San Juan County and holds approximately 28,235 acre-feet of water, which is split into several rights. The water is used primarily for irrigation, although some is also used for stock water. The priority date of
each right is 1887. The water is diverted from South Creek, North
Creek, and the North and South Forks of Montezuma Creek."
Allred Ditch Company: This company, located in Carbon County,
has combined rights of approximately 35,475 acre-feet of water that is
diverted from the Price River. The water is used primarily for irrigation
purposes, though a small amount is also used for domestic supplies. The
priority dates on the three rights this company owns are 1874, 1905, and
1906. In the future, the School and Institutional Trust Lands Administration of Utah may merge or consolidate this company.'
Bryner-Ploutz Ditch Company: While this company, located in Carbon County, holds over 400,355 acre-feet of water, the rights are extremely fragmented, and each right is for only a small amount of water.
In total, this company holds approximately 110 separate water rights.
Fifty-two of these rights are for quantities of 941 acre-feet. Forty-nine of
these rights are for quantities of 1,375 acre-feet. Another forty-nine of
these rights are for 5,791 acre-feet. The water is diverted from the Price
River. The priority dates range from 1882 to 1907. While it appears
that much of the water is used for irrigation, the fragmented nature of
these rights may make it difficult for a large-scale water transfer to take
place. It is possible, however, that this company could make use of the
newly liberalized water right consolidation law in Utah, discussed previously."
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Carbon Canal Company: This company, located in Carbon County,
holds approximately 277,434 acre-feet of water in eight separate rights.
The rights vary dramatically in terms of water quantity. The largest right
is for 187,508 acre-feet, while the smallest is for 385 acre-feet. Although
two of the rights do not list the purpose of use, the other rights list irrigation as the purpose of use. The water is diverted from the Price River.
The rights have priority dates of 1874, 1905, 1906, and 2005.'"
Price Water Company: This company is located in Carbon County
and holds approximately 32,578 acre-feet of irrigation water, although
some water is also used for domestic purposes. The water is diverted
from the Price River, and is split into three separate water rights, with the
largest one being for 26,062 acre-feet. The priority dates of these three
rights are 1874, 1906, and 1907. In the future, the School and Institutional Trust Lands Administration of Utah may merge or consolidate this
company.'
Spring Glen Canal Company: This company, located in Carbon
County, holds approximately 66,605 acre-feet of water that is used for
irrigation and stock water. This water is held in four separate rights.
Two of them are relatively large, with one representing 33,302 acre-feet,
and the other representing 26,063 acre-feet. The water is diverted from
the Price River. The largest right has a priority date of 2001, while the
other priority dates are 1874, 1906, and 1907. There is also one additional right for 7,601 acre-feet that has lapsed. The priority date for this
right is 2001. In the future, the School and Institutional Trust Lands
Administration of Utah may merge or consolidate this company.'"
Wellington Canal Company: This company, located in Carbon County, holds a total of 55,745 acre-feet. This water is held in five separate
rights, two relatively large (26,062 acre-feet and 14,479 acre-feet), one
medium-sized (9,411 acre-feet), and the last two relatively small (approximately 2,900 acre-feet each). The water is diverted from the Price River
and is used for irrigation purposes. The priority dates on the rights are
1874, 1876, 1906, 1907, and 1911. Notably, however, the Utah Board of
Water Resources holds 100 percent interest in each of these rights. In
the future, the School and Institutional Trust Lands Administration of
Utah may merge or consolidate this company."
Dry Gulch Irrigation Company: This company, located in Duchesne
County, holds approximately 399,918 acre-feet of water. This water is
split into thirteen water rights, which diverge greatly in terms of water
quantity. The largest right is for 273,660 acre-feet, while the smallest
right is for 198 acre-feet. The water is diverted largely from Lake Fork
River and Uinta River. The priority dates on these rights also vary widely. The single largest right has a priority date of 1996. Several fairly large
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rights have priority dates in the early 1990s, while most of the very small
rights have priority dates in the mid-1990s. The company uses this water
for irrigation purposes."' According to the company's website, the water
irrigates more than 53,000 acres in the "heart of the Uintah Basin.""
The website also provides lists of its stockholders, organized into classes,
and indicates how many shares each person holds." The shareholdings
range from 1 share to approximately 400 shares. These lists are useful
for identifying the largest stockholders. Possibly, these stockholders
should be approached first when investigating a potential transfer involving company-owned water. Additionally, this water company is a stockholder in the Moon Lake Water Users Association."
Ouray Park Irrigation Company: This company, located in Duchesne
County, holds approximately 284,437 acre-feet. This quantity is divided
into fourteen separate rights. Four of the rights are very large, with values
of 72,397 acre-feet, 30,406 acre-feet, and two for 68,777 acre-feet. The
remaining rights are for relatively small values, which range from 10,000
to 500 acre-feet. The majority of the water is used for irrigation, although
some is used for domestic purposes and one right for 10,000 acre-feet is
used for a fish culture conservation pool. The water is diverted from the
Uinta River, the Duchesne River, the Whiterock River, the Ouray Park
Canal, Cliff Creek, and Deep Creek. There is great variability in the priority dates of the water rights. The dates range from 1927 to 2000, with
most in the earlier half of the 1900s. This company's largest water right
has a priority date of 2000."'
Uintah Basin Irrigation Company: This company is located in Duchesne County and holds a total of 44,386 acre-feet. The vast majority of
this water is held in one right, which is for 40,786 acre-feet. The source
of the water is the Duchesne River, and the priority date is 1910. This
right does not list the purpose of the water use."
Uintah River Irrigation Company: This company, located in Duchesne County, holds a total of 21,719 acre-feet diverted from the Uinta
River. This water is split into two rights, one for 18,099 acre-feet, which
has a priority date of 1905, and the other for 3,619 acre-feet, which has a
priority date of 1961. The water is used for irrigation.''
Cottonwood Creek Consolidated Irrigation Company: This company,
located in Emery County, holds a total of 2,449,190 acre-feet of water
that comes primarily from Indian Creek and Cottonwood Creek. The
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uses for this water include irrigation, municipal, stock water, domestic,
and power. These rights are relatively fragmented. This company holds
a total of seventy-one water rights. Two of the rights are from Cotton-

wood Creek, and the priority dates are 1946 and 1947. The remaining
rights divert water from Indian Creek. Twenty-four of the rights are for
28,234 acre-feet and have a priority date of 1879. Another twenty-four of
the rights are for a quantity of 6,008 acre-feet and have a priority date of
1884. The remaining twenty-one rights are for a quantity of 74,568. acrefeet and have a priority date of 1877. This company puts the issue of wet
versus paper water rights in sharp relief, considering that this company
controls paper rights to approximately twice the amount of water that the
Colorado River Compact actually allocates to Utah.'
Ferron Canal and Reservoir Company: This company, located in
Emery County, holds a total of 86,242 acre-feet. These rights have varied
purposes. Nearly every right uses the water for a combination of purposes, including irrigation, stock water, fish culture, municipal, power, and
domestic. The water is split across nind water rights. The two largest
rights are both for quantities of 18,099 acre-feet, and have priority dates
of 1900. The next largest right is for 15,565 acre-feet, which has a priority date of 1900 as well. There are an additional three rights, each for
10,859 acre-feet with priority dates of 1875 and 1900. The remaining
rights are for relatively small quantities. The water is diverted from diverse sources, including South Straight Hollow Wash, Eli Hollow Wash,
Jewkes Hollow Wash, Dutch Flat Wash, Ferron Creek, Indian Hollow,
Diversion Hollow, and Zwahlen Wash."
Green River Canal Company: This company, located in Emery County, holds a total of 68,777 acre-feet. This water is split into three separate
rights. One right is for 14,479 acre-feet, and it is used to flush silt out of
a raceway and canal system. The priority date is 2000. Another right is

for a quantity of 11,583 acre-feet. This water is used for irrigation and
has a priority date of 1880. The third right is for a quantity of 42,714
acre-feet and is used primarily for irrigation, although some of it is also
used for stock water and domestic supplies. The priority date of this
right is 1880. The water for all of these rights is diverted from the Green
River. Interestingly, in 1998 this company attempted to acquire a right to
361,985 acre-feet of water from the Green River to be used both for municipal supply and for the irrigation of 53,000 acres. The State Engineer
did not approve this request.

Huntington Cleveland Irrigation Company: This company, located in
Emery County, holds a total of 8,135,316 acre-feet. This water is spread

across 145 water rights. Thirty-two of the rights are for 57,917 acre-feet
each; thirty-two are for 32,578 acre-feet each; thirty-two are for 55,926
acre-feet each; four rights are for 7,239 acre-feet each; thirty rights are for
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
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108,595 acre-feet each. The remaining rights are for relatively small
quantities, being primarily for less than 4,000 acre-feet each. The water
has a variety of uses. Some of the water is used solely for irrigation.
Some is used for a mixture of irrigation and stock water, while other
rights are used for a mixture of irrigation, domestic, and municipal purposes. Several rights do not list a purpose. The vast majority of the
rights have priority dates of 1875, 1879, 1884, or 1888. The water
sources include Sand Wash, Cedar Wash, Lake Fork Creek, Lake Canyon Creek, Huntington Creek, Rilda Springs, Little Bear Canyon Spring,
Bear Canyon Spring, Birch Spring, Gate Spring, and Miller Flat Creek.
This company also brings the issue of wet versus paper water rights into
play, considering that this company holds paper water rights that exceed,
by approximately 7,000,000 acre-feet, the amount of water allocated to
Utah under the Colorado River Compact."'
Muddy Creek Irrigation Company: This company, located in Emery
County, holds approximately 91,296 acre-feet. While several of the
rights do not list a use, the company uses the majority of the rights for a
combination of irrigation, municipal, domestic, and stock water. The
water is diverted from Muddy Creek and Fish Creek. The water. is split
into three rights, with priority dates of 1881, 1914, and 1961. This company also holds an additional 2,300 acre-feet, which is contained in approximately ten separate rights-all less than 300 acre-feet each. This
company also has an additional right for 400 acre-feet that has lapsed and
an unapproved application for 6,000 acre-feet."
New Escalante Irrigation Company: This company, located in Garfield County, holds approximately 58,850 acre-feet. The vast majority of
this water is held in two rights, one for a quantity of 28,958 acre-feet, and
the other for a quantity of 23,891 acre-feet. Both of these rights have a
priority date of 1875. There are three additional rights for relatively
small amounts that have priority dates ranging from 1939 to 1969. The
water is diverted from the Escalante River, the North Fork of the Escalante River, Wide Hollow Wash, and Iron Spring Draw. While two of
the five rights do not list the purpose of use, the other three rights are
used for irrigation. This company does hold one additional right for
23,279 acre-feet, with a priority date of 1945, but this right has lapsed.'"
Pine Creek Irrigation: This company, located in Garfield County,
holds approximately 32,400 acre-feet spread across five rights. The largest right is for a quantity of 21,719 acre-feet and has a priority date of
1875. The second largest right is for 7,240 acre-feet and has a priority
date of 1892. The remaining three rights are for approximately 1,600
acre-feet each. Although two of the water rights do not list a use, the other three list irrigation and stock water as the purpose of use. The water is
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diverted from Pine Creek. Notably, the four smallest rights are mortgaged to the Utah Board of Water Resources.'"
Ashley Central Irrigation: This company, located in Uintah County,
holds 154,205 acre-feet. While this water is split into three separate
rights, the vast majority of this water (145,517 acre-feet) is held in one
right. Although the purpose of use is unclear, other holdings are used for
irrigation. The water is diverted primarily from Ashley Creek, as well as
McNaughton Gulch and Palmer Gulch. The priority dates on the three
rights are 1874, 1876, and 1885."
Ashley Upper Irrigation Company: This company, located in Uintah
County, has one water right for 123,074 acre-feet. The water is diverted
from Ashley Creek and is used for irrigation. The priority date is 1874.'
Fremont Irrigation Company: This company, located in Wayne
County, holds 144,000 acre-feet that is used for irrigation. The majority
of the water is held in one right for 131,762 acre-feet. The priority date
of this right is 1889. The remaining holdings are split into three separate
rights, which have priority dates of 1889, 1951, and 1954. The water is
diverted from the Fremont River.'"
Hanksville Canal Company: This company, located in Wayne County, holds 26,062 acre-feet that is split into three separate rights. The water is diverted from the Fremont River and is used for irrigation. The
priority date of one of these three rights is 1883, and the two remaining
rights have a priority date of 1971."
Teasdale Special Service District: This company, located in Wayne
County, holds one water right for 70,949 acre-feet. The water is used for
irrigation, stock water, and municipal purposes. The right did not specify
the water source."
C. WATER USERS ASSOCIATIONS

In Utah, the vast majority of Water Users Associations ("WUAs") do
not hold water rights. Instead, they largely serve as representatives of
their water users in dealings with the United States government. "In
1924, Congress adopted the Fact Finders Act," which mandated that the
Bureau of Reclamation turn over operation and maintenance of federal
reclamation projects to either a WUA or an irrigation district." This
legislation aimed to facilitate transactions between the federal government
and project water users by allowing the United States to deal only with
WUAs or water companies, rather than thousands of different water us-
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ers." As such, WUAs often contracted with the Secretary of the Interior
for repayment of project costs and operations of projects constructed
under the Reclamation Act of 1902.'" Below is a discussion of the various WUAs that are associated with Colorado River Basin water.
Utah Water Users Association: This association is a nonprofit organization that balances multiple duties, including protecting its member's
water rights, promoting water conservation, providing legislative support
for water issues, sponsoring water workshops, giving technical advice to
members, and representing members on national water issues." This
WUA has a statewide scope and therefore represents all of Utah's water
user entities, including irrigators, water conservancy districts, municipal
and industrial water users, federal, state, and local agencies, as well as
engineering and law firms, contractors, suppliers, and insurance companies.' A thirty-three member board governs the organization, and dues
provide the funding.'' Based on a search of WRINDEX, this organization does not hold any water rights of its own.'
Duchesne/Strawberry River Water Users Association: This WUA
"manages several rivers, canals, and reservoirs in ... Duchesne County . .
."'"

It also regulates water use and water rights for the Duchesne area,

along with six other water agencies that own or manage the area's water
resources as well.' River commissioners and canal company employees
such as ditch riders and water masters operate the association.'" The association services the towns of Duchesne, Fruitland, Myton, Roosevelt,
Tabiona, and Upalco." A search of WRINDEX indicated that this association holds no water rights of its own."
Strawberry Water Users Association ("SWUA"): This is a group of
farmers and investors that have participated in the administration of several federal irrigation projects in Utah. SWUA first cooperated in the
Strawberry Valley Project, which created a reservoir in the Strawberry
Valley.' The project developed a reliable source of water for farmers in

167. Id.
168. DAN A. TARLOCK, JAMES N. CORBRIDGE, DAVID H. GETCHES & REED D.
BENSON, WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT: A CASEBOOK IN LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY
784 (6th ed. 2009).
169. UTAH WATER USERS Ass'N, Mission Statement, http://www.utahwaterusers.com/
(last visited Sept. 9, 2011).
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southern Utah County.'" Although preliminary engineering work conducted in 1902 indicated that the project would be prohibitively expensive, the creation of the U.S. Reclamation Service (later renamed the U.S.
Bureau of Reclamation) altered the project's outlook."' In 1905, the U.S.
Reclamation Service approved the Strawberry Valley Project.. "The federal government provided funding and engineering expertise" for the project, while the beneficiaries managed the facilities and were required to
"eventually repay the construction costs . . . ."' The U.S. Reclamation
Service built the Strawberry Valley reservoir, which collected water from
the Strawberry River and Indian Creek and then fed the water into the
Diamond Fork River and then into the Spanish Fork River, from which
the farmers diverted irrigation water." In total, the project carried 500
cubic feet per second (cfs) of water."' Two hundred and fifty cfs were
used for a power plant, while the remaining 250 cfs went through the
"Strawberry Highline Canal to be distributed for irrigation.""
SWUA did not exist when this project was constructed, so the federal
government did not originally contract with SWUA.'" Instead, the Federal Government contracted with individual homesteaders who applied to
beneficially use the Strawberry Project water.. "Once accepted and approved by the United States, the water rights applications constituted
binding contracts between the applicants [homesteaders] and the United
States.""
In exchange for water, these individuals were to assist in repaying the
United States for the costs incurred to build the Strawberry Project. "
Upon repayment, the individual would have the right to use the project's
water in perpetuity.'" However, dealing with so many individuals became
unwieldy and difficult for the U.S. government, and so in 1922 SWUA
was created."' From that point forward, the U.S. government dealt with
SWUA instead of thousands of individual water users."' Virtually all of
the individuals that had entered into contracts with the United States for
Strawberry Project water became shareholders of SWUA." They transferred their water rights to SWUA in exchange for SWUA stock."'
179.
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181.
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184.
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SWUA then entered into contracts with the United States to deliver project water to its shareholders and to begin repaying construction costs."
In 1974, SWUA "completed its repayment obligation."'"
Starting in 1956, the Bonneville Unit of the Central Utah Project updated or replaced most of the infrastructure the Strawberry Valley Project
developed.". Soldier Creek dam replaced the Strawberry Dam and enlarged the Strawberry Reservoir." A 1991 Contract with the U.S. Bureau
of Reclamation "guaranteed SWUA an allocation of 61,000 acre-feet of
water each year from the Enlarged Strawberry Reservoir."'
Moon Lake Water Users Association: This WUA is a non-profit corporation that consists of eight irrigation companies."' These eight companies are: Dry Gulch Irrigation Company, Farnsworth Canal and Reservoir Company, Lakefork Irrigation Company, Lakefork Western Irrigation Company, Monarch Canal and Reservoir Company, South Boneta
Ditch Company, T.N. Dodd Irrigation Company, and Uteland Ditch
Company."' These companies organized this WUA in 1934' to contract
with the U.S. government for the "construction, repayment of cost, and
operation and maintenance of Moon Lake Dam and appurtenant works,"
more commonly known as the Moon Lake Project."
Moon Lake WUA is the only WUA in Utah that actually holds water
rights."' Moon Lake WUA holds 495,009 acre-feet for irrigation purposes. This water is held in eight rights. The quantity of water that each
right represents varies greatly. The largest right is for 238,910 acre-feet,
while the smallest right is for 1,500 acre-feet. The priority dates for these
rights are also diverse, with the earliest date being 1910 and the latest
being 1964. The water is diverted from the West Fork of Lake Fork River, Yellowstone River, Lake Fork River, Sand Wash, and Uinta River.
D.

FEDERAL LIMITATIONS ON THE TRANSFER OF WATER

An additional layer of complexity is added to the water transfer process if a federal project originally developed the water involved in the
transfer. When the Federal Government builds a project to develop wa-

195. Id.
196. Strawberry Water Users Ass'n v. United States, 576 F.3d 1133, 1137 (10th Cir.
2009).
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 1138.
200. MooN LAKE WATER UsERs Ass'N STOCKHOLDERS, supra note 150.
201. Id.
202. Zachary Redmond, Moon Lake Project, BUREAU OF RECLAMATION 10 (2000),
http://www.usbr.gov/projects//ImageServer?imgName-Doc 1305123761664.pdf.
RECLAMATION,
OF
.
BUREAU
Project,
Lake
203. Moon
http://www.usbr.gov/projects/Project.jsp?proj_ Name=-Moon+Lake+Project (last visited
Sept. 10, 2011).
204. WRINDEX, supra note 57.
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ter, there is a question as to who has legal authority to control the water."
This is a significant concern in Utah because the Bureau of Reclamation
has been constructing the Central Utah Project ("CUP"), a large federal
water project, since the 1960s."' The CUP has developed approximately
251,750 acre-feet of water in Utah"' and serves over one million Utahns."
Therefore, the answer to the question of who owns this water will have
significant impacts on a large amount of water and water users in Utah.
The Utah Supreme Court decided a case, In re Ufintah Basin, which
addressed the issue of who owns the water that the federal government
develops for use by a state.' The Strawberry WUA ("SWUA"), who was
a party in this case, operates, maintains, and supplies water from the
Strawberry Valley Project, a federal project that the Bureau of Reclamation built."' SWUA argued that it held title to the project water and that
it therefore had the right to file change applications with the State Engineer to transfer the water without the consent or approval of the United
States." In response, the United States argued that SWUA's water rights
derive solely from its contracts with the United States, and that since the
United States owns the Strawberry Valley Project facilities, having built
them, the United States therefore owns the Strawberry Valley Project
water rights." The United States further argued that "itlhe federal government retains the ultimate approval authority with respect to both the
distribution of project water and any change of place or purpose of use
Ultimately, the court held it was "undisthat might be contemplated."'
puted that the right of use rests with Strawberry IWUAI."" The court,
however, also held that the United States has a protective role over the
common shareholders who have applied project water to beneficial use."
In this way, the United States shares a similar role with water companies
and WUAs, which have duties to act for the benefit of their shareholders."' The United States Supreme Court has also taken this position."'
The Utah Supreme Court did not, however, answer the question of
whether the WUA must receive federal approval before making a change
to an existing water right when the water comes from a federal project
205. See In re Uintah Basin v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 133 P.3d 410, 417 (Utah
2006).
206. Jeffrey Ashley & Robert L. Jones, The Central Utah Project, 22 J. LAND
RESOURCES & ENvTL. L. 273, 285 (2002).
207. CENTRAL UTAH PROJECT COMPLETION ACT OFFICE, U.S. DEP'T OF THE
INTERIOR, Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.cupcao.gov/faq. html (last visited
Sept. 13, 2011).
208. Ashley & Jones, supra note 206, at 285.
209. In re Uintah Basin, 133 P.3d at 412.
210. Id. at 416.
211. Id. at 419.
212. Id.
213. Id.at 423.
214. Id.at 421.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 422.
217. Id. at 423 (citing Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110, 126-27 (1983)).
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(although the Tenth Circuit did, as will be discussed shortly). The Utah
Supreme Court did state, however, that if acting without the United
States' approval would threaten the "integrity" and "viability" of the federal project, then that would be an "extremely compelling" argument in
favor of the United States reviewing and approving changes to the purpose or place of use of project water."'
The Tenth Circuit addressed the issue of gaining federal approval before changing a right in Strawberry Water Users Ass'n v. United States."'
In this case the court held that because the United States did retain legal
title (which is differeiit than the right to use that the Utah Supreme Court
adjudicated) to Strawberry Valley Project water, the United States must,
at a minimum, voluntarily join with SWUA in a change-of-use application
submitted to the Utah State Engineer.' Therefore, SWUA could not
initiate a change with the State Engineer unilaterally."' This means that
either (1) the United States must join in the request to the State Engineer,
or (2) the United States must approve the change the SWUA seeks, then
SWUA can go before the State Engineer to seek a change.' The court
ultimately held that "federal law clearly requires the consent of the United States for such changes.""
Furthermore, federal law recognizes that a "change in the use of project water from irrigation to municipal and industrial use . . . requires a
contract with the Secretary [of the Interior].""' Additionally, the authorizing legislation for many federal water projects designates a geographical
area that the project is intended to serve,"' which is an additional hindrance to water transfers. As a result, the project's boundaries may limit
potential transfers from agricultural areas to urban areas. Therefore,
when considering possible transfers, parties must examine a project's
legislation to determine if such a limitation will be an issue. In sum,
transferring federal project water from farmland to municipalities will
involve an additional layer of approval from the federal government,
which will make a transfer more difficult to achieve.

V.

PROPOSALS TO IMPROVE EFFICIENCY OF WATER TRANSFERS

Utah's water transfer scheme contains two primary obstacles to water

transfers . First, skewed incentive structures make water companies reluctant to engage in water transfers. Second, two legal doctrines-the no
harm rule and the public interest test-govern the State Engineer's decision to approve or veto a change application. These obstacles negatively
218.
219.
2009).
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.

Id. at 424.
Strawberry Water Users Ass'n v. United States, 576 F.3d 1133, 1141 (10th Cir.
Id. at 1147.
Id.at 1146.
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impact water transfers by decreasing efficiency and increasing transaction
costs. The amount of time necessary to determine whether a transfer will
be approved also likely discourages transfers. This Article proposes several ways to reduce impediments to water transfers and improve efficiency, while incentivizing the allocation of water to users who demand it
most.
A.

INCENTIVIZING TRANSFERS OF WATER COMPANY SHARES

Water companies have typically been reluctant to engage in water
transfers. This is partly due to the uncertainty surrounding the authority
of water companies "to pass transfer profits through to the districts'
members."" Often times, water companies either expressly cannot pass
profits from water transfers to their shareholders, or it is unclear whether
companies can do so.' Company by-laws usually do not provide clarity
on whether and how profits can be distributed "because virtually all districts were formed before the recent upsurge of interest in transfers."'
Thus, most by-laws do not address this issue. A direct prohibition on
profit distribution or uncertainty about whether and how a company can
distribute profits likely negatively impacts water transfers for two reasons.
First, if shareholders receive no benefit from a transfer, then shareholders are unlikely to want to transfer the water represented by their own
shares. Second, if shareholders with voting power do not receive any
benefit from such a transaction, which they will not if no mechanism exists for-profit distribution, then there is no incentive for them to allow the
transfer. Because the consequence of a transfer means the water company
controls less water, any shareholder who does not benefit from the transfer will likely resist such a transfer. However, if voting members receive
some monetary benefit from the transfer, they will more likely to approve
a transfer.
This rationale also applies to companies that only allow board members, as opposed to individual shareholders, to vote on transfers. In this
case, while the board is unlikely to allow an action that benefits only one
shareholder (the shareholder wanting to transfer), the board presumably
would be more likely to approve transfers if profit-sharing were available
to spread the benefits among many company shareholders.
Two mechanisms can potentially reduce the negative institutional incentives that company by-laws can create. First, the company board
could vote to change its by-laws. If the by-laws contained a direct prohibition, then amending it to expressly allow for some sort of profit sharing
mechanism would provide an appropriate incentive. One way this profit
sharing mechanism could work is to allow a certain percentage of transfer
profits, such as ten or twenty percent, to be evenly distributed among
226. Barton H. Thompson, Jr., InstitutionalPerspectives on Water Policies and Markets, 81 CAL. L. REV. 671, 731 (1993).
227. Id.
228. Id.
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other shareholders. Admittedly, if a company's by-laws contain an express prohibition, this may indicate a strong company culture of disinclination towards liberalizing water transfer provisions. If this is the case,
amending the by-laws to allow for a profit-sharing mechanism may be
difficult to achieve. On the other hand, if a water company's by-laws are
simply unclear on this issue, altering the by-laws to provide clarification
would be the best way to proceed. Therefore, the success of such a
measure may well depend on the company's existing by-law language and
the degree of change that a profit-sharing mechanism would cause within
each water company.
A second way to reduce water companies' negative institutional incentives could be for the Utah state legislature to pass a law stating that a
profit-sharing mechanism is valid, but not required, under state law.
Such an endorsement would likely have positive effects on water transfers. It could help steer companies towards adopting a profit-sharing
mechanism by strengthening support for such a mechanism. More importantly, such an endorsement would quell arguments those opposed to
water transfers may make that profit-sharing would violate state law.
Admittedly, an uncertain profit structure is only one of several institutional issues that have circumscribed many water companies' interest in
water transfers.' However, altering by-laws or passing legislation at the
state level is a relatively simple method of reducing a prominent obstacle
to water transfers. Thus, it is probably one of the most efficient initial
reforms to begin reducing resistance to water transfers.
B.

IMPROVEMENTS WITHIN THE OFFICE OF THE STATE ENGINEER

1. No Harm Rule
The State Engineer must consider the no harm doctrine when determining whether to approve a change application. The no harm doctrine
hinders water transfers because it states that those who file a change application must present "a prima facie case that the change will not injure
junior appropriators."" The rationale for this rule is two-fold. First, if a
party can acquire water from the original user for a price that simply exceeds the value to the original user, there is no guarantee that the transfer
is socially efficient.-" This is because "[tihe injury to junior appropriators
who are now without water [due to the water transfer] may exceed the
marginal benefit of the water to the [transferee]."" Therefore, to protect
junior appropriators, the no harm rule requires parties to account for
injuries to other water users.' The second rationale for the doctrine is

229. See id.
230. SAX ET AL., supra note 77, at 274.

231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id.
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equitable considerations? This rationale recognizes that junior appropriators have made investments based on previous water diversions.'
Thus, the no harm rule also seeks to protect junior appropriators' livelihoods and lifestyles, as well as their reasonable expectations of continuing
to receive water they have been using for years.
Despite the rationales for the no harm doctrine, the rule is very burdensome. Demonstrating that a change application will not cause injury
to another appropriator is an "extremely complex task,"' and Sax et al.
identifies various factors that pose difficulty to the no injury determination:
Because return flows are typically not a matter of record, experts
must try to estimate the flows. One need only imagine a river with dozens or even hundreds of diversions, all producing and using return flow,
to appreciate how difficult it can be to determine the impact of changing
any given water right and having to assure that no appropriator will be
worse off after a transfer.'
The no injury rule increases the time and expense of transfers, and
may pose an insurmountable obstacle to certain transfers, especially those
involving small quantities of water. In those cases, the required showing
that no harm will befall other appropriators may drive transaction costs
so high that a transfer will not occur at all. To help overcome these barriers and improve the efficiency of water transfers across the West, the no
harm rule could be modified in ways that "protect junior appropriators
without the difficulty, time, and expense of the current process."'
First, the State Engineer could "shift the entire burden of proof to the
This approach
protesters to show that they will lactuallyl be injured."
shifts the burden to the party that has the most information about whether and to what extent injury would occur from a transfer. It also reduces
the incentive for junior appropriators to make unfounded claims of injury. Thus, the number of people involved in protests will likely decrease,
which will lower the time and expense associated with transfers.
A second alternative is to "delay an evaluation of injury until a transfer has actually been made and there is some experience to tell us how, if
at all, junior appropriators are injured."" One benefit of this "trial transfer" approach is that it avoids speculative claims of future injury and ensures that negative impacts have occurred before a water user can bring
action." This approach also has the potential to reduce the time, expense, and numbers of parties involved in a dispute. Notably, however,
this approach has only been used in California, and after eight years, only
234.
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three parties opted to use the system, and the practice was eventually
abolished."'
Third, the use of "formulas to determine the amount of water that
can be transferred" is another method that could be used to modify the
no harm rule." Since water transfers will primarily involve reallocating
water from agriculture to municipalities and industry, a potential formula
could involve agricultural consumption tables.'" These tables "show the
typical per acreage consumption of water for various crops and geographic regions.""' For example, if a farmer wants to take one acre of wheat
out of production to sell or lease the water, the amount of transferable
water would be calculated based on how much water the average acre of
wheat consumed, which would be derived from an agricultural consumption table." These tables could also be used when a farmer decides to
switch to a crop that consumes less water, and then sell the surplus water." In this case, the tables would be used to "determine the amount of
water that could be transferred without reducing return flow."2
The main benefit of an agricultural formula approach is its uniformity
and simplicity. Under this approach, parties can efficiently decide how
much water they can transfer without harm. The drawback to this method, however, is that it may be too simplistic because it does not account
for variations in actual use. Under different scenarios, junior appropriators could incur both benefit and harm. For example, if an agricultural
table states that average water use for an acre of a certain crop is 1 acrefoot, but a farmer uses only 0.7 acre-feet, the farmer may still transfer I
acre-foot. Although he nay transfer more water than he actually uses,
this will harm junior appropriators because there will be 0.3 acre-feet less
water than before the transfer, though this harm would not be accounted
for. Conversely, if the farmer uses more water than the table's average,
the farmer will be limited to transferring the amount on the table, not the
full amount formerly put to beneficial use. This will benefit junior appropriators because more water will be available for them to use. For
example, if the farmer uses 1.3 acre-feet, but the average on the table is 1
acre-foot, the farmer may only transfer 1 acre-foot, which leaves an additional 0.3 acre-feet for junior appropriators.
These scenarios highlight the primary concern with this formula
method: instead of measuring actual use, the tables substitute an average
number that may not be in line with actual water use, which could have
the consequences outlined above. Nevertheless, the efficiency of this
method produces benefits that likely outweigh the costs of slight deviations from actual use.
242.
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Two additional methods that modify the no harm doctrine and facilitate transfers focus on allowing transfers to occur while compensating
those who are injured. The first option is to "relegate junior appropriators to damages."" This would mean that junior appropriators would no
longer have the power to block a transfer, as they do under the current
system if the transfer will harm them.' Instead, if junior appropriators
established harm from the transfer, they would be entitled to "collect
damages from the transferor."" The second option would establish a
statewide compensation fund "by imposing a tax on all water transfers,
and then use that fund to compensate junior appropriators for any injury
that they suffer from the transfers."" This system would at least partially
internalize external negative impacts on other appropriators, though the
benefit would depend on the rate the tax was set at. If the buyer is still
willing to pay for the transfer with the added tax, then the tax moves the
transfer closer to maximizing net social value. If the tax instead causes
the total price of the transfer to exceed the amount that the buyer is willing to pay, then the transfer would not have been socially efficient, although it would have been privately efficient. Therefore, this fund could
help ensure that water, a critical public resource, is put to the highest and
best use.
2. Public Interest Test
Utah law requires the State Engineer to consider the public interest
when deciding whether to approve or deny a transfer application.' The
State Engineer should deny any transfer application that "will unreasonably affect public recreation or the natural stream environment, or will
prove detrimental to the public welfare."" This is the only mention of
the public welfare, also referred to as public interest, in Utah's water
transfer statutes. The lack of any definition of what constitutes public
welfare, as well as the lack of any explicit factors that the State Engineer
should weigh, presents several problems for Utah's water transfer
scheme. In determining whether a transfer furthers the public welfare,
the State Engineer wields enormous power and discretion. Without any
guiding standards, the decision as to what constitutes the public welfare is
guided by the subjective values of the person who holds the position of
State Engineer. This is disconcerting because there is no guarantee that
the State Engineer's opinion of what constitutes the public welfare will
truly reflect public values or will remain consistent when the office of the
State Engineer changes hands. In fact, there is no guarantee that the
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opinion of what constitutes the public welfare will remain the same during the tenure of a single State Engineer.
I With no guidelines to follow, the parties who wish to engage in a water transfer have little way of knowing whether their proposed transfer
will satisfy the public interest test. Parties frequently invest large amounts
of time and money in negotiating the terms of a water transfer and in filing a change application. The uncertainty surrounding the public welfare
test, which is generated by a lack of concrete information on what factors
the State Engineer considers in applying the test, increases the risks associated with water transfers. Because risk generally deters investment, the
lack of statutory guidance likely complicates and inhibits water transfers
in Utah.
Accordingly, Utah should adopt a statute that explicitly sets out factors the State Engineer may consider when determining whether a water
transfer satisfies the public welfare test. Currently, several Western states
have statutes that establish such factors. The two best examples are Alaska's and Idaho's public interest test statutes. While both statutes refer to
the factors that the State Engineer should examine when approving or
denying new appropriations-as opposed to approving or denying water
transfer applications- adopting similarly explicit language would benefit
Utah's water transfer scheme. Alaska Statute section 46.15.080 states:
(b) In determining the public interest, the commissioner shall consider:
(1) the benefit to the applicant resulting from the proposed appropriation;
(2) the effect of the economic activity resulting from the proposed appropriation; (3) the effect on fish and game resources and on public recreational opportunities; (4) the effect on public health; (5) the effect of loss
of alternate uses of water that might be made within a reasonable time if not
precluded or hindered by the proposed appropriation; (6) harm to other persons resulting from the proposed appropriation; (7) the intent and ability of
the applicant to complete the appropriation; and (8) the effect upon access
to navigable or public water."

The Idaho state legislature declared the following to be "in the public
interest": "the streams of this state and their environments be protected
against loss of water supply to preserve the minimum stream flows required for the protection of fish and wildlife habitat, aquatic life, recreation, aesthetic beauty, transportation and navigation values, and water
quality.""
Utah should adopt language similar to the Alaska and Idaho statues
to provide more clarity to its public welfare test. This way, parties submitting a transfer application can look to the statute to identify the factors
that will affect their proposed water transfer under the public interest test.
This would increase the certainty surrounding transfers and greatly re255. ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 46.15.080 (West 2011).
256. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 42-1501 (West 2011).
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duce the discretion that the State Engineer currently has in administering
the public welfare test.
CONCLUSION
As Utah's demand for water grows, transfers of water from agriculture
to municipalities and industries will be required to satisfy increased demand. Although Utah has developed a transfer scheme that allows transfers of both water rights and water shares, the scheme is burdened by
several factors that decrease efficiency, increase transaction costs, and
likely deter water transfers. Three modifications to the scheme would
mitigate these deficiencies and make water transfers a more effective tool
for reallocating water among various users in Utah. First, water companies should alter by-laws to allow for profit-sharing between members.
Second, the legislature should alter the no harm rule. Third, Utah
should adopt a law that explicitly states what factors the State Engineer
must consider when determining whether a transfer is in the public interest. Adopting these three changes would improve Utah's existing water
transfer system by enhancing its ability to handle an increased number of
transfer applications and decreasing uncertainty and transaction costs.
This will make water transfers a more viable option going into the future.
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ABSTRACT

In Colorado, ground water experts provide the basis for the development, protection and adminstration of ground water resources.
Ground water technical experts frequently interact with water rights attorneys and legal experts in matters related to. Colorado water court proceedings, well permitting, rulemaking proceedings and other regulatory
processes. The purpose of this article is to present the questions that
ground water experts answer as partof these proceedings and to describe
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the processes by which ground water experts complete their technical
analyses. In Colorado water court and well permitting proceedings, the
focus of technicalground water concerns is usually on water quantity issues as opposed to water quality. The focus of this article is therefore
focused on water quantity considerations. Water quality contanination
and drinking water quality concerns are frequently addressed through
separateregulatoiy agencies, such as the Colorado Department of Public
Health and Environment (CDPHE) or the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA). Hydrogeologic investigations that occur under the jurisdiction of the CDPHE and the EPA are not the focus of this article.
Technicalissues addressedregardingground water generally focus on
the prevention of injury to senior water rights, protection of water supply
wells and aquifer systems, and quantifying available ground water resources. Ground water experts rely upon available information and a variety of technical tools and methods to complete analyses ofground water
flow, recharge and discharge. Ground water experts use theirjudgment
to select the appropriate tools and methods to analyze specific ground
water problems on a case-by-case basis. In this article, we explore the
tools available to ground water experts and how these tools are apphed to
solve specificproblems.

I. INTRODUCTION TO GROUND WATER
C.R.S. 37-90-103(19) defines ground water as any water not visible on
the surface of the ground under natural conditions.' Since ground water
is invisible, people often think it occurs in underground lakes, streams
and veins.' However, most ground water is located in small void spaces
within soil or rock, known as porosity. Porosity resulting from void spaces between sand and gravel particles -is known as primary porosity.'
Whereas, porosity resulting from void spaces in narrow crevices such as
fractures or faults is known as secondary porosity.' Beneath the ground
surface, these void spaces become saturated with water. The depth at
which the earth is saturated is called the water table and more specifically
can be referred to as the static water level.' At depths below the water
table, the subsurface material is generally saturated.! If the geologic formation, group of formations, or a part of the formation is saturated and
COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-90-103(19) (2011).
RALF TOPPER & BOB RAYNOLDS, COLO. FOUND. FOR WATER EDUC., CITIZEN'S
GUIDE TO DENVER BASIN GROUNDWATER 6 (2007) [hereinafter Groundwater Guide].
3.
C.W. FETTER, APPLIED HYDROGEOLOGY 64 (1980).
1.

2.

4. Id. (defining secondary porosity as the porosity that has been caused by fractures
or weathering in a rock or sediment after it has been formed).
5. See F.G. DRISCOLL, GROUNDWATER AND WELLS 891 (2" ed. 1986) (defining
water table as the surface of a body of unconfined ground water at which the pressure is
equal to that of the atmosphere, and static water level as the level of water in a well that
is not being affected by withdrawal of ground water).
6. See FETTER, supranote 5, at 94.
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sufficiently permeable to yield an economically viable water supply, it is
generally called an aquifer.'
An aquifer's ability to transmit water is expressed by the parameters
of hydraulic conductivity (permeability) and transmissivity (transmissibility).' The porosity of the material and the dynamic characteristics of the
water determine hydraulic conductivity.' Hydraulic conductivity is a coefficient of proportionality describing the rate at which water can move
through a permeable medium." Figure 1 presents a range of hydraulic
conductivities for various geologic materials." Transmissivity is the ability
of the total thickness of an aquifer to horizontally transmit water and is
the product of the aquifer's hydraulic conductivity and saturated thickness." Transmissivity is a function of properties of the liquid, the porous
media, and the thickness of the porous media.' Storage coefficient, specific yield, specific storage and storativity are measures of the amount of
water that is stored in an aquifer.

7. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-90-103(2) (2011) (defining an aquifer as a formation,
group of formations, or part of a formation containing sufficient saturated permeable material
that could yield a sufficient quantity of water that may be extracted and applied to beneficial
use).
8. RALF TOPPER ET AL., COLO. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY Div. OF MINERALS AND GEOLOGY,
GROUND WATER ATLAS OF COLO. 17 (Special Publ'n 53 2003) [hereinafter GWA].
9. Id.
10. FETTER, supra note 5, at 555.
11. G WA, supra note 10, at 19.
12. FETTER, supra note 5, at 100.
13. Id. at 560.
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Figure 1 - Hydraulic conductivity values for various aquifer materials.
Water supply wells are typically used to extract ground water from an
aquifer. Ground water professionals typically design production wells to
be open to the saturated, and most permeable, portion(s) of the aquifer
through perforations in the well casing or manufactured well screen intervals." When a well pumps ground water the water level in the well is lowered, the change in water level is referred to as drawdown. The lowered
water level during pumping is referred to as the pumping water level.
Pumping water level is defined as the level at which water stands in a well
when pumping is in progress." The rate of flow that a well can yield is a
function of the aquifer transmissivity, the amount of available drawdown
above the well pump, the capacity of the pump and the efficiency of the
well structure.
If the water bearing geologic formation is not completely saturated
with water, it is called an unconfined aquifer." An unconfined aquifer is
14.

GWA, supra note 10, at 17.

15.

DRISCOLL, supra note 7, at 206.

16.
17.

GWA, supra note 10, at 17.
Id. at 16.
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defined as an aquifer having a water table, whose surface is at atmospheric pressure." The water level in the a well constructed in an unconfined
aquifer is equal to the water table in the aquifer. When a well pumps'
water from an unconfined aquifer, water drains from the aquifer pore
space and/or fractures to the well, temporarily dewatering a portion of
that aquifer." Typical types of unconfined aquifers include alluvial and
hard rock bedrock aquifers, which are discussed in more detail later.
The amount of water that drains from the aquifer as a result of gravity is
referred to as the specific yield." For example, if a ten-gallon container is
filled with sand and gravel material with a porosity of twenty-five percent
and a specific yield of twenty percent, up to two and a half gallons of water could be added to the container without overtopping. However, if
holes were drilled at the bottom of the container allowing the water to
drain by gravity, two gallons of water would eventually drain out the container. The remaining half-gallon of water would remain affixed to the
sand and gravel under surface tension.
Some geologic formations greatly impede the movement of ground
water. These formations are generally referred to as confining units or
aquitards." Confining units are typically made up of low permeability clay
and shale." If an aquifer is completely saturated, overlain by a confining
unit and under pressure, the aquifer is considered a confined aquifer."
As a result of the pressure, the water level in a well drilled into a confined
aquifer will rise above the top of the aquifer." This water level is the potentiometric surface." If the water level rises above the ground surface
resulting in water flowing out of the well, this is commonly referred to as
an artesian flowing well." When a well pumps water from a confined aqu ifer, the aquifer yields water through compression of the aquifer material, expansion of the water, and drainage of adjacent unconfined areas."
Ground water professionals define the amount of water per unit volume
of a confined aquifer stored or expelled from the storage by the compres-

18. Groundwater Guide, supra note 4, at 32.
19. GWA, supra note 10, at 16.
20. FErER, supra note 5, at 559 (defining specific yield as "[t]he ratio of the water a
rock or soil will yield by gravity drainage to the volume of the rock or soil. Gravity
drainage may take many months to occur").
21. Id. at 553 (defining a confining layer as a "body of material of low hydraulic
conductivity that is stratigraphically adjacent to one or more aquifers. It may above or
below the aquifer").
22. G WA, supra note 10, at 16.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. DRISCOLL, supra note 7, at 890 (defining potentiometric surface as an imaginary
surface representing the total head of ground water in a confined aquifer that is defined
by the level to which water will rise in a well).
26. Id. at 886 (defining an artesian well as a well deriving it water from a confined
aquifer in which the water level stands above the ground surface synonymous with flowing artesian well).
27. GWA, supra note 10, at 16.
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sion of the aquifer material and expansion of water as specific storage,

which is typically several orders of magnitude lower than specific yield."
Ground water moves as a result of a pressure differential, and flows
from areas of higher pressure to areas of lower pressure. The total
amount of pressure within a column of ground water, frequently referred
to as head, is generally expressed in feet or meters of water above a datum." One of the factors that controls the rate of ground water movement is the hydraulic gradient, which is defined as the difference in total
head over a specific distance." When a well pumps ground water, the
pumping lowers the water level in the well creating a hydraulic gradient
between the well and surrounding aquifer, known as drawdown."' This
drawdown drives the flow of water into a well and creates a cone of depression in the aquifer." In an unconfined aquifer, the cone of depression dewaters a portion of the aquifer and reduces saturated thickness;
whereas in a confined aquifer, the saturated thickness remains constant
but the pressure head is reduced.'
Aquifer systems are hydraulically connected with surface water systems, including streams, rivers, lakes and springs." As a result, changes in
aquifer inflow, outflow, or water level (stresses) will generally result in
changes in flow of a surface water system." Aquifer stresses include but
are not limited to: the pumping of a well, a change in ground water return
flows if an irrigation practice is altered, the dewatering of a gravel pit, and
the recharge of water to an aquifer system.'" Aquifer stresses create
change in aquifer water levels that propagate through aquifer systems,
which cause changes in flow patterns and corresponding depletions or
accretions to surface water systems."'

II. PHYSICAL CLASSIFICATIONS OF GROUND WATER
In Colorado, the three most common types of aquifers encountered
include alluvial aquifers, sedimentary bedrock aquifers, and hard rock
bedrock aquifers, discussed in more detail below."
28. FETTER, supra note 5, at 559 (defining specific storage as "the volume of ground
water that an aquifer absorbs or expels from a unit volume when the pressure head decreases or increases by a unit amount").
29. DRISCOLL, supra note 7 at 888.
30. GIVA, supra note 10, at 206 (defining hydraulic gradient as "the slope of the
water table or potentiometric surface").
31. DRISCOLL, supra note 7, at 887.
32. Id. (defining cone of depression as "a depression in the ground water table or
potentiometric surface that has the shape of an inverted cone and develops around a
well from which water is being withdrawn, which defines the area of influence of a well").
33. GWA, supra note 10, at 17-18.
34.

P. ANDREW JONES & TOM CECH, COLORADO WATER LAW FOR NON-LAWYERS

22 (2009).
35. See id.
36. See id. at 24-25; see also TOPPER ET AL., supra note 10, at 18-20.
37. See GWA, supra note 10, at 19.
38. SeeJONES & CECH, supra note 36, at 22.
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ALLUVIAL AQUIFERS

Alluvial aquifers are relatively young aquifers in geologic time, created mostly during the Quaternary' geologic period, and consist of unconsolidated sand and gravel material.' Alluvial aquifers are relatively shallow and proximal to the surface stream systems that created the deposits
However, alluvial aquifers can be thin or absent in areas where the
."
surface stream has eroded into, or is underlain by, bedrock." Some of
the major rivers in Colorado, and therefore, some of the major alluvial
aquifer systems in Colorado, include the South Platte River, Arkansas
River, Colorado River, Yampa River, White River, and Rio Grande River.' Alluvial aquifers have a strong connection to stream systems due to
the unconsolidated aquifer material, relatively shallow depths, and proximity to surface streams."
Well records from the Colorado Division of Water Resources indicate alluvial aquifers in Colorado range in thickness from tens of feet to a
few hundred feet.' Typically, the thickness of alluvial aquifers increases
towards valley centers. Alluvial aquifers are typically unconfined. The
specific yield of alluvial aquifer material ranges from 0.5 percent to 30
percent" and hydraulic conductivity values range from 1 to 100,000 gallons per day per square foot." Due to their high specific yield, high hydraulic conductivity, and proximity to recharge sources (stream systems),
alluvial aquifers are some of the most productive aquifers in Colorado."
Figure 4 presents the generalized locations of alluvial aquifer systems in
Colorado."

39.
What
is
Quaternary,
U.S.
GEOLOGICAL
SURVEY,
http://geomaps.wr.usgs.gov/sfgeo/quaternary/stories/what_is.html (last modified Aug. 18,
2006) (explaining that the Quaternary geologic period represents approximately the last
2 million years).
40.
Introduction to Hrogeology of Colorado, COLO. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY,
http://geosurvey.state.co.us/apps/wateratlas/chapter4page1.asp
(last visited Oct. 24,
2011).
41.
SeeJONES & CHECK, supia note 36, at 23.
Brogden, R.E., and Giles, T.F. 1977, Reconnaissance of ground-water resources
42.
in part of Yampa River basin between Craig and Steamboat Springs, Moffat and Routt
Counties, Colorado: U.S. Geological Survey Water-Resources Investigations 77-4, sheet.
43. JONES & CHECK, supra note 36, at 22.

44.

See id.; see also G WA, supra note 10, at 31.

45.
See,
e.g.,
COLORADO
DIVISION
OF
WATER
RESOURCES,
http://www.dwr.state.co.us/WellPermitSearch/default.aspx (last visited Oct. 20, 2011)
(the Well Construction and Test Reports for well permit nos. 46864-F and 36535-F-R
indicate total well depths of 70 feet and 185 feet, respectively. Both wells are constructed
into alluvial aquifers).
46. DRISCOLL, supra note 7, at 67.

47.
48.

49.

Id. at 75.
GWA, supra note 10, at 5.
Id. at 33.
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From GWA, supra note 10.

Figure 4 - Location map of alluvial aquifers in Colorado.
B.

SEDIMENTARY BEDROCK AQUIFERS

Sedimentary bedrock aquifers in Colorado consist primarily of conglomerate, sandstone,"' siltstone,' and limestone" of varying age and are
located in structural basins containing multiple geologic layers. Many of
these structural basins extend thousands of feet below the earth's surface.
The major sedimentary bedrock aquifers in Colorado include the Denver
Basin, Piceance Basin, Eagle Basin, Sand Wash Basin, Paradox Basin,
San Juan Basin, Raton Basin, Dakota-Cheyenne aquifer, and the High
Plains aquifer. Groundwater flow in sedimentary bedrock aquifers is
influenced by various structural features such as dipping beds," fractures,"
and faults." In addition, groundwater flow in sedimentary bedrock aqui50. Id. at 208 (explaining that sandstone is a sedimentary rock formed by the compaction and/or cementing of sand).
51.
Id. (explaining that silt is a rock fragment or mineral particle with a diameter
smaller than a very fine sand grain and larger than coarse clay).
52. DRISCOLL, supra note 7, at 889 (defining limestone as "a sedimentary rock consisting chiefly of calcium carbonate primarily in the form of mineral calcite").
SCHLUMBERGER,
Glossary,
Field
53.
Oil
(last
visited
http://www.glossary.oilfield.slb.com/Display.cfn?Term=dipping%20bed
11/8/11) (defining a dipping bed as "a layer of rock or sediment that is not horizontal").
54. Jean-Michel Lemieux, Donna Kirkwood, and Rene Therrien, Fracture Network
Analysis of the St-Eustache Quarry, Quebec, Canada,for GroundwaterResources Managenent, 46 Can. Geotech. J. 828 (2009) (defining a fracture as "any discrete brittle
discontinuity in the rock mass along which cohesion is lost").
DRISCOLL, supra note 7, at 888 (defining a fault as "a fracture or zone of frac55.
tures along which there has been displacement of the sides relative to one another parallel to the fracture").
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fers is influenced by geologic layering of different material within sedimentary bedrock formations, such as layered sandstone, siltstone, and
shale.' This layering is known as stratigraphy. As a result of the varying
geology, depth, structural features and stratigraphy, sedimentary bedrock
aquifers have varying degrees of connection to the stream system.
The Denver Basin is the most utilized, and subsequently, most studied sedimentary bedrock aquifer system in Colorado. The administratively defined Denver Basin aquifer system generally extends north to south
from Greeley to Colorado Springs and west to east from Golden to
Limon. The geology of the Denver Basin consists of Tertiary" and Cretaceous' age sandstone, siltstone and shales resembling concentrically
stacked asymmetrical bowls.' Confining layers separate the individual
hydrogeologic units, resulting in four separate statutory aquifers contained in the basin. In descending order, these aquifers include: the
Dawson, Denver, Arapahoe and Laramie-Fox Hills aquifers. The unique
administrative regulations for ground water in the Denver Basin have
provided many Front Range metropolitan entities with an economically
efficient and locally available water supply, enabling growth. However,
many of these entities are now pursuing renewable water supplies to replace their nonrenewable Denver Basin water supplies.
The specific yield, hydraulic conductivity and well yield in sedimentary bedrock aquifers is typically less than alluvial aquifers. The specific
yield of sedimentary bedrock aquifers typically ranges from 5-percent to
20-percent." Specific storage values are typically 0.0001 per foot or less."
Hydraulic conductivity will typically range from 0.0001 to 10 gallons per
day per square foot." Figure 5 presents the general location of sedimentary bedrock aquifer systems in Colorado."

56.
G WA, supra note 10, at 208 (explaining that shale is a rock that is often impervious to water but rather soft, brittle, and easily eroded. Shale is the result of compaction
of silt or mud. Much of the Permian and Pennsylvanian strata in Colorado consist of
various shales, often brightly colored).
57.
Id. at 3 (explaining that the Tertiary geologic period represents the time period
from approximately 65 million years ago to approximately 2 million years ago).
58.
Id. (explaining that the Cretaceous geologic period represents the time period
from approximately 144 million years ago to approximately 65 million years ago. The
end of the Cretaceous Period was marked by the rise of the modern day Rocky Mountains).
CNTY.,
Aquifeis,
DOUGLAS
59.
Denver
Basin
lttp://wvw.douglas.co.us/water/DenverBasinAquifers.html (last visited 11/8/11).
60. COLo. CODE REGs. § 402-6 (2011) (identifying specific yields for the Denver
Basin aquifers ranging between 15-percent and 20-percent); DRISCOLL, supra note 7, at
67 (identifying specific yields for sandstone range from 5-percent to 15-percent).
61.
FE'IrER, supia note 5, at 101.
62.
DRISCOLL, supa note 7, at 75.
63.
G WA, supra note 10, at 34.
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Figure 5 - Location map of sedimentary bedrock aquifers in Colorado.
C.HARD ROCK BEDROCK AQUIFERS
Hard rock bedrock aquifers in Colorado are generally located in
mountainous regions and consist of fractured igneous and metamorphic
crystalline rock from the Precambrian" era and Tertiary period. Folding
and faulting has caused extensive joints and fracture systems within many
of these formations." Primary porosity in these aquifers is very low while
secondary porosity resulting from the fractures and faults can provide
significant permeability within these aquifers."' Hard rock bedrock aquifer wells are historically limited to 400 feet below ground surface because
overburden pressures effectively close the fractures and reduce secondary
porosity with depth," thereby reducing well yield potential at greater
depths. However, productive wells have been constructed at greater
depths." Hard rock bedrock aquifers generally have a strong connection
with surface stream systems.
Hard rock bedrock aquifers are difficult to characterize because of
non-uniform fractures and faults. As a result, well yields are difficult to
predict until after the well has been drilled, constructed and tested. In
Jefferson County, Colorado, this uncertainty has led to the creation of the
Jefferson County Mountain Ground Water Overlay District, which re64.
Id. at 3 (illustrating that the Precambrian geologic era spans the time period from
the origin of the Earth, estimated to be approximately 4.6 billion years old, to approximately 543 million years ago).

65.
66.
67.
68.

Id. at 193.
Id. at 194.
Id. at 195.

Id.
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quires demonstration of an adequate water supply through well testing
prior to approval of a building permit, rezoning application, site development plan or special use and platting application not served by a water
district."
Hydraulic conductivity and well yields in hard rock bedrock aquifers
are highly variable. The hydraulic conductivity of hard rock aquifer systems can range from 0.1 to 10,000 gallons per day per square foot, although lower hydraulic conductivity may occur if fractures are not present
in the formation." Well records from the Division of Water Resources
indicate hard rock bedrock aquifer well yields are generally only a few
gallons per minute, but wells completed in fractured hard rock aquifers
can produce up to 50 gallons per minute or more if they penetrate extensively fractured zones, fault zones, or shear zones." Topography impacts
well yields, with wells in valleys and draws producing at a higher rate than
wells on ridges, slopes, or saddles." This variation may be attributable to
the proximity of faults or fracture zones that have influenced the resultant
topography." Figure 6 presents the general locations of hard rock aquifer
systems in Colorado."

From GWA, supra note 10.
Figure 6 - Location map of hard rock aquifers in Colorado.

69.

Section 54: Mountain Ground Water (M-G) Overlay District,JEFFERSON CNTrY.

PLANNING
COMM'N,
1-2
(Feb.
8,
http://jeffco.us/jeffco/planning-uploa(ds/zoning/zr_28_11 /zr_54.pdf.
70.
DRISCOLL, supra note 7, at 5.
GWA, supra note 10, at 196.
71.
72.
Id.

73.

Id.

74.

Id. at 33.

2011),
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. III. SUMMARY OF COLORADO GROUND WATER LAW
There are three major pieces of legislation that provide the laws, rules
and framework to manage and administer ground water in Colorado, including, the 1957 Ground Water Laws", 1965 Ground Water Management Act 6 ("the 1965 Act") and the 1969 Water Rights Determination
and Administration Act" ("the 1969 Act"). In addition, other important
legislation governing ground water includes Senate Bill 73-213, Senate
Bill 85-5 and House Bill 72-1042. This legislation is discussed in more
detail below.
In 1957, the Ground Water Act established that (1) ground water users must file a statement of use with the State Engineer, (2) a well permit
is required from the State Engineer prior to drilling a new well, (3) a well
permit does not grant or confer a groundwater right to the user, (4) a
ground water right's priority date shall not be postponed beyond its true
date of appropriation due to the failure to conduct a surface right adjudication, and (5) critical ground water areas that "have approached, reached
or exceeded the normal annual rate of replenishment" shall be identified
by the Colorado Ground Water Commission."
The 1965 Act provided authorization to the Colorado Ground Water
Commission to (1) designate ground water basins where ground water
lacks a substantial hydrogeological connection to a surface stream, (2)
employ a permit system to allocate and regulate ground water within designated ground water basins according to a modified prior appropriation
basis promoting economic development and maintaining reasonable
pumping levels, and (3) to create local ground water management districts
to regulate the designated ground water basins." Additionally, the 1965
Act reiterated that all new wells obtain a well permit from the State Engineer and the well permit "shall not have the effect of granting nor conferring a ground water right upon the user."'
The 1969 Act establishes that (1) the State Engineer shall administer
tributary ground water according to the doctrine of prior appropriation
and (2) shall protect vested surface water and tributary ground water
rights according to their decreed priorities, (3) that non adjudicated wells
have two years to file for their original appropriation date, and (4) augmentation plans, discussed in more detail below, may be decreed."' The
1969 Act recognized the interaction between ground water and surface

75. COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 147-9-1 to -15 (Supp. 1960), repealed by S. 367, 45th Gen.
Assemb., Ist Reg. Sess. (Colo. 1965).
76. Colorado Ground Water Management Act, ch. 319, 1965 Colo. Sess. Laws 1246
(codified at COLO. REV. STAT. SS 37-90-101 to -143 (1997)).
77. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-92-101 to -602 (2011).
78. Hobbs, supra note 79, at 12.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 13.
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water and the ability of well pumping to reduce streamflows relied upon
by senior surface water rights."
An augmentation plan allows out-of-priority depletions by providing
replacement water to prevent injury to other vested water rights.' For
example, the withdrawal of tributary ground water through a well results
in either decreased aquifer discharge to surface water or increased loss
from surface water, both of which are depletions to the stream system.
Depletions from well pumping typically do not occur instantaneously.
Instead, there is a timing lag between the time that the well is pumped
and the time that the depletion occurs to the surface water system." These depletions to the stream system are referred to as lagged depletions.
Lagged depletions from wells occur after pumping has stopped, and are
referred to as post-pumping depletions. Post-pumping depletions can
occur over a period of months, years or longer."
Wells differ from surface water diversions in that depletions do not
stop when the diversions stop.' Unlike direct flow surface water rights,
tributary well pumping typically requires an augmentation plan because
lagged pumping depletions occur after the well pump has shut off." A
junior surface water right can be operated without an augmentation plan
because it is feasible to stop a diversion at the time that a senior water
right places a call." In contrast, lagged depletions from a well will continue after a river call is placed, resulting in out-of-priority depletions.
Many high capacity irrigation wells have been drilled into alluvial aquifers
since the 1950's, and must operate according to.augmentation plans designed to prevent injury to senior water rights." Due to the costs associated with augmentation plans, special groups have been formed to assist
with development and operation of these plans. One example is the
Lower Arkansas Water Management Association (LAWMA), which is a
member-owned corporation that provides replacement water to off-set
depletions caused by the membership's ground water use."

Id. (noting that previous legislation created two types of groundwater: groundwa82.
ter that was connected to streams and groundwater that had little or no connection to
stream flow).
Id. at 15.
83.
See, e.g., Well Augmentation Subdistrict of Cent. Colorado Water Conservancy
84.
Dist. v. City of Aurora, 221 P.3d 399, 412 (Colo. 2009) ("Because groundwater depletions can lag behind surface water conditions by many years, the effects of a groundwater
depletion may not be felt by surface waters for long periods of time.").
See id. at 412 (noting pre-2003 depletions were having a continuing effect on
85.
surface water levels).
86. See Hobbs, supra note 79, at 17.
Id.
87.
88. See, e.g., SRJ I Venture v. Smith Cattle, Inc., 820 P.2d 341, 343 n.3 (Colo. 1991)
("A call is placed on a river when a senior appropriator forces upstream juniors to let
flow sufficient water to meet the requirements of the senior priority.").
89. See Hobbs, supra note79, at 15.
90. LOWER ARKANSAS WATER MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION, www.1awma.net (last
visited Oct. 25, 2011).
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As a result of the 1965 Act and 1969 Act, Colorado established two
statutory classifications of ground water: tributary ground water and designated ground water.' The legislature created two additional statutory
classifications of ground water, nontributary and not-nontributary, in
1973 under Senate Bill 73-213 and in 1985 under Senate Bill 85-5, respectively. All ground water in Colorado falls under one of these four
statutory classifications and must be administered accordingly. House
Bill 72-1042 creates an exemption for certain uses of small-capacity wells
designated as exempt wells. The four statutory classifications of ground
water and exempt wells are discussed in more detail below.
The first classification, tributary ground water, involves water that has
a hydrologic connection to surface streams. As a result of this connection, state authorities administer tributary ground water in conjunction
with surface water, under the priority system. Users must follow an augmentation plan to replace the out-of-priority depletions. Alluvial and
hard rock bedrock aquifers are typically classified as tributary. Figure 2
presents an idealized schematic of a well pumping tributary ground water.

Modified from GWA, supra note 10.

Figure 2 - Schematic diagram of an unconfined aquifer system.
The Colorado Ground Water Commission manages the second classification, designated ground water, under a modified prior appropriation
system that only exists in locations that have been "designated" by the
Colorado Ground Water Commission. Designated ground water has two
definitions: (1) ground water "which in its natural course would not be
available to and required for the fulfillment of decreed surface rights"
and (2) ground water "in areas not adjacent to a continuously flowing natural stream wherein ground water withdrawals have constituted the prin-

91.
92.

Hobbs, supra 79, at 13.
GWA, supra note 10, at 19.
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cipal water usage for at least fifteen years."" The Colorado Ground Water
Commission can establish designated ground water basins based on compliance with either definition, however; compliance with the first definition may be difficult to meet due to hydrologic complexities." Currently
eight designated ground water basins have been established in Colorado:
Kiowa Bijou, Southern High Plains, Upper Black Squirrel Creek, Lost
Creek, Camp Creek, Upper Big Sandy, Upper Crow Creek and Northern
High Plains."
The third classification, nontributary ground water, encompasses water located outside the boundaries of any designated ground water basin
that has little to no hydrologic connection to surface streams. Nontributary ground water is defined as ground water that when withdrawn will not
deplete the flow of a natural stream within one hundred years of continuous withdrawal "at an annual rate greater than one-tenth of one percent of
the annual rate of withdrawal."' As a result of this disconnect, nontributary ground water is allocated based on overlying land ownership rather
than according to the priority system." Natural recharge is very low in
nontributary aquifers, and as a result, nontributary ground water is generally considered to be a non-renewable resource. In order to prolong use
of the resource, Senate Bill 73-213 specified a minimum one hundred
year aquifer life for nontributary aquifers." The mandated 100-year aquifer life effectively allocates the total available ground water entitlement
based on 1-percent per year." Nontributary ground water is quantified
based on the product of land area, aquifer saturated thickness, and specific yield, divided by 100 years. The Denver Basin aquifers comprise the
primary nontributary ground water resource in Colorado. An additional
limitation on nontributary ground water specific to the Denver Basin allows no more than 98-percent of the water withdrawn annually to be consumed." Therefore, 2-percent of pumped nontributary Denver Basin
ground water must be relinquished to the surface stream system. This 2percent relinquishment is typically achieved through assignment of return
flows.- Figure 3 presents an idealized schematic of a well pumping
nontributary ground water.'

93. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-90-103(6) (2011).
94. JONES & CECH, supra note 36, at 156.
95. Designated Basins and Ground Water Management, COLO. Div. OF WATER
RES., http://water.state.co.us/groundwater/CGWC/Pages/ManagernentDistricts.aspx (last
visited 11/8/11).
96. COLO. REV. STAT. S 37-90-103(10.5) (2011).
97.
Id. S37-92-305(1 1).
98. Id. § 37-90-137(4).
99. G WA, supra note 10, at 23.
100. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-90-137(9)(b) (2011).
101.
GWA, supra note 10, at 19.
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Modified from GWA, supra note 10.
Figure 3 - Schematic diagram of a confined aquifer system.
Not-nontributary ground water is water located within the Denver Basin that does not meet the statutory definition of nontributary ground
water."" However, pumping depletions remain attenuated over many
decades and centuries. Facing these unique geologic and hydrologic
characteristics and the great economic importance of the ground water
resource, the Colorado Legislature declared that all Denver Basin ground
water not meeting the definition of nontributary ground water would still
be allocated in the same manner as nontributary ground water. Therefore
the allocation of not-nontributary ground water is similarly based on overlying land ownership and a minimum one hundred year aquifer life."
However, in recognition of the depletive effects pumping notnontributary ground water may have on surface streams, the Colorado
Legislature required the approval of an augmentation plan in order to
pump not-nontributary ground water."" The augmentation plan requires
the replacement of depletions both during pumping and after pumping
has stopped. The law requires the replacement of calculated actual depletion for ground water pumped from locations within one mile of the
point of connection between a surface stream or its alluvium and the outcrop of the not-nontributary aquifer. Relinquishment of 4-percent of notnontributary pumping is required at locations greater than one mile from
the point of connection between the aquifer and the stream system.
Exempt wells include "[simall-capacity wells for domestic, stock watering, and low-intensity commercial uses in locations where other [water]
supplies are not available."" Colorado allows exempt wells in tributary,
CNTY.,
DOUGLAS
Law,
State
Water
102. Colorado
http://www.douglas.co.us/water/ColoradoStateWaterLaw.html (last visited 11 /11 /11).
103. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-90-137(4), -92-305(11) (2011).
104. Id. S 37-90-137(9)(c).

105.

Id.

106.

JONES & CECH, supra note

36, at 181.
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designated, nontributary and not-nontributary ground water aquifers, and
largely exempts them from the rules and regulations covering these designations." Recognizing the social and economic benefit, the Colorado
Legislature authorized exempt wells with the intent "to allow citizens to
obtain a water supply in less densely populated areas...where other water
The Colorado Division of Water Resupplies are not available.""
sources has explained that in most cases, permits for exempt wells limit
pumping rates to fifteen gallons per minute and require non-evaporative
wastewater disposal systems." The disposal systems may include septic
tank systems or leach field systems and must return the water to the same
drainage basin in which the well is located."' For example, one type of
exempt well permit is for domestic and livestock uses on tracts of land 35
acres or more, allowing the well to serve up to three single-family dwellings, irrigate one acre of lawn or garden, and provide water for domestic
and livestock animals."' Other exempt well permit types depend on when
a subdivision was platted and may include household use only wells and
small-capacity commercial wells.
IV. HYDROGEOLOGY, WELL-TO-WELL INTERFERENCE AND
STREAM DEPLETIONS
A change to a ground water system in one location can impact surface
water and ground water at other locations within an aquifer system. For
instance, when a well pumps water, the cone of depression" propagates
outward reducing water levels in nearby wells constructed in the same
aquifer. As a result, this reduction in water level can reduce available
drawdown in nearby production wells and potentially limit yields and
result in increased pumping costs. Water level changes in a well, caused
by the operation of another well are generally known as well-to-well interference. In addition to localized interference resulting from a small
number of wells, cones of depression from multiple wells in an aquifer
can overlap and accentuate each other. For example, this occurs during
the irrigation season in the Arapahoe aquifer of the Denver Basin, resulting in a greater seasonal well-to-well interference."' In the Arapahoe aquifer, seasonal water level decline from the beginning of irrigation season
107.
108.

Id. at 179.
COLO. REV. STAT.

S

37-92-602(6) (2011).

COLO. Div. OF WATER RES., GUIDE TO COLORADO WELL PERMITS, WATER
109.
available at waADMINISTRATION,
(Jan. 2008),
RIGHTS
AND
WATER

ter.state.co.us/dwripub/documents/wellpernitguide.pdi
110. Id.
111. COLO. REV. STAT. 5S 37-90-105, -92-602 (2011).
112. DRISCOLL, supra note 7, at 887 (defining a cone of depression as a "depression
in the groundwater table or potentiometric surface that has the shape of an inverted cone
and develops around a well from which water is being withdrawn. It defines the area of
influence of a well").
113. Victor Ponce, Groundwater Utilization and Sustainability, SAN DIEGO STATE
UNIV. (Mar. 2006), http://groundwater.sdsu.edu/.
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to the end of irrigation season can range from 125 to 200 feet.'" Similarly, regional water level decline rates occurring in the Arapahoe aquifer
over time have ranged from 20 to just under 50 feet per year." This regional decline of water levels in the Denver Basin aquifers has emphasized the finite and limited nature of the aquifer system, and has caused
many municipalities relying upon Denver Basin ground water to pursue
costly alternative renewable water supplies."
Ground water pumping and recharge may not only affect other wells
but may also result in depletions or accretions to surface streams. The
cone of depression resulting from a pumping well will ultimately propagate through an aquifer, and if the cone of depression extends to a surface water feature in connection with the aquifer, then the change in water level will induce a depletion to the stream. The interaction between
ground water and surface water occurs at the streambed interface and
impacts both gaining streams and losing streams."'

V. COLORADO REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
The focus of technical issues addressed by ground water experts is directed towards matters related to the Colorado water courts and the State
Engineer's Office. These entities are tasked with prevention of injury to
senior water rights or wells and quantifying legal water supply entitlements. Technical ground water investigations are also completed to determine the adequacy of a proposed water supply. For example, county
governments may require water adequacy reviews for subdivisions or other zoning changes."' As part of the coal mining approval process, Colorado statute requires the Division of Reclamation Mining and Safety
(DRMS) to consider impacts to the "hydrologic balance.""'
In the State of Colorado, water rights adjudications occur in the seven
water courts, which function in the seven primary drainage basins of Colorado.' Adjudications include filings for new ground and surface water
rights, water rights augmentation plans, exchanges, and water rights
changes, including changes of use, alternate points of diversion, and
changes of location."'

114. Daniel Niemela & Harun Ahmed, Bishop-Brogden Assocs., Inc., Irrigation Season Water level Changes in Municipal Arapahoe Aquifer Wells, Douglas County, CO
2007),
28-31,
(Oct.
http://gsa.confex.com/gsa/2007AM/finalprogram/abstract_131260.htm (follow "Presentation Handout" hyperlink).
115. GroundwaterGuide, supra note 4, at 19.
116. See Why is the Northern Project Important?, EAST CHERRY CREEK VALLEY
WATER AND SANITATION DIST., http://ww.eccv.org/view/61 (last visited Oct. 18, 2011).
117. GWA, supra note 10, at 18.
118. COLO. REv. STAT. § 30-28-106(3)(a)(IV) (2011).
119. COLO. REV. STAT. § 34-33-114(2)(c) (2011).
120. GroundwaterGuide, supra note 4, at 12.
121. Id.

Issue 1

TECHNICAL PERSPECTIVE FOR ANALYZING GROUND WA TER

123

The State Engineer has the responsibility of administering water
rights and well permits.'" On multiple occasions, the State Engineer has
also been issued the authority to implement rules and regulations pertaining to ground water administration." Examples of rulemaking proceedings include the Denver Basin Rules,"' the Statewide Nontributary
Ground Water Rules'" and the Produced Nontributary Ground Water
Rules."

VI. ACTIVITIES POTENTIALLY RESULTING IN WATER
RIGHTS INJURY
Listed below are examples of activities that may result in injury to surface water or ground water rights due to changes in the aquifer system.
1. Pumping of a water supply well may result in out-of-priority stream
depletions, even after pumping has stopped.
2. Pumping of wells in an aquifer system may cause excessive drawdowns in an aquifer, thereby inhibiting senior wells from withdrawing
their entitlements.
3. Pumping of wells in an aquifer system may cause drawdowns in an
aquifer, resulting in deeper pump setting depths in nearby wells, greater
pumping costs and lower achievable pumping rates. This type of well-towell interference in not always considered to be injurious in Colorado
water law."
4. If a historical surface water right is changed through the Colorado
court process and irrigation of historically irrigated lands is ceased, then
historical return flows occurring through deep ground water percolation
will no longer return to the stream system. Senior water rights have historically relied on those return flows and the interruption of the return
flows may injure water rights.'"
5. The operation of a ground water recharge plan may result in a rise
of the water table, and thereby cause sub-irrigation of crops and increased
consumption by phreatophytes. Failure to account for this increased
consumption of ground water may overstate accretions of the returned
water to the stream system.
6. In a gravel mining operation, impacts to neighboring water supply
wells may result if a gravel pit is dewatered.
7. Under the Denver Basin Rules, ground water entitlements are
quantified based on overlying land and the characteristics of the aquifer

122.

123.
adopt
124.
125.
126.

127.

Id. at 17.
See, e.g. COLO. REV. STAT. S 37-90-137(9)(a) (authorizing the State Engineer to
rules and regulations pertaining to the administration of ground water).
COLO. CODE REGS. § 402-6(1) (2011).
Id. § 402-7(1).
Id. S 402-17.1.

Justice Greg Hobbs, An Overview of Colorado Groundwater Law, COLO.

WATER, Oct.-Nov. 2007, at 2, 3
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system." Erroneous quantifications may result in an over appropriation
of the aquifer, thereby accelerating the depletion of a limited resource.
Injury to water rights could result from the scenarios described above,
and ground water analyses are needed to quantify the potential for injury.
With these considerations in mind, ground water experts are skilled in
estimating impacts to stream systems, wells, and aquifer systems, specifically to determine the following:
1. The timing, location, and amount of stream depletions and accretions.
2. Changes in aquifer water levels resulting from various aquifer
stresses, including: well pumping, aquifer dewatering or recharge.
3. Changes in ground water / surface water interaction resulting from
an aquifer stress. For example, well pumping in some aquifer systems
has potential to dry up nearby stream systems.
4. The sustainability of an aquifer system.
5. The amount of ground water in storage or flowing through an aquifer system.
6. The amount of ground water available for appropriation from an
aquifer system.
7. Changes to water quality resulting from an aquifer stress.
The findings of ground water investigations are frequently used to develop terms and conditions for inclusion in water rights decrees or well
permits. Examples of terms and conditions that may be specified in Colorado water court decrees are provided below.
1. In fractured rock aquifers, water level monitoring may be required
to ensure that well pumping does not interfere with the ability of nearby
wells to produce their pumping entitlements."
2. In an alluvial aquifer system, water level monitoring may be required to ensure that water level drawdowns resulting from one entity's
pumping do not interfere with another entity's ability to pump their
ground water entitlements. In Lochbuie, trigger water level elevations
were established; if the trigger water levels were measured as a result of
the applicants' pumping, then mitigation was required to maintain aquifer
water levels above the water levels trigger elevations."
3. In a ground water recharge plan, volumetric limits may be specified to prevent excessive water level rises and consumptive use resulting
from shallow ground water levels."

129. See COLO. CODE REGS. § 402-6(5), (7) (2011).
130. See, e.g., In re. Application for Water Rights & Plan for Augmentation of the
Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Gilpin, Case No. 94CW277, at 15 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Water Div.
1 1997).
131. In re. Applications for Water Rights of Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation Co., Case
No. 02CW404, at 3-4 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Water Div. 1 2011) ("Stipulation Between Applicants and the Town of Lochbuie").
132. See, e.g., In re. Application for Water Rights of Cent. Colo. Water Conservancy
Dist., Case No. 05CW331, at 24 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Water Div. 1 2011) ("Stipulated Draft
Decree").
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4. Water rights augmentation plans may require the delivery of augmentation water or recharge water at specific times and locations to ensure that ground water accretions to surface streams occur when and
where they are needed to prevent injury to vested downstream water
rights.

VII. METHODS FOR EVALUATING GROUND WATER
When evaluating ground water resources, ground water experts must
first understand the recharge, discharge and flow patterns of the ground
water system. Such information may be obtained from mapping, published literature and well records. In addition to these sources, field
work including flow measurements, well water level measurements,
pumping tests and water quality testing may be implemented to characterize the local hydrogeology. After data are collected, it can be used to
evaluate ground water movement through the use of modeling techniques
or by applying ground water equations. Ground water experts rely on
ground water equations and models to analyze ground water flow systems
and predict the behavior of flow systems in the future. These tools can
be used to complete simulations of ground water systems and predict
such things as aquifer characteristics, water levels, well-to-well interference, and location and magnitude of surface stream impacts.
A.

PUMPING TESTS

Pumping tests can be conducted on a well after the well(s) has been
drilled and constructed." These tests provide data to determine local
aquifer characteristics such as transmissivity, storage coefficient, and to
identify boundary conditions."' Boundary conditions can include recharge or barrier (negative) boundaries." A recharge boundary may inHowclude a stream or lake and can limit drawdown during pumping.'
ever, a barrier or negative boundary, such as a low-permeability forIn
mation at the aquifer edge, can increase drawdown during pumping.'
addition, pumping tests can be used to determine the efficiency of a well
structure."
Pumping tests involve the pumping of a well under controlled pumping conditions, while measuring static and pumping water levels in the
pumping well and nearby observation wells if feasible.'" Typically, water
level measurements are collected at specified time intervals during pumping and during the recovery period after pumping has stopped." The two
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

DRISCOLL, supra note 7, at 202; see also FETTER, supra note 5, at 210.
See DRISCOLL, supra note 7, at 203; see FETTER, supra note 5, at 210.
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Id.
DRISCOLL, supra note 7, at 204.
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See id.
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most common pumping tests conducted on wells include the step test and
long-term constant discharge test.'" A step test consists of increasing the
well pumping rate at regular intervals." For example, the well may be
pumped at a rate of 50 gallons per minute for. 30 minutes and then the
pumping rate is increased to 100 gallons per minute for the next 30
minutes and so on for several more steps. Data collected during the step
test can be used to estimate the efficiency of a well structure.'" A longterm constant discharge test consists of pumping a well at a constant rate,
typically for 24-hours or longer.'" This type of test provides an accurate
analysis of aquifer characteristics and boundary conditions." Ideally,
observation wells should be identified or installed at appropriate distances from the pumping well to collect data at a distance in the aquifer.
However, due to cost considerations, location, and project timing, observation wells are not always viable. It should be noted that storage coefficients calculated from pumping well data alone are generally not reliable.' Therefore, if no observation wells are available to collect data, other means of determining the storage coefficient should be utilized, such
as data from nearby pumping tests or published values for similar aquifer
types. 7
B. MONITORING PROGRAMS

Ground water impacts resulting from changes to aquifer systems can
be measured by monitoring water levels and water quality. Monitoring
programs are frequently implemented as part of other aquifer analyses or
modeling projections."
Monitoring programs provide information to
understand changes that occur in an aquifer system under natural or static
conditions, and can function as an early warning system if unfavorable
aquifer conditions are expected to occur."' As summarized below, monitoring programs are sometimes included as a requirement in Colorado
water court decrees or stipulations as a protective term and condition."
C. CONCEPTUAL MODELS

A conceptual model is a description of an aquifer system, which includes inflows, outflows, storage, aquifer extent, and hydraulic properties." Conceptual models are the simplest form of model and act as a
141. DRISCOLL, supra note 7, at 203.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 204.
144. Id. at 203.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 221-22.
147. Id. at 203.
148. See, e.g., In re. Applications for Water Rights of Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation
Co., Case No. 02CW404, at 3 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Water Div. 1 2011).
149. See, e.g., id. at 3-4
150. See, e.g., id.
151. See FETrER, supra note 5, at 514-515.
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basis for any additional modeling.'
Conceptual models are frequently
described with cross-sections or other visual means. Other types of conceptual models may include flow charts or simple written descriptions of
the ground water system. Conceptual models are important tools for
understanding ground water systems; however, they are stationary and
unable to make predictions of future behavior.'"
D.

GROUND WATER EQUATIONS (ANALYTICAL MODELS)

Analytical models rely on mathematical methods to arrive at a solution. These mathematical methods are typically applied based on a simplified set of assumptions. To rely on analytical modeling, the assumptions inherent to the ground water equations should be considered to
ensure they are suitable for the question at hand and to ensure that applying a simplified representation of the aquifer system will provide an adequate solution. Types of analytical models may include Darcy's law, the
Theis equation, the Cooper-Jacob equation, and the Glover equation.
These analytical models are discussed in more detail below.
Darcy's law was developed in 1856 by a French engineer named
Henri Darcy and is used to quantify ground water flow.' Darcy found
that the rate of flow between two points in a porous medium is proportional to the difference in head and inversely proportional to the flow
length."
Inputs to Darcy's law include hydraulic gradient, flow rate,
cross-sectional area, and hydraulic conductivity.
C.V. Theis developed the Theis equation in 1935.'" This equation is
most commonly used to predict drawdown and flow rates over time. In
addition, the Theis equation is commonly used to calculate aquifer characteristics from pumping test data. Parameters in the Theis analyses include drawdown, pumping rate, transmissivity, distance from the center
of the pumping well to the point where drawdown is measured, storage
coefficient, and time since pumping started. The Theis equation assumes
an idealized set of aquifer conditions, such as an infinite and homogeneous aquifer.' Physical world aquifer systems are more complex, but the
equation can be applied to estimate how an aquifer will respond to an
imposed stress.
The Cooper-Jacob equation, also known as the modified nonequilibrium equation, was developed by H.H. Cooper and C.E. Jacob in
1946.'" This equation is a simplified version of the Theis equation and
can be relied upon in many instances without significant error. The in-
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puts, assumptions, and uses for the Cooper-Jacob equation are the same
as the Theis equation.
The Glover equation was developed by R.E. Glover and G.E. Balmer
in 1954 to estimate the timing and magnitude of impact from pumping or
recharge on a stream system." Inputs to the Glover equation include the
distance from the simulated well to the simulated stream, distance from
the well to no-flow boundary, distance from the no-flow boundary to the
river, transmissivity, and specific yield. In Colorado, ground water experts often rely on the Integrated Decision Support Alluvial Water Accounting System (IDS AWAS) software, which is a graphic user interface
for the Glover equation."' Similar to the Theis equation, the Glover
equation assumes an idealized set of aquifer conditions."'
F.

NUMERICAL MODELS

Numerical models simulate aquifer flow by breaking the aquifer into
a grid of points or cells. Numerical models rely on mathematical methodologies to simulate flow between the grid cells. Numerical models can
be operated in both transient and steady state modes to predict behavior
in ground water systems. Due to their complexity and time commitment,
numerical models are generally utilized only if analytical modeling is not
appropriate, for instance, with regional aquifers containing complex geometry and heterogeneous aquifer characteristics and thickness. One
example of a numerical modeling tool is MODFLOW, developed by the
United States Geological Survey. MODFLOW is a numerical finite difference program, which is capable of simulating a number of parameters:
ground water and surface water flow, aquifer parameters, water levels in
aquifers and surface water features, evapotranspiration, aquifer recharge,
and boundary conditions. Numerical models can be operated in many
different modes with various input and output parameters. Also, numerical models can be operated to simulate both simplistic and very complex
conceptual models. As is the case with any modeling procedure, the accuracy of the results depends on the accuracy of the input data.

159. S.S. PAPADOPULOS & Assocs. & COLO. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, COALBED
METHANE STREAM DEPLETION ASSESSMENT STUDY - PICEANCE BASIN, COLORADO 37
(2008),
available
at
http://geosurvey.state.co.us/water/CBM%20Water%20Depletion/Documents/PiceanceF
inalReport.pdf.
160. Integrated
Decision
Support
Group,
COLO.
STATE
UNIV.,
(last
http://www.ids.colostate.edu/projects.php?project=awas&breadcrumb-IDS+AWAS
visited Oct. 15, 2011). IDS AWAS was developed in 2003 by the Integrated Decision
Support System at Colorado State University in response to requests of the South Platte
Advisory Committee. Id.
161. S.S. PAPADOPULOS & Assocs. & COLo. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, supra note 167.
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VIII. EXAMPLES OF GROUND WATER PROBLEMS AND
METHODS APPLIED
In order to illustrate the technical approaches that ground water experts typically apply, we provided various examples of actual case studies
involving technical ground water analysis. In each example the approach
was selected based on a number of factors, including the matter in question, the complexity of the aquifer system, available aquifer data, stakeholder concerns, administrative and water rights sensitivities, and project
budget and schedule.
Example A - Alluvial augmentation plan for a water supply well,
South Platte River basin - Division 1 Case No. 03CW025
An alluvial water supply well produces from the alluvium of the South
Platte River and its tributaries. The lithology of the alluvial aquifer is
relatively homogenous and the South Platte River is never dry at this location. The case involved an augmentation plan to replace depletions resulting from the pumping well. The augmentation source was nontributary ground water delivered to the alluvial aquifer near the point of depletion. The Glover equation was selected to determine the timing, location, and amount of stream depletions resulting from the operation of the
alluvial water supply well; the timing, location, and amount of the delivery
of return flows; and augmentation deliveries to the stream system. Inputs
for the calculations in the Glover analysis included aquifer characteristics
obtained from pumping test data on the water supply well and aquifer
boundary conditions obtained from existing hydrogeologic mapping by
the U.S. Geological Survey and others.
Example B - Alluvial augmentation plan for water supply wells,
Cherry Creek basin - Division 1 Case No. 95CW277
Case No. 95CW277 involved an augmentation plan for water supply
wells producing from the Cherry Creek alluvial aquifer. In this portion
of the Cherry Creek drainage, the creek becomes dry during most years.
When the stream is dry and alluvial water supply wells operate, the aquifer is depleted, resulting in a lowering of the water table in the aquifer.
The dry stream condition and simultaneous well pumping result in the
creation of a "hole""' in the aquifer. Well-pumping depletions to the
aquifer increase the size of the "hole" and result in a prolonged period of
a dry stream condition when the hole fills. The enlarged "hole" causes
depletions to occur at periods of runoff when the water in the stream
effectively fills the "hole" instead of flowing downstream. This condition
is more complicated than can be simulated using the Glover equation,
and therefore, a more robust tool was used in order to determine the
timing and location of stream depletions. In Case No. 95CW277, a
MODFLOW ground water model and a spreadsheet water balance model were employed to determine the timing and location of stream deple-

In this context a "hole" in the aquifer refers to a region of the alluvial aquifer in
162.
which the water level is lowered.

130

WATER LAW REVIEW

Volume 15

tions. This hydrologic condition is an example of a condition in which
the Glover equation was not used to estimate the timing and location of
stream depletions.
Example C - Gravel Pit Mining Operation - Arkansas River Basin Quantification of Impacts to Water Supply Wells.
During gravel mining operations, alluvial sand and gravel are sometimes mined from the saturated portion of the alluvium. Operators frequently dewater the mine pit to provide dry access to the sand and gravel
product. As the mine is dewatered, it results in a lowering of the water
table in the vicinity of the mine pit, which can be detrimental to neighboring water supply wells.
Analytical calculations such as the Theis equation can be used to estimate water level changes from mining dewatering activities," but for this
mine a MODFLOW ground water model was developed and used to
simulate water level changes that may result from the mining activities."
To minimize the pumping needed to dewater the mine and to provide for water storage after mining is completed, operators sometimes
install low permeability ground water barriers, such as slurry walls,
around the mine pit. The low permeability barriers serve to protect
nearby wells from the dewatering impacts of mining operations, but can
result in other concerns. Low permeability barriers sometimes result in
the mounding" of ground water, or a rise of water level in the aquifer on
the upstream side of the barrier. Rises in water level can be detrimental
to neighboring basements and septic systems if shallow ground water
conditions exist close to such structures and if the structures are sensitive
to changes in water levels.
The MODFLOW model developed for this gravel pit was capable of
simulating the change in water level that resulted from the sloping water
table interacting with the low permeability barrier." Furthermore, water
level monitoring programs are frequently implemented as part of DRMS
and State Engineer gravel pit well-permitting processes to quantify such
water level changes and to function as an early warning system in case
detrimental water level changes occur. Water level monitoring data can
also be used to project future water level changes in aquifer systems if
new aquifer stresses are planned in the future. Examples of mining operations during which ground water models and water level monitoring programs have been implemented include the Pueblo East Pit in the Arkan-

FErTER, supra note 5, at 154.
164. DEP'T OF RECLAMATION, MINING AND SAFETY, PERMIT No. M-1986-015, Exhibit G at 2 (2011).
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8 (last visited
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Nov. 9, 2011) (defining groundwater mounding as "an outward and upward expansion of
the free water table caused by shallow re-injection, percolation below an impoundment,
or other surface recharge method.").'
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sas River alluvium" and the Lyons Pit in the alluvium of the St. Vrain
River."
Example D - Augmentation Plan for Municipal Well in Fractured
Rock Environment
Fractured rock aquifer systems, such as those that exist along the
Front Range of Colorado, typically contain minimal ground water storage.
As a result, cones of depression resulting from pumping wells can extend
for long distances from pumping wells, potentially impacting water levels
Furthermore, water supply wells completed in these
in nearby wells.
types of aquifer systems often do not result in high pumping rates and
cannot tolerate water level changes as effectively as wells completed in
other aquifer systems. Aquifer systems of this type frequently rely on
recharge from precipitation; therefore, water levels in the aquifer are sensitive to drought conditions.
Division 1 Case Nos. 94CW277 and 03CW217 involved water rights
augmentation plans for two municipal water supply wells producing from
The wells
the fractured bedrock aquifer in Gilpin County, Colorado.
are located in a mountainous setting with numerous residential water
supply wells located within a quarter-mile radius of the municipal water
supply wells. As a result of concerns regarding potential impacts to these
wells, in-depth field investigations were completed as part of Case No.
94CW277 to measure water level impacts resulting from the well pumping. The field investigations included two four-day pumping tests and
long-term monitoring of water levels in the production wells and nearby
residential water supply wells. In addition, projections were made of water level impacts to nearby wells using the Theis equation, based on aquifer characteristics determined from the pumping wells, including observation well data. In this case, the field investigations were utilized to quantify water level impacts resulting from the operation of the municipal water
supply wells. The decree entered in Case No. 94CW277 included terms
and conditions requiring the monitoring and reporting of water levels."
Analytical calculations of water level impacts provided estimates of
water level drawdowns. The aquifer parameters used in the Theis analyses were derived from the pumping test data involving both pumping
wells and monitoring wells. In other words, actual water level changes
measured in the aquifer resulting from well pumping were used to project
water level changes resulting from other pumping scenarios.
Example E - Produced Nontributary Ground Water Rules
During the rulemaking process for the Produced Nontributary
Ground Water Rules,' a process was established by which proponents
could petition the State Engineer to determine that the ground water in
167. DEP'T OF RECLAMATION, supra note 170.
168. BOULDER CNTY. REs. 98-32 (1998).
169. In re Application for Water Rights and Plan for Augmentation of the Bd. of
Cntv. Comm'rs of the Cnty. of Gilpin, No. 94-CW-277 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Water Div. 1
1998).
170. COLO. CODE REGS. § 402-17.3(B) (2011).
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specific oil and gas producing formations at specific locations is nontributary. The Rules identify specific methodologies for the purposes of determining whether or not a formation at a particular location is nontributary.'" The three methods include analytical modeling such as the Glover
equation, numerical modeling such as MODFLOW, and alternate approaches such as geologic isolation of a formation from a surface water
system. Each of these methods was successfully used to support Proposed Alternate Rules in the rulemaking process.
The Glover equation and simplified MODFLOW models were applied to essentially determine the distance to nontributary ground water
from the point of connection between the oil and gas producing formations and the points of connection with surface streams. Both methodologies were determined to be acceptable by the Hearing Officer overseeing the. rulemaking process. One Proposed Alternate Rule relied on
the geologic isolation of a formation from any surface stream in Colorado. The Sussex Sandstone of the D-J Basin was determined to be
nontributary based on the fact that it does not outcrop anywhere in Colorado, and therefore cannot interact with a surface stream.m'

IX. TECHNICAL CHALLENGES, CONSIDERATIONS AND
CONCLUSIONS
Ground water experts are faced with the challenge of developing
quantitative solutions for ground water problems involving the flow of
water beneath the ground surface where it typically cannot be measured
or directly quantified. Ground water experts rely on available data to
provide professional estimates of hydrologic impacts that may result from
changes imposed to aquifer systems. Estimated impacts must be completed in the context of specific project budgets and schedules. Summarized below are the challenges frequently encountered in the field of hydrogeology as it relates to water resources in Colorado.
A.

DATA AVAILABILITY

Available information on aquifer systems is sometimes limited to well
records and occasional published reports on the hydrogeology of a local
ground water system. Information contained in well records is limited to
well depths, geologic logs, water levels, and simple static and pumping
water levels from when the wells were initially tested. Well records do
not contain formal pumping test data that can be used to determine aquifer characteristics. Frequently published reports are not available that
provide meaningful aquifer information for the purposes of ground water
flow calculations. In these circumstances, it is necessary to characterize
the aquifer system based on field investigations, which can be a time intensive and costly process; or in the alternative, it may be necessary to
171.
172.

Id. S 402-17.3(C).
See id. §'402-17.3(D).
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rely on well records and estimates of aquifer parameters based on the
local geology. As summarized below, the findings of ground water analyses can be very sensitive to aquifer parameters, and as a result it is imperative to have reliable aquifer characteristics, which can sometimes be
difficult to achieve.
B.

SENSITIVITY OF AQUIFER PARAMETERS

As shown in Figure 1, aquifer hydraulic conductivities for the same
type of aquifer materials can range over orders of magnitude. For example, the published range of hydraulic conductivity of sandstone can range
from 10'to 10 gpd/fte. Based on Darcy's Law, the flow of ground water
through an aquifer system is directly proportional to the hydraulic conductivity of the aquifer material. Therefore, in this example, the calculated flow through a sandstone aquifer system can range over three orders
of magnitude depending on the hydraulic conductivity value. This example illustrates the variability that may result from a range of aquifer characteristics and the importance of determining appropriate values, representative of the aquifer system in question. Ground water experts rely on
field data, published reports, and their professional judgment to determine the most practical representative aquifer characteristics, but because
of the range of values that may exist in a system, there is potential for
variability in the results of ground water analyses.
C.BUDGETARY AND SCHEDULING CONSTRAINTS

Ground water field investigations and modeling projects can be very
expensive to implement and the schedule and budget is a direct result of
the modeling approach selected for a given project. The modeling approach is typically a function of the technical question that needs to be
answered, but budgetary and time constraints can greatly impact the magnitude of a modeling effort. In general, simplified approaches can be
applied to arrive at an answer to a ground water problem, but the accuracy of the result can be greatly impacted if limited data are available to
accurately characterize a system, and if adequate budget and time are not
available to study the system in detail. Estimates based on simplified analytical approaches may or may not be adequate to address the question at
hand. If simplified approaches are used to arrive at a solution to a complex ground water problem as a result of budget and time constraints,
then it is appropriate to clarify the limitations of the experts' results.
D.

VARIABILITY OF AQUIFER PARAMETERS PROVIDES ROOM FOR
ARGUMENT

A ground water expert may go through industry-accepted methods
and arrive at what appears to be a reasonable answer to a ground water
problem. However, a different expert may analyze the same information
to address the same question and arrive at a different answer. This variability may result from differing assumptions in conceptual models, differ-
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ing assumptions in aquifer parameters, or different modeling approaches.
The differences in the results may or may not be significant. Thus because of this variability, ground water modeling projects are easy to scrutinize and criticize. This is particularly true for numerical modeling projects, which include numerous inputs and assumptions. For example, in
Division 1 Case No. 96CW14, multiple days of trial testimony occurred
focusing on modeling approaches and technical arguments about the validity of the applicants' modeling approach. Ultimately, the Colorado
water court dismissed the case because the applicant's "model generated
information that is not sufficient to support the experts' or the court's
reliance on modeling results . . . ."'
E.TECHNICAL COMMUNICATIONS
Ground water experts need to communicate technical issues to a nontechnical audience. The work product produced by ground water experts
is sometimes a tangible water supply, but at other times, the work product
is a technical report related to a Colorado water court case, well permit
application, or DRMS permitting process. The readers of the technical
reports are sometimes other technical experts, but also include judges,
attorneys, regulatory agencies, or other stakeholders. In the case of Colorado water court proceedings, it is the judge that determines the outcome of the case. Attorneys and stakeholders also play a significant role
in the Colorado water court process. As a result, ground water experts
must be skilled not only at completing technical analyses, but also communicating their findings and methodologies to a non-technical audience.
These communications occur in the form of technical reports, verbal
communications, and testimony.
In summary, ground water problems need to be addressed on a caseby-case basis. The best methods must be selected based on the ground
water expert's professional judgment. There is no "one size fits all" approach for any ground water problem, and many factors need to be considered to determine the most appropriate method to produce the information needed to resolve a ground water problem. Ground water flow
analysis is not an exact science, and the outcome of ground water investigations are influenced by the physical field data, the modeling approach,
and the expertise of the ground water expert. As a result, it is imperative
that ground water experts apply the best technical science, judgment, and
integrity; as well as clearly communicate their results, assumptions, and
the limitations of their findings.

173. In re Application for Water Rights: The Park Cnty. Sportsmen's Ranch, No. 96CW-14 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Water Div. 1June 1, 2001) (order dismissing application).
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ABSTRACT
Irrgators overdraw many Western streams to the detriment of tribal
and environmental uses; these conflicting interestsregularlybattle in state
and federal court over water allocation. This article profiles United States
v. Bell (Bell)'-the latest such skirmish among warring parties in the
Truckee and Carson River basins of northern Nevada. In Bell, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit faced persistent excessive irrigation diversions by the Truckee Carson Irrigation District
(TCID) in violation of applicable federal court decrees, administrative
OperatingCriteriaand Procedures (OCAPs), and the CongressionalSetdement Act of 1990. The Court discussed an unprecedented remedy"water interest"-in order to fully compensate the Pyramid Lake Paiute
Tribe of the Pyramid Lake Indian Reservation for injuries caused by
TCID's unlawful diversions. The United States District Court for the
District of Nevada had awarded water interest, and rather than dismiss
the novel remedy out of hand, the Ninth Circuit remanded the issue to
the DistrictCourt to explain the basis in law or equity for awarding water
interest. This article provides a synopsis of the decades of litigationgiving rise to Bell, an analysis of the decision itself and an evaluation of the
authority supporting the District Court's unusual award of postjudgment
water interest. The article concludes that, taken together, common principles controlling an award of interest, the statutory water recoupment
scheme, and United States Supreme Courtprecedent authorize this novel

remedy. Moreover, such reliefis necessary to fully compensate for the
opportunity cost of lost water and in light of TCID's dogged opposition
to federal law, to dissuade TCID from further procrastinatingin its water
repayment obhgation.

INTRODUCTION
"Procrastination is the thief of time;
Year after year it steals, till all are fled ...
Since 1973 federal courts have struggled to rein in the Truckee Carson Irrigation District (TCID) from delivering water to its irrigators in
1. United States v. Bell, 602 F.3d 1074 (9th Cir. 2010).
2. EDWARD YOUNG, THE COMPLAINT: OR, NIGHT THOUGHTS 22 (Brookfield, E. Merriman
& Co. 1853).
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excess of federal law.3 More than twenty years ago, the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) reported that between 1973 and 1985, TCID
unlawfully diverted "many hundreds of thousands of acre feet of water"
from the Truckee River in violation of the Secretary of the Interior's
(Secretary) Operating Criteria and Procedures (OCAPs), all the while
challenging the Secretary's authority to promulgate such regulations.'
Congress ultimately entered the fray, passing the Fallon Paiute Shoshone
Indian Tribes Water Rights Settlement Act (Settlement Act) in 1990.'
The Settlement Act validated the OCAPs at issue' and incorporated a
water recoupment remedy first implemented a year prior by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Pyramid Lake Paiute
Tribe of Indians v. Hodel (Stampede Credit Case).' Specifically, section
209(j)(3) of the Settlement Act authorizes the Secretary to pursue recoupment of water diverted in excess of OCAPs via settlement or judicial
proceeding, granted that the agreement or order is consistent with the
Endangered Species Act (ESA).' After December 31, 1997 any party with
standing may also pursue recoupment, but "the only reliefavailable from
any court of the United States will be the issuance of a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief directing any unlawful user of water to restore
the amount of water unlawfully diverted."'
3. Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. Morton (Tribe v. Morton), 354 F. Supp.
252, 257-58 (D.D.C. 1973) (chronicling the Secretary of the Department of Interior's
(Secretary) acquiescence to TCID's excessive diversions-"water is taken practically on
demand without necessary safeguards to prevent improper and wasteful use"-and flagrant disregard for regulations-TCID formally declared "that it will disregard the new
regulation and will divert water as it chooses by giving instructions to its own water masters"); see also Truckee-Carson Irrigation Dist. v. Sec'y of Dep't of Interior (TCID v.
Secretar), 742 F.2d 527, 530 (9th Cir. 1984) (describing how in 1973, the first year in
which the Secretary's new regulations were in effect, "TCID intentionally violated [the
OCAPsI by diverting more water than the regulations permitted").
4. S. REP. No. 101-555, at 15-16 (1990) (citing Letter from Richard B. Stewart,
Assistant Attorney Gen., Land and Natural Res. Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Martin
AlIday, Solicitor, U.S. Dep't of the Interior (1989)).
5. Fallon Paiute Shoshone Indian Tribes Water Rights Settlement Act of 1990
(Settlement Act), Pub. L. No. 101-618, §§ 101-107, 201-210, 104 Stat. 3289 (1990).
6. Id. § 2096)(2) (declaring the 1988 OCAPs shall remain in effect at least through
1997).
7. Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. Hodel (Stampede Credit Case), 882
F.2d 364, 366 (9th Cir. 1989); see also Settlement Act S 2090)(3) (directing the Secretary
to ensure compliance with all OCAPs and authorizing recoupment of water diverted in
excess of any OCAP).
8. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2007); Settlement
Act § 2096)(3); see also Carson-Truckee Water Conservancy Dist. v. Clark (Water Conservancy Dist. v. Clark), 741 F.2d 257, 261-62 (9th Cir. 1984) (affirming the district
court's order dedicating the water of the Little Truckee River, from the Stampede Dam
and Reservoir, for the conservation of the cui-ui (Chasmistes cujus) and Lahontan cutthroat trout (Oncorhnchus clarki henshaw) under the ESA rather than dedicating the
water for municipal and industrial use in Reno and Sparks, Nevada under the Washoe
Project Act (Act of Aug. 1, 1956, ch. 809, § 1, 70 Stat. 775, revoked byPub. L. No. 101618, S 205(c), 104 Stat. 3308 (1990))).
9. Settlement Act § 2090)(3) (emphasis added).
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In 1995 the United States brought suit against TCID to recoup over
one million acre-feet of diversions in excess of relevant OCAPs.. In
2003 the United States District Court for the District of Nevada determined that TCID willfully violated the OCAPs and awarded 200,000
acre-feet of water to the United States." Yet-of central interest to this
article-the district court also ordered TCID to "pay" the United States
postjudgment "water interest" at the rate of two percent per year on the
outstanding balance of water owed to the government." On appeal the
Ninth Circuit affirmed a portion of the district court's order, concluding
that the Settlement Act authorized the suit and allowed for a recoupment
award." Yet, in light of the district court's failure to explain the basis for
its award of "water interest" in law or equity, the Ninth Circuit remanded
the issue to the district court to explain its rationale. Specifically, the
Ninth Circuit held that water interest is appropriate only if there is "some
factual basis for awarding more water than was originally taken so as to
provide complete relief.""
Regarding potential sources of authority for an award of postjudgment
water interest, in the absence of common law precedent, applicable statutory provisions may authorize such an award. Yet, the applicable provision in Bell, 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a), only speaks to "money judgments].""
Thus, the district court likely relied on the United States' and Tribe's
briefs that directed the court's attention to the United States Supreme
Court's specific reference to postjudgment water interest in footnote eight
of Texas v. New Mexico (Texas v. New Mexico Ill." Yet, the Supreme
Court concluded it was "unpersuaded, however, that 'water interest,' rather than money, should be awarded unless and until it proves to be necessary."" In Bell, such an award of postjudgment water interest may indeed be necessary to stave off any procrastination on the part of TCID in
repaying its 200,000 plus acre-feet water debt. It was this risk of procrastination-and attendant opportunity cost of lost water-that spurred Special Master Meyers to suggest such a remedy in his 1986 Report to the
Court in Texas v. New Mexico III"
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Bell, 602 F.3d 1074, 1079 (9th Cir. 2010).
Id. at 1079.
Id. at 1082.
Id. at 1080.
Id. at 1083.
28 U.S.C. § 1961(a) (2006) ("Interest shall be allowed on any money judgment in

a civil case recovered in a district court .

. .

. Such interest shall be calculated from the

date of the entry of the judgment, at a rate equal to the weekly average 1-year constant
maturity Treasury yield . . . .").
16. See Bell, 602 F.3d at 1083.
17. Texas v. New Mexico (Texas v. New Mexico II), 482 U.S. 124, 132 n.8 (1987)
(explaining that failure on the part of New Mexico to deliver water pursuant to the
court's order "would entitle Texas to apply to this Court for enforcement . . . and to
some form of postjudgment interest for the period during which that judgment is not
satisfied").
18. Report of the Special Master at 32, Texas v.New Mexico III, 482 U.S. 124
(1987) (No. 65, Orig.) (copy on file with author).
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This article chronicles litigation leading up to Bell, analyzes the decision itself, and evaluates authority supporting the district court's award of
postjudgment water interest. The article concludes that the background
principles controlling an award of interest, the statutory recoupment
scheme itself, and Supreme Court precedent in the interstate compact
context authorize the novel remedy. Further, such relief is necessary to
compensate for the deprivation of the opportunity to put water to beneficial use and, in light of certain time-sensitive Tribal interests, to dissuade
TCID from procrastinating in its water repayment obligation.
I. TIMELINE: A CHRONOLOGY OF CONFLICT
In 1844 Captain John Fremont made the first reported, non-Indian,
sighting of Pyramid Lake." Fifteen years later the United States Department of the Interior (DOI) established a reservation, encompassing the
lake, the lower Truckee River, and surrounding lands, for the Pyramid
President Ulysses S. Grant confirmed the
Lake Paiute tribe (Tribe).
reservation's establishment in an 1874 executive order."
At the turn of the century Congress passed the National Reclamation
Act of 1902,' which authorized the Secretary to withdraw approximately
200,000 acres of land in western Nevada for the Newlands Reclamation
Project (Project).' The Project incorporates water from both the Truckee and Carson Rivers to irrigate the project area near Fallon, Nevada."
Unintentionally, the Newlands Project authorization set the irrigators and
the Tribe on a collision course because the Truckee River is the primary
source of Pyramid Lake water and habitat for the cui-ui and Lahontan
cutthroat trout. " Any diversion of Truckee River water into the Truckee
Canal at Derby Dam (see Figure 1, below) reduces that amount available
for Pyramid Lake, its fishery, and the Reservation.'

19. Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110, 114 (1983).
20. Id. at 115.
21. Id.
22. National Reclamation Act of 1902 (Reclamation Act), ch. 1093, 32 Stat. 388
(codified at 43 U.S.C. SS 371-431 (2007). The Reclamation Act, also known as the
Newlands Act of 1902 for Representative (later Senator) Francis G. Newlands of Nevada
who spear-headed the legislative effort, created a "massive program to construct and
operate dams, reservoirs, and canals" to reclaim arid land for settlement. California v.
United States, 438 U.S. 645, 650 (1978). Only a few weeks after the Act's passage, Secretary of the Interior Ethan Allen Hitchcock established the Reclamation Service (what
would later become the Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation)) under the United States
INST. FOR Gov'T RESEARCH, THE U.S. RECLAMATION
Geological Survey (USGS).
SERVICE: ITS HISTORY, ACTIVITIES AND ORGANIZATION 23 (1918). The Newlands

Project was likely the first reclamation project, even predating the formation of the Reclamation Service. Reed D. Benson, Whose Water is it? Private Rights and Public Authority Over Reclamation Project Water, 16 VA. ENVTL. LJ. 363, 424 & n.367 (1997).
23. Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. at 115.
24. Id. Fallon is located approximately sixty miles east of Reno, NV.
25. See id. at 119.
26. See id. at 115-16, 119.
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Eleven years later the United States filed a complaint in the United
States District Court for the District of Nevada asserting a claim to the
Truckee River for ten thousand cubic feet of water per second (cfs) for
the Project and 500 cfs for the Reservation." This claim on the Truckee
River water initiated the OrrDitch litigation." The United States grounded its claim to water for the Reservation on the "implied-reservation-ofwater" doctrine established in Witers v. United States." At the conclusion of hearings in 1924 a Special Master issued a report and proposed
decree awarding the Reservation a right to 58.7 cfs from the Truckee
River to irrigate 3,130 acres, with a priority date of 1859, the year the
Reservation was established." The proposed decree also awarded the
Project a right to 1,500 cfs to irrigate 232,800 acres within the Project
area, with a priority date of 1902, the year the Reclamation Act was enacted.
The district court subsequently confirmed the water rights as
27.

Map

of Irrigation District, TRUCKEE-CARSON

IRRIGATION

DISTRICT,

http://www.tcid.org/map.htm (last visited Sept. 29, 2011).
28.
Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. at 116.

29.

Id

30. Id.; see Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 577-78 (1908) (holding that
when the United States withdraws land from the public domain to establish an Indian
reservation, it also reserves an amount of water sufficient to meet the present and future
irrigation needs of the Indians; the implied federal reserved water right vests on and
carries a priority date as of the date the reservation was established).
31.
Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. at 117.

32.

Id.
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proposed and entered a temporary restraining order (TRO) which allowed for an experimental period in which the parties to the Orr Ditch
litigation might modify the proposed decreed diversion amounts by
agreement, if necessary."
In 1926 the Truckee-Carson Irrigation District (TCID) began operating the Newlands Project pursuant to a contract with the DOI." The contract authorized DOI to terminate TCID's operation of the Newlands
Project in the event of a breach or a violation of the regulations adopted
to implement the contract." It did not take long for conflicts to develop
over the use of Truckee River water. By the mid-1930s, a severe drought
spurred the parties to settle the OrrDitch litigation and dissolve the 1926
TRO."' In these negotiations TCID, rather than the federal government,
represented the interests of the Newlands Project."
The United States, now only representing the interests of the Reservation, sought additional water rights for irrigating 2,745 more acres of
Reservation land." The parties ultimately accepted DOI's demand for
increased water and signed what later became known as the Truckee River Agreement on July 1, 1935." The Nevada district court then ended the
Orr Ditch litigation in 1944 when it issued a final decree that specifically
incorporated the Truckee River Agreement in its holding." This "Orr
Ditch Decree" affirmed the Tribe's two senior water rights"-Claim
Numbers 1 and 2-with a priority date of 1859" to irrigate 5,875 acres,'
and TCID's junior right-Claim Number 3-with a priority date of 1902
to irrigate 232,800 acres."

Id. The proposed amounts were not modified.
Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. at 118; see also Our History, TRUCKEECARSON IRRIGATION DISTRICT, http://www.tcid.org/historyl.htm (last visited Oct. 1,
2011) ("ITCIDI is a political subdivision of the State of Nevada, organized and chartered
in 1918 for the purpose of representing the water right holders within the boundaries of
the Newlands Project in connection with the operation of the Project.").
TCID v. Secretary, 742 F.2d 527, 529 (9th Cir. 1984).
35.
36. Id. at 529.
37. See Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. at 118.
38. Id.
39.
TCID v. Secretary, 742 F.2d at 529.
40. Id. (referencing United States v. Orr Water Ditch Co. (Orr Ditch Decree), In
Equity No. A3, Case No. 73-cv-00003 (D. Nev. 1944) and United States v. Truckee
River Gen. Elec. Co., No. 14861 (N.D. Cal. 1915) now designated Case No. 68-cv-643
(E.D. Cal.)).
41. Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. at 121 n.8.
42. United States v. Orr Water Ditch Co., 600 F.3d 1152, 1158 (9th Cir. 2010).
43. United States v. Nevada, 412 U.S. 534, 537 (1973).
44. Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. at 117 n.3 (noting that no more than approximately 65,000 acres of Newlands Project land was actually irrigated); Truckee River
Chronology A ChronologicalHistory of Lake Tahoe and the Truckee River and Related Water Issues, Div. OF WATER RES., DEP'T OF CONSERVATION & NATURAL RES.,
STATE OF NEV., http://water.nv.gov/mapping/chronologies/truckee/part3.cfm (last visited
Oct. 4, 2011) [hereinafter Chronology] (explaining that the Orr Ditch Decree entitles
TCID to divert 1,500 cfs at Derby Dam).
33.
34.
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The final OrT Ditch Decree, however, did not put an end to allocation problems. In the mid-to-late 1960s, diversions from the Truckee
River led to the listing of fish native to Pyramid Lake as endangered under the ESA* due to reduced water depth, greater erosion, and increased
salinity levels.' Between 1910 and 1966, irrigation diversions from the
Truckee River at Derby Dam in to the Truckee Canal averaged 331 cfs
(240,000 acre-feet per year)." After the United States Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation) eliminated diversions solely for hydroelectric power generation, average diversions at Derby Dam from 1967 to 1994
dropped to 253 cfs (183,160 acre-feet per year)."
Based on the recommendations of a 1964 taskforce, the Secretary
promulgated regulations in 1967 that established OCAPs limiting the
amount of water available, within decreed rights, to TCID to divert from
the Truckee River in order to increase that amount available to Pyramid
Lake.' In 1970 the Tribe brought suit against the Secretary for failing to
meet his trust responsibilities by illegally and unnecessarily authorizing
TCID to divert Truckee water in exceedance of the 1967 OCAPs.' The
District Court for the District of Columbia held that the 1967 OCAPs
were arbitrary considering that the Secretary disregarded the Orr Ditch
and Alpine Decrees, and the Secretary failed to prevent unnecessary
waste within the irrigation district."
In 1973 the court approved revised OCAPs" designed to effectively
measure water use, minimize waste, restrict application of water to land
pursuant to the Orr Ditch and Alpine Decrees, and ensure TCID's compliance with the revised orders." To meet the court's directives, the
amended regulations maximized storage of upper Truckee River water in
Stampede Reservoir for the benefit of the Tribe, required that TCID
deliver at least 385,000 acre-feet of water to Pyramid Lake to preserve its
current depth, and capped the amount of Truckee River water that TCID
could divert into the Truckee Canal." Additionally, the court affirmed
45. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2007).
46. Stampede Credit Case, 882 F.2d 364, 366 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing Tribe v. Morton, 354 F. Supp. 252, 255 (D.D.C. 1973)).
47. Chronology, supra note 44.
48. Id.
49. 43 C.F.R. § 418.16-.27 (2011); Stampede Credit Case, 882 F.2d at 366.
50. Tribe v. Morton, 354 F. Supp. at 255.
51. Id. at 256-57 (holding also that the Secretary was obliged to promulgate even
more restrictive OCAPs to insure "that all water not obligated by court decree or contract with the District goes to Pyramid Lake").
52. Id. at 260-65 (amending judgment and order including Section A, Truckee Diversion Criteria and Section B, Storage Credit at Stampede).
53. Id. at 258.
54. Stampede Credit Case, 882 F.2d at 366; TCID v. Secretary, 742 F.2d 527, 530
(9th Cir. 1984) (capping the amount to 350,000 acre-feet in 1973 and to 288,129 acrefeet each year thereafter); Tribe v. Morton, 354 F. Supp. at 255. Truckee River water
may be stored either upstream in Stampede Reservoir or diverted at the Derby Dam,
through the Truckee Canal, to Lahontan Reservoir. Whereas water stored in Stampede
Reservoir may be released to Pyramid Lake for the benefit of the Tribe, water, once
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the paramount nature of the Secretary's trust responsibility to the Tribe,
holding that existing contracts between DOI and the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), and Reclamation and the United States
Forest Service,"[could not] be interposed as . . . obstacle[si to the Lake
receiving the maximum benefit from the upper Truckee flow into Stampede."' In practice, the amended regulatory scheme requires that the
Secretary direct any water not obligated by decree or contract to flow to
Pyramid Lake."
Similar to the 1926 contract, the amended regulations also authorized
the Secretary to terminate TCID's contract if the irrigation district engaged in a substantial violation of the regulations." Later in 1973 TCID
intentionally violated the permitted diversion amounts, thus forcing the
Secretary to terminate the 1926 contract." On behalf of the Reservation,
the United States quickly brought suit to secure additional instream (nonconsumptive use) water rights to the Truckee River, beyond those consumptive use. rights previously litigated in Orr Ditch." The United States
asserted, again relying on the Winters doctrine, that the executive order
establishing the Reservation had also reserved the amount necessary to
maintain the Pyramid Lake fishery, including the lower Truckee River
spawning grounds.'
The Nevada district court dismissed the government's claim, holding
that it was "the same quiet title cause of action asserted by the plaintiff in
OrrDitch .... The plaintiff and the Tribe may not litigate several different types of water use claims, all arising under the Winters doctrine and
all derived from the same water source in a piece-meal fashion."' In
United States v. TCID, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit affirmed that part of the decision concluding that res judicata prevents re-litigating the claim at issue in Orr Ditch but held that Orr Ditch
did not conclude the dispute between the Tribe and the owners of Newlands Project lands." The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and ultimately affirmed that part of the Ninth Circuit's decision concerning res judicata of the Orr Ditch cause of action but also reversed
that portion regarding the viability of the claim between TCID and the

diverted to Lahontan Reservoir, cannot be returned upstream to the Tribe. Stampede
Credit Case, 882 F.2d at 366.
Tribe v. Morton, 354 F. Supp. at 258, 260-61; see also supra Figure 1 (illustrat55.
ing how Stampede Reservoir holds upper Truckee River water that may later be released
back into the river for eventual delivery to Pyramid Lake).
Tribe v. Morton, 354 F. Supp. at 256.
56.
57. TCID v. Secretary,742 F.2d at 530.
58. Id. (describing TCID's subsequent suit to prevent the Secretary from terminating
the contract and the district's attack on the validity of the 1973 OCAP; in 1973 the court
upheld the Secretary's decision to terminate the contract).
59. Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110, 118 (1983).
60. Id. at 19.
61. Id. at 120.
62. Id. at 120-21.

144

WATER LAW REVIEW

Volume 15

United States and Tribe.' The Supreme Court held that the United
States was barred from "asserting the same reserved right for purposes of
'fishing' and maintenance of 'lands and waters' that was asserted in Orr
Ditch.""
While parties litigated rights to Truckee River water, litigation over
Carson River water similarly raged. An interim restraining order signed
in 1952 triaged contested claims to the Carson River until the Nevada

district court decided United States v. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co. (Alpine Land & Reservoir )' in 1980." The Nevada district court's final
order, the "Alpine Decree,"' settled water rights to the Carson River and
was subsequently modified and affirmed by the Ninth Circuit."' In 1988
the Secretary established the current OCAP "based on actual project water-righted and irrigated acreage," and in 1992 assigned a water duty of
3.5 acre-feet per year for Newlands Project bottomlands and 4.5 acre-feet
per year for bench lands."' The regulation had the effect of limiting water
delivered by restricting application of water to only that land classified as
"eligible" by Reclamation, in accord with the annual water duty."
By 1990 Congress noticed TCID's deliberate diversion of water in
excess of the 1973 OCAPs (and the Secretary's subsequent termination
of TCID's contract), waste of Newlands Project water, delivery of Project
water to lands without valid water rights, and wrongful diversions potentially exceeding 800,000 acre-feet of water." Partly in response to these
transgressions, Congress enacted the Fallon Paiute Shoshone Indian
Tribes Water Rights Settlement Act of 1990 (Settlement Act)" authorizing
the Secretary to enforce compliance with all OCAPs and "pursue recoupment of any water diverted from the Truckee River in excess of the
amounts permitted by any such [OCAPI."" Congress also specified that

63. Id. at 121.
64. Id. at 134.
65. 503 F. Supp. 877 (D. Nev. 1980).
66. TCID v. Secretary, 742 F.2d 527, 531 n.2 (9th Cir. 1984); see supra Figure 1
(depicting how the Lahontan Reservoir stores both Carson River water and that Truckee
River water diverted at Derby Dam (routed through the Truckee Canal); the system then
employs 600 miles of main water ditches and 1,500 delivery points to distribute the
water for irrigation purposes); see also Tribe v. Morton, 354 F. Supp. 252, 255 (D.D.C.
1973).
67. Bell, 602 F.3d 1074, 1078 (9th Cir. 2010).
68. United States v. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co. (Alpine Land & Reservoir I), 697
F.2d 851, 860 (9th Cir. 1983).
69. Chronology, supra note 44.
70. 43 C.F.R. § 418.1, .8, .10-.11 (2010) ("The valid water deliveries at the headgate
are set by the product of eligible land actually irrigated multiplied by the appropriate
water duty . .

).

71. S. REP. 101-555, at 14 (1990).
72. Fallon Paiute Shoshone Indian Tribes Water Rights Settlement Act of 1990
(Settlement Act), Pub. L. No. 101-618, §§ 101-107, 201-210, 104 Stat. 3289 (1990).
73. Id. § 209(j)(3).
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the Settlement Act not be interpreted in such a way as to conflict with the

OrrDitch and Alpine Decrees.'
TCID's absence from the Settlement Act negotiations was cause for
concern and noted by several parties. Former Nevada Representative
Vucanovich expressed, "[wihether [TCID] walked away from the negotiations or was barred from real participation . . . matters very little at this
point. We simply cannot expect to legislatively end the years of litigation
. .. without involving such a major player in the deal."" In contrast, Nevada Senator Reid explained that the Tribe's and TCID's declaration to
continue litigating relevant OCAPs, rather than settle their differences
within the Act, did not indicate the legislatiofi was fatally flawed." When
questioned by Senator Bradley, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Water and Power, Senator Reid stated "it wouldn't be right to have one party
be able to veto the agreement" after the thousands of hours the cities,
states, and tribes have put into it."
Perhaps not surprisingly, TCID continued to violate the applicable
agreements and regulations, even though they were ratified in the 1990
Settlement Act. As a result, the United States began the litigation that
produced the Ninth Circuit decision that is the subject of this article.

II. UNITED STATES V BELL, 602 F.3D 1074 (9TH CIR. 2010)
In 1995 the United States brought suit against TCID to recoup over
one million acre-feet of diversions in excess of OCAPs in force from
1973 to 1988." Fifteen years later the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit affirmed the validity of the 1973 OCAPs and upheld
the district court's conclusion that the Fallon Paiute Shoshone Indian
Tribes Water Rights Settlement Act of 1990 (Settlement Act)" authorized
the suit." The court further determined that the Settlement Act allowed
for water recoupment awards, upheld much of the district court's recoupment order, and held that the order was compatible with the Orr

74. Id. § 210(b)(13).
75. Truckee-Carson-PyiamidLake Water Rights Settlement Act HearingBefore the
Subconnn. on Water and Power, 101st Cong. 97 (1990) (statement of Rep. Barbara
Vucanovich).
76. Id. at 45 (statement of Sen. Harry M. Reid).
77. Id. at 105.
78. Bell, 602 F.3d 1074, 1079 (9th Cir. 2010). In total, six cases were brought by the
United States in the District Court for the District of Nevada, Judge Howard D. McKibben, Presiding; the Ninth Circuit designated the appeals Nos. 05-16154, 05-16157, 0516158, 05-16187, 05-16189 and 05-16909, and issued one opinion as to all the appeals.
The United States brought the suit against TCID and all agricultural users of water supplied by TCID, including Arthur W. Bell, IV, the lead defendant in all six cases; the
State of Nevada was also a named defendant as a water user. Id. at 1074-75, 1079 (noting lengthy evidentiary proceedings postponed the district court's decision until 2003).
79. Fallon Paiute Shoshone Indian Tribes Water Rights Settlement Act of 1990
(Settlement Act), Pub. L. No. 101-618, § 209(i), 104 Stat. 3289 (1990).
80. Bell, 602 F.3d at 1081.
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Ditcf and Alpine" Decrees.' However, the Ninth Circuit vacated the
award concerning pre and postjudgment interest and remanded with instructions for the district court to explain its basis." The Ninth Circuit
also vacated and remanded the issues of the methodology for calculating
excess diversion amounts, and the calculation of the amount spilled from
Lahontan Reservoir in light of gauge error.'
In 1926 TCID had entered into a contract with the Secretary to assume operational control of the Newlands Project.' Court orders in 1944
and 1980 established the maximum diversion amounts for the Truckee
and Carson Rivers, respectively." However, by the mid-1960s irrigation
diversions from the Truckee had adversely affected the river's ability to
recharge Pyramid Lake, thereby jeopardizing the Pyramid Lake fishery.'
In response, the Secretary established OCAPs in 1967, later challenged
in Tribe i Morton." The 1967 OCAPs were succeeded by more restrictive court-ordered OCAPs in 1973." In 1995 the United States brought
suit against TCID under the Settlement Act seeking recoupment of over
one million acre-feet of water diverted in excess of OCAPs from 1973 to
1988." Although the Nevada district court determined that TCID willfully violated the OCAPs, it awarded just 200,000 acre-feet of water to the
United States, holding TCID liable for excesses in 1974, 1975, 1978, and
1979 and for spills in 1979 and 1980." The district court ordered TCID
to "pay" the United States with water, including postjudgment "water in-

81. United States v. Orr Water Ditch Co. (OrrDitch), In Equity No. A3, Case No.
73-cv-00003 (D. Nev. 1944); United States v. Truckee River Gen. Elec. Co., No. 14861
(N.D. Cal. 1915) now designated Case No. 68-cv-643 (E.D. Cal.).
82. Alpine Land & Reservoir 1, 503 F. Supp. 877 (D. Nev. 1980).
83. Bell, 602 F.3d at 1082, 1085
84. Id. at 1083-84.
85. Id. at 1085 (referencing spills of Truckee River water in the amount of 11,938 af
and 12,193 af in 1979 and 1980, respectively, and the district court's erroneous accounting of the statistical uncertainty associated with the government's published flow data).
TCID regulates its diversions of Truckee River water at Derby Dam based on end-ofmonth storage targets at Lahontan Reservoir, but the mathematical uncertainty in such
forecasts will at times contribute to an excess of water at the reservoir, thus leading to
spills or precautionary drawdowns. JEREMY PRATT, TRUCKEE-CARSON RIVER BASIN
STUDY:

FINAL

REPORT

TO

THE

WESTERN

WATER

POLICY

REVIEW

ADVISORY

COMMIssION 96 (Clear Water Consulting Corp. ed., 1997). Though a system of drains
collects some of the water spilled at Lahontan Reservoir and transports it to Stillwater
Marsh and Carson Lake and Pasture wetlands, a significant portion escapes to the Carson Sink, "failing to serve any of the priority uses in the lower Carson Basin." Id. at 22,
96; see also supra Figure 1 (delineating the Carson Division from the Truckee Division).
86. Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110, 118 (1983).
87. Bell, 602 F.3d at 1078.
88. Id.
89. 354 F. Supp. at 255-56.
90. Bell, 602 F.3d at 1078.
91. Id. at 1079.
92. Id.
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terest."' However, the court denied the government's request for prejudgment interest."
On appeal TCID challenged the validity of the 1973 OCAP but the
Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court on this point, concluding that the
Settlement Act expressly validated the OCAPs." TCID also challenged
whether the Settlement Act authorizes the United States to litigate for
past diversions in excess of OCAPs." Again, the Ninth Circuit affirmed
the lower court and held that the Act unambiguously provides for litigation if settlement fails and authorizes the Secretary to enforce compliance
with all OCAPs, past, present, and future." The court also held that
awarding recoupment water under the Act did not constitute contempt"
and that previous government assurances that the 1973 OCAP would not
be enforced did not constitute "affirmative misconduct" causing "serious
injustice" such that estoppel barred the government's suit."
TCID and Nevada next claimed that simultaneous compliance with
the decrees and the Settlement Act (intended to restore Pyramid Lake)
was impossible given the limited water supply.'"' The Ninth Circuit rejected that argument, reasoning that although a specific amount is decreed, TCID is not always entitled to divert the full amount since the
district's right is dependent on the application of beneficial use without
waste or uneconomic application.o' Moreover, "TCID's past record of
noncompliance" put the burden on TCID to satisfy both the decrees and
recoupment order, possibly through implementation of conservation
measures resulting in "credit water" available to satisfy the order."'
After upholding the district court's determination that TCID was liable under the Settlement Act for violating applicable OCAPs, the Ninth
Circuit next considered the propriety of awarding pre and postjudgment
water interest. Reasoning by analogy to the law on awarding money interest, the court stated that in the absence of common law precedent an
award of postjudgment "water interest" must be authorized by statute."
Since the statute at issue only allows for interest "on any money judgment
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1081.
96. Id. at 1079.
97. See id. at 1080.
98. Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Affordable Media, 179 F.3d 1228, 1239 (9th Cir.1999)
(noting that a party is in contempt only when it first violates a judicial order).
99. Bell, 602 F.3d at 1082 (citing Watkins v. U.S. Army, 875 F.2d 699, 707 (9th Cir.
1989)).
100. Bell, 602 F.3d at 1080.
101. Alpine Land & Reservoir II, 697 F.2d 851, 854 (9th Cir. 1983). See also Bell,
602 F.3d at 1081 (relying on the Ninth Circuit's definition of beneficial use which is
premised on application of that amount of water necessary to irrigate the maximum
amount of crops suitable for a given tract of land).
102. Bell, 602 F.3d at 1081.
103. Id. at 1083. See also Pierce v. United States, 255 U.S. 398, 406 (1921) (holding
that "lalt common lawl,l judgments do not bear interest; interest rests solely upon statutory provision").
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in a civil case," it did not provide the necessary authority." After dismissing the government's argument that prior United States Supreme Court
precedent" allows for "water interest," the court determined that any authority for such interest was likely based in equity. The Ninth Circuit
then remanded the case for the district court to determine if the award
was necessary to compensate the plaintiffs and to explain why the lower
court had chosen a postjudgment interest rate of two percent per year on
the outstanding balance of water owed to the government. The court also
criticized the district court's denial of prejudgment interest. In contrast
to postjudgment interest, in the absence of statutory authorization, common law provides for prejudgment interest.'" The Ninth Circuit also disagreed with the lower court that the government's delay in bringing its suit
warranted a denial of prejudgment interest since the government's cause
of action did not become available until 1990, upon enactment of the
Settlement Act.
The Ninth Circuit next assessed the district court's calculation of the
recoupment award. Declining to second-guess the lower court, the Ninth
Circuit observed that estimates of excess diversions of Carson River water
and spills of Truckee River water matched those of TCID's own expert.
However, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the district court erred in subtracting the level of statistical uncertainty from the published flow data,
which limited the amount of water available for recoupment."' The court
remanded the issue for the district court to recalculate the amount diverted based on the government's published flow data.
Regarding contested diversions from 1981 to 1984, the Ninth Circuit
upheld the district court's denial of recoupment and concluded that the
Secretary's failure to amend the 1973 OCAPs, in light of increased diversions made available by the 1980 Alpine Decree, prevented the government from showing that TCID diverted in excess of a relevant standard
during those years. However, the court agreed with the government that
failure to amend the 1973 OCAP did not excuse TCID's spills at Lahontan Reservoir, in contravention of the principle of beneficial use, between

1981 and 1984.
Finally, the Ninth Circuit upheld the district court's decision not to
dismiss the farmers, even though they bore no individual liability for
TCID's diversions, because the long history of litigation in the basin sug-

104. 28 U.S.C. S 1961(a) (2006).
Texas v. New Mexico III, 482 U.S. 124, 133 n.8 (1987) (explaining that "water
105.
interest" should not "be awarded unless and until it proves to be necessary").
106. City of Milwaukee v. Cement Div., Nat'l Gypsum Co., 515 U.S. 189, 194 (1995)
(reasoning that in the absence of a legislative determination regarding prejudgment interest, "the absence of a statute merely indicates that the question is governed by traditional
judge-made principles").
107. Bell, 602 F.3d at 1085 ("IThe district court accounted for statistical uncertainty
in the flow data by subtracting the confidence interval from the published quantities,
effectively assigning all of the uncertainty against the Tribe.").
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gested it prudent to bar subsequent collateral attack." The Ninth Circuit
also denied the farmers' attorney fees as prevailing parties under the
Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA)." The court concluded that the
farmers were not prevailing parties because the district court's decision
was wholly in favor of the United States and the Tribe."o Although the
district court did not impose individual liability on the farmers, it found
that TCID unlawfully diverted nearly 200,000 acre-feet for the farmers'
benefit."'
On November 29, 2010, the Supreme Court denied TCID's petition
for writ of certiorari after the United States Solicitor General refrained
from replying to TCID's petition."' On remand to the district court, approximately 150,000 acre-feet of water is in play through recalculations
due to gauge error, measurement of that amount spilled, and determination of the validity of awarding postjudgment water interest."' Part IV
next explores sources of authority for postjudgment water interest. It
concludes that in an action to recoup water under federal law, Supreme
Court precedent authorizes a federal court to borrow postjudgment interest concepts from the monetary damages context to fully compensate the
claimant-especially when the interest might dissuade the respondent
from procrastinating in the repayment of water.

III. TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE: UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT PRECEDENT CONTEMPLATES A COMPLEMENTARY
AWARD OF WATER INTEREST TO FULLY COMPENSATE THE
TRIBE AND HEAD OFF ANY DELAY IN REPAYMENT
A federal court sitting in equity must make the injured party whole
and, in light of United States Supreme Court precedent in the interstate
compact context, may borrow the practice of awarding interest on damag-

108. See Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. Peabody W. Coal Co., 400 F.3d 774,
780 (9th Cir. 2005) ("[Wie have elsewhere found that tribes are necessary parties to
actions that might have the result of directly undermining authority they would otherwise
exercise.").
109. Bell, 602 F.3d at 1086-87; See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (2011).
110. Bell, 602 F.3d at 1087 (reasoning that a plaintiff must be "awarded some relief by
the court" on the merits of his claim before he can be said to prevail) (citing Poland v.
Chertoff, 494 F.3d 1174, 1186-87 (9th Cir. 2007)).
111. Bell, 602 F.3d at 1087.
112. Order List: 562 U.S., SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 6 (Nov. 29,
2010), http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/112910zor.pdf; see also Bd. of
Dirs. of Truckee-Carson Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 653, 653 (2010).
113. Bell, 602 F.3d at 1085, 1087 (vacating those amounts the district court found
TCID improperly diverted from 1974 to 1979 (173, 021 acre-feet) and spilled from 1979
to 1980 (24,131 acre-feet), and remanding to recalculate upward in light of gauge error;
vacating and remanding judgment to quantify amounts spilled from 1981 to 1984; and
vacating and remanding post and prejudgment interest calculations in consideration of
same).
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es to fully compensate a claimant for injury due to unlawful diversions."'
In evaluating authority for equitable remedies available to a federal court
in an action to recoup water under the Settlement Act, similar actions
under common law principles, statutory recoupment schemes, and interstate compacts demonstrate the viability of water interest relief. In light
of the scope of injury to the Tribe's agricultural, ecological, and cultural
interests, background principles giving rise to an award of interest on
monetary damages to fully compensate a claimant are particularly relevant
Additionally, water interest complements relief provided by the
water recoupment scheme codified in the Settlement Act. Finally, the
Supreme Court's discussion of interest on outstanding water balances in
the interstate compact context provides the strongest authority for a water
interest award."'
Specifically, Special Master Meyers's practical
posjudgment water interest remedy, as announced in Texas v. New Mexicco III, is necessary to fully compensate the Tribe and stave off any procrastination on the part of TCID in meeting its repayment obligation."'
A. COMMON LAW PRINCIPLES GIVING RISE TO AN AWARD OF
INTEREST IN THE MONETARY DAMAGES CONTEXT ARE PARTICULARLY
INSTRUCTIVE IN THE WATER RECOUPMENT SETTING.

1. Traditional Common Law Causes of Action Lacked Water Recoupment Mechanisms.
Prior to the enactment of state and federal statutory schemes controlling the acquisition and adjudication of water rights, courts insisted that a
claimant satisfy certain predicate elements in actions for damages due to
interference with a vested water right. Unlike property rights in real
property, rights in water "are usufructuary; ownership of the resource
itself remains in the public."" Thus, interference with an appropriator's
right to the continuous flow of water for beneficial use under state law
premised a cause of action. "' Specifically, the measure of actionable
interference corresponded to the repercussions attributable to the inability to apply water to a particular beneficial use."' Further, since "missing"
114. See Kansas v. Colorado (Kansas v. Colorado 1), No. 105, Orig., 2000 WL
34508307, at *40-41 (Aug. 31, 2000); see also Texas v. New Mexico III, 482 U.S. 124,
131-32 (1987).
115. See discussion infra Part IV.C.
116. See Report of the Special Master, supra note 18, at 32.
117. Santa Fe Trail Ranches Prop. Owners Ass'n v. Simpson, 990 P.2d 46, 55 (Colo.
1999).
118.
HENRY
P. FARNHAM,
THE LAW OF WATERS
AND WATER RIGHTS:
INTERNATIONAL,
NATIONAL,
STATE, MUNICIPAL, AND INDIVIDUAL,
INCLUDING
IRRIGATION, DRAINAGE, AND MUNICIPAL WATER SUPPLY 2123 (1904).

119. Id. at 2124 n.2 (presenting the subsequent destruction of a field and the crops
grown thereon as an example of actionable interference). For example, though a Colorado statute requires that any substituted water be of a "quality and continuity" to meet
an appropriator's normal demands, the substitution of clear water for silty water-a highly desirable trait as silt seals cracks in the beds and banks of irrigation ditches-does not
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water is not yet reduced to possession, a cause of action for the value of
such previously diverted water is not available: water "does not become
his property until it reaches his ditches."" Thus, state and federal legislatures enacted remedial statutes allowing for the recoupment of water unlawfully diverted."' However, despite a legislative predilection for recoupment schemes, no express statutory allowance for pre or postjudgment water interest on recoupment awards yet exists in the federal arena.'"2
2. Common Law Principles Controlling Awards of Pre and Postjudgment
Interest are Particularly Instructive to Water Recoupment and Necessary
to Fully Compensate for Deprivation of the Opportunity to Put Water to
Beneficial Use.
Though express provisions for interest on nonmonetary awards in water recoupment actions are lacking, background principles controlling
interest on monetary awards are analogous and persuasive in the recoupment context because any procrastination in the repayment of water
compounds injury to those beneficial uses deprived of the application of
water. In the monetary damages context, the legal principle that guides
the assessment of interest is qui tardiussolvit, minus solvit-whoever pays
tardily, pays less.'" Considering that a delay in reparations prevents the
claimant from making timely use of compensation, thereby compounding
injury, the respondent is expected to compensate for such delay.'' Grotius expressed the concept of compensation for the lost time value of an
injured asset as early as 1625.'" In essence, the claimant is entitled to
those damages associated with the potential income or products derived
from the injured asset. Though in light of the uncertainty in calculating
hypothetical lost profits, interest is usually awarded on injuries to nonconstitute an unreasonable deterioration in quality giving rise to actionable interference.
COLO. REV. STAT. S 37-80-120(3) (2011); A-B Cattle Co. v. United States, 589 P.2d 57,
59-60 (Colo. 1978) (holding that under a maximum utilization doctrine an appropriator
has no legal right to the continued delivery of silt-laden water after the construction of a
federal dam resulted in delivery of clear water from the impoundment area).
120.
FARNHAM, supra note 118, at 2123-24.
121. See NEv. REV. STAT. § 533.481(l)(b) (2010). For instance, in addition to administrative fines upwards of $10,000, the Nevada State Engineer may require a person who
effects an unlawful diversion of water to "replace not more than 200 percent of the water
[unlawfullyl used, wasted or diverted." Id. S 533.48 1(1)(a), (b) (emphasis added); Fallon
Paiute Shoshone Indian Tribes Water Rights Settlement Act of 1990 (Settlement Act),
Pub. L. No. 101-618, S 209(j)(3), 104 Stat. 3289 (1990).
122. Bell, 602 F.3d 1074, 1083 (9th Cir. 2010).
123. Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Below-market Interest in InternationalClaims Against
States, 13 J. INT'L EcON. L. 423, 427 (2010).
124. Id.
125.

HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI Ac PACIs LIBIU TRES [ON THE LAW OF WAR

AND PEACE THREE BOOKs] 431 (Francis W. Kelsey trans., Clarendon Press 1925) (1625)
("Moreover, a person will be understood to have less, and therefore to have suffered
loss, not only in the property itself, but also in the products which strictly belong to it,
whether these have actually been gathered or not, if he might have gathered them . . . .").
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income producing assets." While pre and postjudgment interest operate
similarly to lost profits, in accounting for the time value of money that
should have been paid earlier to compensate for injury, only prejudgment
interest is "governed by traditional judge-made principles."" In contrast,
since the common law does not authorize postjudgment interest, "the
propriety of an award of postjudgment interest 'rests solely upon the statutory provision.""
In addition, Ninth Circuit precedent demonstrates that a monetary
judgment is not a precondition to an award of pre or postjudgment interest.'" In its brief, counsel for the Tribe cited the Ninth Circuit's decision
in United States v. Gordon" that affirmed an award of monetary prejudgment interest on a nonmonetaryjudgment involving embezzled securities (a nonmonetary instrument)."' Therefore, although Gordon does
not speak to an award of nonmonetary interest on a nonmonetary judgment, it does suggest that monetary judgments are not a precondition to
postjudgment interest.
Perhaps even more so than in the monetary damages context-where
monetary interest indirecdy compensates through the purchase of goods
or services to ameliorate injury-nonmonetary water interest directly
compensates, as it is precisely the medium through which deprivation of
application of water to beneficial use is ameliorated. At present, the
Tribe is doubly worse off for TCID's unlawful diversions of water in
1974, 1975, 1978, and 1979: beyond the time it will take to compensate
the Tribe for damage to agricultural, ecological, and cultural resources,"
126. Fellmeth, supra note 123, at 427.
127. Bell, 602 F.3d at 1083-84 (citing Dishman v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 269
F.3d 974, 989 (9th Cir. 2001)).
128. Bell, 602 F.3d at 1083. Some commentators are careful to distinguish 'interest
on damages' from 'interest as damages'; when interest constitutes damages itself, it usually refers to actual costs incurred such as monies borrowed to mitigate damage from a
wrongful act. Fellmeth, supra note 123, at 436. As implemented by the Nevada district
court, 'water interest' would constitute 'interest on damages' since it is based on that
recoupment amount which TCID inust repay, rather than a standalone damages award.
Bell, 602 F.3d at 1082-83.
129. See United States v. Gordon, 393 F.3d 1044, 1057-59 (9th Cir. 2004).
130. See Opening/Answering Brief for Appellee/Cross-Appellant Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians at 31, Bell, 602 F.3d 1074 (9th Cir. 2010) (Nos. 05-16154, 0516157, 05-16158, 05-16187, 05-16189 and 05-16909).
131.
Gordon, 393 F.3d at 1059-60.
132. Indian Water Policy: Hearing Before the S Select Comm. on Indian Affairs,
101st Cong. 43 (1989) (statement of Hon. Joe Ely, Chairman, Pyramid Lake Paiute
Tribe). Regarding the scope of injury suffered by the Tribe from excessive diversions by
TCID, the Hon. Joe Ely, Chairman, Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe, remarked during hearings leading up to the Settlement Act:
For the sake of simplicity, let's tally up the score of destruction the Newlands Project has
executed. Since 1905, it has completely destroyed the natural Lahontan Cutthroat trout
fishery at Pyramid Lake, which consequently completely destroyed the tribe's economy,
leading to reliance on Federal funds. It has all but led to the extinction of the cui-ui,
which is the identity and major component of the tribe's way of life. It has dried up
totally our sister Lake Winnemucca, which was a thriving wetlands and waterfowl area.
It has caused major destruction of the Stillwater Wildlife Refuge near Fallon, Nevada,
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it is uncertain whether the Tribe might ever recover the attendant opportunity cost (e.g., crop production, fish spawning, and cultural preservation)" associated with being deprived of the ability to apply water to beneficial use during the late 1970s.
What is certain though, is that an award of water interest stands a better chance of redressing injuries to the Pyramid Lake fishery than a monetary award. For example, the 1992 Cui-ui Recovery Plan called for supplemental inflow of 110,000 acre-feet of Truckee River water to the Lake,
partly through reduction of TCID's diversions to Newlands Project irrigators.'
It is questionable whether a monetary award would allow the
Tribe to procure water rights to 110,000 acre-feet of Truckee River water
in light of the newly acquired rights' junior priority dates. Moreover,
without a water interest component, any further delay by TCID in honoring its recoupment obligation will compound injury to certain timesensitive interests, like recovery of the endangered cui-ui and threatened
Lahontan cutthroat trout." Therefore, background principles giving rise
to an award of interest on monetary damages are particularly instructive
to the water recoupment setting since pre and postjudgment interest insure a greater probability that injury to Tribal interests will indeed be
fully compensated in a timely manner.
B. AN AWARD OF WATER INTEREST WOULD COMPLEMENT THE
FIRMLY ESTABLISHED WATER RECOUPMENT SCHEME FIRST
IMPLEMENTED IN THE STAMPEDE CREDIT CASE AND LATER CODIFIED
IN THE SETTLEMENT ACT.
Prior to implementing an explicit water recoupment strategy to enforce relevant OCAPs promulgated by the Secretary, federal courts in
where the project spills its toxic poison into the wetlands after irrigating its fields. And it
is currently destroying the world's largest natural pelican refuge, Anaho Island, by contaminating the pelicans' food supply at the Stillwater Wetlands. Id.
133. Donald B. Seney, The ChangingPoliticalFortunesof the Truckee-Carson IrrigaLion District,76 AGRIc. HIST. 220, 225 (2002). Though the Tribe appropriates Truckee
River water for agricultural purposes, members of the Tribe are not historically farmers
but rather fishers who depend on sufficient flows to allow the cui-ui and Lahontan cutthroat trout to reach their spawning beds. Id. Presently, Tribal members derive most of
their livelihood from the Lahontan cutthroat trout fishery through the sale of permits for
fishing, boating, and camping. Indian Water PolicyHearing,supra note 132, at 40.
134. PRATT, supra note 85, at 26.
135. Pyramid Lake is the sole remaining habitat for the cui-ui, a large sucker that
grows to a length of two feet and lives up to thirty years, and was listed as endangered
under the ESA in 1967; the cui-ui also serves as a seasonal food source for the tribe. Id.
at 24-25. Pyramid Lake is also home to the Lahontan cutthroat trout, whose original
Pyramid Lake strain grew to sixty pounds and lived upwards of ten years, and was listed
as threatened under the ESA in 1975. Id. at 27. Though the original strain went extinct
by 1944, the species was restocked via hatchery operations, but restocked species seldom grow more than fifteen pounds. Id. Unlike the cui-ui, the Lahontan cutthroat have
suffered permanent loss of genetic diversity and require significantly greater flows
throughout the year to reach their natural spawning grounds on the lower Truckee River.
Id.
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this ongoing dispute authorized water masters to condition delivery of
water pursuant to federal court decrees." In practice, depriving misbehaving owners of decreed water rights constitutes an approved means of
enforcing regulatory rules and measures." In 1984 the Ninth Circuit in
TCID v. Secretary held that the Secretary is authorized to reduce the
quantity of water diverted to Newlands Project users below the maximum
amounts permitted by the relevant decree since the "the Secretary explicitly reserved the right to issue regulations governing the operation of the
Newlands Project."" In 1989 the Ninth Circuit in the Stampede Credit
Case approved of a restitutionary remedy to recoup illegally diverted
Truckee River water for the benefit of the Pyramid Lake fishery.'" Although TCID released 21,500 acre-feet of water for irrigation from Stampede Reservoir pursuant to the district court's erroneous interpretation of
applicable OCAPs, the Ninth Circuit held that the resultant injury to the
Pyramid Lake fishery could be remedied by storing an equivalent amount
of water from TCID's future allotment, for later release to the Lake." In
essence, TCID and Newlands Project water users were required to repay
the previously released water to the Tribe pursuant to the Secretary's
plan.'
In 1990 Congress formally adopted such a recoupment scheme when
it enacted the Settlement Act."' To ensure compliance with all OCAPs,
the Settlement Act authorized the Secretary to "pursue recoupment of
any water diverted from the Truckee River in excess of the amounts

136. The Orr Ditch Decree limits that amount of Truckee River water available to
Newlands Project users:
Except as herein specially provided no diversion of water into any ditch or canal,
in this decree mentioned shall be permitted except in such amount as shall actually, reasonably necessary for the economical and beneficial use for which the
right of diversion is determined and established by this decree.
Tribe Opening Brief supra note 130, at 4. The Alpine Decree similarly limits that
amount of Carson River water available:
The quantities of water to be diverted by the owners of the several ditches,
through those ditches, on account of the several priorities herein allowed, are allowed subject to the obligations of said owners to divert and use water only at
such times as needed and only in such amounts as may be required for actual,
reasonable beneficial use.
Id.; see also Alpine Land & Reservoir Co. I (Alpine Decree), 503 F. Supp. 877, 881 (D;
Nev. 1980).
137. See Bell, 602 F.3d 1074, 1083-84 (9th Cir. 2010).
138.. TCID. v. Secretary,742 F.2d 527, 529-30, 532 (9th Cir. 1984).
139. Stampede Credit Case, 882 F.2d 364, 365-67, 370-71 (9th Cir. 1989).
140. Id. at 368.
141. Id.; Tribe OpeningBrief,supra note 130, at 12.
142. See Fallon Paiute Shoshone Tribal Settlement Act (Settlement Act), Pub. L. No.
101-618, §§ 101-107, 201-210, 104 Stat. 3289 (1990).
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permitted by any such [OCAPI."'" Specifically, section 209(j)(3) provides
that in a recoupment suit brought by any party other than the Secretary,
the only relief available is an order directing recovery of the unlawfully
diverted water." Additionally, because the Settlement Act is federal law,
"no court may order relief inconsistent with its express terms."'" Therefore, considering that recovery under the Settlement Act is constrained to
water recoupment, and that interest is a necessary component of relief to
fully compensate the Tribe, water interest is an appropriate means of
relief.
In addition, an award of water interest does not run counter to the
Supreme Court's guidance in City of Milwaukie v. Cement Division, National Gypsum Co., that in the absence of an applicable statutory provision prejudgment interest is governed by common law," since the Settlement Act expressly directs the Secretary to recoup water, not money.
Moreover, the Supreme Court spoke to the flexible nature of interest,
declaring "lit] is not recovered according to a rigid theory of compensation for money withheld, but is given in response to considerations of
fairness[.J"'" Thus, a federal court sitting in equity likely has sufficient
discretion to endorse a means of relief that is congruent with the express
water recoupment scheme provided by the Settlement Act.
Finally, by delivering sorely needed water to the Pyramid Lake fishery, water interest furthers both the remedial purpose of the Settlement
Act and Congress's desire that any recoupment order be consistent with
the ESA." Two of the Settlement Act's remedial purposes are to fulfill
the federal government's trust obligations to the Tribes and to further the

143. Id. § 209(j)(3). Sen. Reid, key sponsor of the legislation, spoke to a "credit waters" concept in hearings leading up to the Act's passage. Truckee-Carson-PyraimidLake
Water Rights Settlement Act- HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Water and Power, 101st
Cong. 44 (1990) (testimony of Sen. Reid) (exclaiming that "if we put some efficiency
back into the river's operation we could improve conditions for the cui-ui" and "this
would be accomplished by making better use of the river's available storage facilities
through the exchange of credit waters . . . ."). Granted, parties to the legislation realized

that the Stampede Credit Case litigation would remain outstanding after passage of the
Settlement Act. Id. at 531 ("List of Cases involving Truckee and Carson Rivers remaining if S. 1554 is passed as introduced on August 4, 1989.").
144. Settlement Act S 209(j)(3).
145. Texas v. New Mexico (Texas v. New Mexico 1), 462 U.S. 554, 564 (1983); see
also Texas v. New Mexico II, 482 U.S. 124, 128 (1986) (clarifying that when an interstate compact is approved by Congress it becomes a law of the United States and, similar
to a contract, "must be construed and applied in accordance with its terms") (citing West
Virginia ex rel. Dyer v. Sims, 341 U.S. 22, 28 (1951)).
146. 515 U.S. 189, 194 (1995) ("Far from indicating a legislative determination that
prejudgment interest should not be awarded, however, the absence of a statute merely
indicates that the question is governed by traditional judge-made principles.").
147. Id. at 195 n.7 (quoting Bd. of Comm'rs of Jackson Cnty. v. United States, 308
U.S. 343, 352 (1939)).
148. Settlement Act § 209(i) (providing that any order for recoupment of unlawfully
diverted Truckee River water must be consistent with the ESA).
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goals of the ESA."' -Further, in PolarBear ProductionsInc. v. Timex
Coip. the Ninth Circuit declared that the availability of prejudginent interest "hinges on whether such an award would further the statute's purpose."" In other words, interest can be awarded based on a determination of congressional intent even if interest is not expressly provided for
in the statute. Moreover, the Court in Rodgers v. United States held that
"in the absence of an unequivocal prohibition of interest" on statutory
obligations, it could grant interest based on an appraisal of Congress'
purpose in establishing such obligations."' Therefore, the Nevada district
court is likely authorized to award water interest because such relief
complements the statutory water recoupment scheme and furthers the
remedial purposes of the Settlement Act by directly addressing injury to
the Pyramid Lake fishery.
C. THE DUTY TO FULLY COMPENSATE THE TRIBE AND DELIVER
RELIEF PURSUANT TO THE SETTLEMENT ACT FULFILL THE
CONDITIONS PRECEDENT TO AN AWARD OF WATER INTEREST, AS
EXPRESSED BY THE SUPREME COURT.

The Supreme Court expressly acknowledged the viability of an award
of water interest on the outstanding balance of water due, in its exercise
of original jurisdiction in the interstate compact context. Although the
interstate compact model is not a perfect analogue to federal law expressed in a congressional act, compact cases highlight the Court's view
of whether a particular remedy is sufficient to compensate for injury due
to diversions in excess of federal law. Although the Court usually analyzes unlawful diversions under a compact in terms of breach of contract,
rather than as a violation of federal law (the compact being ratified by
Congress), the process by which the court assigns water recoupment is
similar in both contexts."' In interstate compact adjudication, water re149. Id. § 202(e), (f); see id. S 209(j)(1) (directing the Secretary to implement the
Settlement Act "in a manner that is fully consistent with the decision in the case of
[ Tribe v. Morton]" which ordered that all water not obligated by decree or contract flows
to Pyramid Lake); see also Tribe Opening Brief supra note 130, at 20.
150. 384 F.3d 700, 718 (9th Cir. 2004) (concluding "even in absence of legislative
direction, a court may, in its discretion, award interest if necessary to effectuate legislative intent").
151. 332 U.S. 371, 373 (1947).
152. Though ambiguity exists as to whether water recoupment in the interstate compact context is best viewed through a breach of contract, violation of federal law, or
order of mandamus lens, water interest simply addresses the common root injury caused
by diversions in excess of federal law. For example, the Supreme Court in Texas v. New
Mexico II characterized the interstate compact as a contract, ratified by Congress. 482
U.S. 124, 128 (1986) ("IBlut a compact is, after all, a contract.") (citing Petty v. Tenn.Mo. Bridge Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275, 285 (1959) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)). One
scholar hypothesized that the compact's nature as a positive enactment of law, like the
Settlement Agreement, explains any contract versus statutory enactment ambiguity.
Joseph W. Girardot, Toward a RationalScheme of Interstate Water Compact Adjudication, 23 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 151 nn.57, 58 (1989) (explaining that although the court
hesitates to invoke equity, specific performance is itself an equitable remedy). Rather
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coupment functions as a restitutionary remedy in the equitable apportionment of water. Though the Court's discussion of water interest in
Kansas v. ColoradoI" is less instructive than its decision in Texas v.
New Mexico III,' both decisions acknowledge the viability of water interest in the water recoupment context.
1. Pursuant to Texas v. New Mexico III,it is Necessary to Award Water
Interest to Head Off Procrastination on the Part of TCID in its Repayment of Water to the Tribe.
In Texas v. New Mexico III, the Supreme Court determined that
New Mexico failed to honor the terms of the Pecos River Compact"' such
that Texas was deprived of 340,100 acre-feet of water from 1950 to
1983." Although questions regarding New Mexico's actual, quantifiable
obligations were not resolved until 1984, the Court held that "good-faith
differences about the scope of contractual undertakings do not relieve
either party from performance .

.

..

New Mexico cannot escape liability

for what has been adjudicated to be past failures to perform its duties
under the Compact."'" The Court agreed with Special Master Myers's
recommendation that New Mexico "repay" Texas approximately 34,010
acre-feet of water each year for ten years" since the compact contemplated delivery of water and the court should not order relief inconsistent
with its terms."' Also, in footnote eight the court acknowledged the viability of water interest in instances when nonmonetary relief is granted.'"

than embrace any ambiguity, the Supreme Court in Kansas v. Colorado simply characterized the diversions in excess of compact terms as a breach of contract. Kansas v.
Colorado (Kansas v. Colorado I), 533 U.S. 1, 20 (2001) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
("We are dealing with an interstate compact apportioning the flow of a river between two
States. A compact is a contract. It represents a bargained-for exchange between its
signatories . . . ."). Finally, the character of "payment in water" might more closely re-

semble an order of mandamus, than specific performance of a contract. Girardot, supra
note 152, at nn.57, 58.
153. 533 U.S. at 9.
154. 482 U.S. at 124 .
155. Pecos River Compact, H.R. 3334, 81st Cong. S Art. 111(a) (1949).
156. 482 U.S. at 127-28.
157. Id. at 129.
158. Id. at 127-28. Responding to New Mexico's argument that it simply did not have
recoupment water available, the Special Master stated that New Mexico state law authorized the state to purchase or condemn water rights and then pump that amount directly
into the Pecos River. Report of the Special Master, supra note 18, at 34-35. The Special Master explained, "only by invoking the power of eminent domain can the state
distribute its own waters as its public policy requires." Id. at 35, n.15 (citing Kaiser Steel
Corp. v. W.S. Ranch Co., 467 P.2d 986, 990 (N.M. 1970)). Because New Mexico law
authorized transfers of water right ownership and permitted changes to the original purpose for appropriation, New Mexico was precluded from arguing that the doctrine of
prior appropriation prevents it from providing the decreed amount to Texas. Report of
the Special Master, supra note 18, at 35.
159.
Texas v. New Mexico III, 482 U.S. at 130 (endorsing Special Master Meyers's
"cautious" approach, the court concluded that although the compact does not mandate
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Yet, even prior to footnote eight, the Court acknowledged its authority to craft a remedy along the lines of the Special Master's recommendation of water interest. Responding to Texas's concern that awarding only
money damages would allow New Mexico to ignore its water debt, the
court announced that its authority to order that water be repaid in-kind,
along with " whatever additionalsanction might be thought necessary for
deliberate failure to perform," would provide sufficient deterrence.""
Thus, the court embraced the Special Master's conclusion: "the relief to
be recommended, at least by a Special Master, ought to be specified in
In light of TCID's dogged opposition to federal
quantities of water."'
regulation, such in-kind relief addresses the potential for TCID to default
on its water repayment obligation.
At its heart, the concept of "water interest" is simply a pragmatic
method to dissuade TCID from procrastinating in the repayment of its
water debt to the Tribe. In Texas v. New Mexico III, Special Master
Meyers expressly designed postjudgment water interest to "prevent procrastination" on the part of New Mexico: "water interest should be
charged on the undelivered balance of water due in any year in which
New Mexico does not meet its annual minimum delivery obligation ('deficit amount')."'" Without an "interest penalty," the Special Master concluded that New Mexico would have no incentive to fulfill its decree
aside from avoidance of further litigation." In essence, water interest
would curb any potential "bad faith" on the part of New Mexico." By
applying the rate (i.e., the yield on the one-year Treasury bills on the date
the deficit was determined) in that case, the Special Master intended to
"approximate the opportunity cost to Texas of late delivery of water by
New Mexico."" Given that it will take time-precipitation and overeager
appropriators permitting-to repay the water debt owed to the Tribe,
postjudgment water interest is necessary to fully compensate for injury
due to diversions in excess of federal law.
2. The Supreme Court's Decision in Kansas v. ColoradoIAlso
Acknowledges the Viability of Water Interest.
Unlike in Texas v. New Mexico III, the Supreme Court in Kansas v.
Colorado I concluded that damages due to Colorado's violation of the
repayment in water in the event of a breach, "[W]e are quite sure that the Compact itself
does not prevent our ordering a suitable remedy, whether in water or money").
160. Id. at 132.
161. Id. (emphasis added).
162. Report of the Special Master, supra note 18, at 32.
163. Id.
164. Id.at38.
165. Id. at 36-37.
166. Id. at 32 n.13 (emphasis added). Moreover, Special Master Meyers was aware of
an inflationary effect.on the water damages award that would work to Texas's detriment,
and thus restricted New Mexico's repayment schedule to no more than ten years. Id. at
41-42.
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interstate compact should be paid in money, not water, considering that
the unlawful diversion period spanned fifty years and any interest rate
would unreasonably compound the total award." The Court cited the
difficulty in implementing a water repayment program-including water
interest-over fifteen years, in light of uncertainty related to the availability of Colorado water in dry years and whether Kansas farmers could
make use of repaid water in wet years." Interestingly, over sixty-six percent of the total amount Kansas claimed in damages was attributable to
prejudgment interest-that amount necessary to compensate for investment opportunities lost due to the unavailability of water." Also, the
Court alluded to something akin to water interest when it concluded that
it was authorized to award interest or "its equivalent" as an element of
damages." The court also described the importance of awarding prejudgment interest to compensate for the fact that during such protracted
litigation, the upstream state retains access to the water and will continue
to divert to the detriment of the downstream state, especially since a preliminary injunction is not available."'
As noted in Part IV(A)(2), this same unfortunate dynamic-by which
claimant's injury is compounded by successive delay in compensation-is
also experienced by the Tribe. A federal court, sitting in equity, likely
has discretion to address this dynamic considering that the water recoupment remedy itself is grounded in equity.. In Kansas v. ColoradoI,
the Supreme Court spoke directly to such equitable principles: "making
up past shortages by delivering more water has 'all the earmarks of specific performance, an equitable remedy that requires some attention to the
relative benefits and burdens that the parties may enjoy or suffer.'""'2
Moreover, the Court analogized water repayment to a money debt and
noted, "[ilf this were a money debt, the full amount would be due upon
167.

Kansas v. Colorado L No. 105, Orig., 2000 WL 34508307, at *50 (Aug. 31,

2000).
168. Id. at *48-50.
169.
Kansas v. Colorado II, 533 U.S. 1, 9, n.2 (2001) (noting that although final damages were not yet calculated, Kansas had claimed $62,369,173 in total damages). Of
note, the court also affirmed the concept that a remedy for excess diversions need only
address the flow available, rather than the source of water. Kansas v. Colorado I, 2000
WL 34508307, at *22 (explaining that the determining factor for compensation is the
flow measured at the state line, not the source of the water).
Kansas v. Colorado II,533 U.S. at 14 (citing Miller v. Robertson, 266 U.S. 243,
170.
258 (1924), "When necessary in order to arrive at fair compensation, the court in the
exercise of a sound discretion may include interest or its equivalent as an element of
damages on unliquidated claims.") (emphasis added, internal quotations removed).
Regarding whether Colorado was on notice that it would be subject to automatic prejudgment interest, the court opined that before 1949 it was reasonable to expect a court
to balance the equities when evaluating an award of prejudgment interest. Id. ("Given
the state of the law at that time, Colorado may well have believed that we would balance
the equities in order to achieve a just and equitable remedy, rather than automatically
imposing pre-judgment interest in order to achieve full compensation.").
Kansas v. Colorado I,2000 WL 34508307 at *43.
171.
172.
Id. at *50 (quoting Texas v. New Mexico II,482 U.S. 124, 128 (1986)) (emphasis
added).
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judgment and would bear interest if not paid" and "[aIllowing another
fifteen years to settle the account in water, by paying simply the amount
of the judgment, does not make Kansas whole." Therefore, considering
that the Settlement Agreement specifically requires repayment in water,
and the Supreme Court recognizes that a concomitant award of interest
on such obligation is necessary to make the claimant whole, the Nevada
district court should award water interest on TCID's outstanding debt.
CONCLUSION
In sum, the United States District Court for the District of Nevada's
practical remedy is justified on several grounds, including: 1) common
law principles controlling an award of pre and postjudgment interest on
damages; 2) the recoupment scheme as codified in the Settlement Act;
and 3) United States Supreme Court precedent in the water recoupment
context. Moreover, water interest directly redresses injuries sustained by
the Pyramid Lake fishery-a fishery upon which the Tribe depends for its
livelihood.' Given TCID's recalcitrance, the Ninth Circuit's approval of
this novel remedy might usher in a more pragmatic compensation scheme
to address time-sensitive interests in similar long-standing water rights
contests in other basins.'"

173. Kansas v. ColoradoI 2000 WL 34508307 at *50 (emphasis added).
174. Tribe v. Morton, 354 F. Supp. 252, 254 (D.D.C. 1973) ("[Pyramidl Lake has
been the Tribe's principal source of livelihood. Members of the Tribe have always lived
* The area has been consistently
on its shores and have fished its waters for food.
recognized as the Tribe's aboriginal home.").
175. Id. at 257-58 (chronicling TCID's declaration "that it will disregard the new
regulation and will divert water as it chooses by giving instructions to its own water mas-

ters"); see also TCID v. Secretary, 742 F.2d 527, 530 (9th Cir. 1984) (describing how in
1973, the first year in which the Secretary's new regulations were in effect, "TCID intentionally violated [the OCAPs] by diverting more water than the regulations permitted").

BOOK NOTES
Charles Fishman, The Big Thirst, Free Press, New York (2011); 388
pp; $26.99; ISBN 978-1-4391-0207-7; hardcover.

Charles Fishman is a best-selling author and award-winning business
journalist for the innovative business magazine Fast Company. His reporting explains how an organization or industry works that is at the same
time familiar and unknown. The Big Thirst explores the human relationship with water in ten chapters each focusing on a different aspect of this
complicated relationship. Fishman presents water issues on both a global
scale and an individual scale.
In Chapter One, The Revenge of Water, Fishman introduces the
main problems in the human relationship with water, which he goes on to
explore in later chapters. Over the past century, developed countries
have provided people with water on demand, but most people take this
water for granted because the delivery and disposal systems are invisible.
Many countries have neglected both water supplies and systems. The
golden age of water taught people that water is naturally abundant, cheap,
and safe. However, water scarcity will force a change in how people think
about water and how they manage water systems; the golden age of water
is ending.
Fishman presents statistics on water availability and use around the
world as well as the impact of growing populations on water needs. The
water cycle is used to illustrate two facts about water: (1) it can be
cleaned, and (2) it cannot be used up. Many water scarcity problems occur when people manage water poorly; water problems are inherently
local problems. Water from one place cannot be moved to help with a
water scarcity in another place without significant investments. However,
while the problems are local, the consequences and the costs can be felt
around the world. For this reason, water needs to become visible, so it
can be valued and managed wisely.
In Chapter Two, The Secret Life of Water, Fishman shows that, despite the fact that we are surrounded and dependent on it, the average
person knows very little about water. The water on Earth today has been
here since it was originally created in space; water molecules today are
the same molecules from millions of years ago. From the biochemistry
of human cells to the vast amount of water deep in the rock of the Earth's
mantle, Fishman illustrates how crucial water is to not only human existence but to the existence of the Earth itself. The unique physical properties of water make life on Earth possible. Fishman concludes that while
knowing the science of water is important, it only scratches the surface of
the human relationship with water.
161
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In Chapter Three, Dolphins in the Desert, Fishman focuses on the
water management problems in Las Vegas and Atlanta, two cities whose
main reservoirs dropped dramatically over the last decade. In the desert
city of Las Vegas, Fishman walks the reader down the Strip, describing
the lavish water features at the major casinos. Fishman introduces water
manager Patricia Mulroy, the woman responsible for a thirty-one percent
drop in per capita water use in Las Vegas over the past two decades.
Mulroy challenged everyone in Las Vegas to rethink water conservation
and reuse, from residents to casino moguls, from golf courses to hotel
laundries.
Fishman contrasts the successful water conservation in the desert with
the political struggle in Atlanta. Fishman attributes Atlanta's water problems to complacency. As the population grew, the city failed to add new
water sources and when Lake Lanier started running low, Atlanta had
nowhere to turn. The battle for Atlanta's water was played out in the
courts and Atlanta lost. Instead of seriously addressing the water scarcity
problem by finding new water sources or imposing strict conservations
standards, the city of Atlanta imposed mild water conservation measures
and got lucky when the drought ended.
In Chapter Four, Water Under Water, Fishman gives the reader an
inside look at the water infrastructure system of Galveston, Texas as the
city struggled back from Hurricane Ike's direct hit in 2008. Galveston's
water system was devastated by the hurricane, and the city officials struggled to restore basis water before re-opening the evacuated city.
In Chapter Five, The Money in the Pipes, Fishman profiles companies around the world that have taken a hard look at how they use water
and how changing that use can save them money. From Michell Wool in
Australia to MGM Resorts International in Las Vegas to Coca-Cola and
IBM, companies are realizing that the cost of business looks a lot like the
cost of water. Fishman also describes the economics of bottled water and
compares the costs to those of maintaining the water system in the United
States. This chapter explores the changes in behavior that occurs when
companies start to look at the business and economic value of water.
In Chapter Six, The Yuck Factor,Fishman addresses how the failure
of water managers and politicians to consider the emotional connection
people have with their water supply can backfire. In the midst of a massive drought, the city officials in Toowoomba, Australia made a decision
to start recycling wastewater into drinking water. The technology exists to
provide safe, clean drinking water from wastewater, but the pressure from
outraged citizens ultimately stopped the project. Instead of being open to
changing the way they thought about water, the people of Toowoomba
ended up paying a lot more money for a massive water pipeline.
In Chapter Seven, Who Stopped the Rain?, Fishman explores the
consequences of Australia's epic drought, the Big Dry, from the perspective of agriculture water use and municipal water use. The Murray River
in Australia once provided irrigation for the most productive rice crops in
the world. Now, not only are the fields sitting un-irrigated, the Murray
River no longer has a current sufficient to flow into the ocean.
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In the city of Perth, water manager Jim Gill started planning for
drought after looking at inflow data for the city's dams and concluding
that the only trend was less and less water. Gill decided building more
dams was not going to solve the city's water problems if there was no rainfall, so he started looking for other sources of water. With good technology and better political maneuvering, Gill managed the construction of
Australia's first city-scale, drinking water desalination plant. But even
with a desalination plant, the real struggle is changing the human habits
that assume abundant water.

In Chapter Eight, Where Water i

Worshioped, but Gets No Re-

spect, Fishman presents India as an example of a broken water system.
Major cities in India do not provide 24/7 water to any customers; in this
way, when it comes to water, the poor and the wealthy in India have a lot
in common. The difference is the poor gather their water in five gallon
buckets, while the wealthy use pumps to fill large storage tanks in their
homes. The water is available, but the neglected infrastructure cannot
deliver it reliably or safely. In rural India, women and girls can spend
hours walking to get water from wells; this prevents them from working or
going to school.
In Chapter Nine, It's Water, Of Course Its Free, Fishman explores
the pricing of water. The monthly water bill is not a charge for water, but
for the infrastructure to deliver that water. Without transparent pricing,
water use is inefficient. However, pricing water equally becomes a problem when society does not want to price anyone out of access to safe water. Fishman introduces different ways of approaching water economics
while still providing the first glass.
In Chapter Ten, The Fate of Water, Fishman reiterates the need for
transparency in the human relationship with water. People need to start
thinking about water and thinking about their attitude towards water.
In conclusion, this book is an enjoyable read directed towards a nontechnical or non-legal audience. Fishman provides illustrative and memorable examples of the relationship between people and water.

Jessica Bidgood

Alex Prud'Homme, The Ripple Effect: The Fate of Freshwater in the
Twenty-First Century, Scribner, New York (2011); 405 pp; $27.00; ISBN
978-1-4165-3545-4; hardcover.
To most people, water is boring. It comes cheaply and easily from
our taps and showerheads, fills our swimming pools and oceans, and
flows through our rivers. Though most people interact extensively with
water on a daily basis, we rarely stop think about our impact on what is
essentially a static resource.
In a world of ever-increasing population and pollution, fresh water is
becoming more and more scarce and the consequences of shortage are
severe. In The Ripple Effect, Alex Prud'Homme provides a bird's-eye
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view of both water issues and innovations. Separating his discussion into
four sections, Prud'Homme first explores the issue of water quality. In
the second and third sections, he confronts the consequences of drought
and flood on water supplies and quality. And finally, Prud'Homme examines current innovations that could harm or alleviate fresh water shortages.
Prud'Homme quickly grabs your attention, presenting a gripping
murder mystery that leads into the far-reaching effects of a dead body in a
source of drinking water. This provides the reader with an interesting
example of how one relatively small source of contamination could potentially poison the source of drinking water for millions of people.
Prud'Homme then creates a complex map of related issues of water quality, identifying large point sources of pollution and incorporating a discussion of the BP oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, the contamination of
Chesapeake Bay, and the Pittsfield General Electric Plant. In each of
these cases Prud'Homme tells the story from the point of view of an eyewitness.
Perhaps the most interesting story in section one is the story of Sister
Francis Gerard Kress. A local nun, she became worried about the health
of her neighbors when she noticed the existence of "black mayonnaise"
in her Brooklyn neighborhood in the summer of 1978. This "black
mayonnaise" was a viscous layer of industrial chemicals that coated the
surface of Newton Creek. When outside help was not readily available,
she donned a hazardous materials suit, climbed fences into vacant lots,
and dodged packs of wild dogs, all in an attempt to examine the creek.
Eventually, the Church caved to external pressure and banished her to
another parish. It was not until 2009, when local interest groups sued the
oil companies that were the source of the "black mayonnaise," that any
real progress was made. Newton Creek is still largely lifeless because the
$104.7 million jury award is grossly insufficient to ameliorate the effects
of decades of severe pollution.
In the second section of the book, Prud'Homme discusses the effect
and likelihood of drought in the United States. In what seems like a
counterintuitive approach, he begins the section by discussing the quality
of plumbing in Manhattan and upgrades that are currently underway.
While interesting, the example leaves the reader a bit puzzled as to what
this example has to do with drought. The answer comes a few chapters
later when Prud'Homme explains that the United States' drinking water
system is one of the most outdated and inefficient in the world. Its drinking water systems, wastewater treatment plants, inland waterways, and
levees have all been declared "dangerously.compromised" by the American Society for Engineers. This means not only that the United States
uses water extremely inefficiently, but also that water officials have only
rough estimates of actual water use due to such inefficiency. Thus, in the
event of a severe drought, water officials will have incomplete preliminary
data with which to implement austerity measures.
Next, Prud'Homme examines the existing drought in the American
Southwest and the resulting effects on its growing cities. Providing an
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excellent synopsis of the conflicts surrounding California's Owens River
Valley, he illustrates the rise of water transfers to booming cities like Los
Angeles and San Diego. Las Vegas, he bluntly explains, is a city that
should not exist. In the early days of the city, there existed a large
enough aquifer beneath it to sustain a small population. As the city grew,
the aquifer dried up and Las Vegas is now almost entirely dependent on
Lake Mead for its water. But what makes Las Vegas the "city that should
not exist" is its opulence and excess juxtaposed with its tenuous supply of
drinking water. For example, the Sultan of Brunei's property in Las Vegas uses 17 million gallons of water per year. Furthermore, this opulence
is not the exclusive practice of the Las Vegas elite. Las Vegans use an
average of 254 gallons of water per capita per day compared with San
Diegans (residents of another city known for its golf courses and swimming pools), who use only 150 gallons of water per capita per day. Perhaps most damning for the future of Las Vegas is the fact that its water
officials have chosen to find more water to import from further away,
rather than implement strict conservation measures and raise water rates.
Therefore, Las Vegas could face serious trouble in the case of a severe
drought.
In the third section, the book centers on the effects of flood on the
inefficient water infrastructure of the United States. Focusing mainly on
the Southeastern United States, Prud'Homme examines the "comedy of
errors" that led the Army Corps of Engineers, local politicians, and an
inefficient legal system to create a levy system that is dangerously underfunded and incapable of handling a major natural event. He highlights
how the use of the hundred-year levee has proven insufficient without
proper maintenance. The prominent example he uses is the devastating
effect that the failure of the levees had on New Orleans during Hurricane
Katrina. He then contrasts the use of the hundred-year levee with the
ten-thousand-year flood protection in place in the Netherlands.
As a naturally low-lying country, the Netherlands has been building
levees for centuries. Today roughly two-thirds of Holland's population
lives almost twenty feet below sea level. In order to protect its population, its government has funded the most comprehensive and technologically advanced flood control system in the world. Considering this system cost $7.5 billion, one would think that the Dutch would be content
with their defenses. Yet the Netherlands was willing to commit another
$1.5 billion to upgrade its flood control system to combat global warming. Prud'Homme explains that not only is the Dutch system more technologically and scientifically advanced than that of the United States, but
it is also significantly better-funded. Funding, he argues, is the crucial
factor in determining the effectiveness of a flood control system.
The final section of the book focuses on the future of water quality isAs the world population grows-having now surpassed the seven
sues.
billion mark-it is going to exert more and more pressure on a finite
amount of water. Many countries are looking to address future water
issues through a combination of conservation and technological innovation. Prud'Homme notes that conservation is tied to the cost of water;
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therefore as population grows, water will likely become more expensive
and prompt further conservation measures. "Water prospecting" has
emerged as a new field and attracted many former oil and gas prospectors, including famous Texan T. Bonne Pickens.
Pickens believes that as fresh water becomes scarcer it will move from
being a common good, like air, to a commodity, like oil. As a common
good, water is already a $500 billion-a-year industry in the United States.
If markets start treating water as commodity, the profit potential increases
almost exponentially. Proponents of the commodity approach claim that
there will be less waste if water is privatized, and that technological innovation is more likely to be effective in a privatized model. Proponents of
the "common good" approach instead argue that water is essential to life,
like food or air, and should not be privatized because doing so would
only widen the gap between rich and poor. Ultimately, the focus of water
administrators would shift from supplying as many people as possible
with clean drinking water to making a profit and pleasing shareholders.
Examining water privatization in developing countries, Prud'Homme
finds that privatizing water often leads to innovation but also prompts
price increases, social and political discontent, and sometimes violence.
He then proposes a hybrid system wherein a certain amount of water is
allocated to a person per day. In this system, any additional water would
be treated as a commodity that could be bought and sold.
Technological advancements are often difficult to predict in advance,
but many engineers argue that technology could make significant strides
to alleviate a future water quality crisis. For example, Prud'Homme explains that desalinization efforts underway in arid regions around the
world have met some degree of success. And as desalination technology
advances, it will likely become less expensive, more efficient, and less
environmentally damaging. Another option Prud'Homme discusses is
cloud seeding, which involves efforts to change the precipitation from
clouds. While there is little or no scientific evidence that cloud seeding
actually works, places like Colorado, Wyoming, and even China are willing to pay millions to develop and test this technology.
The Ripple Effect provides a gripping and comprehensive view of

freshwater is'sues around the world. Prud'Hoinme explains complicated
water problems in a way that is both informative and exciting. The Riople Effect is an excellent book for any person, especially one new to water issues, who desires a comprehensive view of freshwater in the United
States.

Johna Varty
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Steven Solomon, Water: The Epic Struggle for Wealth, Power, and
Civilization, Harper Perennial Publishing, New York, NY (2011); 596 pp;
$17.99; ISBN 978-0-06-054831-5; paperback.

Steven Solomon is a journalist and historian, and his prior works can

be found in The New York Times, Business-Week, The Economist,
Forbes, and Esquire. Water looks back through the annals of history
ending in the present day and draws correlations between the successful
development of water resources and what it means to be a successful civilization.
The Prologue paints a comprehensive portrait of civilization's use of
water from the time of Abraham through the present day. Repeatedly,
history has shown that successful civilizations are those , which harness
the potential of water for industry, security, expanding economic capacity,
domestic consumption, and do so sustainably. Throughout history, innovative societies have created key water breakthroughs that propelled the
world's civilizations forward until the next heralded breakthrough. So the
cycle continues; however, with no water breakthrough on the foreseeable
horizon, the 21st century will be a century of reckoning. Those societies
that are flexible and innovative will make it, while leaving those societies
that remain entrenched in the conventional wisdom of yesteryear behind.
Part I, Water in Ancient History,explores the various methods some
of the world's earliest civilizations used to exploit water resources.
Chapter One, The Indispensible Resource, highlights that of all the
resources we depend upon water is the only renewable one. Yet, what we
have access to as recoverable freshwater is less than one percent.
Chapter Two, Water and the Start of Civilization, theorizes that
throughout history the most successful civilizations were those that best
utilized their water resources. Historically there are five ways civilizations
have used water: (1) domestically for drinking, cooking, and sanitation;
(2) economic production for agriculture, industry, and mining; (3) power
generation; (4) transportation; and (5) environmental mitigation. As
technological innovation and expertise progressed-and access to irrigation water made easier-agricultural production increased translating to an
upsurge in human population.
It is a correlation that is not unique in history. The reliance on irrigation to produce food for an ever-growing population continues today. It
is no small significance that in water scarce civilizations strong-centralized
leadership structures were commonplace.

Chapter Three, Rivers, Irrigation,and the EarliestEmpires, discusses
four of the cradles of civilization of ancient history: Egypt, Mesopotamia,
Indus, and China. The common denominator shared by each of these
civilizations is that they grew grain irrigated from large, flooding, and navigable rivers: the Nile, Euphrates and Tigris, Indus, and Yellow rivers
respectively. In these early civilizations, if a leader controlled the water,
they controlled the people. While water was at times plentiful, its erratic
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regime and physical properties posed significant challenges for exploitation. Direction from a strong central authority and the use of a massive
labor force defined water projects during that era.
Chapter Four, Seafaring, Trade, and The Making of the Mediterranean World, theorizes that trading among the various city states dotting
the Mediterranean coast developed because of limited water resources.
Trading encouraged the early Mediterranean states to develop early
forms of market-based economies with a vested citizenry. For many of
these city-states, survival was dependent on the development of a worthy
navy. Rome's rise to superpower status occurred only after wresting control of the sea-lanes of the western Mediterranean. Often, Rome's most
successful periods were those during aqueduct construction and an expanding water supply. There is little doubt that this ability to exploit water resources-unrivaled until modern times-led to Rome's unparalleled
rise to power.
Chapter Five, The Grand Canaland the Flourishingof Chinese Civilization, highlights China's superior exploits in mastering its water resources. The Grand Canal was its water breakthrough, bridging the gap
between the drier northern reaches with fertile soils and the moisture-rich
The development of the Grand
but nutrient-poor southern reaches.
Canal gave China access to 30,000 miles of inland water travel for distribution of supplies. It provided the catalyst for revolutions in transport,
agriculture, and industry.
Chapter Six, Islam, Deserts, and the Destiny of History's Most Water-FragileCivilization, discusses the pivotal role early Islamic civilization
had as the liaison between East and West. Acting as the nexus between
East and West, the Islamic civilization had a broad and effectual power
base from Spain to North Africa to the western borders of the Silk Roads
in Asia. No other civilization was more bound to the hydrological regime
than the Islamic civilization, where water scarcity meant complete reliance on trade for food.
Part II, Water and the Ascendancy of the West, discusses the key
role water had in the Industrial Revolution and the rise of Europe.
Chapter Seven, Waterwheel, Plow, Cargo Ship, and the Awakening of
Europe, highlights two transformative water breakthroughs for the West:
(1) trans-oceanic sailing with long distance cannonry, and (2) the use of
water power for industry. Northern Europe's temperate climate provided
adequate moisture for agricultural production and plentiful streams for
industrial use of water. On top of that, the coastline provided many natural harbors for shipping. The invention of the moldboard plow triggered
an agricultural revolution that required more effectual water management
schemes. Mirroring the expansion in agricultural productivity, Europe's
population doubled in the 400-years between A.D. 700 and 1200. Advances in the cog-a ship that by 1200 was able to transport over 300tons-opened up Europe for trade and supported thriving markets along
Europe's coast.
Why was Europe the birthplace of modern day capitalism? The late
anthropologist Marvin Harris theorized, "Unlike hydraulic despots, Eu-
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rope's medieval kings could not furnish or withhold water from the
fields." Lacking that control, Europe's citizenry were free to develop
cultural and economic identities.
Improved navigation, ship design, and advances in long-distance cannonry also contributed to Europe's rise. Trade increased exponentially
because of these advances within the Mediterranean region, eventually
leading to Europe's trans-oceanic seafaring. Chapter Eight, The Voyages
of Discovery and the Launch of the Oceanic Era, highlights the significance of this event. Essentially, because of these voyages of discovery,
the next 500 years belonged to European powers as they ventured forth
to secure raw goods, slave labor, and precious metals.
Chapter Nine, Steam Power, Industry, and the Age of the British
Empire, discusses the rise of Great Britain and its technological prowess
in the nineteenth century. Driven by a shortage of local wood fuel, England was keen to develop methods for heating and textile production
without the use of wood charcoal. The Industrial Revolution came about
in two phases. The first centered on textiles and the use of the waterwheel-and later steam-in a centrally organized production model i.e., a
factory. The impacts these developments had on British culture were
profound, economic growth accelerated from one percent to over four
percent annually.
Part III, Water and the Making of the Modern IndustrialSociety, explores the challenges and triumphs of managing water resources as civilizations transitioned into the modern age.
Chapter Ten, The Sanitary Revolution, highlights the consequences
of poor water quality. Industrialization encouraged concentrated urban
centers, which compounded the effects of pollutants. Since Rome's heyday, the link between health and proper sanitation remained illusory in
Europe. Scotland initiated a Rome-styled water impoundment program
and incorporated water filtration. London soon followed. Becoming
evermore dependent on the Thames for freshwater due to increased
population and industrial use, London was vulnerable to large and severe
Cholera outbreaks. In response, London invested in state-of-the-art sewage and freshwater delivery systems that were independent from one another. By 1940, the United States had virtually eliminated waterborne
diseases by installing wastewater treatment facilities while acquiring and
protecting new freshwater resources. These developments proved essential to the sustainability of the city and played no small part in the West's
rise to dominance.
Chapter Eleven, Water Frontiers and the Emergence of the United
States, discusses the transfer of power from Europe to the United States
and America's ability to capture its diverse water wealth. Employing
"Yankee ingenuity", along with European technologies, the United States
experienced exponential growth with the opening of the frontier west of
the Appalachian range. Many large navigable rivers, engineered canalworks, and able steam-powered riverboats, coupled with a transcontinental railroad network, fueled America's industrial engine. Utilizing water resources in its eastern half, the United States made proficient
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use of the water turbine in factories while the nation as a whole exploited
hydropower to provide cheap and accessible electricity. The United
States demonstrates again that those civilizations that best harness their
water resources and continually innovate their water infrastructure find
themselves at the top of the heap.
Chapter Twelve, The Canal to America's Century, describes the herculean effort brought by the United States to construct and operate a caThe United States went to great
nal across the Isthmus of Panama.
lengths to build the canal; it fostered Panamanian independence in order
to wrest control of the isthmus from Columbia. Facing the challenge of
widespread yellow fever and malarial outbreaks, the United States created
vaccines and devised strategies to significantly reduce infection rates,
which in turn increased worker's productivity on the canal. Moreover, it
employed steam-power in innovative ways to get through the most daunting stretch of the canal-the Culebra Cut.
The benefits of the completed canal were almost immediate. Today
billions of dollars worth of various goods and commodities pass through
the canal every year. Construction of the canal further propelled the
United States rise to superpower status. By incorporating the Pacific and
Atlantic fleets at short notice, the United States could respond to challenges all over the world.

Chapter Thirteen, Giant Dams, Water Abundance, and the Rise of
the Global Society, brings to the forefront the many advances in water
resource exploitation in the twentieth century and what it may mean for
communities in the twenty-first century and beyond. The development of
massive multi-purpose dams, such as the Hoover on the Colorado River
and Bonneville on the Columbia, provide inexpensive electricity and subsidized irrigation water to rural communities and growing cities such as
Los Angeles, Phoenix, Las Vegas, and San Diego. While not immune to
the consequences of drought, the advent of the multipurpose dam created large reservoirs with the capability to trap multiple years' worth of a
river's flow. Civilizations around the world soon initiated similar projects: Egypt's Aswan Dam, China's recently completed Three Gorges'
Dam, Turkey's Ataturk Dam, and Pakistan's Tarbela Dam to name a
few. In sum, over 45,000 large dams exist around the world, reservoir
capacity has quadrupled, agricultural production expanded by two and a
half times, the availability of hydropower doubled, and overall world
GDP multiplied by six.

Part Four, The Age of Scarcity, brings it all together by connecting
the lessons of the past to the uncertainties of the future.
Chapter Fourteen, Water: The New Oil, brings to the forefront the

new realities of the twenty-first century's Water-Haves and Have-Nots.
As oil was to the twentieth century, water is to the twenty-first. However,
there is one key distinction that makes this comparison inadequate, oil

can be replaced-albeit painfully-by other fuel sources, while water cannot. A paradigm shift is taking place. Most of the world's accessible water resources are built-out and tapped out. Absent a new water breakthrough, which is not likely in the near future, civilizations around the
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world are about to go through a tumultuous period like none before.
The disparity between the Water-Haves and the Water Have-Nots will
increase.

Chapter Fifteen, Thicker Than Blood: The Water-FamishedMiddle
East, makes mention of the fact that currently, in the Middle East, water
use exceeds 120 percent of renewable supplies. Egypt, for example, is
dependent on forces outside of its border for access to the historic flows
of the Nile. Innovative watershed-wide agreements will need to be legitimate and enforceable for success in the region.
Equitable apportionment of the Jordan River is crucial to any Palestinian-Israeli peace agreement. While water reuse and desalinization can
offset some losses and provide some wiggle room, the Jordan River will
continue to play an integral role moving forward. Much as Ethiopia
holds the key to the Nile, Turkey holds the key to Euphrates and nearly
Iraq and Syria are both dependent on
half the Tigris River's waters.
Turkey's willingness to distribute impounded waters equitably. From the
Arabian Peninsula to Northern Africa the few remaining exploitable water resources that exist are going to be up for grabs. Success in the region
will depend on how well the various interests can work together.

Chapter Sixteen, From Have to Have-Not: Mounting Water Distress
in Asia's Rising Giants, discusses the constraints on water resource development in Asia and the deleterious effects of environmental degradation
on its economy. Along with the United States, China and India produce
half of the world's grain; any shortage of water in this region will undoubtedly have a global impact. India's infrastructure is dependent on
seasonal monsoonal patterns leaving India vulnerable to the slightest
change in climate. Coupled with unregulated and pervasive groundwater
While China continues to pursue
extraction India is ripe for disaster.
large-scale water projects with massive multi-purpose dams, although realizing a clear economic benefit from the distribution of irrigation water
and inexpensive hydropower, the environmental effects of unchecked
growth may retard its economic growth.

Chapter Seventeen, Opportunity from Scarcity: The New Pohtics of
Water in the Industrial Democracies, imports the idea that while the
threat of conflict in a water scarce world is very real, it is by no means
inevitable. Small-scale, ecosystem-oriented solutions are beginning to
take root in many industrialized societies. Market forces are beginning to
show themselves as scarcity becomes more noticeable. We are seeing
efficient water reuse with existing technologies; municipalities are creating
sustainable systems that safely and economically create reused treated
wastewater for domestic supply. Irrigation practices are becoming more
efficient, coupled with the planting of crops that are better adapted to the
environment. Communities are using desalinization to augment drinking
water supplies. Landscape practices around homes and businesses include the use native plants and decorative rock in place of water hungry
lawns.
As promising as these innovations are, they are still facing plenty of
headwinds. There is the constant threat of rolling back environmental
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safeguards. Moving water still requires tremendous amounts of energy,
which in and of itself is becoming more costly. These challenges can be
overcome by bold leadership, unconventional foreign policy directives,
and taking advantage of strategic alliances. It may take a full-fledged crisis to bring these new forces to bear, but without a new water breakthrough, the only viable way out of the impending crisis is to employ these factors to achieve a sustainable and efficient use of water resources.
The Epilogue highlights four traditional categories of water use: (1)
domestic use; (2) economic production; (3) power generation; and (4)
transport or military. The author advocates for a fifth category: innovation of governing bodies and technologies to better tap into available -resources sustainably and in a way to equitably distribute freshwater to a
thirsty planet. This can be done by maximizing efficiency in existing
technologies, employing market oriented incentives that assign a realistic
value to water, continued investment in effective infrastructure, and
adaptability to each nation's water requirements. Finally, we should never forget the lessons of history.
Water provides a comprehensive overview of civilization's successes
and its failures exploiting water resources. Offering more of a historical
overview than contemporary analysis, the book sheds light on the inherent value placed on water, a value taken for granted in a majority of developed societies. While Water does a good job of integrating the lessons of history into a contemporary analysis, the book's best asset is the
in-depth descriptions of water's impact on humankind throughout the
ages and how we, as a society, can use those lessons when facing the water
challenges of the future.

Gregory Cowan

CASE NOTES
FUTURE OF DITCH-WIDE CHANGE CASES IN
COLORADO: REDUCING PER-SHARE WATER
QUANTITIES WITH HISTORICAL CONSUMPTIVE
USE DETERMINATIONS BASED ON UNLAWFUL
ENLARGEMENT AND AVERAGE RESERVOIR
RELEASES: BURLINGTON DITCH RESERVOIR &
LAND CO. V. METRO WASTEWATER
RECLAMATION DIST., 256 P.3D 645 (COLO. 2011)
DAVID W. BAKER
I. INTRODUCTION
Transfer of agricultural (irrigation) water rights to municipal and industrial uses is one way water providers can meet the needs of a growing
population in Colorado.' A water right owner's ability to change a water
right adds value to that right and is sometimes the only way for it to generate economic benefits for the owner. Scarcity of water supply and climate change variations in rainfall and snowmelt timing threaten to reduce
the available water supply across the entire state.' In the future, more
farmers may look at cashing in on their valuable water rights. This case,
however, is an example of the perils of submitting water rights to the scrutiny of opposing parties and how Colorado courts apply the no injury
rule, which requires senior water right holders to prevent injurious

*
With thanks to Bill Paddock, Partner, Carlson Hammond & Paddock, L.L.C.,
for review and comments.
1. See The Municipal & Industrial Water Supply and Demand Gap, COLORADO

WATER CONSERVATION BOARD, http://cwcb.state.co.us/water-management/water-supply-

planning/Pages/TheWaterSupplyGap.aspx (explaining that the Colorado Statewide Water Supply initiative includes agricultural transfers as one way to address increasing water
demands).
2.

Climate

Change,

COLORADO

WATER

CONSERVATION

BOARD,

("Current climate
http://cwcb.state.co.us/environment/climate-change/Pages/main.aspx
models project that Colorado will warm by 2.5*F by 2025 and 4'F by 2050.") (last visited
Dec. 22, 2011); Iris T. Stewart et al., Changes in Snowmelt Runoff Timing in Western
North America Under a "Business as Usual" Climate Change Scenario, 62 CLIMATIC
CHANGE 217, 230 (2004), available at http://meteora.ucsd.edu/cap/stewartsclch.pdf
(explaining earlier peak snowmelt and warmer temperatures will affect evaporation rates
in reservoirs and limit water available for beneficial use in dry months).
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changes in stream conditions for the benefit of junior appropriators.'
Potential transferors must take into account the real risks inherent in the
court's requantification of their water rights that is part of every change of
water rights proceeding.
Here, the Colorado Supreme Court clarified how it applies the
measure of historical beneficial use to the one-fill rule for water storage
rights in Colorado that, in turn, may impact how storage right owners
exercise their water storage rights. The court also excluded long-term
practices and private agreements from its calculation of historical consumptive use. Further, the applicants' ditch-wide methodology for determining historical use effectively resulted in a re-quantification of all
remaining shares relying upon the same water rights in the ditch company, even though many of its shareholders never applied for a change of
use. As a result of this case, shareholders in other mutual ditch companies may oppose those shareholders who wish to change water rights in
the ditch based upon a ditch-wide analysis because of the resulting
requantification on a per-share basis and potential reduction of all shareholders' water rights.

II. BACKGROUND
A. PARTIES TO THE CASE

This case was an appeal from a judgment of the District Court for
Water Division No. I ("water court"). The appellants ("applicant below")
Farmers Reservoir and Iriigation Company ("FRICO"), Burlington
Ditch, Reservoir and Land Company ("Burlington"), Henrylyn Irrigation
District ("Henrylyn") (collectively "Companies"), the United Water and
Sanitation District ("United"), and East Cherry Creek Water and Sanitation District ("ECCV") appealed the water court's interpretation of the
lawful uses of water under the decrees at issue, historical consumptive
use, its analysis of the one-fill rule, and the effect of new diversion and
transportation structures on the appellants' rights to divert water from the
South Platte River.' The opposer-appellants took issue with parts of the
water court's decree, but were not aligned on every issue because of the
broad scope of the issues before the water court, so they separately argued on an issue-by-issue basis.' Those parties included the City of
Thornton ("Thornton"), the City of Englewood ("Englewood"), the City
of Brighton ("Brighton"), the City and County of Denver ("Denver"), the
Engineer for Water Division No. I ("State Engineer"), the City of Aurora
("Aurora"), the Central Colorado Water Conservancy District ("Cen3. See Farmers Highline Canal & Reservoir Co. v. City of Golden, 272 P.2d 629,
631 (1954) ("[Jlunior appropriators have vested rights in the continuation of stream
conditions as they existed at the time of their respective appropriations.").
4. Id. at 653.
5. Burlington Ditch Reservoir & Land Co. v. Metro Wastewater Reclamation Dist.,
256 P.3d 645, 654 (Colo. 2011).
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tral"), and the Public Service Company of Colorado d/b/a Xcel Energy
("Public Service").'
In 2003, ECCV, FRICO, and United entered into an agreement to
implement the multi-million dollar United ECCV Water Supply Project.
FRICO agreed to change the type and place of use of water rights represented by shares in the Burlington Ditch and Barr Lake systems that the
Companies diverted from the South Platte River. The water rights at
issue were the 1885 Burlington Ditch water rights and 1908 and 1909
FRICO water rights currently used for irrigation below Barr Lake.
FRICO was to change the water rights so that United could augment
ECCV's well field depletions to the South Platte water in the Beebe Draw
north of Barr Lake and also send water directly into ECCV's system.'
The applicants sought to quantify the historical use of these water rights
using a ditch-wide methodology." The augmentation plan itself was not at
issue on appeal."
B. BURLINGTON BARR LAKE SYSTEM

For a basic understanding of the entire water diversion, storage, and
delivery system at issue, the court went through the history of the Burlington Barr Lake System. Burlington's original appropriation began in
1885, with an adjudication date of 1893 for a 350 cfs direct flow water
right from the South Platte River and a storage right in Barr Lake and
Oasis Reservoir, filled at a rate of 350 cfs from the same source." Presently, the Burlington Barr Lake System consists of the original Burlington
Canal, now the Little Burlington Canal, the Burlington O'Brian Canal
("Burlington Canal"), and Barr Lake, which is a combination of Barr and
Oasis Reservoirs." The two canals divert at the same point on the South
Platte River near the Adams County line, and carry diverted water in the
same canal running northwesterly, before eventually separating." The
Little Burlington Canal delivers water to irrigators above Barr Lake, while
the Burlington Canal runs into Barr Lake." Before the Burlington Canal
reaches Barr Lake, it delivers water into the Denver Hudson Canal,
which delivers the water into the Henrylyn system." Below Barr Lake, a
series of lateral ditches carry water from the reservoir to the irrigated

6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 655; see Concerning Application for Water Rights of Midway Ranches
Prop. Owners' Ass'n, Inc. in El Paso & Pueblo Cntys., 938 P.2d 515, 526 (Colo. 1997)
(validating previous ditch-wide determination of historical consumptive use per-share as
controlling future augmentation plans absent changed circumstances).
9. Burlington Ditch Reservoir& Land Co., 256 P.3d at 655.
10. Id. at 656.
11. Id. at 655.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
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lands." Before FRICO's involvement, the East and West Burlington Extension canals were the primary ditches below Barr Lake." FRICO subsequently improved and expanded the ditches into the current Speer and
Neres Canals to serve additional irrigated acreage below Barr Lake with
water from the system."
In 1909 FRICO first contracted with Burlington for its water rights
in excess of those rights . . . to fill Barr Oasis . . . and used for direct

irrigation."' After that contract, FRICO enlarged the Burlington Canal
and its headgate and introduced an additional 150 cfs into the system that
it applied to acreage below Barr Lake." FRICO also separately adjudicated water rights from the South Platte River with a direct flow right of
600 cfs and 900 cfs for storage in Barr Lake between 19.1 and 34 feet
with a 1908 and 1909 priority date respectively."
. In 1921, the Companies agreed to share water within the Burlington
Barr Lake system." Under the agreement, the first 200 cfs of 1885 direct
flow water was sent to the shareholders in the Little Burlington System
above Barr Lake, and the remaining water was split at the Denver Hudson Canal, with half going to Henrylyn and the rest to the FRICO shareholders."

III. SUPREME COURT DECISION
The Colorado Supreme Court upheld all of the water court's findings
and limitations on historical consumptive use for the direct flow and storage water rights within the Burlington Barr Lake system. The court reviewed the water court's findings of fact under a clearly erroneous standard and reviewed the water court's legal conclusions and interpretation of
prior decrees de novo.'
A. DETERMINATION OF HISTORICAL CONSUMPTIVE USE

The court first went through the background principles of historical
consumptive use. In general, historical consumptive use is the quantitative measure of a water right, "calculated based upon a pattern of diversion and use over a representative period of time, expressed in acre-feet
of water."" A water right arises when an appropriator puts "a specified
quantity of water to an actual beneficial use,"" decreed as of the time of
15. Id.
16. Id. at 655-56.
17. Id. at 656.
18. Id. at 657.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 656.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 660-61.
24. Id. at 662.
25. Id. at 661 (citing Empire Lodge Homeowners' Ass'n v. Moyer, 39 P.3d 1139, 1146
(Colo. 2001)).
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appropriation.' Further, the anti-speculation doctrine "prevents unlawful
enlargements," curbs unneeded appropriations, and requires "diligence
in placing water to actual beneficial use."'
The court stated that in a change of right case, the trial court must determine historical consumptive use to maintain "optimum use and reliability" of water resources." It will only approve a change of water right if
no injury will occur to other adjudicated water rights or if it can include
terms and conditions that will prevent an enlargement of historical consumptive use." Central to this determination is that an applicants bear a
"realrisk ofrequantification"of the water rights sought to be changed.'
1. Original Burlington 1885 Decrees
Irrigation appropriations are "limited to the acreage the appropriator
intended to irrigate when the appropriation was made."" The flow rate
on the face of a decree is not the equivalent of historical consumptive
use." Consumptive use in a change proceeding "does not include water
from an undecreed enlargement, even if there has been a long period of
enlarged use."'
The court looked at the language of Burlington's 1885 direct flow decree and its intent at the time of appropriation. On its face, the decree
stated a direct flow water right of 350 cfs and a storage right of 11,000
acre-feet of water." The referee's opinion at the time identified 12,000
acres of lands above the reservoirs for irrigation, with 28,000 acres below
the reservoirs "susceptible to being irrigated" and unlimited potential "as
it may continue to the eastern line of Colorado."' FRICO argued that
this language included land below the current Barr Reservoir in the original decree." The court deferred to the water courts finding that a vague
potential for irrigation on undefined land was insufficient to support a
finding that Burlington made an appropriation for such lands." Burlington, at the time of appropriation, used the direct flow rights solely above
Barr Lake." In addition, the applicants did not provide the water court
with evidence of a different intent." Further, the structures in u'se at the
26. Id. at 662.
27. Id. at 661.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 662.
30. Id. at 662 (quoting Pueblo W. Metro Dist. v. Se. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist.,
717 P.2d 955, 959 (Colo. 1986) (emphasis added)).
31. Id. at 662.
32. See id.
33. Id. at 662; In re Water Rights of Cent. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist., 147 P.3d
9, 16 (Colo. 2006).
34. Burlington Ditch Reservoir & Land Co., 256 P.3d at 664.
35. Id. at 656.
36. Id. at 664.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
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time of adjudication could only divert a maximum of 200 cfs." Therefore, FRICO's expansion of the system and use of water on additional
acreage below the lake was an unlawful enlargement and Burlington's
"excess water" was not part of the Companies' historical consumptive
use."
2. The One-Fill Rule
In Colorado, the one-fill rule governs reservoir storage. The court
announced the rule in City of Westminster v. Church," which held that a
reservoir right permits "one fill of the reservoir per year."' However, in
Southeastern Colorado Water Conservancy Ditrict v. Fort Lyon Canal
Co.," the court further interpreted that rule, requiring a change of storage
rights to consider "diminished return flows."" Here, the Colorado Supreme Court upheld the water court's conclusion that The Water Right
and Determination and. Administration Act of 1969' ("1969 Act"), required approval of a change of storage right only if no injury would result." In a change case, "storage itself is not a beneficial use," so the
court must determine the amount of actual beneficial use to determine
the "proper consumptive use credit per share in the ditch or reservoir
company."'
In this case, Barr Lake has a capacity of 30,000 acre-feet, but typically
carried-over an average of 11,000 acre-feet of water each year." The
court held that volumetric storage limitations of historical consumptive
use below the reservoir imposed by the water court were appropriate and
consistent with the 1969 Act." The court stated the limitation was proper
because otherwise the changed shares could divert more South Platte
River water to fill the Barr Lake storage right than was historically released and consumed for irrigation below that reservoir." In addition,
applicants failed to meet their burden of showing the change would not
injure junior appropriators;" while opponents presented evidence that the

40. Id.
41. Id.at 665.
42. City of Westminster v. Church, 445 P.2d 52, 58 (1968).
43. Burlington Ditch Reservoir & Land Co., 256 P.3d at 663.
44. See Se. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist. v. Fort Lyon Canal Co., 720 P.2d 133,
146 (Colo. 1986) (holding modifications to decree required to protect against diminished return flows in storage rights cases).
45. Burlington Ditch Reservoir & Land Co., 256 P.3d at 663.
46. CoLo. REV. STAT. §§ 37-92-101 to -602 (2011).
47. Burhngton Ditch Reservoir & Land Co., 256 P.3d at 663.
48. Id, at 663.
49. Id. at 667.
50. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37- 9 2-305(4)(a)(II) (2011) ("The relinquishment of part of
the decree for which the change is sought . . . if necessary to prevent an enlargement
upon the historical use or diminution of return flow to the detriment of other appropriators.").
51. Burhngton Ditch Reservoir & Land Co., 256 P.3d at 667-68.
52. Id. at 667.
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proposed change would enlarge historical use, alter historical fill patterns,
and lengthen senior calls on the water.' Thus, the court ruled that the
one-fill rule allowed FRICO one fill of the reservoir once annually in
priority, charging the carry-over storage against the amount of total diversion for the year. In the future, FRICO could not reduce carryover storage and increase water use below the reservoir in excess of historical consumptive use."
The court held that the no injury rule in change of water right cases
"work[s] in concert" with the one-fill rule limit to ensure that a storage
right holder does not enlarge its water right.' Therefore, the court limited FRICO's 1885 storage right to its historical beneficial use on lands
"below Barr Lake prior to FRICO's enlargement of the system."'
3. Study Periods
The court upheld the water court's selection of appropriate study periods for historical consumptive use determinations. The water court
selected time periods for calculations that excluded FRICO's unlawful
enlargement of the Burlington Barr Lake system in 1909 or were susceptible to corrections for FRICO's unlawful uses. For Burlington's 1885
direct flow right, the court used an 1885 to 1909 study period." For Burlington's 1885 storage right, the court used a 1927 to 2004 study period,
excluding deliveries to the enlarged Speer, Neres, and Beebe Canals.'
4. Seepage Water
After FRICO's purchased an interest in the system, it built a drain
system in the embankment of Barr Lake ("toe drains") that collected
about 2 cfs of seepage water from the lake and then delivered it into the
Beebe Canal." During water court proceedings, FRICO's general manager testified that the company installed the toe drain to "lower the saturaFRICO
tion level and mitigate the potential for dam instability."'
claimed the historical use of the water from the toe drains and from
seepage entering the Beebe Canal at other locations.
In ruling against FRICO on this claim, the water court found the
Beebe Canal was a "gaining ditch" that received water from irrigated
lands above the ditch and reservoir seepage." The court.explained the

53. In re Application for Water Rights of Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation Co. (Water
Court), No. 02CW403 at T 556 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Water Div. I Sept. 5, 2008).
54. Burington Ditch Reservoir & Land Co., 256 P.3d at 668.
55. Id. at 663.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 665-66.
58. Id. at 666.
59. Id. at 658-59.
60. In re Application for Water Rights of Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation Co. (Water
Court), No. 02CW403 at 1 447 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Water Div. 1 Sept. 5, 2008).
61. Burlington Ditch Reservoir & Land Co., 256 P.3d at 659.
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basic rule that seepage water tributary to a natural watercourse is subject
to appropriation.' Because the original decrees for storage and use below the reservoir did not include the appropriation of seepage waters and
FRICO did not later apply for an appropriation of seepage waters, the
court upheld the water court's exclusion from historical consumptive use
of seepage gains into the Beebe Canal." Therefore, FRICO's actual reservoir releases were the appropriate measure of historical consumptive
use."
B. PRIOR WATER COURT DECREES

FRICO and Thornton both appealed separate water court conclusions that claim preclusion did not bar a ditch-wide determination in the
present case. The court discussed whether historical consumptive use of
rights within the Burlington Barr Lake system was previously determined
by the parties' previous water court decrees.' Under Orr v. Arapahoe
Water and Sanitation District,the court may at a later time determine
historical consumptive use even after a finding tha't "new points of diversion would not injure other appropriators."' When an individual user
changes shares for use at a different location, a later ditch-wide analysis
could then reduce the same user's allocation at the new point down to its
percentage of historical consumptive use at the original diversion."
In the first decree at issue, the water court granted FRICO a new
storage right in addition to its 1885 Burlington right. The appellants unsuccessfully argued that the water court's grant of storage between 19.1
and 34 feet implicitly confirmed the first 19.1 feet for the original 1885
storage right." The court held that the prior decree's assumptions did not
meet the legal standard for claim preclusion and upheld the water courts
calculation of historical consumptive use."
For the second water court decree, Thornton in 1987 changed shares
from irrigation to municipal uses on the Little Burlington system and
received a consumptive use credit of 1,326 acre feet annually." FRICO
argued that the current determination of historical consumptive use for
the system as a whole would injure the quantification of those vested
The water court's previous determination only calculated
rights.
62. Id. at 666.
63. Id. at 666-67.
64. Id. at 667.
65. See id. at 670.
66. Orr v. Arapahoe Water & Sanitation Dist., 753 P.2d 1217, 1223 (Colo. 1988).
In Orr, the applicant wanted to change from irrigation to municipal uses, but had previously changed the point of diversion from surface water to wells, where the water court
determined no adverse impact. Id. No evidence of the amount of land irrigated was
presented at the hearing. The court upheld a determination of historical consumptive
use based on past use of the surface ditches. Id.
67. See Burlington Ditch Reservoir & Land Co., 256 P.3d at 669.
68. Id. at 669.
69. Id. at 669.
70. Id. at 658.
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Thornton's shares in the Little Burlington system. In this case, the water
court found that the entire 200 cfs under the 1885 Burlington direct flow
water right was attributable to the Little Burlington System above Barr
Lake. Because FRICO historically administered the shares separately
and gave them first priority, those rights were not injured with a subsequent ditch-wide determination." Therefore, claim preclusion did not
bar the court's ditch-wide historical consumptive use determination.
C. NEW STRUCTURES AND POINTS OF DIVERSION

The court analyzed the Metro Districts' delivery of water directly into
the Burlington Barr Lake system below the Burlington headgate and the
Globeville Project's alteration to FRICO's diversion structures on the
South Platte River. The court found that both the source of water and
alterations at the point of diversion constituted undecreed points of diversion and could not count towards historical consumptive use in the
change proceeding.
1. Metro Pumps
First, the court looked at discharges from the Metro District's
wastewater treatment plant. From 1952-1963, the total available water
above the Burlington Headgate included Denver's Northside Wastewater
Treatment Plant's ("Northside"), which annually discharged an average of
When the Metro
68,000 acre-feet into the South Platte River."
Wastewater Plant went into service in 1966, it discharged the treated
wastewater below the Burlington Ditch headgate. The Companies then
unsuccessfully brought an action against the Metro District to prevent the
discharge below the Burlington Headgate." The parties reached a settlement in which the Metro District agreed to install pumps at the plant and
deliver an average of 9,600 acre-feet per year of treated wastewater directly into the Burlington Canal." FRICO sought to include this water in the
historical use of the water rights to be changed. The water court found
however, that "no factual or legal basis" existed for it to include the water
supplied by the Metro Pumps in its calculation of historical consumptive
use."

Englewood and Denver claimed that without the Metro Pumps the
Companies would fill their senior reservoirs more slowly, which in turn,
would delay the time when junior water could divert in priority." The
71. Id. at 670.
72. Id. at 659 (explaining the Companies did not establish how much was legally and
physically available at the Burlington Headgate or how much of the water was actually
diverted).
73. Metro. Den. Sewage Disposal Dist. No. I v. Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation Co.,
499 P.2d 1190 (1972).
74. Burlington Ditch Reservoir & Land Co., 256 P.3d at 659.
75. Id. at 671-72.
76. Id. at 672.
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court held that this was not a cognizable injury because juniors cannot
rely on undecreed diversions for the maintenance of stream conditions."
Further, it rejected the argument that the Metro Pumps simply replicated
the pre-1968 diversions as insufficient, because every appropriation must
go through the administrative process, and the state engineer's acquiescence to the agreement was not enough." Metro District's pumping water
into the canal on the other hand injured Public Service Company's downstream rights because it enlarged upstream water rights." The court held
the pumps were an "alternate point of diversion limited to the amount of
water legally and physically available at the headgate," which excluded the
entire 9,600 acre-feet of agreement water from historical consumptive
use."
2. Globeville Flood Control Project
Second, the court looked at whether flood control changes to the
South Platte River at the Burlington headgate constituted a change in
point of diversion."' The court explained that under Colorado statutory
law," a change occurs whenever an appropriator removes or controls water. The applicants argued that the alterations on the South Platte River
were similar to those in Downing v. Copeland, where the appropriator
constructed a channel within the streambed to control and move water
towards its headgate.' In Downing, the court held that because the construction only moved water towards the appropriator's original headgate it
did not require court authorization as a new point of diversion." Here,
new headgates capable of diverting 1000 cfs, as compared to 700 cfs, controlled the diversion and directed the water into a channel hydrologically
separated from the river." The old. Burlington headgate only prevented
overflow.' The Companies also argued that the new headgate was a permitted upstream extension of the original diversion," but the court added
protective conditions because "larger and more effective diversions"
would injure vested rights on the over-appropriated South Platte River."
The court held that the new headgate and concrete chanel constituted
an undecreed point of diversion.

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id at 673.
COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-103(7) (2011).
Downing v. Copeland, 249 P.2d 539, 540 (Colo. 1952).
Id.
Burlington Ditch Reservoir & Land Co., 256 P.3d at 673.
Id. at 660.
See COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-86-11 (2010).
Burlington Ditch Reservoir & Land Co., 256 P.3d at 674.
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D. RESUME NOTICE AND THE SCOPE OF THE WATER COURT'S
DECISION

FRICO's change application included more shares than it currently
sought. One of the purposes of a ditch-wide determination was so
FRICO shareholders could transfer their rights into the Project at a later
date without separately litigating an entirely new change case. On appeal,
the FRICO shareholders who did not include their shares in the application argued that the court had no jurisdiction to re-quantify those shares
unless and until they applied for a change and the water court's ruling
could only bind those shares if and when they were subject to a change of
use application."
Specifically, Henrylyn argued that its rights should not be affected because it entered into a stipulation agreement with Aurora, Central, and
Englewood, which the water court approved, that stated the determination of historical consumptive use did not apply to its FRICO and Burlington shares." The court held that the published notice of the application was sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the water court over all of the
FRICO and Burlington water rights at issue and a stipulation would not
determine the state's administration of water rights under court decrees."

IV. ANALYSIS/DISCUSSION
The outcome in this case severely restricted FRICO's water rights for
the Barr Lake System and deprived shareholders of what they believed
were their decreed water rights. The applicants failed to produce evidence that the changes requested would not injure other appropriators on
the South Platte River. Following is an analysis of the court's holding and
how it may affect future agricultural transfers to municipal use.
A. CONTINUOUS USE AND EXPECTATIONS

The court's basic premise is that expanded use cannot ripen into a
water right, no matter how long it is continued. In this case, FRICO believed it had purchased 150 cfs of "excess" water and put it to beneficial
use under the original decree, and had done so for almost one hundred
years. This continued use for an extended period could not ripen into a
water right, but the court's decision limiting diversions may alter historical stream conditions and expectations along the South Platte River.
FRICO was unable to prove to the water court that Burlington intended to irrigate land below Barr Lake at the time it appropriated the
1885 water rights. The court focused on Burlington's lack of intent to
irrigate additional lands because it had sold FRICO the rights before ever
using them. However, water rights are generally transferable and owners
89.
90.
91.

Id. at 675.
Id. at 676
Id. at 677.
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can sell them for a profit. Burlington's choice to sell may have been a
reasonable business decision and efficient allocation of the burdens of
water supply system development costs at the time. FRICO and Burlington together exercised the full extent of the decreed rights, so FRICO
could simply have perfected the appropriation initiated by Burlington
when it delivered water to lands below Barr Lake.
If this was the intent of that transaction, the parties did not aid their
case with the "excess" language in their agreement, because even at that
time a senior appropriator could not "lend, rent, or sell any excess water
after completing the irrigation of the land for which the water was appropriated."" However, when the district court adjudicated the 1909 storage
right, it assumed that FRICO's use under the 1885 decree was proper.'
At that time, other appropriators on the South Platte River could have
introduced evidence of unlawful enlargement or injury, but did not do so.
The issue was not decided then - and without clear evidence of intent at
the time of the original decree - the court deferred to the water court's
findings and subtracted FRICO's expansion of the 1885 rights from historical consumptive use.
B. METRO AGREEMENT

As described above, the court upheld the water court's decision that
treated sewage from the Metro Pumps could not be included in the historical consumptive use calculation. FRICO argued that the agreement
replicated historical stream conditions prior to the relocation of the
wastewater treatment plant. The water court rejected the argument because undecreed alternate points of diversions are not "retroactively justified" to maintain stream conditions." Additionally, the water court worried that recognizing this agreement would create an incentive for acts
"outside of the statutory change of water right process and subsequently
grandfather in such changes.""
This outcome, however, takes away from the parties' practical solution. The court had previously held that FRICO did not have a vested
right in the location of sewage return flows.' If FRICO had no vested
right to the location of sewage return flows, on what basis could it claim a
new point of diversion for its water rights from a source it had no vested
right to receive? Its right to delivery by means of the Metro Pumps into
the Burlington Canal was a private agreement that replicated the water
92. Enlarged Southside Irrigation Ditch Co. v. John's Flood Ditch Co., 183 P.2d
552, 554 (Colo. 1947) (emphasis added); see also Fort Lyon v. Chew 33 Colo. 392, 81 P.
37, 39 (1905) (holding owners' exchange or loaning of water rights were limited to decreed volume and could not injure other appropriators).
93. See Burlington Ditch Reservoir & Land Co., 256 P.3d.at 669-70.
94. In re Application for Water Rights of Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation Co. (Water
Court), No. 02CW403 at 1 172 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Water Div. 1 Sept. 5, 2008).
95. Id.
96. See Metro. Denver Sewage Disposal Dist. No. I v. Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation Co., 499 P.2d 1190, 1193 (Colo. 1972).
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supply at the existing Burlington point of diversion. Further, other appropriators on the river would not be injured because they also could not
obtain a vested right to the location of sewage return flows. Therefore,
the court could limit the water rights represented by shares to historical
consumptive use absent the Metro Pumps deliveries when changing their
use.
The court stressed that appropriators must adjudicate all alternate
points of diversion and therefore will probably not take outside circumstances or agreements into account in the future.
C. SEEPAGE GAINS OF WASTEWATER

The court focused on whether the water right decree's terms included
the appropriation of seepage gains. Alternatively, the court might have
analyzed the dam drainage as irrigation wastewater that never left
FRICO's control. Return flow is "irrigation water seeping back to a
stream after it has gone underground to do its nutritional function," while
waste water is water carried in a ditch and then wasted into a stream." In
that circumstance, FRICO could install a toe drain in order to cease wasting the water based on the court's reasoning in City of Boulder v. Boulder & Left Hand Ditch Company because downstream appropriators
have no right to the continuation of waste water.' The toe drains FRICO
built into the dam to capture water may be different than collection of
seepage water in Lamont v. Riverside, because here the water never left
FRICO's control." The appropriator in that case needed a separate appropriation for seepage after it migrated though the soil below the dam
and percolated to the surface.'" If FRICO had stopped the seepage instead of draining it from the base of the dam to promote stability, FRICO
could have used that water because it would remain in storage. Here, the
drain FRICO cut in the base of the dam does not necessarily return the
water into the natural stream because the company measures and directs
the flow into its canal for beneficial use below the reservoir."'
In addition to holding FRICO did not have a vested right to the seepage below Barr Lake, the water court concluded that delivering the seepage and replacing seepage losses in storage, per the decrees terms,
amounted to double counting." Thus, FRICO's use would exceed the
decree if it counted the water delivered into the Beebe canal as a loss
against reservoir storage. Overall, FRICO's delivery of water from the
97. City of Boulder v. Boulder & Left Hand Ditch Co., 557 P.2d 1182, 1185 (Colo.
1976).
98. Id. ("(Dluty to prevent, as far as possible, all waste of the water which they have
appropriated.").
99. Lamont v. Riverside Irrigation Dist., 498 P.2d 1150, 1153 (Colo. 1972) (holding
Seepage water was distinguishable from irrigation waste water).
100. Id. at 1152.
101. In re Application for Water Rights of Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation Co. (Water
Court), No. 02CW403 at 1 447 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Water Div. 1 Sept. 5, 2008).
102. Id. 1 452.
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toe drain into the Beebe Canal promoted conservation and was similar to
a reservoir release.
D. LIMITING WATER STORAGE RIGHTS TO RESERVOIR RELEASES
Maintaining stream conditions and preventing injury to vested rights
is a part of all change cases." If a change of a water storage right increases historical use, then the court must include conditions that prevent injury. However, a rule that limits storage rights to historical releases for
beneficial use may have some unintended results. The court stopped
short of declaring this rule applied to all cases, but the opinion made the
analysis possible in most cases and opponents will certainly use this decision to limit storage rights.
One major issue is how this rule could affect the administration of
storage rights. One of the principal values of a reservoir is to store water
in times of plentiful supplies for use in dry years. Under the Court's decision one could argue that the owner of a storage right cannot annually
drain a reservoir that historically carried over a portion of its water for
use in dry years. This rule creates a disincentive to conservation storage.
To maximize historical use, reservoir owners may begin to release all
water annually to ensure they maximize their historical use, Which would
eliminate much of the benefit of this reservoir storage. The duty of water
in Colorado prevents waste and mitigates some of this danger," but increased use up to the standard of waste would damage the pure conservation function of reservoirs and limit the flexibility of rights."
A second issue relates to when outside factors affect the release of
stored water. The Rio Grande Water Users Association's amicus brief
raised concerns over the Rio Grande Compact, which may distort historical beneficial use of water storage rights in the Rio Grande Basin." The
conservation function of carryover storage is essential for Colorado to
utilize the water apportioned to Colorado under the Compact."' The use
of water from storage in the Rio Grande Project in New Mexico affects
when and how Colorado's post-compact water storage right holders can
103. See Orr v. Arapahoe Water & Sanitation Dist., 753 P.2d 1217, 1224 (Colo.
1988) (holding limitation of historical consumptive use read into every water decree by
implication).
104. See Farmers Highline Canal & Reservoir Co. v. City of Golden, 272 P.2d 629,
634 (Colo. 1954) (The duty of water "is that measure of water, which, by careful management and use, without wastage, is reasonably required to be applied to any given tract
of land for such period of time as may be adequate to produce therefrom a maximum
amount of such crops as ordinarily are grown thereon.").
105. Brief for The City of Westminster at 9, Burlington Ditch Reservoir & Land Co.
v. Metro Wastewater Reclamation Dist., 256 P.3d 645 (Colo. 2011) (No. 2009SA 133).
106. COLo. REV. STAT. § 37-66-101 (2011) (agreement between the state of Colorado,
the state of New Mexico, and the state of Texas); Brief for the Rio Grande Water Users
Association at 6, Burlington Ditch Reservoir & Land Co. v. Metro Wastewater Reclamation Dist., 256 P.3d 645 (Colo. 2011) (No. 2009SA133) ("Rio Grande Water Users
Association").
107. Rio Grande Water Users Association, supra note 106, at 6.
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be exercised. Thus, looking at historical reservoir releases alone would
deprive Colorado of the benefits it obtained under the Rio Grande Compact." The court did not rule on the issue, but noted that these specific
concerns would be analyzed as they arose."
Overall, this new rule potentially makes the one-fill rule insignificant
in a change of storage rights case. The one-fill rule still applies in Colorado for the administration of reservoirs, but a historical consumptive use
determination will always be less than or equal to the storage right.
Therefore, the court may need to clarify whether historical consumptive
use was a condition in this case to prevent injury or whether historical
consumptive use is always the limit of a storage right.
E. FUTURE DITCH-WIDE DETERMINATIONS IN CHANGE CASES

Shareholders in a mutual ditch company may look more carefully at
change of water rights applications that involve a so-called ditch-wide
analysis of historical use. A possibly significant reduction in their water
rights from such a change prosecuted by other shareholders may discourage ditch-wide change of water rights analyses. Ditch-wide determinations could result in drying up large areas of land because agreements to
change water rights will only be reached if a sufficient voting portion of
the ditch is in favor of selling their rights. Therefore, the economy of
entire farming communities may not survive a change case. Henrylyn
argued that COLO. REV. STAT. S 37-92-305(4) only allows terms and
conditions oi water "subject to change" or "for which change is sought.""o
When the court allocates rights to water in proportion to an owner's
shares in a ditch company, it does not take into account the individual's
consumptive and beneficial use of the water.' Ditch-wide methodology
under Williams v. Midway Ranches required that the same quantification
methodology govern future change proceedings, unless circumstances
changed."' Therefore, a court proceeding is still required when a shareholder wishes to transfer their right, based on the previously determined
form of calculation from the ditch-wide case.
Stipulations between adverse parties help create fair and efficient
transfers. Would the court enforce an agreement between parties that
limited any change to non-transferred rights? For example, the parties
involved could settle concerns of increased use in a way that would not
affect other shareholders until they changed the specific water rights.
This case seems to point towards no. If the court finds that a ditch com-

108. Id. at 13, 15.
109. Burlington Ditch Reservoir & Land Co. v. Metro Wastewater Reclamation Dist.,
256 P.3d 645, 667 n.13 (Colo. 2011).
110. Brief of Henrylyn Irrigation Dist. at *7, Burlington Ditch Reservoir & Land Co.
v. Metro Wastewater Reclamation Dist., 256 P.3d 645 (Colo. 2011) (No. 2009SA 133),
2010 WL 3973553.
111. See id. at 15.
112. Id. at 16.
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pany enlarged its rights during a ditch-wide determination, then the court
would limit the amount of diversion in priority to what is legally available
at that company's headgate.

V. CONCLUSION
Applicants for a change of water right bear the risk of requantification
of the water rights that are subject to the application. Agricultural transfers to municipal uses will continue, but large mutual ditch companies
and other water providers with common diversions have the potential to
lose in these transactions. When a number of shareholders seek ditchwide analysis, the court will quantify the entire water right at issue because the court applies historical consumptive use to every decree at the
point of diversion. Further, those shareholders that oppose a ditch-wide
determination don not appear to have any legal basis to stop the ditchwide analysis once the Applicant puts the Company's water rights at issue.
Adjudicating all shares may make future transfers more efficient, but it
can have harsh and unfair effects on farmers who do not change their
rights. The increased value of readily changeable water rights benefits
ditch shareholders financially. However, the court's historical consumptive use determination may force farmers to immediately sell their rights
if the per-share determination reduces the water rights to an amount that
is insufficient to maintain economically feasible farming operations.

MONTANA V. WYOMING: IS WATER
CONSERVATION DROWNING THE
YELLOWSTONE RIVER COMPACT?
JOE NORRIS

1. INTRODUCTION
Water planners across the western United States are constantly working to address the effects of the world's expanding population, climate
change, and energy demands on water. One major cause for hope is the
possibility of implementing large-scale water conservation programs.
Irrigated agriculture, the largest consumptive use of water in the West, is
typically at the forefront of the conservation discussion. ' Additionally,
the advancement of modern technology in irrigation efficiency is increasing the ability of irrigators to optimize water use in their irrigation practices. However, water rights in the West are notoriously complex and
specific to each state, making broad-based efficiency initiatives difficult to
implement.
Proponents of irrigation efficiency have enjoyed many positive
strides. However, the United States Supreme Court's recent decision in
Montana v. Wyoming brings to the forefront one of the most complicated and contested facets of irrigation efficiency: who owns the rights to the
conserved water? For the last sixty years, Montana, North Dakota, and
Wyoming have diverted and used water on the Yellowstone River and its
tributaries under the provisions of the Yellowstone River Compact (the
"Compact") with relatively little controversy until recently when Wyoming allowed its water users to change from traditional flood irrigation to
more efficient sprinkler irrigation.'
Sprinkler irrigation, which more evenly distributes water over crops,
allows those crops to consume more of the applied water than flood irri1. Craig Bell, Promoting Conservation by Law: Water Conservation and Western
State Initiatives, 10 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 313, 313 (2007).
2. Charles F. Wilkinson, Western Water Law in Transition, 56 U. COLO. L. REV.
317, 330-31 (1985) (explaining water withdrawals for agriculture in the West are roughly
eighty percent of available water resources, while about seventy percent of the world's
freshwater resources are dedicated to irrigated agriculture). See also Lawrence J. MacDonnell & Teresa A Rice, Moving Agricultural Water to Cities: The Search for Smarter
Approaches, 14 HASTINGS W.-Nw. J. ENvTL. L. & POL'Y 105, 105-06 (2008); Rebecca
Torres, FreshwaterResource and InternationalIrrigation Policy and Reform: A Comparative Study, 13 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 107, 108 (2009).
3. First Interim Report of the Special Master at 54-55, Montana v. Wyoming, 131
S. Ct. 1765 (2011) (No. 137) (Montana alleging that flood irrigation consumes approximately sixty-five percent of water applied to a field, and the other thirty-five percent
flows back to the stream over the surface or by percolation through the ground).
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gation, which results in more wastewater to recharge groundwater sources
and increase return flows to surface water sources.' As a downstream
water user on the Yellowstone River, Montana challenged Wyoming's
action as increasing its net consumption of water and thereby decreasing
the actual flows of water available for Montana users.' Neither party disputed that sprinkler irrigation can be, in general, more efficient and consume more water than traditional flood irrigation; however, the parties
both claim their respective right to use this conserved water under the
terms of the Compact.!
The Compact's preamble states its goal is to "remove all causes of
present and future controversy between said States."' It is unclear, however, whether the drafters of the Compact contemplated whether the parties would employ more efficient irrigation technologies that would result
in an appreciable increase in consumptive use of the concerned water.
The resulting dispute before the Supreme Court (the "Court") embodied
a struggle between private appropriative property rights and progress towards more sustainable and efficient irrigation technology. Though the
Montana v. Wyoming opinion will not be binding precedent on other
states or even other interstate river compacts, it will surely have a widereaching impact on water policy and society in the West.

II. THE YELLOWSTONE RIVER COMPACT
States can allocate water on interstate rivers in one of three different
ways: (i) adversarially through adjudication by the Supreme Court; (ii) by
an act of Congress with no state involvement; or (iii) collaboratively
through an interstate compact." Because states can compromise to reach
a voluntary agreement, interstate river compacts are often their preferred
option.' Montana, North Dakota, and Wyoming chose this third option
and jointly signed the Compact on December 8, 1950."
The Yellowstone River Basin covers approximately 70,000 square
miles and flows north out of Wyoming and through Montana to North

4. Id. at 55 (explaining that sprinkler irrigation can increase efficiency from sixtyfive percent to ninety percent or more, which reduces return flows from thirty-five percent to ten percent or less).
5. Montana v. Wyoming, 131 S. Ct. 1765, 1769 (2011) (listing North Dakota as a
party because it is a signatory state to the Compact, however it did not participate in the
dispute); First Interim Report of the Special Master, supra note 3, at 13.
6. Wyoming's Motion to Dismiss Bill of Complaint at 55, Montana v. Wyoming,
131 S. Ct. 1765 (2011) (No. 137), 2008 WL 8118503.
7. MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-20-101 (2011); N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-23-01 (2011);
WYo. STAT. ANN. § 41-12-601 (2011) (references to the Yellowstone River Compact are
hereinafter only to the Wyoming Statutes Annotated).
8. John B. Draper et al., Gunboats on the Colorado:Interstate Water Controversies, Pastand Present,55 ROCKY MT. MIN. L. INST. 18-1, § 18.03 (2009).
9. Annotation, Constitutionality Construction and Application of Compacts and
Statutes Involving Co-operationBetween States, 134 A.L.R. 1411 (1941).
10. WYo. STAT. ANN. § 41-12-601 (2011).
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Dakota, where it joins the Missouri River." Seasonal flows on the Yellowstone are heavily dependent on snowfall and can vary drastically from
year to year." This means that in dry years, many of the junior appropriations will go unsatisfied. The Compact itself outlines three distinct tiers
of priority for water distribution among the states when water is low in the
Basin.'" The first tier lists appropriative rights existing in each signatory
state as of January 1, 1950." Second, the Compact allocates supplemental
water supplies necessary for already-decreed, pre-1950 uses.' The third
tier includes the remaining unused water on each tributary river, divided
by percentage between Montana and Wyoming." This framework sets all
pre-1950 appropriations at an equal seniority between states. Therefore,
in dry years, downstream Montana users could potentially receive no water due to pre-1950 Wyoming users lawfully consuming all of the available water."
A key provision of the Compact, Article V, apportions
"[aippropriative rights to the beneficial uses of the water of the Yellowstone River system existing in each signatory state as of January 1, 1950."'
Additionally, the Compact instructs that these rights "shall continue to be
enjoyed in accordance with the laws governing -the acquisition and use of
water under the doctrine of appropriation."' The controversy surrounding the Compact arises from a breach of this seemingly simple provision;
however, the parties extensively litigated, and the Supreme Court's opinion ultimately turned on, the meanings of the terms "beneficial use" and
"doctrine of appropriation" in this case. In February 2008, The Supreme
Court granted Montana leave to file a complaint against Wyoming for its
alleged breach of the Compact.'

11.
First Interim Report of the Special Master, supra note 3, at 3.
12.
Montana v. Wyoming, 131 S. Ct. at 1770.
13.
Id.
14. WYo. STAT. ANN. S 41-12-601 art. V(a) (2011).
15.
Id. at art. V(b).
16.
Id. (Wyoming receiving the following percentages of the remaining unused water
after pre-1950 appropriations are filled: sixty percent of the Clarks Fork River, eighty
percent of the Bighorn River, forty percent of the Tongue River, and forty-twp percent
of the Powder River; Montana receiving the remainder).
17.
Montana, 131 S. Ct. at 1772; Transcript of Oral Argument at 51, Montana v.
Wyoming, 131 S. Ct. 1765 (2011) (No. 137, Orig.), 2011 WL 65029 (stating some other
interstate river compacts have used a different construction where upstream states will
assure a minimum amount of flow to the downstream state on a yearly basis); See e.g.
COLO. REV. STAT. S 37-61-101 (2011) (the Colorado River Compact).
18. WYo. STAT. ANN. S 41-12-601 art. V(a) (2011) (emphasis added).
19.
Id. (emphasis added).
20.
Montana, 131 S. Ct. at 1770 (as a signatory to the Compact, Montana has standing to sue for a breach of the interstate water compact); U.S. CONsT. art. III, S 2, cl. 1;
WYo. STAT. ANN. § 41-12-601 art. XIII (2011); Draper et al., supra note 8, § 18.02.
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III. THE PARTIES
Montana's basic allegation in its complaint was that the Compact
guarantees Montana users enough water to meet their pre-1950 needs,
subject to natural river conditions." Montana did not allege that Wyoming's increased irrigation efficiency itself was a Compact violation, but
rather argued that a number of Wyoming's actions have increased the
water available for Wyoming users and diminished the water available for
Montana users.' Montana also relied on the Compact's definition of
"beneficial use" to support its argument that a water right is a consumptive right rather than a diversion right."' Alternatively, should the Court
construe the Compact language as ambiguous, Montana claimed that a
correct interpretation of the drafters' intent is that the Compact created
permanent allocations of water to each individual state for pre-1950 uses." Finally, Montana recommended the Court ignore the common law
doctrine of prior appropriation because it is inconclusive on the topic of
return flows."
Wyoming opposed, alleging that Article V of the Compact created a
divertible flow compact, which does not limit an appropriator to a specific volume of water as in depletion compacts." Wyoming further argued,
therefore, that because efficient irrigation remains a beneficial use, increased consumption under the same historical diversion remains an acceptable use under the Compact. Wyoming claimed that this interpretation is in conformance with the typical administration of water rights in
western states."
The Compact's structure and specific reference to appropriation law
also supported Wyoming's argument that the Compact did not establish a
permanent volume allocation of water to Montana." The Compact lays
out a specific methodology in Article V for calculating and allocating the
volume of divertible flow on the river for only post-1950 users." Wyoming concluded that, because the drafters did not apply this method to
pre-1950 appropriations, the Compact intended to consider only existing
appropriations as of 1950 under prior appropriation law, and not as permanent allocations.
21. Montana's Exception and Brief at 9-14, Montana v. Wyoming, 131 S. Ct. 1765
(2011) (No. 137), 2010 WL 4132841.
22. Montana, 131 S. Ct. at 1770 (Montana's complaint including claims that Wyoming was appropriating water for "irrigating new acreage; building new storage facilities;
conducting new groundwater pumping; and increasing consumption on existing agricultural acreage").
23. Montana's Exception and Brief, supra note 21, at 18-19.
24. Id. at 17.
25. Id. at 21, 32.
26. Wyoming's Motion to Dismiss Bill of Complaint, supra note 6, at 36.
27. Wyoming's Reply to Montana's Exception at 40-44, 51-52, Montana v. Wyoming, 131 S. Ct. 1765 (2011) (No. 137), 2010 WL 4132840.
28. Id. at 53.
29. WYo. STAT. ANN. § 41-12-601 (2011).
30. Wyoming's Reply to Montana's Exception, supra note 27, at 8, 10.
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The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over interstate compact
disputes." Here, the Court appointed a Special Master to consider Wyoming's motion to dismiss and brief the case." The Special Master evaluated numerous amicus briefs, but dismissed one notable brief from the
Anadarko Petroleum Corporation." Anadarko argued Wyoming would
not adequately represent its interest with respect to the Compact's stance
on groundwater. Anadarko maintained that Montana's claims to return
flows and groundwater threatened produced water in conjunction with its
coalbed natural gas operations in Wyoming. ' Anadarko suggested that
the holding should not affect produced water from drilling operations.
Although Montana's claim specifically identified pumping associated with
coalbed natural gas in the Tongue and Powder River Basins," Anadarko
may have seen this case as an opportunity to have the Court differentiate
water associated with coalbed drilling and other historical groundwaterconsumptive drilling. Still, the Special Master determined that admitting
Anadarko's amicus brief could unnecessarily lengthen the discovery and
trial proceedings, and accordingly dismissed Anadarko's amicus brief."
IV. THE SUPREME COURT OPINION
After briefing each party's arguments, the Special Master concluded
that the Court should deny Wyoming's motion to dismiss." The Special
Master agreed in part with Montana that, "Article V of the Compact protects pre-1950 appropriations in Montana from new surface and groundwater diversions in Wyoming," but eventually sided with Wyoming's argument that simple efficiency improvements do not constitute an opportunity for relief.' While both states accepted the majority of the Special
31. U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2.
32. Montana, 131 S. Ct. at 1770; see also Kansas v. Colorado, 543 U.S. 86 (2004);
Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605 (1983); Vincent L McKusick, Discretionary Gatekeeping: The Supreme Court's Management of Its OriginalJurisdiction Docket Since
1961, 45 ME. L. REV. 185 (1993).
33. First Interim Report of the Special Master, supra note 3, at 96.
34. Motion for Anadarko Petroleum Corp. for Leave to File Amicus Brief at 2, Montana v. Wyoming, 131 S. Ct. 1765 (2011) (No. 137), 2008 WL 8118500.
35. Amicus Brief in Support of Respondent State Wyoming at 2, Montana v. Wyoming, 131 S. Ct. 1765 (2011) (No. 137), 2008 WL 8119115. A number of parties have
been concerned about the relatively unknown environmental and hydrologic effects of
coalbed drilling operations in Montana. See, e.g. Myers, T., GroundwaterManagement
and Coal Bed Methane Development in the Powder River Basin of Montana,
NORTHERN
PLAINS
RES.
COUNCIL
(Oct.
11,
2011),
http://www.northernplains.org/groundwater-management-and-coal-bed-methanedevelopment-in-the-powder-river-basin-of-montanal (accepted for publication in the
Journal of Hydrology for March 2009 issue).
36. Id. at 4.
37. First Interim Report of the Special Master, supra note 3, at 96.
38. Id. (the Special Master concluding that Wyoming adequately represented Anadarko's interest in the case).
39. First Interim Report of the Special Master, supra note 3, at 89-90, 115-16.
40. Id. at 14-15.
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Master's lengthy report, Montana objected to the Special Master's rejection of its claim that increased efficiency decreased water available for its
pre-1950 appropriators." Accordingly, the Supreme Court only considered one of Montana's several allegations." The Court's opinion, written
by Justice Clarence Thomas, relied on two major principles to resolve the
dispute: historical principles of prior appropriation law and interpretation
of the Compact itself.
A.

PRINCIPLES OF PRIOR APPROPRIATION LAW

Prior appropriation law provides the basis for water rights in most
western states, including Montana and Wyoming.'" The Compact expressly states that it is based on "the laws governing the acquisition and
use of water under the doctrine of appropriation."" Under prior appropriation law, the date of an appropriation determines the seniority of that
water right.' In practice, an appropriative water right entitles a water user
to divert a specific amount of water from a stream for a particular beneficial use, typically in units of cubic feet per second ("cfs")." The Supreme
Court has made it clear that the measure of an appropriative water right is
the actual beneficial use of water, and therefore any appropriators ceasing
actual beneficial use forfeit their rights." Montana's complaint raised two
sub-principles of prior appropriation law: the no-injury rule and the doctrine of recapture.
1. The No-Injury Rule
The no-injury rule states that any new appropriator is entitled to divert water subject to the stream conditions as they exist at the record date
of appropriation.' Even junior appropriators may raise an injury claim
under the no-injury rule when an upstream senior appropriator makes
changes to stream conditions." However, the rule is limited in its application and "generally concerns changes in the location of the diversion and
the place or purpose of use."' The Court examined Wyoming and Montana case law and several water law treatises that dealt with changes to
more water-intensive crops, day-to-day operations, and the addition of

41. Montana's Exception and Brief, supra note 21, at 1.
42. Montana v. Wyoming, 131 S. Ct. 1765, 1770 (2011) (No. 137), 2010 WL
4132841.
43. First Interim Report of the Special Master, supra note 3, at 5.
44. WYo. STAT. ANN. § 41-12-601 art. V(a) (2011).
45. Montana, 131 S. Ct. at 1772.
46. First Interim Report of the Special Master, supra note 3, at 5.
47. E.g. Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 805
(1976) ("Continued beneficial use of the water is required in order to maintain the
right").
48. Montana, 131 S. Ct. at 1773.
49. Id.
50. Id.
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irrigated acreage." Justice Thomas suggested that the relative absence of
litigation over changes in irrigation efficiency, compared to other types of
water use changes, implied that irrigation efficiency is not a violation of
the no-injury rule." The Court definitively concluded that irrigation efficiency improvements "seem to be the sort of changes that fall outside the
no-injury rule as it exists in Montana and Wyoming" because they do not
concern changes in place of diversion or purpose of use, both hallmarks
of change-of-use disputes.'
2. The Doctrine of Recapture
The doctrine of recapture entitles an appropriator to "exclusive control [of his appropriated water] so long as he is able and willing to apply it
to beneficial uses, and such right extends to what is commonly known as
wastage from surface run-off and deep percolation, necessarily incident to
practical irrigation."' While the Court readily acknowledged the unsettled nature of this area of law, the doctrine of recapture tends to support
allowing increased water consumption due to irrigation efficiency as part
of the original appropriative right.' Montana argued that the doctrine of
recapture does not apply to water that returns to the source of the original diversion.' While there is some persuasive case law in neighboring
Colorado and Utah for this proposition, the Court dismissed Montana's
argument after limiting its analysis to Montana and Wyoming law.
While Colorado and Utah are comparatively strict in prohibiting
change applications that have a negative effect on stream conditions, neither state suggests differentiating water based on the direction in which
runoff or seepage travels." In East Bench Irrigation Co. v. Desert Irngation. Co., the Utah Supreme Court considered upstream users' application to change the point of diversion and increase the amount of land
irrigated.' The Court recognized that upstream users may increase their
consumptive use by irrigating a different crop without filing a change application; however, upstream users cannot file a change of use application
that would detrimentally impair stream flow conditions for downstream
Similarly, in Comstock v. Ramsay, the Colorado Suappropriators.'
preme Court addressed a dispute over seepage waters and noted that,
"practically every decree on the South Platte River...is dependent for its
Id. at 1773-74.
Id. at 1774.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 1775-76 (citing Ide v. United States, 263 U.S. 497, 506 (1924) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
55. Id. at 1775, 1777.
56. Id. at 1775.
57. Id.
58. East Bench Irrig. Co. v. Desert Irrig. Co., 271 P.2d 449, 450 (Utah 1954).
59. Id. at 455-56 (the Court granting the upstream users' application on the condition that the proposed change in place of diversion or place or manner of use would not
impair the downstream users vested rights).
51.

,52.
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supply...upon return, waste and seepage waters."" In remanding the case,
the Court held that allowing a new appropriator to divert seepage waters
would replace the fundamental principle of prior appropriation water
law-first in time, first in right-with an unrecognized one, "last in time
first in right."" While making a fairly persuasive argument, Montana cited no binding authority for its proposition that the doctrine of recapture
does not apply to waters that return to their original source of diversion.
Further, neither Colorado nor Utah have recognized that an appropriator
is prohibited from "reuslingi his own wastewater while it is still on his
property simply because it otherwise would return to the original
stream.""
Despite Montana's argument, the Court found that both Montana
and Wyoming law "apply, without qualification, the basic doctrine that
the original appropriator may freely recapture his used water while it remains on his property and reuse it for the same purpose on the same
land."' It is clear in Wyoming that users diverting irrigation runoff and
seepage directly from another user are doing so subject to the original
appropriator's use of water." The Wyoming Supreme Court has expressly held, "IN]o appropriator can compel any other appropriator to continue the waste of water which benefits the former."" Montana law expresses essentially the same sentiment, stating the general rule "is that the
owner of the right to use the water-his private property while in his possession-may collect it, recapture it, before it leaves his possession.""
Therefore, under both Montana and Wyoming common law, the doctrine of recapture is expansive and most likely allows an appropriator to
increase irrigation efficiency (and thereby consumption) on the same land
to which the original appropriative water right was applied."
B.COMPACT INTERPRETATION

.

Montana's final argument was that the Compact's definition of "beneficial use" limited the pre-1950 water uses to non-wasteful, beneficial uses.' The term "beneficial use" is defined in Article 11(h) as, "that use by
which the water supply of a drainage basin is depleted when usefully employed by the activities of man."' Because the Compact protects pre60. Comstock v. Ramsay, 133 P. 1107, 1110 (Colo. 1913).
61. Id.
62. Montana, 131 S. Ct. at 1775.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 1775-76. (A creek fed by irrigation runoff and seepage could not be secured because it was subject to the irrigator "findling] better ways of utilizing the water
on *the same land so that less waste and seepage would occur"); Bower v. Big Horn
Canal Ass'n, 307 P.2d 593, 601 (Wyo. 1957).
65. Montana, 131 S. Ct. at 1776 (citing Bower, 307 P.2d at 601).
66. Id. (citing Rock Creek Ditch & Flume Co. v. Miller, 17 P.2d 1074, 1080 (Mont.
1933)).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1777.
69. WYo. STAT. ANN. S 41-12-601 art. 11(h) (2011).
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1950 appropriative rights, Montana alleged that Wyoming's amount of
beneficial consumption at that date limits its use.' Applying this interpretation would assure downstream Montana users of their access to historical return flows."
1. Definition of "Beneficial Use"
Through a plain reading of the Compact and a comparison to other
interstate water compacts, the Court joined the Special Master's recommendation to dismiss Montana's statutory interpretation of beneficial
use." Montana's argument stressed that beneficial use equates to depletion of water in the most general sense, and the Court conceded that all
types of beneficial use result in some amount of depletion." Justice
Thomas explained that the clear language of the Compact defining beneficial use merely says that "that use" must be one that "deplete[s]" the
"water supply."" Therefore, the Compact defines beneficial use as "a
type of use that depletes the water supply."' The Court elaborated that
this plain reading was justified because; at the time the Compact was
drafted, Wyoming had a statutory preference for irrigation over nondepletive uses like power generation." Additionally, beneficial use in
irrigation has, in practice, historically allowed for losses to runoff, evaporation, percolation, leakage, and seepage as long as they are reasonable
and claimed in good faith." The Court suggested that, had the drafters of
the Compact intended Montana's interpretation of beneficial use, the
definitional language would likely have been more explicit in altering the
commonly understood meaning of beneficial use to include "the amount
of water consumed," or the "volume by which the water supply...is depleted."" Putting it simply, the Court stated that any other interpretation
of beneficial use would make little sense under the ordinary principles of
prior appropriation.'
The Court also supported its statutory interpretation of the term beneficial use with a brief investigation of other interstate water compacts.
Before the Yellowstone River Compact, Wyoming had already entered
into the Colorado River Compact, which explicitly reserved water for
"beneficial consumptive use" and required upstream states to assure a
flow of 75,000,000 acre-feet for any consecutive ten-year period. " Mon70. Montana, 131 S. Ct. at 1778.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 1777-79.
73. Id. at 1778.
74. Id. (citing WYo. STAT. ANN. § 41-12-601 art. 11(h) (2011)).
75. Id. (emphasis in original).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. (emphasis in original).
79. Id. at 1778-79.
80. Id. at 1779; WYo. STAT. ANN. S 41-12-301 (2011) (the Colorado River Compact
was signed by Wyoming on November 24, 1922).
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tana's analysis of the Compact was unpersuasive when prior interstate
compacts explicitly allocated water based on volumetric or consumptive
use parameters." In essence, the Court reasoned that because the Compact's drafters used a formula different from the volumetric apportionment used previously in the Colorado River Compact, the drafters must
have intended a different meaning. Montana,.North Dakota, and Wyoming agreed in the Compact to distinguish pre-1950 rights from post1950 rights and apportion water based on a percentage related to a diversion amount rather than a consumptive or volumetric measure."
2. The Scalia Dissent
Justice Scalia challenged the majority opinion based on its interpretation of statutory language.' The backbone of the prior appropriation
doctrine is beneficial use." Beneficial use is both the measure and limiting factor of any appropriative water right.' Justice Scalia therefore argued that the drafter's use of the word "deplete" was deliberate, giving it a
distinct meaning from "divert."" The words "divert" or "diversion" appear a number of times throughout the Compact, but the drafters specifically chose to use the word "depletion" in the definition of beneficial
use." Justice Scalia argued that the majority's analysis of general prior
appropriation principles was unnecessary and suggested that the only
question before the Court should have been "whether 'beneficial use'
measures the volume diverted or the volume depleted" within the language of the Compact." He stated that the Court's only explanation for
choosing the diversion interpretation was that Wyoming disfavored nondepletive hydroelectric power." This reason was unpersuasive to Justice
Scalia because non-depletive uses "are already excluded from appropriative rights."" In his dissent he found it extraordinary that the Court used
this case to define beneficial use-"a state water law question that no court
of any Western State has ever answered"-when the Compact itself appeared to afford a clear answer."

81.
Montana v. Wyoming, 131 S. Ct. 1765, 1779 (2011) (No. 137), 2010 WL
4132841; see also COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-67-101 (2011) (the Republican River Compact
allocated water to Colorado, Kansas, and Nebraska in April 27, 1923, by the acre-foot
for beneficial consumptive use).
82. See Id.
83. Montana v. Wyoming, 131 S. Ct. 1765, 1780 (2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86.

Id.

87.

Id.

88.

Id. at 1781 (emphasis in original).

89.
90.
91.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1782 (emphasis in original).
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V.POLICY
Ultimately, the Court concluded, "Itihe doctrine of appropriation in
Wyoming and Montana allows appropriators to improve the efficiency of
their irrigation systems, even to the detriment of downstream appropriators."' In a decision of first impression, the Court relied heavily on policy considerations associated with weighing private property rights against
irrigation efficiency measures. Upon review of the Court's opinion, the
Special Master's Report, and the parties' briefs, several major policy concepts emerge: (i) administering water rights practically; (ii) encouraging
efficient irrigation; and (iii) defining beneficial use.
The most evident policy implication of the Court's opinion is that
administering appropriated water rights is impracticable on a net consumption basis. The net consumption concept suggests that beneficial
consumptive use limits any water right to the volume consumed minus
the volume of return flows. Historically, western states have required
appropriators to install structures such as headgates, weirs, or flumes to
measure the amount of water diverted under their decree at the specific
point of diversion." Augmented stream flow due to irrigation return
flows, however, are not as easy to measure." Determining the timing and
location of groundwater return flows requires extensive and expensive
groundwater modeling." The expense and physical presence of testing
equipment required for such testing would likely make even basin-wide
applications of a net consumptive concept economically and politically
infeasible. At oral argument, Justice Bryer questioned, "how can you
read this treaty to require landowners to put back amounts into the river
[when] they didn't even know what they were?""
Next, the policy of encouraging efficient irrigation technologies will
be exceedingly important for the future of water law in the West. Commentators have long criticized prior appropriation's "use it or lose it"
principle as discouraging water conservation in agriculture." Conservation and efficiency in irrigation are essential to ensuring future water supplies for growing populations in the arid West." However, there is no
universal agreement as to the best use of conserved water. The Court's
92.

Id. at 1779.

E.g. WYO. STAT. ANN. S 41-3-613 (2011).
See Aj. Clemmens, R.G. Allen, and C.M. Burt, Technical Concepts Related to
Conservation of Irrigation and Rainwater in AgriculturalSystems, 44 WATER RESOUR.
RES. W00E03, 4 (2008) (doi:10.1029/2007WR006095). (to technically evaluate irrigation efficiency, one must consider five separate categories: (i) crop evapotranspiration;
(ii) other evapotranspiration; (iii) recoverable surface and ground water; (iv) unrecoverable groundwater; and (iv) storage water within the system).
95. See MacDonnell & Rice, supra note 2, at 120-21.
96. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 17, at 12. (Justice Sotomayor also
questioned, "How in the world do any States monitor that? The change in crops, the
change in irrigation methods, the change in anything that would cause a difference in
return flow?"); Id. at 7.
97. Bell, supra note 1, at 314-15.
98. Id. at 313-14.
93.
94.
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decision in Montana v. Wyoming seems to support protecting vested private rights in water by allowing appropriators to retain conserved water
for their own use. At the end of the day, the Court likely sided with protecting private property rights because of an overall sense of fairness in
protecting senior appropriators' vested rights.
Because many rivers in the West are overappropriated, water planners are paying close attention to the potential for new water sources deriving directly from conservation projects." Commentators have suggested a variety of innovative solutions to promote conservation through voluntary programs and/or legislative actions.'" Appropriators have long
used salvaged water transfers as a private sector tool to realize the monetary benefits of irrigation efficiency."' Montana itself enacted a statute in
1991 allowing appropriators to use or transfer water made available by
water-saving methods.'" This program is entirely voluntary and is also
subject to approval from the Montana Departmeht of Conservation and
Natural Resources in order to protect third party appropriators from injury." A similar concept to the salvaged water transfer agreement is the
water bank, wherein irrigators may deposit excess or salvaged water for
purchase or use by multiple parties."' Conversely, some assert that the
best use of conserved water is dedication to instream flows. A major argument for instream flow protection derives from the state's public interest in protecting the waters of the state for the benefit of fish, wildlife, and
recreation. '
Ultimately, any state can amend or pass its own laws or programs to
require more efficient irrigation technologies and then distribute the conserved flows however it pleases." Oregon, for example, allocates seventyfive percent of conserved flows to the irrigator implementing the efficient
practices, while the state reserves seventy-five percent of the flows for
instream flow protection." While there exist a number of proven tools
for implementing irrigation efficiency programs, governments have mostly
resorted to grassroots and watershed-specific campaigns rather than stateor region-wide programs due to political pressures, third party impacts,
and environmental threats.

99. COMMITTEE ON WESTERN WATER MANAGEMENT, NATIONAL
CouNCIL, WATER TRANSFERS IN THE WEST: EFFICIENCY, EQUITY,
ENVIRONMENT 8, 14 (1992).
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100. MacDonnell & Rice, supra note 2, at 136-37.
101. Id.
102. MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-102.02, -419 (20.11).
103. MacDonnell & Rice, supra note 2 at 136-37 (to make a salvaged water change of
use, a Montana appropriator must prove (i) water rights of others are no affected; (ii) the
proposed change works are adequate; (iii) the proposed use is beneficial; and (iv) the
applicant for the change has consent of the proposed beneficial user).
104. Bell, supra note 1, at 321.
105. Id. at 313-14, 324; NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 99, at 11.
106. MacDonnell & Rice, supra note 2, at 121.
107. OR. REV. STAT. § 537.470(3) (2011).
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Finally, Montana v. Wyoming brings into question the well-known
and often-litigated definition of "beneficial use." Although the Court
stopped short of explicitly defining the term, it analyzed many of the essential components of the doctrine of beneficial use. One component,
water duty, will likely become a more contentious efficiency-related concept in the future. Water duty is one measure of reasonable and beneficial use in a specific geographic region, taking into consideration crop
type, climate, and soil characteristics." For example, water duty quantifies the reasonable use of water to a specific amount of acre-feet per year.
Beneficial use is still the ultimate measure and limit of a water right; however, some courts have set a maximum water duty in adjudicating appropriations and resolving water disputes." The next logical question is
whether technological advances should require water duties to decrease
to reflect modern advances in conservation and efficiency. "o Allowing a
sliding scale for water duty may provide a more flexible approach to determining what is actually "beneficial" use. As a common law principle
that each western state sets individually, beneficial use is flexible and will
eventually adapt to include or even require modern, more-efficient technologies. However, water law is a creature of tradition, slow to change,
and can be altered more quickly through legislative initiatives favoring
irrigation efficiency.
VI. PRECEDENT AND FUTURE IMPLICATIONS
Although the policies underlying the Court's holding are compelling,
the actual legal precedent that this case sets for western water law will be
somewhat limited for several reasons. First, because water law is specific
to each state, Montana v. Wyoming's holding will only be binding on
interpretations of Wyoming and Montana law. Second, the law of return
flows is distinctly different in other western states, and the Supreme
Court could potentially reach the opposite conclusion in a different state.
Lastly, the Yellowstone River Compact's three-tier system is unusual in
comparison to other interstate water compacts. However, the Court's
determination that more efficient and more consumptive irrigation practices are allowable under the Compact will have a broad effect on western
water law in general. Water practitioners will undoubtedly be able to cite
Wyoming v. Montana for the assertion that prior appropriation law is

108. MacDonnell & Rice, supra note 2, at 128-29 (the Oregon Water Resources
Department terminated work with Oregon State University developing technical data to
establish regional water duties in the state due to limited time and incomplete regulatory
structure to implement the regional system).
109. E.g. United States v. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co., 697 F.2d 851, 853 (9th Cir.
1983) (the federal appellate court upheld the 3.5 acre-feet per year water duty to bottomland farmer and 4.5 acre-feet per year to the Newlands Project to irrigate agricultural
lands on the Carson River in California).
110. Janet C. Neuman, Beneficial Use, Waste, and Forfeiture: The Inefficient Search
forEficiencyin Western Water Use, 28 ENVTL. L. 919, 980 (1998).
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rooted in the practical administration of rights, and the protection of private Water rights will reward appropriators embracing irrigation efficiency.
VII. CONCLUSION
The biggest concern in the West is that "tall the water that will ever
be is, right now.""' Western water users will undoubtedly continue to
pursue more efficient technologies because of economic and environmental incentives, creating conflicts with downstream users who rely on
upstream waste or return flows. The Supreme Court's opinion in Montana v. Wyoming will undoubtedly be persuasive in such disputes despite
the fact that it is non-binding on other western states. In Montana, water
users have always been subject to pre-1950 Wyoming users, but will this
expansive view of appropriative rights further tighten Wyoming's grip on
the Yellowstone River Basin? For now, the practical effect of this decision on the Yellowstone River Compact remains unknown.

111. U.S. Geological Survey, Water Resources of Connecticut: Water Quotes (Jun.
25, 2010), http://ct.water.usgs.gov/education/norewater.htm (citing National Geographic,
Oct. 1993).
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ADDRESSING CLIMATE CHANGE IN COLORADO
At the Colorado Bar Association, Taryn Hutchins-Cabibi, a Drought
and Climate Change Technical Specialist with the Colorado Water Conservation Board ("CWCB"), discussed the potential impacts of climate
change on water in Colorado and what the CWCB is doing to address
these issues. In recent years, the CWCB has taken a more active role in
understanding how climate change could influence Colorado's water resources. Focusing on long-term water supply planning, Hutchins-Cabibi
gave a detailed overview of some of the CWCB's specific climate-related
initiatives.
In 2008, the CWCB commissioned a report entitled Climate Change
in Colorado: A Svnthesis to Support Water Resource Management and
Adaptation ("Synthesis Report"). The Synthesis Report summarizes climate change science in relation to Colorado's water.supply and provides
a basis for further study of climate change impacts on water resources.
The Synthesis Report also examines how climate change could affect
temperature and precipitation in Colorado. The Synthesis Report analyses climate models that project Colorado's climate will continue to
warm, with summer temperatures increasing more than winter temperatures. This shift may have significant implications for water management,
as temperature can greatly influence water availability. Although, as of
2008, only 27% of Colorado municipal water suppliers had considered
climate change impacts on long term water supply planning, this figure is
expected to increase.
Next, Hutchins-Cabibi discussed the ongoing Colorado River Water
Availability Study ("CRWAS"). The CWCB is conducting the CRWAS
as a multi-phase study. Phase one looked at how much water is available
for new development in the Colorado River Basin under existing water
use practices. Phase two will consider existing uses and how water demand may change in the future.
Hutchins-Cabibi then discussed the Colorado Drought Mitigation and
Response Plan ("Drought Plan"). The CWCB revised the Drought Plan
in 2010 in compliance with Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) requirements. The Drought Plan outlines how Colorado will
respond to, and mitigate for, drought. The Drought Plan also includes a
vulnerability assessment that quantitatively and qualitatively examines
how various sectors (for example, tourism and agriculture) may be susceptible to drought impacts. As part of this vulnerability assessment, the
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Plan also examines climate change and what drought could look like in
the future, considering both duration and intensity of drought spells.
The CWCB also developed a series of tools to aid local entities in developing their own drought management plans.
Next, Hutchins-Cabibi discussed the Joint Front Range Climate
Change Vulnerability Study ("Front Range Study"). The CWCB is collaborating with multiple Front Range water providers and others to examine potential climate change effects on water supplies. Hutchins-Cabibi
spoke about the benefits of a regional approach realized through communication, coordination, collaboration, resources, and scale, and also
emphasized that pooled resources made the Front Range Study possible.
One of the goals of the Front Range Study was to determine streamflow
sensitivity to projected changes in temperature and precipitation. The
results of the Front Range Study will be published by the Water Research
Foundation soon.
Hutchins-Cabibi's final topic was the Colorado Climate Preparedness
Project ("CCPP"), a statewide effort to assist Colorado in continuing to
prepare itself for climate variability and change by providing a catalog of
climate vulnerabilities in relation to current activities. The CCPP consists
of (i) a report outlining research findings and recommendations; and (ii) a
searchable database of active adaptation efforts already underway in Colorado, grouped into four sections: organizations, people, projects, and
products. The CCPP focuses on five sectors that have been identified as
particularly sensitive to the impacts of climate change and climate variability: water; wildlife, ecosystems, and forests; electricity; agriculture; and
climate-sensitive tourism and outdoor recreation. It also focuses on what
informational gaps need to be filled.
The Synthesis Report, a draft of phase one of the CRWAS, the
Drought Plan, and the CCPP Final Report are publicly available on the
For more detailed information, please go to
CWCB's website.
http://cwcb.state.co.us/.
John Lahner

COURT REPORTS
STATE COURTS
COLORADO
Centennial Water & Sanitation Dist. v. City & Cnty. of Broomfield,
256 P.3d 677 (Colo. 2011) (holding that a city and county failed to meet
its burden on an application for conditional appropriative rights of exchange and for conditional water rights for several water sources that it
did not own or control because it was unable to fulfill the "first step" requirement and the "can and will" test).
On December 20, 2004, the City and County of Broomfield
("Broomfield") filed an Application for Conditional Appropriative Rights
of Exchange and for Conditional Water Rights ("Application") in the
District Court for Water Division No.1 ("water court"). The Application
requested judicial confirmation of conditional appropriative rights of exchange for a total of seventeen sources of substitute water supply.
Broomfield owned or controlled nine of the sources, but not the other
eight.
Centennial Water and Sanitation District and the City of Boulder (together, "Opposers") filed Statements of Opposition to the Application.
Opposers argued that the court should treat the Application as a proposed augmentation plan, rather than an application for a conditional
water right. Under this theory, Broomfield would need to own or control
each proposed substitute source of water supply in order to succeed on
its Application. Disagreeing with Opposers, the water court found that a
conditional appropriative right of exchange is a conditional water right
and held that it would analyze the Application under a conditional water
right analysis.
The water court then applied the "first step" requirement and the
"can and will" test to determine whether Broomfield had met its burden
of satisfying the elements for a conditional water right for substitute supplies. Under the "first step" requirement, an applicant must demonstrate
that it has taken a first step toward appropriating a certain amount of water. Under the "can and will" test, an applicant must show that there is a
substantial probability that the applicant can and will complete the appropriation with diligence. Applying both analyses, the water court found
that that while Broomfield had met its burden for all of the sources it
owned or controlled, it had failed to meet its burden for six of the
sources that it did not own or control. Both Opposers and Broomfield
appealed the water court's decision.
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On appeal, the Colorado Supreme Court first addressed whether the
trial court erred in treating the Application as an appropriative right, rather than as a proposed augmentation plan. An augmentation plan operates to replace depletions with substitute water supply in an amount necessary to prevent injury to other water rights. In contrast, an appropriative. right allows a strict one-to-one diversion of upstream water in exchange for providing continuity with a source of substitute supply at a
point downstream. The court reasoned that defining a conditional appropriative right of exchange in terms of conditional water rights is in line
with Colorado water law's principle of maximum utilization. Accordingly, the court determined that, because an exchange is an appropriative
right and not an augmentation plan, courts should review an application
for a conditional appropriative right of exchange under a conditional water right analysis.
The court then considered whether the trial court erred by applying
the "first step" requirement and the "can and will" test to Broomfield's
sources of substitute supply on a source-by-source basis. Broomfield
argued that the court should instead apply these requirements to its exchange plan as a whole. The court found, however, that when an applicant claims various substitute sources of supply for a proposed plan of
conditional appropriative rights of exchange, the court must analyze each
individual substitute source in order to identify the specific risk of injury.
Therefore, the court considered each substitute source individually.
In Colorado, to obtain a conditional water right, an applicant must
demonstrate three actions: (i) it has taken a first step toward appropriation of a certain amount of water, (ii) its intent to appropriate is not based
upon the speculative sale or transfer of the appropriative right, and (iii)
the applicant can and will complete the appropriation with diligence. In
affirming the water court, the court found that Broomfield had met its
burden for all of the sources it owned or controlled, but had failed to
meet its burden for six of the sources that it did not own or control.
Accordingly, the court approved Broomfield's conditional appropriative rights of exchange based on the nine sources of substitute supply that
it owned or controlled and two of the sources it did not own or control.

Molly Callender

Kobobel v. Dep't of Natural Res., 249 P.3d 1127 (Colo. 2011) (holding that the water court had exclusive jurisdiction to hear, and properly
denied, a claim by a group of well owners who asserted they were entitled
to just compensation because the State Engineer issued curtailment orders that allegedly effectuated a taking).
Well owners ("Owners"), with rights to thirteen decreed irrigation
wells tributary to the South Platte River with appropriation dates between
March 1945 and December 1966, brought an inverse condemnation action against the State of Colorado in Morgan County District Court ("district court") after receiving a cease and desist order ("order") from the
State Engineer. The order stated that, because the wells were part of an
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augmentation plan pending in the District Court for Water Division 1
("water court"), Owners must stop pumping until the water court entered
a decreed augmentation plan. The district court dismissed Owners' action, finding that the water court, not the district court, had exclusive jurisdiction over the action. The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the
district court on the same grounds. As a result, Owners brought their
action in the water court. Although Owners submitted to the jurisdiction
-of the water court, they continued to assert the district court had proper
jurisdiction over their inverse condemnation action. Owners did not seek
approval for an augmentation or substitute water supply plan before the
water court.
. The water court dismissed Owners' complaint for failure to state a
claim upon which relief could be granted, holding that Owners' right to
use their wells was qualified by Owners' priority date and senior vested
interests. The water court reasoned that all tributary groundwater wells in
Colorado operate within the priority system, and because owners of such
wells must obtain augmentation plans before pumping out of priority to
prevent injury to senior rights, the State Engineer's order was not an unconstitutional taking. Owners appealed the water court's decision directly
to the Colorado Supreme Court.
Owners first claimed that the district court, not the water court, was
the proper venue for their takings action. In analyzing this issue, the
court looked at the nature of the claim. The court focused on the distinction between actions involving the use of water and the ownership of
water. District courts have jurisdiction over the latter, however, the water
court has exclusive jurisdiction over the former. The court held that because Owners' claim depended on whether the State's action improperly
interfered with their right to use their wells, and ownership of wells and
corresponding appropriation dates were undisputed, the water court had
exclusive jurisdiction over the claims.
Next, the court addressed Owners' takings claims. A property owner
may bring an inverse condemnation action when state action may substantially deprive the owner of the use and enjoyment of the property and the
State has brought no formal condemnation action. Owners claimed the
orders deprived them of their vested right to use the water in their wells,
precluding all economically beneficial use of their land. Owners claimed
that the government owed them just compensation for the loss of their
crops resulting from curtailed irrigation water.
To support their takings claim, Owners raised two arguments. First,
they argued that because their wells were decreed before the 1969 Water
Rights Determination and Administration Act ("1969 Act"), which incorporated tributary groundwater into the priority system, their rights were
the equivalent of a vested property right in nontributary groundwater.
Second, Owners argued the orders were a regulatory taking because the
State Engineer had allowed them to pump out of priority for decades,
and recent action on behalf of the State Engineer to enforce the regulatory scheme condemned their vested interest.
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The court rejected both of these arguments because they were based
on a misconception of the nature and scope of the rights at issue. Despite the temporal relation between the priority of the rights and the 1969
Act, Owners' rights had always been qualified by C6lorado's doctrine of
prior appropriation, which prohibits use of water that would injure senior
rights. The order enforced this doctrine by addressing injurious effects to
senior rights resulting from pumping wells tributary to the South Platte
out of priority. Because the court held that Owners did not have an unqualified, constitutionally protected property interest in the use of water
in their wells, Owners could not show that the State took their property.
The court accordingly affirmed the water court's dismissal of Owners'
takings claims.
In her dissent, Justice Eid disagreed that the water court had exclusive jurisdiction over Owners' claims, and instead asserted that the claims
involved issues of ownership proper for the district court. Justice Eid
reasoned that if the water court held in favor of Owners, it would have
been required to transfer the case to the district court and that is problematic for two reasons. First, the eminent domain statute gives the district court jurisdiction over inverse condemnation actions and does not
intend for the water court to be entitled to an initial review. Second, the
dissent found the majority approach to be repetitive, as evidence presented at water court would also need to be presented in district court.
John Lahner

S. Fork Water & Sanitation Dist. v. Town of S. Fork, 252 P.3d 465
(Colo. 2011) (holding that a special district cannot withhold approval to
allow a municipality to provide water service for its residents when the
special district has failed to do so itself).
Between 2001 and 2003, the South Fork Water and Sanitation District ("District"), a special district and quasi-municipality formed to provide sewerage services, took preliminary steps toward creating a centralized water service. However, the project was not constructed because the.
District failed to secure funding. In 2006, the Town of South Fork
("Town"), which is located within the District, began preparing to provide
a water service to its residents by amending its Land Use and Development Code to require the commitment of water rights as a condition for
subdivision approval. The District then filed a declaratory judgment
complaint alleging the town was providing a water service within the District without the District's approval, which was a violation of Colorado
statutory law. In response, the Town filed a petition for exclusion from
the District pursuant to state law, but ultimately withdrew the petition
after over 100 voters petitioned for an election regarding the question of
exclusion. In 2007 and 2008, the Town negotiated three letters of intent
to obtain private water systems.
Through the application of Colorado case law, the Colorado District
Court for the 12th Judicial District in Rio Grande County construed the
applicable state statute to require a reasonable exercise of the approval
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power. The district court found that the District's withholding of the
approval was unreasonable because the District itself was unable to provide water service. The district court held that it was within the Town's
police powers to require the dedication of water rights as a condition of
subdivision approval.
The Colorado Court of Appeals upheld the district court's ruling.
The appellate court concluded that the District's attempt to bar the Town
from furnishing water service was an unreasonable exercise of their approval power because it had neither the intent nor financial resources to
provide water service itself.
The Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari. The court began
with an overview of the powers that the General Assembly conferred to
special districts and statutory towns. Special districts have the power to
"acquire water rights and construct and operate lines and facilities within
and without the district," while statutory towns have general police powers. The court then discussed the two applicable sections of Colorado
statute that address the operation of water and sewer systems. Because
special districts are considered municipalities for the purposes of the
statute, the powers conferred apply to both the District and the Town.
The statute prevents one municipality from providing water services in
another municipality without the approval of the other municipality.
The District argued that it must approve the Town's furnishing of water services because their territories overlap. The Town argued that because the District was unable to provide water services, the District could
not prevent the Town from providing water services. The court looked at
the statute as a whole and determined that consistent with case law and
the legislative intent, the statute intended to promote rather than hinder,
an essential service. Therefore, the approval power was not unlimited
and must be exercised reasonably. The court held that the District could
not prevent the Town from exercising its police and land use powers to
promote public health and to regulate the distribution and supply of water to its own residents within its own territory.
The court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals.
J. Tobin Weiner

S. Ute Indian Tribe v. King Consol. Ditch Co., 250 P.3d 1226 (Colo.
2011) (holding that a water rights determination can include reviews of
prior court decrees and the service requirements for such water rights
determinations are satisfied by resume notice and newspaper publication).
Between 2001 and 2006, seven of the eight ditch companies with water rights in the Pine River system ("ditch companies") filed applications
The Southern Ute Indian Tribe
for winter stock watering rights.
("Tribe"), another rights holder on the Pine River, filed statements of
opposition to each application. After consultation, the state Division
Engineer determined that the applications were unnecessary because pri-
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or decrees in 1934 and 1966 allowed for incidental non-irrigation uses of
the water, such as stock watering in winter.
The parties entered into settlement negotiations in light of the Engineer's determination but failed to reach a settlement. In March 2009, the
ditch companies filed a consolidated application for a water rights determination in the Water Court Division Seven ("water court"), asking the
water court to find that the prior decrees allowed winter stock watering.
The court then gave notice of the application in a resume published in a
local newspaper. Two months later the ditch companies filed a verification of the application, which Colorado law required for a water rights
determination.
In May 2009, the Tribe filed an untimely statement of opposition to
the application. The tribe therefore included a motion to intervene, asking the court to excuse the untimely statement of opposition. In the filing, the Tribe argued that the water rights determination was invalid because of the failure to verify the application and because the application
should have been filed as an action for declaratory judgment. A declaratory judgment action would have been subject to the Colorado Rules of
Civil Procedure (C.R.C.P.), which required personal service on affected
parties such as the Tribe. This differed from the rules for water rights
determinations, which merely require resume notice. The water court
held the ditch companies timely filed their verification of the water rights
determination because the verification related back to the original filing
in March 2009. The water court also denied the statement of opposition
from the Tribe as untimely and used its discretion to deny the motion to
intervene because it would delay the proceedings and force the expenditure of unnecessary time and resources. The Tribe then appealed to the
Colorado Supreme Court ("court").
On appeal, the court considered: 1) whether a water rights determination included a review of prior decrees and whether resume notice and
newspaper publication was sufficient notification for interested parties; 2)
whether the relation back doctrine can apply to a belated verification of a
water rights determination; and 3) whether the water court abused its discretion in denying the motion to intervene.
First, the court looked at the plain language of the statute governing
water rights determinations and held that a determination was not limited
to a plan or change in plan. The court considered the definition of "determination" in the Webster's New International Dictionary and the statutory definition of "water right." Here, the ditch companies were taking
action so that the water court could determine whether prior decreed
water rights included winter stock watering. As such, the court could
properly characterize the ditch companies' application as a water rights
determination.
The court then turned to the question of notice requirements. The

C.R.C.P. required personal service on affected parties, however, the statutes provided less stringent notice requirements for matters of water. By
filing a water rights determination, the ditch companies had to meet the
less stringent statutory notice requirements. Resume notice by the water
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court's clerk and publication in a local newspaper satisfied this requirement. Personal service was only required for water matters in limited
circumstances where a specific party's ownership interest was subject to
termination or abandonment. The court also noted that the statutory notice requirements applied equally to federally reserved rights, such as the
Tribe's, due to a waiver of sovereign immunity by the U.S. Government.
Therefore, the court held the lesser notification standard of resume notice and publication in a newspaper was sufficient.
On the second issue, the court looked at whether it was proper for
the water court to relate back the belated verification to the original water
The
rights determination resulting in a timely filed determination.
C.R.C.P. allowed for amendments to pleadings that relate back to the
original pleading, so long as the interested parties have notice of the
claims from the original pleading. A court must construe the C.R.C.P.
liberally to allow for amendment of pleadings with technical errors not
substantially affecting other interested parties. Here, the Tribe had notice of the water rights determination through the resume notice and
newspaper publication. The court held that the technical error of initially
omitting verification did not substantially affect the Tribe's rights.
Lastly, the court turned to whether the water court abused its discretion by not allowing the Tribe to intervene after it missed the deadline to
file a statement of opposition. There was no right to intervention absent
extraordinary circumstances. The water court did not find sufficient evidence of extraordinary circumstances to excuse the Tribe. In addition,
the court agreed that allowing the Tribe to intervene would significantly
increase the private and public time and resources committed to resolution of the water rights determination, frustrating the intent of the Colorado legislature for expediency and finality. The court held that the water
court did not abuse its discretion by denying the Tribe's motion to intervene, affirming the water court's ruling in a 4-3 decision.
The dissent argued that the court was expanding the definition of "determination" to include water rights procedures not previously included
and that this was a declaratory review of a prior decree - not a water
rights determination. Thus, the lesser resume notice and newspaper publication requirement was not applicable and C.R.C.P. required the ditch
companies to serve all interested parties personally.

MichaelL. Downey

Upper Yampa Water Conservancy Dist v. Dequine Family L.L.C.,
249 P.3d 794 (Colo. 2011) (holding that the Upper Yampa Water Conservancy District's application for a conditional water right failed to
demonstrate sufficient need for additional water because existing contracts for stored water, absent any specific plan or demonstration of reasonably anticipated future need based on projected population growth,
did not constitute a beneficial use).

The Upper Yampa Water Conservancy District ("District") applied in
Water Division No. 6 ("water court") for conditional water rights to fifty
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cubic feet per second of water in Morrison Creek, to be diverted into
Stagecoach Reservoir ("Reservoir"). Landowners in the Morrison Creek
Basin ("Opposers"), on whose property the District's physical diversion
and conveyance facilities would be located, objected to the-District's proposed transfer and filed a motion for determination of the conditional
decree as a matter of law. The water court held that direct flow and storage rights are not one in the same and cannot be combined to form a
single water right as a matter of law. Thus, a conditional right to direct
flow could not be put to beneficial use through storage.
The District then amended its engineering report to reflect the water
court's ruling on the theory that the District's needs could still be met
through a conditional direct flow right without storage. The District produced evidence at trial showing that it had contractual obligations with
multiple commercial and municipal users for storage and delivery of
13,192 acre feet of water, and that it required 2,000 additional acre feet
in its augmentation plan. An expert for the District determined that the
additional water would only increase the firm yield of the reservoir by
2,615 acre feet, leaving the total reservoir yield significantly below the
more than 15,000 acre feet the District was obligated to supply. The District's representative admitted that the District had never released some
of the contractually-obligated water and that 7,000 acre feet of the contract water was designated for Tri-State Generation and Transmission
Association, but was not being put to any beneficial use because there was
no existing or planned project for the water.
The water court granted the Opposers' motion to dismiss, holding
that the District did not establish any need for the additional water and
therefore had not satisfied the anti-speculation doctrine. The water court
further found that the District already had a sufficient supply of water to
meet its foreseeable future demands. The District appealed the water
court's decision to prohibit a joint appropriation of direct and storage
flow rights to the Supreme Court of Colorado ("Court").
The District first argued that because the sales and transfers of appropriative water rights involved firm contractual commitments, they
were not speculative because they required yearly payments from the contractees and obligated the District to deliver the water when needed.
Nonetheless, the Court found the District's contractual obligations to
various municipal and commercial users insufficient to show an absence
of speculative sale or transfer. Consequently, the District lacked proof of
beneficial use without any firm contract with a user who was committed
to put the water to a beneficial use. Accordingly, the Court held that the
District failed to show it had made a "first step" toward appropriation
through beneficial use.
Next, the Court rejected the District's argument that governmental
agencies have wide flexibility and may acquire conditional decrees based
upon projections of future growth. The Court based its finding on existing Colorado case law stating that a firm contractual commitment to appropriate waters must also have a specific plan for beneficial use of the
water, or be "consistent with reasonably anticipated requirements, based
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on substantiated projections of future growth." Accordingly, the Court
held that there is no immunity for municipalities and other government
agencies from speculation challenges under a governmental planning "exception."
Finally, the Court held that the District's assignment of error by the
water court could be rejected as a matter of law. The court determined
that not only did the District fail to assert any over-commitment (other
than the 7,000 acre feet already under contract for some future delivery
with no plan for beneficial use), it also failed to show that any of the
13,000 acre feet it had under contract was committed to a specific beneficial use or was necessary for the municipality's reasonably anticipated
population growth. The Court rejected the District's argument that its
planned water uses, or those of its contractees for water, were irrelevant.
The Court concluded that the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law
to prove a need for additional rights or any recognizable legal demands
and, thus, it was unnecessary to make any decision regarding joint appropriation of direct and storage flow rights.
Accordingly, the Court affirmed the water court's ruling granting the
Opposers' motion to dismiss.

Michael Lerch

IDAHO
Clear Springs Foods, Inc. v. Spackman, 252 P.3d 71 (Idaho 2011)
(holding that the Director's curtailment of junior groundwater users
pumping volume, in favor of protecting the rights of senior surface water
users, was a proper decision under Idaho law and within the Director's
discretion).
This appeal dealt with seven issues arising from a Final Order issued
by the Director of the Idaho Department of Water Resources ("IDWR"),
curtailing withdrawals from the Eastern Snake River Plain Aquifer ("Aquifer") by individual appropriators and groundwater districts (collectively
known as "junior groundwater users"). The Final Order was the result of
delivery calls made to the IDWR by Clear Springs Food, Inc. and Blue
Lakes Trout Farm, Inc. (collectively known as"senior surface water users") and was the culmination of IDWR administrative proceedings. The
junior groundwater users filed an appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court
after the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District affirmed the Final
Order.
Initially, the court rejected the junior groundwater users' first issue on
appeal that the Swan Falls Agreement, made in 1984, precluded the senior users' ability to make delivery calls so long as minimum flows were
maintained in the Snake River below the Murphy Gauge. The Swan Valley Agreement was a settlement between the Idaho Power Company and
the State of Idaho, which reduced minimum flows for hydroelectric power generation on the Snake, thus leaving more water available for future
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appropriation upstream. The court reasoned that only the resolution of
Idaho Power's water rights were at issue in the agreement, and the Comprehensive Plan referenced in the Agreement had nothing to do with allocating water or determining priorities among the various appropriators
upstream from the Swan Falls Dam.
The next issue on appeal was the meaning of a "full economic development" clause contained in Idaho Code S 42-226 ("the code"). The
groundwater users argued the IDWR should have denied the senior surface users' calls, because the code required that reasonable exercise of
prior ground water rights not interfere with the full economic development of the underground resource, and curtailment of their water rights
will result in substantial, disproportionate economic harm to the underground junior users. The court rejected this contention. The statute
only applied to the prior appropriation doctrine by setting a limit on reasonable pumping levels between groundwater user, not by eliminating the
concept of first in time, first in right in favor of evaluation of highest economic value or greatest economic harm of use absent a sufficient water
supply.
The court, likewise, rejected the next issue on appeal. The junior
groundwater users further contended that the meaning of "full economic
development" permitted utilization of the aquifer as long as water was not
overdrawn. The court, after reaffirming Idaho's Constitutional approval
of the prior appropriation system and its dependency on the doctrine of
first in time, first in right, explained that the groundwater users' argument
would essentially preclude conjunctive management of the hydraulically
connected surface and ground water that constituted the aquifer. The
court took notice of Idaho's longstanding tradition of managing surface
water and groundwater conjunctively in order to further Idaho's policy of
securing the maximum use and benefit of an aquifer. Interestingly, the
court mentioned that, although not brought up on appeal, perhaps the
underground user could have challenged the surface users' means of diversion as unreasonable if a reasonable alternative existed.
The junior users' next contended that because there was no evidence
on the record that the additional water would increase fish production the
department hearing officer erred in making a finding of material injury to
the senior users. The court emphasized that water put to a beneficial use
is a vested right and an appropriator who holds a vested water right is
entitled to the.full amount of that right absent any interference with that
right. Therefore, evidence of the surface users' springs was sufficient to
show material injury.
The juniors then proposed that because curtailment of their pumping
capacity had not resulted in a measured increase in the flow at the surface
users' spring, the Final Order was nothing but a futile call. The "futile
call rule" is difficult to apply in cases of underground water, where, unlike surface water flows, a person cannot physically observe water flowing
from point A to point B. As noted by the hearing officer, curtailing
pumping often does not provide an immediate result because of the
complex nature of underground water flow. The court provided that a
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reasonable time to see a measurable effect may extend for days, months,
or even years; therefore, the lack of evidence of an increase after curtailment was not dispositive.
The junior users next asserted that the Director abused his discretion
when he relied on the Ground Water Model utilized to study the viability
and necessity of curtailing withdrawals from the Aquifer. The hearing
officer testified that he relied on the model because it was the best available science and it contained an acceptable level of reliability. The record
showed that the margin of error was about ten percent and the court
found that no other evidence existed to contravene this finding. After
applying the Idaho abuse of discretion standard, the court held the director did not err in relying on the Ground Water Model.
The court further held that the junior users were denied due process
of law when they were denied a hearing prior to the initial determination
by the hearing order; however, because the parties did receive a hearing
before the issuance of the Final Order this was a harmless error.
. Finally, the court addressed the surface users' sole issue on appeal,
whether the District court erred in failing to order the Director to curtail
more water from the groundwater users. Essentially, the court upheld the
finding of the Director to not curtail the flows of those within the ten percent margin of error by applying the same abuse of discretion standard
used earlier to justify curtailment at all.
Accordingly, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the finding of the
District Court, and all parties prevailed in part on appeal.

Richard Neiley

KANSAS
Cochran v. State Dept. of Agric., Div. of Water Res., 249 P.3d 434
(Kan. 2011) (holding that the Cochrans had sufficient standing, under
both statutory and traditional standing analyses, to seek administrative
review of the Chief Engineer's decision to grant water appropriation permits to the City of Wichita when the City's permits would potentially impair the Cochrans' senior water rights).
Pursuant to an "Integrated Local Water Supply Plan," the City of
Wichita ("City") sought to divert groundwater from both the Equus Beds
Aquifer and Arkansas River bank storage water, from an area known as
the Bently Well Field. The City therefore applied to the Chief Engineer
of the Division of Water Resources for the requisite permits. The Chief
Engineer approved the City's permit applications and issued an order
granting the permits. The Cochrans ("appellants"), who owned water
rights with points of diversion close to the points of diversion the Chief
Engineer approved for the City, expressed concern that the City's diversion would negatively impact their water rights.
Appellants sent a letter to the Kansas Department of Agriculture requesting a hearing on the Chief Engineer's issuance of the permits. The
Department of Agriculture entered an initial order denying appellants'
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request on the grounds that appellants lacked standing to request a hearing because only the permit applicant itself may request a hearing on the
disposition of its own application.
Appellants filed a petition for judicial review of the Chief Engineer's
decision in Sedgwick County District Court ("district court"), requesting
that the district court (i) enter an injunction against the Chief Engineer;
(ii) modify or set aside the Chief Engineer's decision; and (iii) grant other
equitable claims for relief. The district court agreed to hear limited arguments regarding appellants' standing and ultimately decided under existing Kansas case law that appellants had standing to bring their claim.
The City then filed an interlocutory appeal, challenging the appellants'
standing, with the Kansas Supreme Court.
The Court first examined whether appellants had standing to seek review under the Kansas Water Appropriation Act ("KWAA") and/or the
Kansas Act for Judicial Review and Civil Enforcement of Agency Actions
("KJRA"). The KWAA, which established the prior appropriation system in Kansas, contains standing requirements that limit standing for administrative review of decisions pertaining to water permits to the permit
applicant itself. Accordingly, appellants did not have standing under the
KWAA to challenge a permit application by the City.
The KJRA, however, grants standing for judicial review of an agency
action to anyone who was a party to the agency proceedings that resulted
in the agency permitting action. Because appellants owned water rights
and participated in the process by which the Chief Engineer analyzed the
City's permit application, appellants met the standard for standing under
the KJRA.
The Court next examined which Act the district court should have
followed when ruling on whether appellants had standing to bring a
claim. The Court concluded that, because the KJRA was enacted after
the KWAA, the Court had to assume that the legislature enacted the
KJRA with full knowledge of the KWAA and all the provisions therein.
The Court accordingly held that the legislature intended to adopt a
broader definition of standing under the KJRA, so the KJRA was the relevant statute for determining whether appellants had standing.
Last, the Court examined the "traditional" definition of standing,
which requires a party to demonstrate that (i) it has suffered a cognizable
injury; and (ii) there is a causal connection between the injury and the
challenged conduct. Appellants indeed alleged a potential injury to their
property and that this injury would be caused by the City's use of its water
permits. The Court thus held that appellants met the criteria for standing
to seek judicial review under both the statutory and traditional requirements of standing.
Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court's holding that appellants had standing to challenge the Chief Engineer's issuance of the
permits and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
Patrick Peluso
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NEBRASKA
Frenchman Cambridge Irrigation Dist. v. Dep't of Natural Res., 801
N.W.2d 253 (Neb. 2011) (holding that the Frenchman Cambridge Irrigation District lacked standing to appeal the Department of Natural Resources' denial of its reevaluation petition for the Republican River Basin
because it had not shown a distinct and particularized, present, or imminent injury).
Frenchman Cambridge Irrigation District ("FCID") owns water rights
in the Republican River Basin, which spans Colorado, Nebraska and
Kansas.
In 2004, the Nebraska Department of Natural Resources
("DNR") designated the basin as fully appropriated. In 2009, FCID petitioned the DNR to reevaluate its designation, arguing that new scientific
information and a correction of the DNR's past interpretive errors would
make the basin overappropriated, a status that would allow the DNR
greater authority over the basin. The DNR denied the petition, stating
that Nebraska law only authorized it to reevaluate a designation where the
potential existed for a change in result. The DNR reasoned a change in
result was impossible because a statute defined as overappropriated only
those basins that were subject to an interstate cooperative agreement on
or before July 16, 2004.
While the Republican River Basin was subject to an interstate coinpact, the DNR ruled that an interstate compact was not the same as an
interstate cooperative agreement because the two terms are not used interchangeably where they appear in other regulations. Interstate cooperative agreements are voluntary agreements between states. The Nebraska
Legislature had passed laws for the specific purpose of modifying state
water policy to better accomplish the obligations of such interstate cooperative agreements.
The Republican River interstate compact, by contrast, did not arise
from a voluntary agreement; rather, it resulted from an interstate lawsuit
under which a final settlement stipulation required Nebraska to adhere to
its allocation scheme. FCID appealed the DNR's denial of FCID's petition to reevaluate the Republican River Basin designation. FCID challenged the DNR's distinction between interstate compacts and interstate
cooperative agreements, and further argued that the DNR has broad authority to evaluate a basin's appropriation designation. The DNR crossappealed for dismissal, arguing that FCID, having no injury, lacked the
requisite standing to bring a claim in court.
The Nebraska Supreme Court ("Court") first considered whether
FCID had standing, or the requisite personal stake in the matter to invoke judicial review. To have standing, a party must have suffered an
injury in fact. The injury must be (i) concrete and particularized to that
party (that is, not abstract or of general harm to many); and (ii) actual or
imminent, not merely "possible." The Court affirmed that, although
statutory language allows parties interested in the outcome of a water ap-
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propriation to offer testimony or evidence on that application, that fact
alone does not confer standing on such a party.
FCID argued that it would suffer an imminent injury of lost revenue
if overappropriation of the Republican River Basin were to curtail its own
allocation. FCID further argued that it did not provide evidence of actual, present injury because it relied on the DNR's stipulation that it was an
interested party.
The DNR pointed out that a 2010 Nebraska Supreme Court decision, which occurred after the DNR had stipulated FCID's interest, held
that the mere possession of a water right is insufficient to establish standing because standing requires injury-in-fact.
Because FCID failed to allege a specific injury, the Court held that
FCID lacked standing to pursue review of the DNR's decision. The
Court further held that neither stipulation by a party nor a court's acquiescence could supplant this fundamental jurisdictional principal requiring
actual injury. The Court reasoned that FCID's claims of future lost revenue, dependent on the possibility that the basin was overapproriated,
were too speculative.
Accordingly, the Court dismissed FCID's appeal.

GregoryAngstadt

NEVADA
Redrock Valley Ranch, L.L.C. v. Washoe Cnty., 254 P.3d 641 (Nev.
2011) (holding that (i) the State Engineer's approval of RedrockValley
Ranch's proposed water transfer did not preclude Washoe County from
appropriately denying its application for a special use permit; and (ii)
public testimony regarding the detrimental effects of the proposed water
transfer under a county land use ordinance provided sufficient evidence
to support Washoe County's decision to deny the permit).
Redrock Valley Ranch, L.L.C. ("RVR") applied to the State Engineer
for a permit to transfer water from one hydrographic basin in Washoe
County, Nevada to another for irrigation, domestic, and municipal purposes. After an initial hearing, the State Engineer approved some, but
not all, of the water transfer applications upon determining the project
would not conflict with existing water rights or protectable interests in
domestic wells, and would not be detrimental to the public interest. The
State Engineer placed certain conditions on the remainder of RVR's applications.
After facing local resistance, RVR entered into a stipulation with
Washoe County, agreeing to limit its water use in exchange for Washoe
County's support of the water transfer. RVR concurrently entered into
an agreement with Truckee Meadows Water Authority granting it a right
of first refusal to purchase RVR's transferable water rights. This agreement required RVR to apply to Washoe County for a special use permit
for the water transfer facilities.
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RVR first submitted its permit application to the Washoe County
Department of Community Development, which recommended approval
of the permit application after a limited review of the plan's potential
impact on the water facilities. Following a public hearing, the Washoe
County Board of Adjustment denied the special use permit on the
grounds that it failed to meet all of the requirements of the County's land
use code. RVR appealed the Board of Adjustment's decision to the
Washoe County Commission, which also denied the permit because the
Commission could not ensure that the permit would not be "significantly
detrimental to the public health, safety or welfare; injurious to the property or improvements to adjacent properties; or detrimental to the character of the surrounding area," as County land use ordinances required.
The Commission cited problems concerning public health, property values, community character, noise, and policy conflicts.
RVR sued Washoe County for judicial review, declaratory relief, and
damages. The district court denied relief, concluding that the County did
not abuse its discretion and that substantial public testimonial evidence
supported its decision.
RVR appealed to the Nevada Supreme Court ("Court"), requesting
the case be reviewed de novo. RVR laid out several arguments, the first
of which was that Washoe County did not have the authority to deny
RVR's special use permit application after the State Engineer had recommended its approval. Reviewing de novo, the Court held that the
State Engineer's ruling neither preempted nor precluded Washoe County
from deciding to deny the permit. The Court further held that the State's
recently amended Water Management Plan endowed cities and counties
with the authority to make final decisions regarding infrastructure improvements, and that Washoe County rightfully based its decisions on
public policy concerns. Therefore, the State Engineer's ruling did not,
and could not, limit Washoe County's ability to reject the special use
permit for the social and economic reasons contained in the code, which
were separate and distinct from the issues that the State Engineer addressed.
RVR then argued under issue and claim preclusion that Washoe
County could not redetermine any issue or claim that the State Engineer
decided or could have decided. The Court held that the public interest
considerations of one agency are not necessarily the same public interest
considerations of another agency. The State Engineer's primary interests
were whether the proposed water transfer applications interfered with
existing rights or protectable interests. In contrast, Washoe County's
primary interests were, among others, impacts on existing land uses. Accordingly, because Washoe County and the State Engineer play distinct
roles in managing water, the Court held that Washoe County did not
abuse its discretion in rejecting the State Engineer's ruling.
RVR also asserted that Washoe County violated the stipulation
wherein RVR agreed to request less water in exchange for Washoe County to withdraw its protests against RVR's water transfer applications. The
Court held, however, that Washoe County did not agree to issue a special
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use permit as part of the stipulation. The court also determined that the
stipulation only concerned proceedings before the State Engineer, and
therefore could not apply to RVR's later application for a special use
permit.
Lastly, RVR challenged the sufficiency of the evidence upon which
Washoe County relied in denying its special use permit. RVR argued
that Washoe County reached beyond the scope of ordinary special use
permit review, contending its review should have been limited to whether
the proposed land use had potential to adversely affect other land uses,
transportation systems, or public facilities in the vicinity. The Court
held, however, that a public agency's review is not so limited. Rather, the
Court held that a public agency may rely on public testimony in determining whether to issue a special use permit, and, that a public hearing
can, and in this case did, provide the agency with sufficient evidence.
Accordingly, the Court affirmed the ruling of the district court and
upheld Washoe County's denial of RVR's special use permit.
Tyler Geisert

